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THE WORKS OF

ORESTES A. BROWNSON

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BY

HENRY F. BROWNSON.

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JAN 3 1983

FAITH AND THEOLOGY.

[From Brownson's Quarterly Review for January, 1863.]

A CHIEF reason why our religion encounters so much opposition among well disposed and comparatively well informed persons brought up outside of the church, is simply in the fact that they do not understand it and take it to be very much the reverse of what it is. They suppose we confound theology with faith, and claim for the opinions and speculations of theologians, however crude and imperfect, the same authority that we claim for the revealed word of God; and hence they suppose that we regard as faith, as matter not to be rejected without heresy, all the traditions, notions, speculations, opinions, or convictions to be found among Catholics in any age or country. Assuming that Catholics profess to act always from the promptings of divine grace, and under the authority of the church held to be infallible, they hold our religion itself responsible for all that has been done in any age or nation, not only by the clergy, but by Catholic princes and people; and as there is undeniably much in the history of Catholic populations, governments, and nations, which no honest and enlightened man can approve, they conclude that our religion is an imposition, our faith vain, and the claims of our church to be the church of God unfounded. Yet the whole of this non-Catholic reasoning rests on a false assumption, and proceeds on a total misapprehension of real Catholic doctrine. There are two sets of traditions amongst Catholics, as amongst non-Catholics; the one denominated by our Lord, "traditions of men," and the other held to be divine traditions, or traditions of the word of God revealed by Christ, the prophets, the apostles, and canonical authors. The latter traditions only are of faith, and it is only in regard to them that Catholics profess to have infallible authority in the church. The former, the traditions of men, are not included in the traditions of faith, and we do not hold them, or profess to hold them, on divine authority, even though entertained and held as probable or as true by churchmen. They fall into the category of all human beliefs and convictions, and are open to the free judgments

of reason, to be held or rejected as reason holds them worthy or unworthy of belief.

Catholics, if at all instructed, always distinguish between faith and theology. Faith is the revealed word of God; theology is a human science, constructed by the human mind operating on divine things partly revealed, and partly evident from natural reason. In theology there may be more than in modern times is included under the term *philosophy*, but there is, at least, all that is included under that term. Theology includes as an integral part of itself, at least the whole of philosophy, and we find it difficult for ourselves to draw any valid line of distinction between them. Theology, it is said, takes its principles from both revelation and natural reason, and philosophy takes its principles from natural reason alone; but a philosophy which borrows nothing from the revelation of the superintelligible, or the super-rational, will never be able to explain even the intelligible, or be deserving of the name of philosophy. The natural is not complete in itself, and the intelligible has its origin and ground in the superintelligible, the rational in the super-rational, and, therefore, is not explicable by itself alone, as naturalists and rationalists pretend. The intelligible order, not being complete in itself, is not explicable without revelation. The natural and supernatural are distinguishable, no doubt, but not separable. Strictly speaking, the supernatural is that which is done immediately by God, while the natural is that which is done by him mediately, through the agency of second or third causes; but what he does in either of these ways, forms only a part of one complete and indissoluble whole. The natural and supernatural are not two parallel orders, each sufficing for itself and complete in itself. What is called the supernatural order, the Christian order, the order of grace, and known to us only by supernatural and divine revelation, is not an order separate from the so-called order of nature, but is in the plan of the Creator related to it, as its complement or completion, and in that plan forms only one full and complete order with it. Neither part can be really known and understood without the other. They are two parts of one whole. We can have no real science of the supernatural without natural reason, or of the natural without supernatural revelation. To all science constructed without revealed principles, there must be always something wanting, as there is always something wanting to the

natural man, that is, the cosmic man, remaining in the order of generation, and not elevated by grace to the order of regeneration, or created anew in Christ Jesus. For ourselves personally, we regard theology and philosophy, when rightly understood, as substantially identical, or at least attach little value to a philosophy that can be separated from theology and constructed independently of principles derivable only from supernatural revelation.

Faith, we mean *Catholic* faith, is restricted to what we call the Catholic idea, but what is more commonly, and more intelligibly to our readers, called the revealed word of God. Father Véron, in his *Règle générale de la foi catholique*, as cited and approved by Chrismann* says: "All and only that is of Catholic faith, which is revealed in the word of God, and proposed by the church to all men to be believed with divine faith. For any doctrine to be an article or dogma of Catholic faith, it is necessary first of all that it should be revealed by God through Christ, the prophets, the apostles, or the canonical authors." Hence the church can propose nothing to be believed with divine faith, or to be received as Catholic faith, that is not contained in the revealed word of God, transmitted to us from Christ, through the prophets, apostles, or canonical authors. The church can, then, by her own authority make or propose no new faith, and is restricted in her office of teaching to "the faith once delivered to the saints," or, as theologians say, to the *depositum*, or faith deposited with her from the beginning, for the ultimate reason of Catholic faith is not the authority of the church proposing, but of God revealing. The church is the witness to the fact that God reveals the article or dogma, but the article or dogma itself is believed on the veracity of God, who is the truth itself, or because it is his word.

Catholic faith must be the whole faith, and be catholic in time as well as in space. According to the *dictum* of St. Vincent of Lérins, only that which is always and everywhere believed, *quod* SEMPER, *et ubique*, and by all, is catholic faith. If the faith in the beginning was catholic, the whole faith was then revealed, proposed, and believed, and no subsequent addition was possible. If the whole was not revealed, proposed, and believed in the beginning, then the faith in the beginning was not catholic, and the primitive believers were

*Regula fidei catholicæ et collectio dogmatum credendorum.

not Catholics. If less than the whole is now proposed and believed, faith now is not catholic, and present believers are not Catholics. The faith must, then, if catholic have been complete in the beginning, and have been transmitted to us without addition or diminution. The church has, therefore, no authority to alter or change the faith, to add any thing to it, or to take any thing from it. If among Catholics any change, addition, or diminution has occurred, it has been without authority, and the result of ignorance or error.

In the controversy occasioned by Dr. Newman's *Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine*, we discussed this point at length. We did not then, and we do not now, object to development, but we found fault with the theory of the learned author, because we understood him to maintain that there may be development in the faith itself, objectively considered,—development in the revealed truth, not simply in its explication, or in our understanding and appropriation of it. It is possible, however, that we misunderstood him, and that after all he really meant only what we ourselves held then and hold now. But be this as it may, we denied then and we deny now all development, growth, or increase in the faith, or as the theologians say, the object (*objectum materiale*) of faith. Objectively considered the Catholic faith is Christ himself, and he reveals it in revealing or manifesting himself. He is "the way, the *truth*, and the life," and in revealing himself reveals the whole Catholic faith. As he changes not, neither enlarges nor diminishes, but is invariable, immutable, "the same yesterday, to-day, and forever," the faith in itself must be invariable, always one and the same. Perhaps we should speak more truly if we said, not that he *revealed* himself, but that he *reveals* himself to the church, as ever present to her and dwelling in her, as her continuous and unfailing light and life. Hence the revelation she receives is neither old nor new, but always present, and always equal to itself. In this view, again, there could be no change, variation, development, growth, or diminution of the faith in itself.

Now the authority and infallibility of the church as teacher rest on the presence in and to her of Christ, the universal and living truth. When our Lord commanded his apostles to go and teach all nations, he added, "For I am with you all days unto the consummation of the world." The church derives her authority not simply from an external appointment or commission, which, while it gave the legal right,

could not give the internal ability to teach, but also and chiefly from the presence of Christ with her and in her, as her light and her life. The church on her divine side lives the life of Christ, has her light in his light, and speaks externally the words he speaks internally to her. Here is the real ground of her authority. In divine things all is real, nothing merely putative, arbitrary, or forensic. A commission to the church to teach, as a commission from a prince to one of his servants to command his army, would not be in itself a real power to teach, or a sufficient warrant for believing or obeying her, for she might, with her commission in her pocket, lack the ability to teach truly the word of God. The human mind is not and cannot be satisfied with the knowledge that she has a simple legal commission to teach, for it does not see how such a commission is or can be in itself a sufficient pledge of infallibility. The commission is intrinsic, not forensic simply, and is in the fact that He who is truth itself is living in the church, and living in her as her life and her light, so that in teaching she has only to speak the word which He who can neither deceive nor be deceived, speaks in her to her own consciousness. He is, in some sense, her mind, her intellect, her intelligence. But the very ground of the infallibility and authority of the church necessarily restricts both to what Christ reveals, and therefore to faith alone, or to what is revealed in the word of God spoken or speaking to her. Hence all Catholics maintain that the church in teaching is authoritative and infallible only in matters of faith. She has authority, but not infallibility in discipline or administration, and the faithful must submit to her authority for the sake of order and a good conscience, since she is appointed to govern as well as to teach. But in matters of discipline and administration the church is human, a human legislator and administrator, and whatever is human is imperfect, and may be mistaken. The administration of the church, or the administration of the state, is intrusted to men,—for the most part, we believe, wise and good men, but still men, and men with the appetites, propensities, passions, and infirmities of men. But in matters of faith, the church as the living body of our Lord, by virtue of her union with him, and the indwelling Holy Ghost, is not only authoritative, but infallible, and authoritative because infallible. Beyond, however, what is of Catholic faith, what her indwelling Lord in all times and places reveals to her of himself, she teaches neither infallibly nor authorita-

tively, and beyond, no Catholic is bound to believe what she teaches on pain of heresy, although always and everywhere, and in all matters she is to be respected.

From this we gather, first, that as Catholics, we are not bound to defend every act or measure of ecclesiastical administration during the centuries since St. Peter erected the papal throne in the city of the Cæsars, far less every act of the civil and political administration of Catholic states and nations. We have, without any impeachment of our orthodoxy or of our filial duty as Catholics, the right to refuse to defend what we honestly believe to be indefensible, and to criticise what we honestly believe deserving of criticism in the history of the church, and are no more bound to defend Catholic princes and governments in their civil and political administration than we are non-Catholic princes and governments. As a fact, we believe, the ecclesiastical administration has been by far freer from error and imperfection than any secular administration, and that the administration of Catholic states, on the whole, compares more than favorably with that of the best governed non-Catholic states. Yet we do not feel ourselves bound to defend every act of the popes, not even of those who have been canonized. We venerate the memory of St. Gregory VII. as that of a great man, a great pope, and a great saint, and yet among the popes he is the principal author of that system of centralism which we so dislike and deplore. He evidently adopted it as the only practical remedy within his reach for the evils of his times; but he acted in view of the present and not of the future, as we should were we to abolish states' rights and install a military dictator as the condition of escaping from our present national embarrassments and evils. Far less do we feel ourselves bound to defend the policy of Cardinal Ximenes as regent of Spain in destroying the estates and grasping all power for the crown; Philip II. in his conduct toward the Netherlands; James II. in following the advice of Father Petrie in dealing with the Church of England; Louis XIV., either in his attitude toward the pope, or in his revocation of the Edict of Nantes, and dragooning the Huguenots into the church; or the war of the Bourbons on the Jesuits, or the demand of the frightened princes and ultra-conservatives for their re-establishment in 1814. We have a right to judge of all these things in the light of history, experience, and sound reason. We may err in our judgment,

egregiously err, and that may be much to our discredit, as a wise statesman, a philosophical historian, or author seeking to enlighten public opinion, but it is not necessarily any impeachment of our loyalty or our orthodoxy as a Catholic or member of the Catholic Church.

We gather, secondly, from the principles laid down, that, since we are bound only in matters of faith, in matters of theology, unless we contradict faith, we are free, and are not bound by the opinions of theologians. Theology is not faith, but is a human science, constructed by human reason operating on both rational and revealed principles. The faith regarded in itself is the same, whether revealed or unrevealed, and even revealed it would be to us as if it were not, if we did not believe it, and if it did not become the object of our thoughts and to us a principle of intellectual life and activity. To have it avail us, we must ourselves receive it, appropriate, or assimilate it. We must seek to understand it, to grasp its relations with ourselves, with our reason, with the whole world of intellect, and with the universe of which we are a part. This gives rise to what is called theology, which is not faith, but is the science of faith—the articles, dogmas, or propositions of faith, or the several truths revealed, reproduced in our minds in their scientific form and relations, and brought into harmony with the whole body of truth, whether attainable to by reason or revelation. It is the answer the mind gives to the question: What does the revelation or the faith mean? Now in this the church teaches the revealed principles on which the mind operates, and teaches them infallibly, and with divine authority; but the operations themselves are strictly human operations, the operations of our own understanding, reason and judgment, and as free as any mental operations are or can be. What we are bound by faith to do, is to preserve intact the revealed principle, and all the church does or attempts to do in the case, is to intervene to define the principle, the article, dogma, or proposition of faith, whenever we deny, pervert, or mutilate it. She in her authoritative character intervenes only to preserve, in its purity and its integrity, the revealed word. Her definitions are designed to guard the word against suffering from human rashness, ignorance, or error. They do not deny the freedom of the mind, or interfere with our free understanding, explication, and appropriation of the word, but simply define beyond what

bounds we cannot go without departing from the truth, or going against the word itself.

The definitions of the church have something of the character of criminal jurisprudence. They are not a part of the revelation,—are not necessary to her positive enunciation of the word, or essential to its life and operation; but they are required to vindicate it from error, as criminal courts pass sentences to vindicate the law which has been violated. Nobody who comprehends any thing of the matter restricts the word to the definitions of the church, or supposes that the definitions either make the faith or cover the whole of the revealed word. It is not to be supposed that nothing is believed or to be believed that is not formally defined by the church, for her definitions touch only so much of the faith as has been controverted or denied. But all theological questions, however unsound they may be, that have not been condemned or declared to be contrary to faith, may be held without incurring the note of heresy, and be freely discussed, *pro* and *con*, according to the judgment or prejudices of theologians. The faith in itself is one, a whole, a living whole, and its efficiency, in great measure at least, consists in its being received as such, or embraced in its real synthesis; and, hence, definitions which break it into fragments, or present it in detached parts, are in some respects an evil. They are an evil, inasmuch as they tend to present the faith, not as a whole, but in distinct and isolated propositions, which the mind finds it difficult, often impossible, to reunite and integrate in the living unity of truth. But they are a necessary evil, for, without them the word, owing to the weakness and not unfrequent corruption of the human mind, would itself be corrupted and lost, as it was with the ancient gentiles, and as it is with the modern sects. It is well that definitions should be authoritatively made when needed to save the integrity of the faith, but it were better, if possible, that none should even be needed. It is better to err than never to think, but it is better to think without erring than it is to err, ever though we be ultimately set right.

All the mysteries, such as the Trinity, the Incarnation, Grace, the Efficacy of the Sacraments, the Resurrection of the Dead, the Last Judgment, the Glorification of the Saints, and the Everlasting Punishment of the Wicked in Hell, are of faith, on which all believers do and must agree. As to these there is no controversy, or if any, it must be ended at once by authority. But the explication of these mysteries,

so far as explicable they are, their scientific exposition, and their reduction to an intellectual system harmonizing with the whole body of revealed and rational truth, is not faith, but theology; not divine revelation, but the work of the human understanding, operating on revealed principles and principles supplied by natural reason itself. The mystery itself must be held as revealed by God, and declared by authority, but the scientific exposition, the appropriateness of the analogies by which we seek to explain or understand it, as well as the justness of the arguments by which we seek to defend or vindicate it to natural reason, are to be taken on their merits, are not of faith, are not authoritative any further than rationally convincing, even though used by a pope or a council in defining the dogma, or condemning errors opposed to it. In all that comes within the intelligible order, in all that rests on the operations of the human understanding, or on the principles of natural reason, the mind is free, and it is and can be bound by no extrinsic authority any further than to leave the dogma or mystery in its purity and integrity. We gave, for example, in the first of our *Essays on the Reformation*, a theological exposition of the Trinity, showing its necessity in the very conception of God as real, living being, being in its plenitude, and finding in it the prototype of all creation. We may have been right, or we may have been wrong, but if we preserved the dogma unimpaired, left standing in all its integrity the ineffable mystery itself, our orthodoxy is unimpeachable, though our theory of the Trinity, our method of explaining or defining it, and the conclusions we drew from it, are untenable. Authority does not interfere with us, and the church leaves the error to be exposed and refuted by argument, that is, by theologians and philosophers.

The same is to be said of all the sacred mysteries, articles, or dogmas of faith. Authority guards the mystery, protects the dogma, the revealed word of God, but it does not undertake to protect theology from all error, or to indicate and condemn every false analogy, every unwarrantable deduction, every bad or inconclusive argument, to be found in the systems constructed by the human understanding, operating on principles revealed in the word of God. The church gives free scope to the theologian so long as he does not contradict or impair faith, but she commits herself to no theological theory; and no theory, however widely it may have been accepted, not even that of St. Augustine, or that

of St. Thomas, in so far as it is purely theological and the work of the human understanding, that is, in so far as it is theology, not faith, can allege her authority in its favor, or profess to be taught by her divine and infallible authority. Either St. Augustine or St. Thomas is high authority for what either declares is or is not of faith, and the opinion of either on any question of pure reason deserves great weight, and may be cited as an argument, but never as an authority which must end controversy. Speculative theology is always more or less affected by the philosophical and psychological doctrine of the theologian, and often by that of the age or nation in which he is bred; and moral theology is often affected by the prevailing political doctrine, and by the theories of physiologists. The progress of physiological studies, every one knows, has greatly modified many of the decisions of our casuists. Things once allowed as innocent are now prohibited as sinful; and things once prohibited as sinful are now allowed as innocent. The church does not profess to have received a revelation of the facts of history, of the science of chronology, astronomy, chemistry, electricity, physics, or geology. Churchmen and laymen, Christians and infidels, have all to learn these in the same way, and by one and the same discipline; and yet all these sciences are laid more or less under contribution by the theologian, and affect, more or less, not his faith, but his theology. Many theological disputes would have been speedily ended, if the disputants had known more of physiology, history, chronology, or even of geography. Theology is, therefore, a human science, and has as a science only the authority of science in general. In it we have the simple authority of human reason, and can never claim or allege for it the divine infallible authority of the church.

In examining the claims of the church, or in judging of her character, we must always draw sharply the line of distinction between faith and theology, and remember that we are to hold the church officially responsible, not for the speculations, theories, and opinions of theologians, but only for what she defines or declares to be of faith. Theological and philosophical, historical and scientific errors even in her clergy make nothing against her claims; and you must convict her of error in her faith before you can deny her infallibility in any matter or in any sense in which she claims to be, or we, her children, are bound to believe her infallible. She is infallible in the dogma, in whatever pertains to the

divine idea, the revealed word, but not in what is human and depends on human reason and science. Let non-Catholics bear in mind that Catholics do not assert for the church in matters of faith only a simple external authority or commission to teach,—authority in a simple, legal, forensic sense,—but through her mystic yet real union with Christ her head, the internal and abiding ability to teach infallibly the revealed word of God, a word continuously revealed and ever present to her understanding by virtue of the indwelling Holy Ghost; and let them further bear in mind that this authority extends only to the dogma, and leaves the mind free in all else, so long as it leaves the dogma intact, and they will find nearly all their objections to the teachings of the church removed. We do not say that their objections to all the theories, notions and practices of Catholics would be removed; but their objections to all that is really Catholic and enjoined by the church, and that is obligatory on us as Catholics, would be obviated. Entertaining this view, many theologians have from time to time attempted to draw the line between what is strictly faith and what is merely theology.

There are, undoubtedly, many things received among Catholics which the unlearned place on the same line with faith, that have at best only a theological authority, or are deductions of theologians from revealed principles, or the conclusions drawn by theologians by their own reason operating on divine things. Many of these are, no doubt, true, and could not be denied without what is technically called error, or at least rashness; but even these are not of faith and withdrawn from free discussion. Others, again, though suffered to pass without any brand of public censure, are unfounded, doubtful, or of superstitious tendency. Some of these things we have from time to time adverted to and pointed out, things which every Catholic theologian knows are not of faith or exempt from criticism, but which the ignorant and unlearned confound with faith, and suppose cannot be questioned without questioning the faith itself.

Our readers will remember the outcry raised against us for some suggestions we threw out with regard to the future condition of the reprobate. We raise no question whether we were right or wrong, yet the views we seemed to question were only widely received theological opinions, or conclusions. They were not articles or dogmas of faith enjoined by authority, and their denial, even if an error, was no

sin against faith. Besides, there were respectable theologians who held the views we suggested, and a writer in the London *Tablet*, who seems to have studied the subject, asserts that they were the views generally held by Catholic theologians prior to Peter Lombard, Magister Sententiarum, in the twelfth century. The questions we raised were simply theological questions, and as such free questions, that is, questions not to be decided by any appeal to authority, but by the evidence and reasons proper in the case. For if they were not always questions of faith, they could not be made so by any action of authority, since the church has no authority to found or create new articles or dogmas of faith. Even a *consensus theologorum* that an opinion is sound, does not evidence it to be of Catholic faith. The *consensus* that it is of *faith* might be conclusive, but the *consensus* that it is the true opinion, only proves that such is and always has been the opinion of theologians, and by no means takes it out of the category of opinion and places it in that of faith. To deny it, may or may not be rash, according to the reason one has for denying or not denying it, but it is not and cannot be heresy.

Theologians differ as to the authority and infallibility of the pope, and have by their discussions so obscured the question that it is not easy for an unlearned man like ourselves to say precisely how much or how little on the subject is of faith, or pertains to the dogma. That the pope, that is to say, the archbishop of Rome, as successor of St. Peter, prince of the apostles, chief of the apostolic college, is the visible head, primate, or supreme pastor of the whole church, is evidently of faith, as is the assertion also, that his primacy is a primacy of authority or jurisdiction, not simply a primacy of honor. That the pope has authority to feed, rule, and govern the church, both clergy and laity, as their chief pastor, by the institution of Christ, is defined by the Council of Florence. Yet the Greeks, who deny his supremacy and refuse to submit to his authority, have never, as we are aware, been treated for that as heretics, but only as schismatics.

The more prevalent theological doctrine is, that the pope speaking *ex cathedra* is infallible, that is, as some interpret it, speaking officially to the whole church, or as others interpret it, the pope, with his auditory, or speaking with the whole church. That the papal definitions are not irreformable, and therefore that the pope in defining questions of

faith and morals is not infallible, is maintained by the French clergy in the four articles adopted by them in 1682, and those articles have never been condemned as heretical. They no doubt gave great offence at Rome, and they were instantly annulled, as to their legal effect upon the French clergy, by the reigning pontiff, Innocent XI., but they have never been declared contrary to dogma, and Gallicans, who adhere to them, receive absolution at the hands of the priest as orthodox Catholics. Evidently, then, we cannot say it is of faith that the pope is infallible in defining questions of faith and morals. We have always maintained and maintain that it is the sounder theological opinion that he is infallible by virtue of divine assistance when solemnly deciding litigated points of faith or morals for the whole church, but we have never maintained and do not maintain that it is of Catholic faith. They who deny it may be as orthodox as they who affirm it, though, in our judgment, not so good logicians or so sound theologians.

The same distinction between faith and theology must be made when treating of the power which the popes in the middle ages exercised over temporal princes. The right of the pope, as supreme pastor and highest court of conscience, to take cognizance of the conduct of all the faithful under its relation to the law of God, is, if not of faith, so intimately connected with the dogma, as to be hardly separable from it. To us it seems to be the dogma itself stated in its practical form. The pope, then, representing the church in her supreme and spiritual authority, would have the same right to judge princes as subjects, and to pronounce sentence against them for their violation of the Christian law, to admonish, rebuke, reprove, interdict, and excommunicate them for their crimes, and for their crimes committed in their public as well as in their private capacity. So much we suppose to be really, if not formally, of faith. All beyond this is not faith, but theological conclusion, or theological opinion. It is, we suppose, of faith that the pope represents Christ upon earth in his pontificate. Christ unites in himself the offices of prophet, priest, and king, but it is not of faith that the pope is his vicar on earth in all three of these offices. The first, that of prophet or teacher, the pope represents with the whole church, and it is not of faith that it is filled by the pope alone, although it is not unlawful to hold that it is. The offices of priest and king united in Christ are confessedly separated in his

earthly representatives. The sacerdocy or pontificate is given in its plenitude to the pope or supreme pontiff, but it is not of faith that he has given him also the kingship, and we think it is of faith that he has not. The pope is *alter Christus* as priest or pontiff, but not as king. As Pope Gelasius says to the Emperor Anastasius, our Lord has established two powers for the government of the world, the pontifical and the imperial, the spiritual and the secular or temporal. The pope, then, has the supreme pontifical power, but, as vicar of Christ, no kingly or temporal power, and therefore has no authority over temporal sovereigns, except what is inherent in the pontificate, or in the spiritual over the secular. God gave the pontificate and priestly power to the clergy, or the *pontifex maximus*, but he gave the temporal or secular sovereignty to the king, or rather to the people, and therefore the pontiff has no right according to his own will and pleasure, by virtue of his pontificate, to bestow or take away crowns, to establish or subvert the constitutions of states and empires. He cannot depose sovereigns and absolve subjects from their allegiance; he can only judicially declare when, according to the law of God, the sovereign has forfeited his right to reign, and the oath of allegiance ceases to bind the subject. More than this we are not aware any pope has ever claimed, and this is all we understood ourselves to maintain in our essays on the papal power, which called forth against us the animadversion of several bishops, especially Bishop O'Connor, of Pittsburgh. At least, this is all we ever supposed we were maintaining as of Catholic faith. The French clergy, in the four articles already referred to, deny that the pope receives in the power of the keys any power to dispose of the crowns of sovereigns; and, although we do not accept those articles as good theology, we are obliged to confess that they contradict no article or dogma of Catholic faith.

The temporal power of the pope, or his sovereignty of the Roman states, is a different question, and wholly outside of Catholic faith. The pope is actually pontiff and prince, as were at one time nearly all the bishops of western, northern, and central Europe, and as very few of them now are. The union of the pontificate and principality in one and the same person, though not forbidden, is not by virtue of the institution of Christ. It is a union that grew up with the feudal constitution of Europe, but never had any ground in the essential constitution of the church. It is not of Cath-

olic faith that the supreme pontiff should be a secular prince, or that his temporal principality is essential, necessary, or even useful in the maintenance of his spiritual independence, or the discharge of his spiritual functions. The pope, no doubt, holds his temporal power by a good and valid title, and he cannot, more than any other sovereign, be deprived of it without crime. Yet he holds it by the same tenure and subject to the same conditions as any other secular sovereign holds his estates. The question is properly between him and his own subjects, with which foreigners have no right to intermeddle. In other words, so far as we can see, if, as we have maintained, the pontifical and secular powers are separated by Christ, the temporal sovereignty of the pope stands on the same footing as all legitimate secular sovereignty, and is neither more nor less sacred. He can abdicate it if he and his subjects choose, and he can, if he judges best, insist upon retaining it, and maintaining it by force. In other words, as temporal sovereign, he has all the rights and duties of other sovereigns. The religious question is only accidentally associated with the temporal sovereignty question.

The government of the church and the government of the papal states have, to a great extent been mixed up together, and it is obvious that they cannot be separated now without great inconvenience to ecclesiastical administration. The Holy Father himself and the bishops recently assembled at Rome, assert that the maintenance of the temporal sovereignty is, in the present state of the world, necessary to the interests of religion. This, though not a definition of doctrine, and not an assertion that binds the Catholic conscience or judgment as an article of faith, or as a formal judicial sentence of a supreme court, is yet not to be treated with levity, or set aside as of little account. It is an assertion deserving of grave consideration, and with us it is of controlling authority. We could not maintain the contrary without placing ourselves in opposition to the general opinion of Catholics, and that too, when, after all, we cannot say absolutely that they are wrong, or that we are right, and when also our opposition can hardly do any good and might do some harm. We have never, as it has been calumniously alleged, attacked the temporal sovereignty of the pope, and have never defended any of those who have attacked it. We believed two years ago, considering things as they then were, that the interests of religion and civilization could be better promoted

by the Holy Father voluntarily ceasing, than by his continuing to be a temporal prince. The opinion we had a right to maintain and to express, for it was in violation neither of Catholic faith, nor of Catholic morals. But as the opinion was not approved by the pontifical government, and as the Holy Father, with whom alone rests its adoption or rejection, has decided, with the approbation of the great majority of the bishops of the Catholic world, to pursue a very different policy, it would be at best only a piece of impertinence for us to continue to urge it. Besides, many things have changed since we expressed the opinion, and the time when the policy we urged could effect the particular good we hoped from it, has gone by. The unity of Italy, which might have been secured then in spite of France, and as a counterpoise to France, and also without confirming the Italians in their hostility to the Holy See, is now apparently impracticable, or at least impracticable without forcing Italy into heresy and schism. Appearances indicate that Italian unity has failed, and that the Emperor of the French hopes yet to carry out the policy of a confederated Italy, as indicated in the treaty of Villafranca. The Old World is not yet ripe for the policy we have recommended—the complete separation of church and state, or for abandoning that admixture of civil and ecclesiastical administration, which grew up after the Roman Empire became Christian, and received its fullest development in feudal Europe.

It is of faith that in the beginning God created the heaven and the earth, all things visible and invisible, but it is not of faith that this earth was created at first, and only about seven thousand years ago, precisely as we now find it; nor has the church, by any act of authority, declared that the order of creation, given by Moses in the first chapter of Genesis, is to be understood in a literal and historical sense, or not as a philosophical and moral order, as St. Augustine explains it. The dogma that Moses wished expressly to impress upon the Hebrew people, in opposition to the prevailing errors of gentile philosophy, is the grand fact, that God created the world, did not simply form, fashion, generate, or evolve it from himself, but actually created it from nothing, by his own word, his own power. This, we take it, is the essential dogma, and that the questions, whether the earth came forth from his hand, as geologists now find or think they find it; whether it was created in a rude and elementary state, and has come to its present state by the action of secondary

causes; or, whether it subsisted a long time, and underwent numerous changes before man was created to till it, are questions, not of faith, but of science, and must be determined according to the discoveries and inductions of scientific explorers. For ourselves personally, we think geological science is as yet too recent and too imperfect for full confidence to be placed in its inductions and theories, but we see no objection on the side of faith to giving the geologist as long a series of ages as he can ask for to explain the phenomena he discovers. We are not aware that the Usherian chronology is matter of faith, or, as to that matter, even the chronology of our Hebrew Bible. The Greek fathers did not follow the Hebrew chronology, and that of the Septuagint differs from it not a little. We are not aware that the church has ever decided that the exact age of the world is a matter of revelation, or decided authoritatively how many centuries have elapsed since the creation. We confess that if we do not demand so long a period to explain the changes and phenomena recorded in civil and political history, as the geologist does those imbedded in rocks, and indicated by the courses of rivers, positions of lakes and seas, &c., we should find it a great convenience in doing it to be allowed more than forty centuries between the creation and the birth of our Saviour. The need of a wider margin, we apprehend, is felt by all who have devoted themselves with a little attention to the study of the rise, progress, and downfall of nations, the development, progress, decline, or loss of ancient civilizations.

There are many things asserted by theologians, which, even though they be true, or at least probably true, are yet not of Catholic faith or to be received on the authority of the church, as contained in the revealed word of God. It is of faith that among the most noble creatures of God are angels; but it is not of faith that the angels are incorporeal, or that they are divided into nine or ten choirs, as asserted by Dionysius the Areopagite, in his *Celestial Hierarchy*, or by some one who writes under his name. It is of Catholic faith that there is a purgatory, but not that it is a place, that its punishment is by literal fire, or that such or such is the degree or duration of its suffering. It is of faith that souls suffering in purgatory are helped by the suffrages of the living, especially by the holy sacrifice of the mass, but not that the suffrages or the sacrifice actually obtain their release, or that the church has any power, except *per modum*

suffragii, to remit their guilt. The just may help others by their prayers, but it is not of faith that the penances they perform or submit to for them, benefit them, except as so many good and fervent prayers to God in their behalf. It is of faith that children, dying in infancy without baptism, never see God in the beatific vision, but it is not of faith that they do or do not suffer the *tortures* of hell. It is of faith that the righteous enter into eternal life, and are forever blest in the vision of God, and that the wicked dying in their sins, go into hell, and are forever tortured in the gehenna of fire, but it is not of faith that the fire is literal, material fire, or that, though their sufferings can never end, they receive no mitigation.

It is of faith that the church has power to grant indulgences, and that indulgences are profitable, but it is not of faith that by them the church remits the temporal guilt, or any portion of the temporal guilt, in either the living or the dead, that remains unexpiated or unremitted before God, except *per modum suffragii*. It is disputed among theologians, whether indulgences conceded by the church are to be understood as simple relaxations of the canonical penances imposed by the early discipline of the church, or whether they are to be understood as a relaxation of the temporal penalty remaining before God and due *ex natura rei* to sin, even after the eternal guilt has been remitted. The latter opinion is commonly held and currently insisted on; but as Holden, in his *Analysis of Faith*, says, it is not of Catholic faith, and therefore we may maintain without heresy, the opinion that the church, in granting indulgences, only relaxes her own canons. Father Véron says it is not of faith, that in the use or concession of indulgences, are remitted the temporal penalties due after the sin has been forgiven *in foro Dei*, either in purgatory or in this life. Suarez says, "Some Catholics hold that indulgences do not remit the penalty due to God, but simply remove the obligation of performing the canonical penance or penances enjoined by the church." But however this may be, it is not of Catholic faith that the church can, in conceding an indulgence, remit the penalty imposed by the divine law, immediately and by the simple force of the indulgence itself, or by simple condonation of the penalty to be atoned for, either in purgatory or in this life. It is further yet from faith that the church can concede a true indulgence, so that it is a remission of punishment to the dead, still less that she will do it, except

per modum suffragii. Indulgences, whether conceded for the living or the dead, beyond the relaxation of canonical penances enjoined by the church herself in her early discipline, are, so far as faith affirms, or the church herself teaches, efficacious only as the prayers or suffrages of the church, and according to the measure of the piety and sanctity of those who offer or beseech them. It may be that many people regard indulgences as something more, and suppose that when they have performed the conditions annexed to the concession, the remission follows as a matter of course, and we say not that it does not; we only say that it is not of faith that it does. The indulgence of beads, crucifixes, medals, pictures, and the like, only pledge the prayers or suffrages of the church to those who use them according to her intent, and her prayers no doubt are always of value. But if any one supposes that his beads can be so indulged that it is certain that a soul will be released for every bead on which he says a prayer, he supposes what is not of Catholic faith, and what no principle of Catholic faith warrants. The indulgence may be obtained, the church promises the help of her prayers in obtaining it, but no remission of temporal any more than of eternal guilt is possible without intrinsic virtue, a virtue possible only by real union with Christ our Lord in the regeneration. We can obtain real indulgences for others, whether in this life or in purgatory, but only so far as God, in consideration of our suffrages, bestows on them graces which unite them to him, or prepares them for entrance into his presence. Our suffrages may solace souls suffering in purgatory, but it is not of faith that they can obtain their release or shorten the time they must suffer. The true Catholic accepts with gratitude indulgences conceded by the church as the pledge of her suffrage, but he seeks rather the virtues which merit the indulgence than the indulgence itself. We may add in concluding this point, that nothing of what theologians say of the treasury of the church, or of the accumulation in her treasury of the merits of saints from their works of supererogation, which she can bestow in indulgences on others to make up for their own deficiency, as if the merits of one, save *per modum suffragii*, could be transferred to others on the principle of the communion of saints, is by no means of Catholic faith, and enters not into the official and authoritative teaching of the church. We can none of us atone for one another before God. Christ alone could atone for our sins, and his atonement actually

frees us only as we become united to him by grace as our head, so that we merit in him as the member merits in the head.

It may be true, as the Molinists teach, that grace will be given to every man who makes a diligent use of his natural faculties and the light that he has, but it is not of faith. It is of faith that no one can be saved out of the church, but it is not of faith that none are in the church who are not joined to her visible communion. It is not of faith that it is necessary, *necessitate medii ad salutem*, that all should believe *explicitly* the doctrine of the Trinity, or that of the Incarnation, but we should suppose it necessary to believe them at least implicitly. It is of faith that it is lawful to invoke or pray to the saints, and therefore no Catholic can say it is unlawful, but there is no precept that makes it obligatory upon any Catholic to do so. It is of faith that the saints may be honored, venerated, in the old sense of the word, worshipped, but it is not of faith that the worship it is lawful to pay the saints is a *religious* worship, or in its nature different from that which is paid by the true man to heroic worth, wherever he finds it. It is of faith that images and pictures of holy persons may be kept and honored, but it is not of precept that they should be. The same may be said of relics. It is of faith that they may be kept and honored, as relics of worth, or of persons deserving of honor, but it is not of faith that any of the relics placed in churches, carried in procession, or preserved by individuals, are genuine. We bear about with us what purports to be a relic of the true cross, certified as such by the Congregation of Rites, but it is not of faith that it is such or that it is genuine. It is not of faith that the tunic preserved at Treves and recently visited by some two millions of pilgrims is the veritable tunic worn by our Lord. It is not of faith that the church is infallible in canonizing saints, or that those she points out to be reverenced by the faithful are actually saints in heaven, unless those who are said in Holy Scripture to have "fallen asleep in the Lord." It is of faith that miracles continue in the church, but it is not of faith that our Lady actually appeared to the shepherds of La Sallette, or that any particular event alleged to be a miracle, even though approved at Rome as such, is really a miracle. All these things, as particular facts, rest on human testimony, and each man must judge for himself of the sufficiency of the testimony. Even were there a revelation unques-

tionably divine affirming or confirming any one of them, it would not, since subsequent to the apostles and canonical writers, make it of Catholic faith, or heresy to deny it. The denial might be erroneous or rash, indicative of a sceptical disposition or of an unsound judgment, but it would not be heresy. For ourselves, we believe many things which seem to us sufficiently accredited, or which seem to us congruous to faith, or to be logical deductions from it, which we yet do not hold to be of Catholic faith, or believe with divine faith. We defend them earnestly with the best reasons at our command, but we do not assert and have no right to assert them as of faith, or as proposed on the authority of the church. We cannot impose them, but as they do not contradict faith, we may, if in our power, convince by appropriate arguments the free reason of others of their truth.

In pointing out certain things as not of faith, it does not enter into our head to maintain that nothing is to be contended for by theologians not strictly of faith, or that it is a mark of a generous Catholic spirit to seek to reduce Catholic faith to its minimum. We do it for a very different reason. We wish, in the first place, to show our non-Catholic readers that many things peculiarly offensive to them, contended for by Catholic theologians, are not obligatory on the believer, because they are not of faith and taught by the church on her divine and infallible authority, and therefore may be received or rejected on their merits, freely examined and judged of by human reason. We say frankly to them that our heart's desire and prayer to God is that they should become Catholics, and we wish them to understand what they must accept and what they are not obliged to accept as of Catholic faith, in becoming Catholics. We want them to understand the bounds of authority and the extent of freedom. Our own belief is that very few would reject our religion, if they did not confound the notions and practices of Catholics outside of the faith and the commands of the church with her real faith and precepts.

We have wished, moreover, to protest against the tendency always in the schools, even among ourselves, to confound theology and discipline with dogma. Dogma is irreformable, because infallible; discipline is always reformable by the proper authority, because it is founded on human prudence and expediency, and to obtain its end must adapt itself to a state of things constantly changing. The church is always free to reform her disciplinary canons, and the in-

terests of religion require her to change them as the world itself changes around her, as much as do the interests of a state require it to change its legislation to meet a change of circumstances. All Catholics are bound to submit to discipline as long as it is in force, and to refrain from all attempts to reform or change it, except in a legal way and by legal means; but we are not aware that it is or ever was a part of the discipline of the church, that the faithful must not express, in an honest and peaceful way, their opinion that certain reforms and changes have, with the lapse of time and change of circumstances, become necessary, providing they do not seek to effect them without or in spite of authority.

Theology being a human science, constructed by human reason operating on principles supplied partly by revelation and partly by the light of nature, can never have the invariability and fixedness of faith. The elements supplied by the human mind itself, from sources independent of revelation, are variable, and vary with human science itself. Our human science, whether of history or nature, of man or the earth, is constantly changing, sometimes for the better, sometimes for the worse. It sometimes advances, it sometimes recedes, but so long as the human mind is active, it does not and cannot stand still. The human mind is limited and infirm, and takes in things not in their wholeness, all at once; it studies and comprehends them under special aspects or in a succession of views. Even the faith, though all revealed at once, is not taken in and appropriated all at once. Our understanding of it grows with time and study, and it gains with process of time, as St. Vincent of Lérins teaches, light, distinctness, and evidence. The fathers of the fourth and fifth centuries modify, not the faith, but the theology of the fathers of the second and third centuries. St. Thomas modifies the theology of St. Augustine and St. Gregory the Great. He has a different philosophy, and in the human element follows almost servilely Aristotle, whereas St. Augustine inclines much more to the Platonic school. One's theology is intimately connected with one's philosophy, and Gassendi and Condillac could have made nothing of the theology of St. Anselm or St. Bonaventura. Descartes, in depressing philosophy and rendering it light, frivolous, and superficial, inflicted on theology, both with the orthodox and the heterodox, a blow from which it has not yet recovered. Theology can flourish only where thought is strong and

masculine, and thought can be strong and masculine only where it is free.

To attempt to give to schools of theology the invariability and fixedness of faith, is to confound faith with theology; and to censure a man because he does not follow in his theology or philosophy whether the earlier or the later scholastics, is to forget the very nature of theology and the human mind. We find this forgetfulness in the order issued a few years ago by the general of the Jesuits, commanding the professors of philosophy in the colleges of the society to teach the philosophy of Aristotle and Fonseca. Of Fonseca's works we know nothing by our own reading, but of Aristotle we do know at least a little, and we know no right that any one has to make him the philosopher of the Christian world, and to impose his system, even as modified by Fonseca, by authority on the intelligence of our sons. What we object to, however, is not the school or system, but the attempt to impose any system of human reason or science as authority which must be received without question, discussion, or rational conviction. In theology and philosophy, saving the faith, there is and should be no authority, but that which is founded on human reason itself. When St. Thomas asserts that this or that is of faith, we take him, not as infallible indeed, but as very high authority, and we should hesitate long before daring to dissent from him; but when he simply puts forth a theological or philosophical doctrine, we treat it respectfully as the opinion of a great man, but we accept or reject it according to our own free judgment of its soundness or unsoundness. It is not, however, St. Thomas that we dispute, but it is the freedom he exercised for himself that we claim the right to exercise for ourselves. Now, this freedom all schools tend in their practical development to deny, and they all seek to bind the student to the word of the master, not by virtue of his superior reason, but by reason of his personal authority. They are not required to follow the founder because by their own reason and judgment they are convinced that he was right, but because he was their master. *Magister dixit*, the master has said it, is the only reason that is to be asked or given; a good rule in faith where the *Magister* is God himself, but a bad rule in theology or philosophy, where the speaker is a man, and really, in the highest sense, no master at all.

The constitution of the illustrious Society of Jesus binds

its professors to teach the theology, and if the theology, the philosophy of St. Thomas, for no man's philosophy and theology are separable; and its present general, as we have said, issued his order prohibiting its professors from teaching any of the ontological philosophies, and commanding them to teach Aristotle and Fonseca, the latter a Portuguese Jesuit of the sixteenth century. How can the theological and philosophical professors of the society under these obligations be free either to exercise their own reason and judgment, or to develop and exercise the reason and judgment of the youth committed to their care? These professors are not themselves free, for they have imposed on them a particular theological and philosophical system, which, whether sound or unsound, is not imposed by divine or infallible authority, and which is not of faith, but is simply a human system, the work of human reason operating on divine and natural things. What is this but an attempt to give a society existing in the church, and by human authority only, an authority greater than is ever exercised by the church herself, and to theology the invariability and fixedness of faith? We are, as our pages abundantly prove, no enemy of the Society of Jesus. We love and honor the members of that society as ranking among the most exemplary, learned, devoted, and heroic of the clergy in any age of the church, but we do not recognize the society as the church of God, or its peculiar theological and philosophical opinions as Catholic faith which cannot be questioned without impeachment of one's orthodoxy. Yet it is not the system they teach, but the teaching of it by authority, on the authority of great names, or of the society itself, not on the authority of reason common to all men, that we object to, and which in our judgment does the harm. One thing is certain, that under the teaching by authority in matters not of authority, we have seen theology and philosophy decline, thought become superficial and commonplace, and the free and energetic thinkers of the age arrayed against the church. The fact is unquestionable and deplorable. Whether between it and the method pursued by the society there is any relation of cause and effect, we pretend not to determine. Authoritative faith quickens, expands, and invigorates the intellect, for it supplies from God himself the super-rational principles essential to intellectual life; authoritative science, whether theological or philosophical, has necessarily, in our judgment, an opposite tendency, because it suppresses in-

stead of stimulating mental activity, save so far as it stimulates revolt, and drives the revolted to infidelity or scepticism.

The general of the Jesuits orders his professors to teach the philosophy of Aristotle. He might have done worse. What was studied in the schools in the sixteenth century and the beginning of the seventeenth, as Aristotle's philosophy, was, in our judgment, far superior to the Cartesianism that supplanted it, or to any philosophy that has been taught in them since. Descartes upset with his superficial speculations the old systems and no better have taken their place. Aristotle was a great master of reason, but, as we judge, inferior to Plato, and both he and Plato were inferior to St. Augustine or to St. Thomas. We dare also to be known to hold that in intellectual power and philosophic genius and attainments, the Abbate Gioberti may rank as the peer of any one of the four. Yet not by the words of any one of the five in theological or philosophical science would we swear as by the word of a master who must not be disputed, and we object as strenuously to having the Giobertian system taught as authoritative in our schools, as to that of Aristotle as remodelled by Fonseca.

We have mentioned Gioberti, and his name inflames the passions of a thousand hearts; and a thousand angry voices loudly denounce us for presuming to mention him in respectable company. Why? Gioberti was a Catholic, even a priest, who, for aught we know, lived and died in the communion of the church. "No; he was a bad Catholic, no Catholic at all." You say so, but we do not know it. You have said we are no Catholic, and represented us as having apostatized, or as being on the point of apostatizing from the church, and how know we that you have not misrepresented him as you have misrepresented us? But Aristotle, was he a good Catholic? He was, as is well known, a Greek, a heathen, and no Catholic at all. And yet St. Thomas without blame derives nearly the whole of his philosophy from him, and the general of the Jesuits commands his professors to teach his philosophy to our generous and unsuspecting youth. "But Gioberti's works are on the Index." So we have heard it reported, and so we have seen it stated in the newspapers, but we do not know it. We have had no official information of it. But suppose they are, what then? Unless we have been misinformed, the study of Aristotle's works in Catholic schools was prohibited by the

pope in the twelfth century, and his works themselves were burnt at Paris by the public executioner. Yet you teach the philosophy of Aristotle. Has Gioberti ever been convicted of heresy, or of any offence against faith? If so, it is unknown to us. If his theology or his philosophy is at fault, refute it, prove it so. You need not calumniate the man, or seek to underrate his personal merits. "But he wrote *Il Gesuita Moderno*, and attacked the theology and philosophy of the Jesuits." But Father Curci wrote his *Divinazione* against him, and attacked his theology and philosophy, and that is a fair offset. To attack the Jesuits may be a sin against charity, but it is not necessarily a sin against faith, or against the church. If what Gioberti says against the Jesuits is true, it is idle to complain of it; if it is false, refute it. We have had many falsehoods told against us; some have been told even in the form of grave charges against us, at Rome, and we are suffering throughout the whole Catholic community, at home and abroad, from the false accusations and misrepresentations circulated against us. What then? Are we to believe that all who circulate them are bereft of sense and judgment, are totally depraved, and to be looked upon as unworthy to be named in respectable society? By no means. We know something of human nature; we know that all men have passions, and that no man is infallible in his understanding. We may have been misunderstood sometimes through our own fault, sometimes without any moral fault on either side; we may at times have been too trenchant in our remarks, and been understood to be more so than we supposed, or than we really were. Add the usual quantity of exaggeration, imagination, zeal, and false inferences, and it is easy to explain the false representations so injurious to ourselves, or so prejudicial to our character and influence, without being angry with their authors. What has happened to an individual may happen to a religious community. The eminent Western prelate said to have lodged with the Propaganda six charges against us, professing to be deduced from a single article of ours, every one of which was a false charge, intended, we presume, no injustice to us, and was moved only by his zeal for the service of religion. He doubtless read carelessly our article, with a prejudice against us, and substituted, unconsciously, his gloss for the text. We do not say the case was the same with Gioberti in *Il Gesuita Moderno*. But let the society do as we do, receive his

false accusations with equanimity, frankly concede to the author his incontestable merits in other respects, put the best construction possible upon his conduct, and leave it to time, or rather, to Providence, to bring out the truth and set all things right.

But all this by the way. We certainly hold Gioberti as a theologian and philosopher in high esteem, but we will receive, and wish others to receive, nothing on the authority of his name, or because he says it or defends it. We want freedom of mind in all things not of faith, and will no more consent to be deprived of it by an individual than by a community. Yet we understand well the tendency of schools to put themselves in the place of the church, or to claim her authority for their teachings. The tendency is not peculiar to Catholic schools, and there is, as we know by experience, as well as from general principles, more theological and philosophical liberty practically as well as theoretically allowed in them than in non-Catholic schools that make any pretences to a positive faith. For the distinction which all Catholics recognize, in theory at least, between faith and theology, is unintelligible in the bosom of any Protestant sect. In the sect all is faith or all is theology, and the only distinction admissible is between fundamentals and non-fundamentals. But this distinction avails the sect little, for it recognizes no authority competent to make it, and is at best only a reminiscence of the distinction made by the Catholic Church between faith and theology.

Though we protest against the tendency of the schools to render their systems authoritative and fixed, we recognize as underlying it something good and desirable. There is under it something conservative and true. He is only half a man who would sever himself from all connection with the past, and who has no reverence for the great and noble, the wise and just, the learned and heroic of other ages. We reverence genius and worth wherever we find them, and accept truth wherever we meet it. Nothing great or good, true or desirable, can ever be introduced absolutely *de novo*. Our Lord proclaimed not a new law, but that which had been the law from the beginning. He came not to destroy the past, but to fulfil it. The germs of the future are always in the past, and all true progress and real reform consist in developing, not in destroying them. The real reformer never reproduces the past; he develops and matures the germs it contained. The condemnation of Luther and

Calvin is not that they sought a reformation, either of theology or discipline, for that was needed; but that they sought it by severing themselves from the past life of humanity, and therefore by severing themselves from the future and from God. The life of humanity flows on in one continuous stream in the church, for in her dwells the Word made flesh. They who, for the sake of reform, break from the church, break from the life of the God-man, and necessarily lose both the good they have and the good they seek. All real reforms, all genuine progress must be of the church, in the church, and by the church. Luther and Calvin saw not this; they, therefore, became schismatics and heretics, and their seed will not inherit the land.

THE MYSTERIES OF FAITH.

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Modern controversialists, especially the more popular among them, dwell almost exclusively on the extrinsic authority for our faith, and almost entirely neglect the intrinsic authority, or intrinsic reasonableness of the faith itself. We may be wrong, but we are firmly persuaded that this is a grave mistake. They suppose that their opponents have a faith which they have not, and which, if they had it, would render all controversy superfluous. The argument from external authority, whether of the Scriptures or of the church, is effective only with such as already have a simple and childlike faith. It is conclusive for Catholics who already believe all Catholic doctrine in principle, and only need in the case of any particular doctrine to be shown that it is really taught in the Holy Scriptures, or by the church. It is a mistake to suppose that we can successfully pursue the same method with every class of the heterodox, or to conclude that when we have proved that God has supreme authority, that he can neither deceive nor be deceived, that he has founded the church, revealed to her the truth, authorized her to teach it, and that she actually teaches the doctrine in question, we have exhausted argument, said all that can be said, and that, if any remain

unconvinced it is owing to their malice, the perversity of their hearts, and nothing more can be done but to pray for their conversion by some miraculous interposition of divine Providence. It is not that the topic is defective, or the argument unsound, or incomplete in itself, but that it does not meet and remove the antecedent difficulties in the unbeliever's way of believing. The Unitarian, for instance, regards the mysteries of our faith as intrinsically incredible, and no amount of proof we can adduce from tradition, ecclesiastical authority, or the Scriptures, can enable him to believe them; not because they are above reason, and he will not believe what he cannot comprehend, but because he cannot see how he can believe them without denying certain other things of which he is as certain as he can be of any thing. He cannot, whatever his good will, or his mental efforts, believe them till they are shown to him to be not intrinsically incredible, but intrinsically credible, therefore provable, and neither is shown by the argument from external authority alone.

Unitarianism is not all false or all evil. Every system has its good side, and its true side; otherwise it could never be embraced by the human mind, created as it is for truth as its object. New-England Unitarianism was a protest of reason and common sense, as Dr. Channing well said, against the errors and exaggerations of Calvinism. It first manifested itself under the form of Arminianism, as a protest against irresistible grace and unconditional election and reprobation. Its development went on with time and inquiry, and from these Calvinistic doctrines it proceeded to protest successively against the doctrine of total depravity, vicarious suffering and imputed merit, the incarnation, the proper divinity of our Lord, and finally the Trinity, till the protest ended in the rejection of all the great mysteries of our faith as presented by Calvinistic theology. But, if we study carefully the Unitarian mind, we shall find that in all his protests the Unitarian was asserting and seeking to vindicate a truth which, in his judgment, these mysteries deny. He, in his own mind, in rejecting the Trinity was simply asserting the unity of God against tritheism, or an unintelligible form of words; the direct mercy of God against its supposed denial in the doctrine of the atonement, or vicarious satisfaction; intrinsic justice against imputed merit; the necessity of good works against justification by faith alone; human worth against total deprava-

tion of nature; and human freedom and responsibility against unconditional election and reprobation. In all this what he opposes to the mysteries is undeniably true, and the only way to convince him that the mysteries are credible, is to show him that he can accept them without giving up any thing of the truth he opposes to them, or that the mysteries in their real orthodox sense are perfectly compatible with the truth he holds and so strenuously insists upon.

Yet how can the Unitarian be shown this by arguments drawn from simple extrinsic authority? Bring the most overwhelming proofs of the mysteries, if you enter into no explanations, assign no intrinsic reasons which remove his antecedent objections to them and present them to him as intrinsically credible, you will not convince him of their truth, for you will not show him how he can accept them without denying the truth he objects to them. It is not because he refuses to believe God at his word, or God's word till endorsed by his own reason, as is sometimes alleged, but because he cannot, whatever the proofs you bring, or the efforts of his own will, believe that that is God's word which contradicts what he knows, as well as he ever knows any thing, is true and undeniable. No man, whatever he may pretend, either does or can believe what contradicts his reason, or what appears to him to be unreasonable. One may believe what is above his reason, never what is against his reason. To regard a thing as unreasonable, and not to believe it, is one and the same thing. The Unitarian does not refuse, no man refuses to believe things simply because they are mysteries, and it is never necessary to prove that mysteries are credible. Life is full of mysteries; our very existence is a mystery, and even the simplest fact of nature is a mystery to us, which we do not and cannot explain. All know this, concede it, and every moment of their lives act on a belief in mysteries. The difficulty lies not there. The mysteries the Unitarian refuses to believe, are mysteries which appear to him to be unreasonable, opposed to reason, and without any dialectic relation to the system of things of which we are a part. It is always more reasonable to believe that we mistake God's word, than it is to believe that he reveals unreasonable mysteries. God's word is truth, and no higher evidence of truth than his word is possible; but no proof, nothing in the world can convince a reasoning man that unreasonable

mysteries are his word, or have been revealed by him. Such mysteries are incredible, improbable, unprovable. A man may not be always able to explain away the authorities you bring in their favor, but believe them he does not, cannot, for he can never believe that truth contradicts truth, or that reason conflicts with reason.

Let us be just to the human mind, which is as truly the work of God as supernatural revelation itself. Let us be just to the Unitarian. We wrong him when we accuse him of setting up his own reason against the reason of God. He does no such thing. He is as ready to believe God's word as you or we, when once it is brought home to his reason that what is proposed is God's word. What he refuses to believe is not what he believes to be God's word, but what he believes is not and cannot be his word. He does not allege against the mysteries, "though revealed by God I do not and will not believe them," but, "such is the character of the mysteries you require me to believe that I do not and cannot believe that God has revealed them. It is derogatory from the essential attributes of God to represent him as revealing that one is three, and three are one; as becoming incarnate to effect a purpose just as easily effected without the incarnation; as reputing one a sinner who knows no sin, or a man just who is really unjust; as justifying men by faith alone, without works, or intrinsic holiness; or as causing men to sin necessarily, that he may have the glory of damning them. Such mysteries and some others like them to be found in popular Protestant theology, are blasphemous when asserted as revelations of God, and no thinking man ever does or ever can believe them to be any part of God's word."

The mind must believe God's word, but it must be allowed the right of a preliminary examination, as our friends of *The Rambler* maintain, of what purports to be the word of God, not indeed to determine what it must be, if his word, but what if his word, it cannot be. What God will or can reveal is beyond the province of reason to determine, and can be known only from his revelation itself; but we can say beforehand that certain things cannot be revealed, because they are unreasonable, unjust, and repugnant to the divine attributes cognizable by natural reason. We know that it is impossible for God to lie since he is truth, truth itself, and therefore we know that what is a lie is no revelation made by him; we know that he is holy, and therefore that what is unholy he can neither do nor approve.

There appears to be with some theologians, otherwise of good repute, a disposition to remove the mysteries of faith too far from the plane of reason, to distinguish too sharply between them and the truth cognizable by our natural intelligence, and to treat with too little consideration the difficulties which reason finds in the way of accepting them. They treat reason too cavalierly, and dismiss her objections too summarily. They seem to imagine that they would profane the mysteries, and detract from the merit of faith, were they to attempt to explain them, and by the aid of analogies borrowed from the intelligible and the visible to bring them nearer to our understanding, to show their intrinsic credibility. We think them wrong. We gain nothing by wrapping ourselves up in our dignity, and simply saying, "God has said it, believe it, or be damned." In so doing we are not true to the spirit of the church. The Gopel is throughout a manifestation of the infinite condescension of God to human weakness. Our Lord came to seek and to save them that are lost. The early fathers reason in the most patient and loving manner with the unbelieving, and the popes themselves, as we learn from St. Leo Magnus, are accustomed to reason with heretics before condemning them. The great object which all controversial theologians should have in view is the good of souls, and of the souls of the heterodox no less than of the orthodox. Faith loses none of its merit by being shown to be not unreasonable, or even by being shown to be reasonable. Revelation was not given to silence reason, to overwhelm it, to puzzle it, or to supersede it; but to aid it, strengthen it, enlarge its scope, and to supply its defects. It brings to man's understanding the superintelligible, and is a sort of telescope added to the natural eye of reason. But the telescope does not supersede the natural eye, for it is the natural eye that sees in or through it, and it would be of no use to a blind man. So of revelation. It does not supersede or even lessen our natural intelligence, for it is our natural intelligence, after all, that understands and believes in it or by it.

It is a great error to regard the revealed mysteries as unreasonable or as unintelligible. They are superintelligible, but not unintelligible. The unintelligible is the unexisting, the unreal, absolute negation, and therefore no object either of revelation or of faith. The superintelligible is real, and may be both revealed and believed, because it is neither separate from nor contrary to the intelligible and the visible,

but is really united to them and really forms with them only one indissoluble dialectic whole.*

The superintelligible is the essence of the intelligible, and the intelligible is the essence of the visible, in such sense that the visible would be nothing without the intelligible, and the intelligible nothing without the superintelligible. The superintelligible is not disjoined, in the world of reality, from the intelligible or the visible, and is superintelligible only in relation to us. It can be known by us only through supernatural revelation; but by supernatural revelation it can be rendered analogically intelligible to our understanding. Otherwise it could not be to us an object of faith; for faith is primarily an act of the understanding, and is in the understanding as its subject, as St. Thomas maintains. We do not, even when revealed, grasp the superintelligible directly, but nevertheless we grasp it indirectly, by means of analogies borrowed from the intelligible and the visible. Hence the Scriptures always represent the superintelligible by means of such analogies. This is perfectly philosophical, for the lower is always symbolical of the higher. The very fact that the sacred writers use these analogies is sufficient to assure the Christian believer that there is a real relation between the truths revealed in the mysteries and the truths directly cognizable by the light of reason. Both must belong to one and the same general system, or there could be no such analogies in the case. These analogies are real analogies, and therefore the revelation of the superintelligible is possible, and revelation and science belong to one and the same system, not two separate, much less two mutually contradictory systems. There must, then, be an intrinsic reason for the mysteries, as well as an extrinsic reason, as is also evidently implied in the fact maintained by all our theologians, that in the beatific vision faith

*See Vol. III. pp. 572–586.—The word *dialectic* here and elsewhere with us expresses a *real*, and not a mere *formal* relation. In our philosophy, logic is not purely formal, representing the relations of abstract notions or conceptions, but is real, representing the concrete relations of things. Its foundation is in the ideal formula, or divine judgment, *ens creat existentias*. As the *creat* is the real copula between the subject *Ens*, or Being, and existences or creatures, so the *dialectic* or logical copula means a real, objective relation between the subject and the predicate. It is the real *nexus* between contraries, and hence a dialectic union means a real union of contraries made one by means of the middle term. A dialectic whole is a real living whole, an organism, and not a mere aggregation. By the creative act, the real *medius terminus* of the universe, all the parts of the universe are made one dialectic whole, in which all the parts are really connected with the whole, and with one another.

is lost in sight, and discursion in intuition, whence the blest are called *comprehensores.*

Faith, the apostle tells us, is the substance of things hoped for, the evidence of things not seen. It must, therefore, be initial comprehension, the beginning of that of which the beatific vision is the completion. Hence baptism, the sacrament of faith, is defined by the church to be the door, that is, the entrance to the kingdom of heaven. It is not too much, then, to assume that by faith, or the light it sheds, though not otherwise, we may grasp something of the intrinsic reason and truth even of the most hidden mysteries of the Christian revelation, and rise to what St. Thomas calls *scientia divina*, or divine science—*theologia prima.* We are not arguing that we can know any thing of these mysteries without revelation, or that even with revelation we can, in this life, *viatores*, pilgrims as we are, returning from exile to our home, attain to a full comprehension of them; for now we see only in part, only through a glass darkly; but that we can know something of them, and grasp the revealed truths as they are mirrored or reflected by the analogies taken from the natural order—*per speculum in ænigmate.* We may thus, we maintain, grasp the connecting link between faith and science, and apprehend them in their dialectic union. There have been theologians who have held, uncensured, that, taking revelation as a fact, and using the light it sheds on the whole intellectual world, it is possible to demonstrate rationally the truth of all the great mysteries, even the most recondite, of our faith, and certainly the great fathers and doctors of the church, such as St. Augustine and St. Thomas, go very far in that direction. But without either asserting or denying that, we hold this much to be certain, that the human mind, starting from the position in which it is placed by the reflected light of revelation, can go so far as to remove all antecedent objections that reason can bring against the mysteries, and to show that they are not intrinsically unreasonable, but credible, and therefore provable.

To make this evident, we will, with the reader's permission, hastily glance at the principal mysteries of our faith controverted by the Unitarian, and also at his antecedent objections to them. The mystery of the Trinity is the basis of orthodoxy, and so essential to it that its denial involves the denial of the whole Christian system, the whole Christian doctrine as professed by orthodox Christians. To this mystery the Unitarian objects, that it denies the divine unity, and is intrinsically

unreasonable. He is unquestionably right so far as his objection asserts one and one only God, and rejects whatever in any way or shape militates against that great primal truth. There is one and one only God, maker of heaven and earth, and all things visible and invisible. The question between orthodoxy and Unitarianism is no question as to the unity of God, but simply a question as to the Trinity. Does the assertion of God as triune deny his unity? Is there no intrinsic reason apprehensible by us for asserting the one God as Father, Son, and Holy Ghost? That one is not three, and three are not one, is, of course, true. It needs no very profound philosophy to discover that, and to assert that God cannot be one in the respect that he is three, or three in the respect that he is only one. But the assertion that God is one, is not the assertion that he is unity and nothing else. Simple unity, or unity without contents or interior relations, is a mere abstract, empty unity, the unity or τὸ ἕν of the Alexandrians, the *reine Seyn* of Hegel which Hegel himself identifies with *das Nicht-Seyn*. The Alexandrians never regarded their τὸ ἕν, the One, as the equivalent of the term God, but added to the conception of unity, which they erroneously regarded as the radical conception of the Divinity, two other conceptions λόγος, or νοῦς, and δύναμις, intelligence and power. They erred in their exposition of the Trinity, and never asserted the Christian Trinity at all, but they well understood that simple, abstract unity is not and cannot of itself be living God. All the various heathen theogonies, however absurd or ridiculous they may appear to us, were only so many abortive efforts to explain the existence in God of something not included in the conception of abstract unity, and indicate a deeper and richer philosophy in the heathen than has prevailed since Descartes even in the Christian world.

The one, or naked and empty unity, even in the Unitarian mind, is not the equivalent of God. When he says one, he still asks, one what? The answer is one God, which implies, even with him, something more than unity. It implies unity and its real and necessary contents as living or actual being. Unity is an abstract conception formed by the mind operating on the intuition of the concrete, and as abstract, has no existence out of the mind conceiving. Like all abstractions, it is in itself dead, unreal, null. God is not an abstraction, not a mere generalization, a creature, or a theorem of the human mind, but one living and true God, existing from and in himself, *a se et in se*. He is real being,

being in its plenitude, eternal, independent, self-living, and complete in himself. To live is to act. To be eternally and infinitely living is to be eternally and infinitely acting, is to be all act; and hence philosophers and theologians term God, in scholastic language, most pure act, *actus purissimus*. But act, all act demands, as its essential conditions, principle, medium, and end. Unity, then, to be actual being, to be eternally and purely act in itself, must have in itself the three relations of principle, medium, and end, precisely the three relations termed in Christian theology Father, Son, and Holy Ghost,—the Father as principle, the Son as medium, the Holy Ghost as end or consummation of divine life.* These three interior relations are essential to the conception of unity as one living and true God. Hence the radical conception of God as triune, is essential to the conception of God as one God, or real, self-living, self-sufficing unity. There is nothing in this view of the Trinity that asserts that one is three, or that three are one; nor is there any thing that breaks the divine unity, for the triplicity asserted is not three Gods, or three divine beings, but a three-fold interior relation in the interior essence of the one God, by virtue of which he is one actual, living God. The relations are in the essence of the one God and are, so to speak, the living contents of his unity, without which he would be an empty, unreal abstraction; one—nothing.

Empty, abstract unity, or unity that has no concrete reality, no interior contents or relations, is without life, dead, inert, unproductive. Hence the old Eleatics, who asserted God as simple, naked unity, could never assert creation, and, in fact, denied that there can any thing exist distinguishable from unity. A being who has in himself no principle of multiplicity cannot create or produce any thing distinct from himself. Unity gives only unity; from one you can get only one, and one multiplied by one gives only one. The Unitarian himself does not really believe God is simple, abstract unity, and really, in his own mind, conceives of God as having essential interior relations, only he does not perceive that they are and must be the Trinity of Christian theology. At any rate, as he reflects, he learns that with the simple conception of unity he cannot assert creation. Hence

*What is here asserted is further developed and proved in the first of the *Essays on the Reformation*, to be published in a later volume.—Ed.

we note among Unitarians a double tendency—the one a tendency to return towards orthodoxy, and the other a tendency to pantheism, which is the absolute denial of the divine creative act. There are very few Unitarians to be found to-day who adhere to the Unitarianism of 1815 or 1825, and their number is daily diminishing. Some have become Episcopalians, some Swedenborgians, some like Br. Bellows and Dr. Osgood, are yearning for a church and a deeper and richer theology; others are trying to form to themselves a spiritual Christianity, without any historical Christ; and others still have fallen asleep in pantheism, or are seeking a vent from their interior activity in the various philanthropic or social movements of the day, confining, even avowedly, their thoughts and their hopes to the world of space and time. So true is it that the dogma of creation goes with the dogma of the Trinity, though creation is a fact constantly passing before our eyes. Pure unity has no interior life, no interior relations, and is therefore inert, and can act neither interiorly nor exteriorly, and therefore cannot be creative being.

God creates and can create only after ideas or types in his own eternal mind or essence, as Plato long ago taught us. Deny the Logos, God's interior word, or interior expression, so to speak, of his own thought or intelligence, the *verbum mentis*, and you deny these eternal ideas or types, and consequently the creative ability of God, or his power to produce existences distinguishable from his own unity. God can place no existence out of himself, the idea, type, or principle of which is not in himself. Creation is the exterior expression by the Creator of his own interior word. The artist cannot produce without an interior design, and in producing, be it a poem, a statue, a picture, or a temple, he only gives expression or *outness* to his design, the idea or type which he contemplates in his own mind. God being complete in himself, and in all respects sufficing for himself, is free to create or not to create, to create this existence or that, according to his own pleasure; but, if he creates at all, he must create after the idea, type, or pattern eternal in his own mind, therefore in his own essence; for St. Thomas has well said that *Idea in mente divina nihil est aliud, quam essentia Dei.* Yet God as the divine artist must eternally *behold* the ideas or types eternal in his own essence, and then evidently we must recognize a distinction between the divine essence *beholding* and the divine es-

sence *beheld*. The beholding is precisely what is meant by the generation of the Word or Logos; and as the Word is generated, not made, the relation between God generating and the Word generated is that of generator and generated, or that of father and son. The generator bears to the generated the relation of father, and the generated bears to the generator the relation of son, and hence the reason why the Word is called Son, and the generative principle Father. The divine action generating the Son completes and can complete itself only by a return through the Son to the generative principle. This return through the Son is the Holy Ghost, a third relation equally eternal in the divine essence. Hence in the divine interior eternal progression the Father is the principle, the Son is the medium, and the Holy Ghost is the end or the consummation. The relation of the three persons, as they are called, of the Godhead, is to be noted in creation, or in the external action, or action *ad extra*, of God, and creation itself must copy exteriorly the interior progression of the divine being. It proceeds from the Father as principle, through the Son as medium, and returns in the Holy Ghost through the Son to its principle, or to God as its final cause. The three persons equally concur in every external act of God, only they concur in diverse respects. But this is digressing. We do not identify the ideas or types of creation, which are indistinguishable in his divine essence with the Son, but we identify God's contemplation of them in his own essence with the generation of the Word. And as he could not create without them and without beholding or contemplating them, we maintain that without his essential tri-unity, he could not create at all.

As there can be nothing in creation which has not its idea, type, or principle in the creator, there must be in him the idea, type, or principle of society, for there is undeniably society in creation. All society is founded on what we call family relations, and implies the relation of sex, marriage, generation. Society is restricted to the same genus or species. Man has and can have no proper social relation with any race but his own. The idea, type, or principle of sex, marriage, generation, must, then, be in God. The heathen understood something of this, and hence represented in their theogonies, the *dii majores*, as androgynous, male and female. Their representations were gross and false, because they misinterpreted the analogies in the case;

but under their gross and disgusting representations, which took the analogies in an anthropomorphous sense, there was a truth concealed, misconceived, distorted, or travestied, which it will not do to overlook. God is not male and female, or androgynous, in the gross sense represented by the heathen, but there must be in him the principle of sex, of marriage, and of generation, or there could not be society in creation. If he in his own being were unsocial, solitary, so to speak, absolutely alone, he could create no society, for his creation is but the outward expression, or expression *ad extra*, of his own interior life, which it does and must copy. The social type, the divine original of society, is in the Trinity, as has been well set forth by the late Donoso Cortés.

Unitarians themselves call God Father, and do not scruple to address him as *our* Father. But the relation of father is a relation of generation, not of creation. God is not father because he is creator, and he cannot be father unless he generates a son, and a son of his own nature. To deny the eternal generation of the Son, or that the Son is of the same nature with the Generator, is to deny that God is Father. To be able to call God Father, it is necessary, then, to concede the eternal generation and proper divinity of the Son.

But even conceding that God is father in relation to his own divine Son, that does not give us the right to address him as *our* Father, or to repeat the *Pater Noster*. God is not *our* Father because he is our Creator. The relation of parent and child is in the order of generation, not of creation, and the parent and child are of the same nature. God is father by the eternal generation of the Son, but not by that fact is he *our* Father. This a serious difficulty in the way of Unitarianism. The gentiles, indeed, call God father, but never, so far as we remember, *our* Father. Zeus or Jupiter is called father; but because he is father of gods, not because he is father of men. He is addressed as "father of gods and king of men." The Mahometans, who are stanch Unitarians, and deniers of the Trinity, do not address God as *our* Father. Their formula is, "God is God, and Mahomet is his prophet." Nowhere outside of the Christian faith, unless with the Jews, who believed in the Incarnation, at least, implicitly, if not explicitly, is God, to our knowledge, ever addressed as *our* Father. This is as it should be. We can have a real filial relation to God,

only in Jesus Christ, and not even in him, if he was only a man sent with a divine message from God, or if he was even, as the Arians maintained, a superangelic creature, the first and highest of the creatures of God. In neither case would filial relation to him be a filial relation to God. We can be sons of God and have God for our father, only as we are begotten by him and have the same nature with him. This is possible only in the Incarnation, in which our nature is made really and truly the nature of God. In the Incarnation real sonship to God is possible, for in that our nature is hypostatically united to God in the unity of the divine person, and hence in the Incarnation our nature is really the nature of God, and if reborn in Christ Jesus, we become really sons of God.

Jesus Christ being God, and the Son of God in his divine nature and person, by taking up human nature to be his nature, establishes a relation of nature between him and us. God, by condescending to become man, enables man to become God. By being born of him in the regeneration, we are born of God, are sons of God, and joint-heirs with him. We can then with truth say *our* Father, and with real filial piety cry, "Abba, Father." Hence we may see a deep significance in the Incarnation, and understand that it pervades the whole Christian economy, is essential to it, without which we might indeed prostrate ourselves before God as our Creator and sovereign Lord, but could never approach him and love him, and commit ourselves to him as our Father. For it is only by virtue of our common nature that he can have the relation of father to us, or we have the relation of children to him; and to suppose such common nature otherwise than through the Incarnation, would be to confound creature with creator, and to fall into pantheism, that supreme sophism. The *Pater Noster*, the Lord's Prayer, would be false in its doctrine, if the Incarnation were not a fact, and it is always inappropriate in the mouth of any one not regenerated in Christ Jesus by the Holy Ghost. That wonderful prayer can receive only an orthodox sense. It will be found, if analyzed, to contain, simple and brief as it is, the sum of Christian doctrine, of Christian prayer, of Christian virtue, and Christian piety. Its brevity, simplicity, and comprehensiveness, prove its more than human origin, that it never could have been composed without divine inspiration.

The Unitarian objects to the mystery of the Incarnation,

that it is unintelligible, incredible, self-contradictory, absurd, and, even if true, could serve no useful purpose. That some popular or mimetic representations of this mystery, as understood by Unitarians, are open to these objections, we shall not undertake to deny. The mystery is superintelligible, but it is not unintelligible, nor is it self-contradictory, absurd, or without a very intelligible and important meaning in the Christian economy, as we have just seen. Its apparent incredibility is due to its sublimity, to its being the divine creative act carried to its highest point, where the creature becomes one by nature with the Creator. It is the highest possible manifestation of the divine condescension, the divine wisdom and love, as well as of the divine creative power. Certainly man is not God, and God is not man, in one and the same respect. No orthodox believer pretends that the human is divine, or that the divine is human, that the Divinity was born of woman, or that it died, or could die on the cross. The "divinity of humanity," of which so much was foolishly said some years ago, is a pantheistic, not a Christian, conception. God, in his divine nature, is eternal and immortal, and is not in his divinity born, was not crucified, was not dead and buried, nor did he rise again the third day. To assert that would be, indeed, to assert the unintelligible, the incredible, the self-contradictory, the absurd. But it cannot be asserted without denying the very fact of the Incarnation itself. Undoubtedly, the orthodox faith asserts that God was born, that he dwelt among us in the flesh, that he grew, eat, and drank, went about doing good, was poor, had not where to lay his head, was betrayed by a disciple into the hands of his enemies, was tried, condemned as a malefactor, crucified between two thieves, was dead, laid in a new tomb, on the third day rose again, and, after forty days, ascended into heaven; but in his human, not in his divine nature; in his humanity, not in his divinity. Yet not, therefore, has the Unitarian the right to say that it was only a man of whom all this was affirmed; for that human nature was God's nature as literally, as really, as substantially, as the divine nature itself, since the very meaning of the Incarnation is the assumption by the eternal Word of the human nature to be God's nature.

Here is the wonderful condescension of God. He did not make human nature divine, for that even he, with all his omnipotence, could not do; but, leaving it human na-

ture still, he condescended to it, and made it, in the strictest sense of the word, his own nature. The mystery is precisely in the union of two forever distinct natures in one divine person. It is superintelligible, but not unintelligible; and it appears unintelligible to the Unitarian, only because he mistakes it, and conceives of the Incarnation always in either a Nestorian or a Eutychian sense, and never in the orthodox sense. If we assert two distinct natures, he assumes that we assert two distinct persons; and if we assert one person only, he assumes that we really assert only one nature. He assumes that unity of nature necessarily carries with it unity of person, and duality of nature duality of person, so that God could not, unless he assumed human personality, have assumed human nature. But, with his permission, this is not self-evident, and he fails to prove it. Certainly there is no *person* without *nature*, for person is the nature completed, or having its last complement; and, therefore, there can be no divine person without a divine nature. There can, again, be no human nature without personality, either human or divine; but nothing hinders God, if it so please him, from supplying its last complement with his own personality. The human nature would then be truly person, but its person would be God, and also the person of the divine nature. Each nature would be person, but both would have one and the same divine personality. And this is the precise mystery of the Incarnation—God making himself the person of human nature, or making human nature his own nature. Our Lord is, therefore, indissolubly God-man, with two forever distinct natures in the unity of one divine person. He acts necessarily always as one person, and, as what is done in either nature is done by him as person, and as his person is God, that which he does in his human nature is done by God as truly and as strictly as what he does in his divine nature. It is not, then, simply the man that is born, that grows, that suffers and dies, is buried, and rises again, but God himself, in his human nature. The self-contradiction and absurdity alleged by the Unitarian disappear the moment we take the Incarnation in its orthodox sense. How God could become incarnate, or make human nature his nature, we, of course, do not attempt to explain, nor is it necessary that we should. The fact is not impossible, for nobody can say that it exceeds the infinite power of God, since it involves no intrinsic contradiction. The objection of the Unitarian, therefore, is not well taken.

But the reason for accepting the mystery of the Incarnation is not purely negative, or even extrinsic. It has a reason in the very constitution of the universe. In examining the mystery of the Trinity we have found that all acts, to be complete, must return to the actor. This return is their consummation. The creative act, if it ended with the procession of existences from the Creator as first cause, would be incomplete, initial, inchoate, unconsummate; for the existences would attain to no final cause, and fulfil no purpose. God cannot create without creating for an end, and in creating final cause is as essential as first cause. God can create for no final cause but himself. Hence the sacred writers assure us throughout, that all things are made by him and for him. Then all creatures must have two motions, and the universe two cycles, the one the procession of existences, by way of creation, from God as first cause, and the other their return to him, without absorption in him, as final cause, which completes or consummates the creative act, as the return in the Trinity of the act generating the Son through the Son to the Father, or the procession of the Holy Ghost, completes, consummates the interior and eternal progression of the divine being. It makes the universe a copy or external expression of the interior essence of God, as all creation must be. The two cycles or two motions, the procession of existences from God as first cause, and their return to him as final cause, is recognized and asserted by all gentile theology, oriental and western, ancient and modern, and especially by Buddhism, but, unhappily, in a pantheistic sense. No gentile philosophy, not even that of Plato, recognizes the divine creative act, the great fact asserted in the first verse of *Genesis*. "In the beginning God created heaven and earth." Hence the gentiles never conceive the procession of the universe from God to be by way of creation, but by way of formation, generation, or emanation, and its return to him as final cause, they hold to be its absorption in him, as the bubble in the ocean, which is really its annihilation. Christian philosophy or theology, illumined by the light shed on cosmogony by the mystery of the Trinity, escapes pantheism by asserting the creative act, and showing that the procession of existences from God as first cause is by way of creation, and their return to him as final cause is not by way of absorption in him, or their annihilation as existences, but as existences retaining their distinct and substantive existence; therefore a

return that consummates the creative act, instead of withdrawing it, and avoids the pantheism universal in all gentile philosophy.

The procession of existences from God as first cause, or of existences in the first cycle, is what, after the Greeks, we call Cosmos, or the universe regarded in its relation to God as first cause. Now the return of existences to God as final cause cannot be in the cosmos, because that would be the denial of the second cycle, and would confound the final cause with the first, or the return of existences to God with their procession from him. The explication or development of the cosmos in space and time, which is by natural generation, is all in the first cycle, and in the order of procession from God. The cosmos cannot attain to its final cause, be completed or consummated by natural explication or development, for explication and development cannot carry it out of its own cycle into the second cycle, or even initiate the motion to return. Here is the refutation alike of those who assert that man can attain to his end in the order of generation by natural development and culture, and of those also who assert the possibility of natural beatitude. The final cause of man is God, and God, whether regarded as first cause or as final cause, is supernatural, always above nature; and as our own beatitude can be only in attaining to our end and resting in our final cause, our beatitude can be only in the supernatural, as Christian orthodoxy always asserts. From the natural to the supernatural there is and can be no natural transition. The cosmos does not emanate or flow out as a natural stream from God, but is created by the direct and immediate act of God, without the concurrence of any cosmic concreative act, and the creative act of God is therefore strictly supernatural. Adam was not generated, that is, developed by the concreative act of the creature; but was created by the direct and immediate act of God, and the same must be said of the original of every genus or species in the universe; for generation produces no new race or species; and only explicates, develops, or brings out what was original in the progenitor of the race, immediately created. Even in the cosmos the original individual must be supernaturally created; for only by a supernatural act can creatures proceed from the first cause. So only by a supernatural creative act, providing the supernatural individual or father, can the return of creatures to the supernatural as final cause be initiated and effected.

The second cycle, the second motion, the return of existences to God, is not and cannot be the natural development of the cosmos. As the cosmos can be consummated only in returning to God, only in the supernatural, it must be supernaturally elevated to the plane of the supernatural before the second motion, or motion of return, can commence. This elevation is possible only in the Incarnation, for it is only by the supernatural assumption of the nature of the cosmos to be the nature of God that the cosmos can stand on the plane of a supernatural end, or of God as final cause. Here is an intrinsic reason for the Incarnation, which by the supernatural act of God completes the cosmos or the first cycle, and initiates the second or return, which in the New Testament is called *Palingenesia*, usually rendered in English by the term *Regeneration*. God founds the palingenesia by the act by which he creates the hypostatic union with human nature, making it his nature, as he founds the cosmos by his eternal Word unincarnated in time.

The lower orders of creation were created for man, and their natures are contained in him, for he is microcosm, as said the ancients, and they return to God as final cause in man's return. Their nature was assumed in the assumption of human nature, for our Lord assumed body as well as soul, flesh as well as spirit, and all Christians profess to believe in the resurrection of the flesh or the body. This disposes of any difficulty the Unitarian might find in relation to the lower orders of creation. As to the higher, their nature was in some sense assumed in assuming the spiritual nature of man, as is implied by the church in calling Mary, the mother of God, "the Queen of Angels," which she could not be, if her divine Son did not enable them to return to their final cause by the nature he took from her. He directly assumed, indeed, only human nature, but in assuming human nature he really assumed all created nature, though he suffered and died, made atonement for, and redeemed from sin only the human race, not the angels that kept not their first estate. The Incarnation, or assumption of human nature to be the nature of God, was necessary to enable man to attain to his end, and to have with God as final cause, a relation corresponding to his relation to him as first cause, to consummate the creative act in both cycles, so that God should be "all and in all," without the annihilation of distinct created existences, and without any favor being extended to the pantheism of the emanationists, or the realization

by God of his own possibility in creation, as maintained by the Hegelians.

The return of existences to God as their final cause, necessarily implies that they become God. This is necessarily the meaning of the assertion that the creative act, to be completed, consummated, must return to its principle. The Holy Ghost is God equally with the Father and the Son. But we find in the Trinity, that the Holy Ghost is the spiration of the love of the Father for the Son, and the Son for the Father. The return of creatures to God as final cause, is their spiration as love, copying externally, in the order of creation, the procession of the Holy Ghost, and hence the Holy Ghost is called the Sanctifier. The return proceeds from love, and the natural tendency of love is to unify, and it is never satisfied till it is identified with its object, as we may learn from the analogy of purely natural love. The love is not fulfilled, consummated, till the lover and the loved become one, and each possesses the other. It can be fulfilled, consummated, only when they both have one and the same nature. Even Channing was aware of this, and therefore maintained that man has "a kindred nature with God," meaning that man's nature is akin to the divine nature, whence his disciples talked much of the "divinity of humanity," and of the "divine element in man." But without intending it he gave utterance to a pantheistic sentiment. Man can be akin to the divine nature, and can claim kindred with God, we have seen, only as our nature in the Incarnation is made the nature of God. The love which returns to God can be consummated only in the Incarnation. In the Incarnation man literally becomes God by nature, and without implying a pantheistic sense. In that our nature becomes God's nature, and we can become one with him, even in our nature. God in becoming man enables man to become God without ceasing to be man and God's creature. By the union of our nature with his the distance between creator and creature is removed; we can enter into true social relation and hold real and living communion with him, not a merely imaginary or fictitious communion, which is all the Sacramentarians can admit.

The human nature assumed by our Lord, though individuated in him as it was in Adam, includes all individuals, only generically, only as they existed in the first individual, or progenitor of the race. All individuals were in Adam, for in him was the entire human race, but they were in him

unexplicated, and could actually exist only as explicated or developed by natural generation. The same law holds good in regard to our Lord, the second Adam. All individuals are in him, for he assumed entire human nature, and was perfect man as well as perfect God; but they must be explicated, developed, or born of him by regeneration, which is by grace, not natural generation, before they exist in him as distinct individuals. Now, as grace may be resisted by our free will, and even be lost though once bestowed, it does not follow that all will enter the palingenesiac order; or that all who enter it will persevere, and attain to glorification or actually return to God as their final cause. So it may turn out that large numbers of individuals may forever remain in the order of genesis, mere cosmic, and therefore inchoate existences, real abortions, and never become one with God in Christ Jesus. But, if so, the fault is their own, for our Lord, by assuming entire human nature, renders their personal return to God possible, if they choose to comply with the necessary conditions.

What we have thus far said, if we have succeeded in making our meaning intelligible, answers the objections of the Unitarian to the great and fundamental mysteries of the Trinity and the Incarnation, and shows that there are not only no intrinsic reasons against them, but very strong intrinsic reasons for them. Yet the Unitarian system is not refuted in all points. The Unitarian objects more strenuously still to the dogma of original sin and the mystery of Redemption or the Atonement. He understands original sin to mean that the guilt of Adam's sin is imputed to all his posterity, who are punished for it as if it were actually their own. He objects that this is unreasonable, unjust, indeed, impossible. God cannot impute sin where there is no sin, for he is a God of truth. It is impossible that one should be guilty of a sin which he has not committed by his own voluntary act, and to punish one for a sin of which he is not guilty is manifestly unreasonable and unjust. Most certainly. But the objection confounds original sin with actual sin. Original sin is the sin of origin, and in no sense implies that men as individuals are actually guilty of Adam's sin, or that as individuals they are actually punished for it. The meaning of the dogma is that as the race was all in Adam as its progenitor, his sin tainted the race, the source from which we as individuals spring; so that we are born of a tainted nature, or a degenerate race. Adam by his sin lost the justice in which

he was originally constituted, and the integrity of his nature. As this loss was by sin, it is called itself sin, and as it tainted human nature or involved the degeneracy of the race, it is called original sin. But no orthodox theologian ever contends that we as individuals are actually guilty of it, or that any individual as an individual is guilty of it, save Adam himself. The race suffers from it, and rightly, because the race was all in Adam and sinned in his sin; and individuals suffer from it, not because as individuals they had any hand in committing it, but because they are born with a tainted nature and of a degenerate race. But individuals are never actually punished for it as if it were an actual sin committed by them as individuals, or held responsible for it, as for a personal fault.

The Unitarian further objects to the dogma of original sin, because he confounds it with the Calvinistic doctrine of total depravity, which asserts that man is clean gone in iniquity, and is so utterly corrupt in his nature that he is incapable of a good thought or a good deed, and all his thoughts, words, and deeds are necessarily sins, and hateful to God. But this Calvinistic doctrine is an exaggeration, and overstates the case. Certain it is that the unregenerate can think no thought and perform no act meritorious of eternal life, or that is good in relation to the supernatural end of man; but not therefore does it follow that all their thoughts and deeds are sins, or that they cannot perform acts that are good and merit a reward, as St. Augustine teaches, in the cosmic or natural order. Indeed, men generally are weak rather than wicked. The instances of great wickedness are rare, and even the most abandoned are seldom without some good traits, and seldom pass their lives without some acts not sinful. If the Calvinistic statement were true, there would be an end of human society, of domestic affection, and of public spirit. We do not believe our Calvinistic friends are as bad as they represent themselves, or that even Luther and Calvin, Cranmer and Knox were totally depraved.

The inability of the unregenerate to merit eternal life, or to perform acts good in the palingenesiac order, asserted by all orthodox Christians, we have already shown to be inherent in the cosmic nature of man. It is not the effect of sin, and would have existed even if man had not sinned, as we have shown in demonstrating the necessity of the Incarnation to complete the first cycle and to initiate the

second, or the return of man to God as his final cause. Eternal life is in this return, or rather the consummation of this return, and none but the regenerated, those who are born of Jesus Christ, ever can or ever could live this eternal life or do any thing to merit it. Regeneration or the new birth was always necessary, and is not made necessary either by original sin or by actual sin. Adam was constituted in original justice and placed on the plane of his return to God, and had he stood there, and persevered to the end, he would have secured eternal life for himself, and, as is commonly held, for all his posterity. But he was not constituted in that justice by his nature, or as cosmic Adam, and never could have transmitted it to his posterity by natural generation, as we have seen in the necessity of the Incarnation as the medium of man's return to God as his final cause. All he could have done would have been to transmit his integral nature. He was elevated to that justice by supernatural grace, perhaps in the first instant of his creation; yet he was elevated to it by supernatural grace, and this elevation of nature, or placing man on the plane of his beatitude, which is God, and therefore supernatural, is precisely what is meant by regeneration. Regeneration was, therefore, as necessary in Adam innocent as in Adam fallen, and consequently even had he not sinned his posterity could never have entered into the order of eternal life without regeneration, or the new birth in Christ Jesus. The reason of this is obvious, for our beatitude does not lie in the first cycle, the cosmos, the natural order, or order of natural generation, but in the second cycle, in the return to God as final cause, and God, whether as first cause or as last cause, is supernatural. There is not and there never could have been a natural beatitude for man. Natural beatitude is a created beatitude, and to suppose it would be to suppose that man can attain to his beatitude in the cosmos, in time, not in eternity, and without attaining to his end or last cause, while he is still on his way, a mere initial, inchoate existence, eternally below his destiny, which would be to suppose man finds his beatitude in what all Christian theology regards as hell! We therefore maintain that the necessity of regeneration is not created by sin, and therefore, as regeneration is possible only in the Incarnation, that God would, if he designed to consummate his work, have become incarnate even if man had not sinned, although if man had not sinned, he would not have come

to suffer and die on the cross, or to redeem us and make satisfaction for our sins.

But though man, even had he not sinned, could not have done any thing good in the order of eternal life without regeneration by the Holy Ghost in Christ, the incarnate God, who completes the first cycle and initiates the second, completes the cosmos and initiates palingenesia, as Adam initiates genesis or the order of generation; yet is original sin a fact very intelligible in itself and very certain. Its accidents may not be always and everywhere the same, and the degeneracy of the race may be greater or less in some families, tribes, or nations than in others; and, though not so fatal a taint to our nature as Calvinistic exaggerations assert, yet the fact itself is universal and undeniable. Our nature has evidently declined from its original rectitude, and is not now in its normal state. It bears in itself the proofs of internal disorder, and that it lacks integrity, equilibrium. It does not operate harmoniously, with the due concordance of the parts with one another, and with the whole. It is out of joint. The spirit lusteth against the flesh, and the flesh against the spirit. We see and approve the better, and yet follow the worse. The appetites, passions, and affections do not move only as commanded by the understanding and the will, and are continually bringing both understanding and will into bondage, compelling them to be their slaves. What our modern authors of fiction call strong will is usually nothing but strong passion, which has taken complete mastery of the man. We evidently have lost what our theologians call *natura integra*, and our nature is evidently affected with a certain morbidity, which disorders it and renders it weak and infirm. The fact of this morbidity is attested by universal experience, and experience equally attests that it is curable by no natural culture, however wise or judicious. It is asserted in the universal traditions of the race, and without assuming it we can in no manner explain individual experience or the facts of history.

The fact of the transmission of sin by hereditary descent, or its propagation by natural generation, is easily enough understood, if we admit, as we should, the reality of genera and species, without which there could be no generation, and no original sin. The difficulty the Unitarian feels under this head arises from his nominalism or conceptualism, which regards genera and species, the universals of the

schoolmen, as empty words, or as mere conceptions or mental abstractions with no objective reality, or existence, out of the mind that conceives them. With the Unitarian, humanity, when not taken in the sense of a moral quality, is either a simple aggregation of individuals, or a mere mental abstraction or generalization, without existence, as the schoolmen say, *a parte rei*. But genera and species—universals—are not mere empty words, as Roscelline asserted, nor mere mental conceptions, without objective reality, as Abelard taught, but are objectively real, as the old realists, with Guillaume de Champeaux at their head, maintained, though not, as they are said to have maintained, entities that can exist separately without individuation or individuals. There is in the Unitarian body to-day a decided tendency to realism; but, with the most of them, it is an equally decided tendency to pantheism. Modern philosophy has pretty generally exploded both nominalism and conceptualism, and led to the reassertion of what Plato and some of the Greek fathers call the methexis. So far all is well. But our heterodox philosophers, in rehabilitating the Platonic ideas, and in asserting the reality of universals, or genera and species, confound them with the ideas or types in the divine mind, and thus make the methexic ideal, and the ideal God, or, in other words, make genera and species identical with the essence of God, which is pure pantheism. They do not understand that methexis is methexis, that is a participation of the divine ideas, or essence, *mediante* the divine creative act, so that the methexic is as much a creature as the mimetic or the individual.*

* Methexis means literally having with, that is, participation, and is used to express the relation of genera and species to their ideas or types in the divine mind. Mimesis means imitation, copy, or sensible representation. Plato understood by the methexis the ideal, the ideas or types in the divine mind, which impressed on a pre-existing matter, as the seal on wax, formed individual existences. He therefore cannot be cleared of the charge of pantheism. In Christian philosophy the methexis is the participation in the divine essence indeed, for we have our being in God, but *mediante* the creative act, not immediately. The methexis is not precisely genera and species, nor is the mimesis precisely their individuation. The methexis stands in immediate relation to the creative act of God, and through that is the creature touching and uniting with the Creator. It has its first and immediate explication in genera and species, which, as it were, mediate between it and the mimesis, or the individual. It is partly intelligible and partly superintelligible. The mimesis is the explication of the methexis by genera and species, and the explication of genera and species by individuals, and is partly intelligible and partly sensible. The creative act gives immediately the me-

Genera and species have their ideas and types in the divine essence, and participate in them through the creative act; but they are creations, and distinguishable from God, as are all creatures. They are real existences, but not existences subsisting separately from the individual. The race is distinguishable, but not separable from the individual. The race and the individual are alike real, but the one is never without the other. There are no men without man, and no man without men, or man individuated. Hence we read in Genesis: "And God created man in his own image; in his own image created he him; male and female created he them;" that is, he created man as the race in a generative or productive individual. In generation the race is propagated, and individuals multiplied; but the generation or multiplication of individuals adds nothing to the race, which was entire in Adam; it only explicates or develops it. Adam was generically all men, and all men are generically Adam. What we can affirm of Adam as the race, we can affirm of all men generically. If the race was tainted in him, it is necessarily tainted in all born of him, unless preserved by some special miracle of divine grace, as Pius IX. has affirmed to have been the fact in the case of the

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thexis, which through it is the participation by the creature of God as first cause; the methexis concreatively with the divine creative act gives genera and species; and genera and species give also concreatively individuals, or the mimesis, so that individuals are really fourth causes, rather than second causes. But the point to be borne in mind is that in each degree there is a reality peculiarly its own, and the mimetic is real, not purely phenomenal, and therefore is something more than the purely sensible. But ordinarily and practically it suffices to understand by the methexic the essential and the generic, and by the mimesis the individual and the sensible, though it must never be forgotten that while for philosophical purposes we distinguish the methexic and the mimetic, they are never separable, and are indissoluble in every created existence, generic or individual. We, owing to the limited nature of our faculties, may not always grasp them in their synthesis, and treat things exclusively from either the methexic or the mimetic point of view. If from the methexic, we lose sight of the sensible world, of the reality of body, and tend to philosophical idealism; if from the mimetic, we lose sight of the essential and generic, and fall into sensism. The old Docetæ fell into the latter. Preachers aiming chiefly to address the senses and the sentiments, often speak from the mimesis, especially in describing hell, and though what they say is mimetically true, it is not a true presentation of the methexic truth from the point of view of the methexis,—true as to the senses and the sentiments, but not always true in the methexic relation. These remarks may help some readers to the understanding of the unfamiliar terms; but they are also defined by the context, or the manner of using them, so that none capable of understanding the subject under discussion need mistake the sense in which they are used.

Blessed Virgin, for the race is one and identical in all men, in Adam and all born of him. All generation is in one and the same race, and the generated and the generator have one and the same nature. We saw this when treating the mystery of the Trinity. Adam could generate only his own nature, and that nature having been tainted by his sin, he could generate only that tainted nature. To say that the race is degenerate in all men is only saying that it was degenerate in Adam, the progenitor of all. The race was all in him; if it fell in him it necessarily fell in all, and the assertion of original sin is, if we consider it well, only the assertion that the race sinned and fell in Adam, or that Adam's sin tainted his nature. Recognize the objective reality and unity of the race, which imply a real, not merely a covenanted or arbitrarily decreed solidarity of all men with Adam, and the objections to the dogma of original sin are removed, and we are obliged to assert it if we assert that Adam sinned, for as he was the race, he could not sin without the race partaking in his sin.

We may now approach the atonement, or the mystery of Redemption. The Unitarian objects to it, that it is unnecessary, unjust, and impossible. It is, he says, as easy for God to forgive directly the sinner on repentance and amendment of life without satisfaction, as it is indirectly, by sending his Son to make the satisfaction. The sinner gives and God receives nothing in the one case that he does not in the other. God is the creditor, and he is not paid by taking the amount due him from his left hand and putting it into his right hand, or by paying himself out of his own funds. It is unjust to lay on Jesus Christ, who was innocent, the penalty of man's transgressions, and impossible that he should pay it and obtain the sinner's discharge, for the sentence was, "*Thou* shalt surely die," not "Thou shalt surely die unless another is found to die in thy stead." God could undoubtedly have forgiven the sinner directly on simple repentance and amendment of life, if he had so chosen, and in fact, he does so forgive, and forgives no one otherwise. They who persevere and die in their sins, die unforgiven, unredeemed, and suffer the consequences of original sin and their actual sins, an everlasting exclusion from heaven, and the tortures of their exile. But the simple pardon of individuals, as supposed, would not have redeemed human nature itself, and restored it to moral health and soundness, without which regeneration is impossible. The nature must

be healed, at least in the logical order, before it can be regenerated or elevated, and it must be regenerated before it can return to God as its final cause,—a fact Calvinistic theology tries, but not successfully, to indicate by making justification precede sanctification. Redemption precedes logically regeneration, so that regeneration without redemption is impossible, and therefore the race, since it had fallen in Adam, must be redeemed in Christ before individuals could be regenerated in him, placed on the plane of their return to God.

Justice is revolted, not satisfied, by the punishment of the innocent for the guilty, and laying the penalty on the innocent cannot release him who has actually incurred it, we concede, if understood mimetically, as the Unitarian always understands it. The principal of vicarious suffering and vicarious merit is methexic, not mimetic, and implies the reality and unity of the race, as we have already explained, and consequently the real solidarity of the head and members. In the cosmos, or first cycle, stands at the head of the race the individual Adam, immediately and directly created by the creative act of God. Natural generation by which individuals are born in the mimetic order, only explicates or develops Adam, and brings out what was in him, or what in the methexis Adam is. He was the entire human race, and the race, as to the first cycle, was complete in him. Hence his sin was original sin, and in his fall fell the race. At the head of the race in the second cycle, palingenesia, stands the second Adam, Christ the Lord from heaven, no more produced by natural generation than was the first Adam. The hypostasis or hypostatic union of the two natures in the unity of his divine person, is by the direct and immediate creative act of God, and that act carried to its apex. In him, as in Adam, is the entire human race, for he assumed man himself, and the regeneration is the explication or development of what was in him from the instant of his assumption of humanity. He is, therefore, in the second cycle or teleological order, methexically all men, and all men are methexically in him; and hence what he does in his human nature is done by man in him; and what is done by man is done methexically by all men, because all men are methexically man, and only man.

The human nature our Lord assumed was that very nature which fell in Adam; and in assuming it he assumed all its liabilities, therefore its duties, and the penalties it had in-

curred, though himself was without sin. In expiating in his humanity the offences of man by his life, sufferings, and death, or his obedience unto death, even the death of the cross, it was not another expiating for man, but man expiating in his head his own offences, suffering the penalty he had incurred, and yielding the perfect obedience he owed. It was not one man atoning for another, but man become God atoning, methexically atoning for himself.

This disposes of the alleged injustice and impossibility of the atonement or Redemption through Jesus Christ. It also disposes of the Protestant doctrine of imputation, whether imputed guilt or imputed merit. God is truth, and cannot impute guilt where it is not, or justice to one who is not intrinsically just. Neither guilt nor justice is transferable. God punishes sin in him who commits it, and rewards merit in him who has it. So far the Unitarian in his protest against Calvinism is right. Certainly we are redeemed and justified by the merits of Jesus Christ, but only on the ground of our solidarity with him, our real participation in them as his members, as the members participate in whatever affects their head. We must be literally in him, really joined to him as our head, so that he and we are methexically one, living one and the same identical life, else we have and can have no share in his merits. His merits avail us only as they are ours as well as his, and ours in that they are his. We have shown how this is possible by what we call the solidarity of the race, or what in the teleological order, or palingenesia, is called theologically "the communion of saints." He who grasps this solidarity of Christ and his members, will grasp the radical conception of the church as an organism, not merely an organization, and understand what St. Augustine means, when he says the church is the whole Christ, —*Ecclesia totus est Christus.*

But we must not lose sight of the fact that the second cycle is teleologic, while the first Adam is initial; or that while the first is the father of the order of generation, the second is the father of the order of regeneration, or the order of the return of existences to God as their final cause. The race is equally complete in both, but while its explication in the first Adam is by natural generation, its explication in the second Adam is by GRACE. Though the race is redeemed in Christ, and the methexic man is restored to original justice, men as individuals, or mimetically considered, do not participate in it by natural generation, as they do in

original sin, because they are not by natural generation born of Christ. As they partake of original sin by being born of Adam, so they partake of original justice to which the race is restored by redemption by being reborn of Jesus Christ; but, as this rebirth is in the order of return, and is the initiation into the second cycle, it can be only a rebirth by grace, for the reasons already given when treating of the mystery of the Incarnation.

The Redemption, though complete for the race, methexically perfect, is effected in individuals only as they are joined to Christ as real members of him, begotten in him by the Holy Ghost; for not otherwise are they *solidaires* with him, or his merits their merits. No individuals are redeemed as individuals, except as they are regenerated. Hence redemption and regeneration are mimetically coincident,—a fact which has led many theologians to maintain that if man had not sinned, God would not have become incarnate. As the redemption of the race is a necessary condition of regeneration, since the race has fallen, and as the practical application of the atonement to individuals and the regeneration take place in the same gracious act, the primary object of the Incarnation has been supposed to be Redemption. But we have shown that the Incarnation would have been necessary even if man had not sinned, that it was an essential part of the original plan of the Creator, that its primary object was the regeneration and the glorification of man by raising his nature to be the nature of God, and enabling him to attain to the end for which he was created, and that redemption was secondary, as having been rendered necessary by man's sin, to repair the damage caused by transgression. Hence, also, as only in being united to Christ by the new birth do men actually share in the redemption. Calvinists and Jansenists have held that God died only for the elect, which is mimetically true; but as the entire race was assumed by the Word and redeemed, it is more proper to say that he died to redeem all, for the actual redemption of all was made possible, since all individuals were potentially in the race assumed, and therefore necessarily potentially redeemed in its redemption. In the mimesis the redemption is limited; in the methexis it is universal.

We have said the explication or rebirth of the race in Christ is by Grace. It could not be otherwise, since the return of man to God is not in the natural order. Man's

end is God as final cause, and God either as first cause or as final is always supernatural. Man has necessarily his origin and his end in the supernatural. But the grace of regeneration is, since man has sinned, conditioned on the grace of redemption, a grace always gratuitous, as say the theologians, for God could, if disposed, have left man in the state where he had placed himself by his own sin. God is not, therefore, obliged by his own justice to render the grace of redemption effectual in the case of all individuals. Therefore the new birth is not only not by natural generation, is not only by grace, but by the *election* of grace, and those whom he predestinates to be redeemed, regenerated, and finally glorified, are called the elect. The grace is freely offered to all; but grace can be successfully resisted by human liberty, which must be respected, because in either cycle the explication is by the concreative act of man, or the active concurrence of the human will. Though Christ died for all, and redeemed all potentially, it does not necessarily follow that all will enter the palingenesia, or that all who enter it will persevere therein to the end, and actually attain to their final cause. Those who do not, remain necessarily forever in the first cycle, with a mere cosmic existence, and therefore initial, inchoate, forever below their destiny, which is the hell of Christian theology, precisely the heathen and the Unitarian heaven. But these will have only themselves to blame.

There are several other points, such as irresistible grace, election and reprobation, or predestination and human freedom, which we intended on commencing to discuss at length, but which we must reserve for a future article. Even many points on which we have touched demand for the majority of readers, we fear, a much fuller elucidation than we have given them, and they will be taken up again hereafter. There also are depths in the mysteries we have glanced at, and within the reach of the understanding, to which we have not penetrated or attempted to penetrate. We are perfectly aware that we have done nothing like justice to the great subject we have opened, and our main object in opening it has been to revive what is almost a forgotten science amongst us. But we think we have shown the importance of distinguishing—not separating—between the extrinsic and the intrinsic reasons for believing the mysteries of our holy faith. We do not pretend to have demonstrated the intrinsic truth of the mysteries, nor have we undertaken to do it;

but we have shown, unless we greatly deceive ourselves, that, though superintelligible, they are not unintelligible, or without analogy in what we know and are sure of; that they are not only not unreasonable, but reasonable, and what reason herself demands as her complement. They, then, are not incredible, but credible, and provable by an ordinary degree of external testimony.

We do not regard the argument from intrinsic reason alone as sufficient, and we rely on it only so far as to prove that the mysteries are intrinsically credible. To complete it, it is necessary to join to it the argument from extrinsic authority. We would present the intrinsic part first, for it prepares the way for the extrinsic. Moreover, for the heterodox brought up even in a nominally Christian land, little more is necessary than to remove the *a priori* objections to the mysteries, or the antecedent difficulties in the way of believing them. The external authority is given virtually in Christian civilization. Remove the *prohibentia*, and the man trained in Christian civilization asks little more. Few want reasons *for* believing, when their reasons for *not* believing are removed. We shall never forget the joy with which we found our objections to the old faith of Christendom, one after another, giving way, and began to see that we too might believe, and might enter the communion of saints, and claim kindred with the saints and martyrs of all climes and ages. Unbelief is an unnatural state, a state of violence, and no man who is a man, is at ease in it. The human mind, as soon as relieved of the pressure of unbelief, springs back to faith, and joys to be once more in its normal state.

THE WORSHIP OF MARY.

[From Brownson's Quarterly Review for January, 1853.]

We propose to consider the worship of Mary in its foundation, the principles or reasons on which it rests, and to defend the strong expressions used by Catholic writers when speaking of her in connection with our salvation. We do not propose to do this for the special benefit of Protestants, for they are not in a proper state of mind or heart to appreciate what we have to offer; we propose to do it solely for the sake of those of our Catholic friends who are liable to be more or less affected by the objections, cavils, and sneers of the heretical and unbelieving world in the midst of which they are obliged to live.

As Catholics we worship, that is, honor, Mary in common with all the saints, and we also offer her a peculiar worship, which we offer to no other saint. We defend this worship in part on the principle on which rests the worship of saints in general, and in part on her peculiar relation, as mother of God, to the mystery of the Incarnation. In the *cultus sanctorum*, or worship of the saints, we must distinguish between the honor rendered to the saints, and the invocation of saints; for the two things rest on very different principles. We honor the saints, we offer them a religious worship, and we pray to the saints, or invoke their interposition for us.

The principle of the worship of the saints, or of the honor we render them, is that of honoring God in his works, especially in his works of grace, and therefore in his saints, who are his greatest and noblest works. The principle, that God is to be honored in his works, is the most reasonable principle that the human mind can entertain. We do not know from reason alone what is the honor that we are to render to God, but we do know from simple natural reason, that we are to love and honor him supremely, with our whole heart, soul, mind, and strength. But we cannot do this without loving and honoring him in his works. To despise or to refuse to honor the work is to dishonor the workman, and nothing is more natural or more proper, when our hearts are filled with the honor and

glory of the workman, than that they should overflow with love and honor to the work. It is a high honor to have been the work of God, for if we rightly consider who and what God is, we must conclude that he can do, or even touch, nothing, without imparting to it, in some sense, an infinite value. Rightly considered, God is no less worthy of honor in his doing than in his being; for since he is, as the theologians say, pure act, his doing and his being, on his side, so to speak, are inseparable. Consequently, he is infinitely adorable in all his works, and whoso despises the meanest of his creatures, even though the veriest clod of senseless earth, despises God, and whoso honors the meanest, because the work of God, honors God himself.

Because the work of God, we say; and this must not be forgotten. The worship of the saints is not the worship of the works of God as abstracted from him, but the worship of God in his works. If we honor the creature for any other reason than that it is God's creature, we do not honor it as the work of God, but as God, and the honor is idolatrous, and gives to the creature what is due only to the Creator. Here is where our modern transcendentalists, rationalists, socialists, and philanthropists commit their most fatal mistake. They tell us, and tell us truly, that God can be honored in his works, that if we honor God, we shall honor his creatures, and that if we love God, we shall love our brother also; but they add, therefore to honor the works is to honor the workman, and to love man as our brother is in itself to love God. But this conclusion is illogical, for if we do not love and honor the creatures for the reason that they are his creatures, we do not in loving and honoring them love and honor God at all. We love and honor them in place of him, and fall into mere creature-worship, which is idolatry, the crying sin of our times, no less than of the times before our Lord's advent. But to love and honor the works of God, *because*, the works of God, for the reason that they are his works, is to love and honor him in them, and is not only not idolatry, but even one of the most effectual preservatives against idolatry, because even in the creature it keeps the mind and heart fixed on the Creator. The principle here is analogous to the principle on which we discharge our duty to God by discharging it to our neighbor. We owe a duty to our neighbor only in God, and we pay it to God, in paying it to our neighbor, if we pay it for God's sake.

Under this point of view, as the work of God, all nature is lovely and worthy of honor, and the true worshipper of God loves to honor it, from the highest to the lowest. To him the crawling worm, the insect of an hour, the mote in the sunbeam, has an untold worth, and becomes an object of tender affection, as we see in the life of many of the saints, especially of St. Francis of Assisi. He who cannot, in a degree at least, sympathize with this seraphic saint in his love of all created things, even the lower orders of creation, has as yet comprehended very little of the mystery of the love of God, and he to whom the saint's love seems ridiculous or unwarranted has as little reason to boast of his progress in true science as in true piety. We have, indeed, no sympathy with our modern nature-worshippers, or our modern cockney poetry, which goes into ecstacy before a daisy or a cowslip; for it stops short with created nature itself, with nature as independent of God, without regarding it as his handiwork. For this reason our modern poetry is less respectable than the ancient, which peopled the woods, the groves, the rivers and fountains, with fauns, dryads, hamadryads, and naiads; for even a false conception of the Divinity is still a conception of the Divinity, and is better than none. Ancient poetry sang nature only in its supposed divine relations; the modern severs nature from God, and reflects not that it owes all its truth, beauty, and worth to the fact that it is God's creature. But look upon nature in its relation to the Creator, have always present to the mind that it is his creature, and is hallowed by being the work of his hand, and it at once becomes worthy of the profound reverence and love of every devout heart.

Now, all the arguments which prove that God may and should be honored in his works, prove, *a fortiori*, that he may and should be honored in his works of grace, which are incomparably superior to his works of nature. Of the works of grace, the saints are the greatest. The saint is in reality the greatest and the noblest work of God, and therefore it is especially in his saints that we are to honor God in his works. The saint is a saint only by what he receives from God, and God in crowning him, as St. Augustine teaches us, does but crown his own gifts. What we honor in him is his heroic sanctity, and as this is the work of divine grace, in honoring him we do but honor God in his noblest work. We honor here the gifts of God, and in this we do but imitate, in our feeble manner, God him-

self, who also honors them, and with a crown of glory, that fadeth not away, eternal in the heavens. What can be more reasonable than for us to honor God in his saints, or more pleasing to him than for us to imitate him in honoring those whom he himself delights to honor? The honor we give, however high we carry it, redounds to his glory, for it is always *his* works, always *his* gifts, that we honor. How beyond all price do we prize the work or gift of a much-honored and dearly loved friend! Yet what friend so dear, so intimate, as God? What friend can impart so high a value to his work or to his gift?

These considerations prove beyond all doubt or cavil the reasonableness, in fact the duty, of honoring God in his saints, or of honoring them as his works, and that to refuse to do so would be to offer an affront, an indignity, to God himself, who deserves all honor both for what he is and for what he does. Therefore the prophet-king breaks forth: "Praise ye the Lord in his saints; praise ye him in the firmament of his power."

The principle, then, on which rests the worship of the saints is solid and unobjectionable. Consequently the worship of Mary as a saint is fully warranted, and there is nothing to be said against it; for certainly Mary was a saint, and the greatest of saints. We see her sanctity in her perfect humility. Who of mortal maidens was ever so highly honored, and yet who so lowly? Never does she once obtrude herself upon our notice; she lives all for God, and breaks her silence only for his glory. In perfect humility is pefect love, and in perfect love is every virtue. Not to honor her as a saint, not to thank God for her spotless virtue, not to call her blessed among women, not to hold her character up for universal love and imitation, would argue on our part hearts cold and depraved, and minds incapable of appeciating true heroic virtue.

The second part of the *cultus sanctorum* is the invocation of saints. We honor the saints by invoking them. This rests on a different principle from that of honoring God in his works, namely, that of intercession, which itself rests on the fact that God carries on, so to speak, his works of providence and grace by the agency of ministers. God, of course, could, if it seemed to him good, accomplish the ends of his providence immediately, without the employment of any intermediate agency. Ministers are not necessary to him; he needs no instruments; he can will, and it is done;

speak, and it stands fast. He could make the corn to grow without any labor of man to prepare the soil, or to sow the seed. He could confer on us all temporal and spiritual blessings, without our asking for them, for he knows what we need before we ask him, and he is always more ready to give than we are to ask. He could by the direct operation of the Holy Ghost convert the soul, and make us his faithful servants, without the ministry of the church, or the agency of teachers to instruct, or pastors to rule, feed, and defend us. That is, we see no abstract reason why he could not, if he chose. But he evidently does not so choose. He employs the ministry of angels, and also of men. This, it is evident from Scripture and tradition, is a part of his plan. In his works of providence, especially in the supernatural order, he admits the faithful, whether angels or men, to a share, employs them on his errands of love and mercy, and permits them to co-operate with him in the work of converting and perfecting souls. He does this, not because he needs them, not because he would impose upon them a task; but because he loves them, and delights to honor them. It is a great honor to be employed by him, and to be permitted to labor in his service. Even to be employed by a temporal prince in the administration of the temporal government is counted a great honor to the one employed; men covet it, and to obtain it shrink from no exertion, and sometimes even from no crime. But the honor of being employed by God, the King of kings and Lord of lords, is infinitely greater than can be that of being employed by the greatest and best of temporal sovereigns. It is a favor which God shows to those who love him, a reward which he confers on them for their love and devotion to him. As he delights to honor them, and to give them, so to speak, a part in his own glory, as the Friend, the Ruler, the Redeemer and Saviour of men, he permits them to be agents for obtaining and communicating his favors and graces to others. This evidently, from the whole of our religion, is the principle on which he conducts his gracious providence, and we need spend no time in proving it.

Now, this premised, we can understand why intercession may and does have place. God does not need the intercession of any one to placate him, and to render him disposed to confer graces on mankind, for the charity that intercedes comes from him, as its fountain, as its origin and cause; but he requires it for the honor and reward of his saints, so

that the intercessor shall be blessed at the same time that is blessed the one for whom he intercedes. It is only on the principle of intercession that prayers for one another are proper, or justifiable, for to pray for another is to make intercession for him. All concede the propriety of praying for one another, and of asking another to pray for us. The priest makes intercession for the people when he prays for them. The Protestant even solicits intercession, when he asks his minister and the congregation to pray for him, for his family, for health, for recovery from sickness, for the sanctification to him of his sorrows or afflictions,—that he may be protected in his journeying by sea or by land, or that he may be delivered from dangers which threaten, and blessed with seed-time and harvest, rain and sunshine. Every one admits the principle, whenever he says to another, "Pray for me," or, "Let me have an interest in your prayers."

Now, here is the principle of the invocation of saints. No one hesitates to ask his friend to pray for him, that is, intercede for him, and the better we esteem such friend, and the more we love him, the more confidently do we beg his prayers. Why shall we ask a weak and fallible mortal, still affected by the infirmities of the flesh, to pray for us, and yet shrink from asking the same thing of a saint in heaven, who sees God face to face? Is it that the saint is less alive? To suppose it were to doubt immortality. The church teaches us better, in calling the day of the death or departure of a saint his birthday, because it is only then the saint truly begins to live. All before had been, as it were, only a promise of life, upon the reality of which he now enters. It is the blessed privilege of the Christian to have a full assurance of a future life, and to look upon the world after death as more truly real than the present. He has faith, not a simple conjecture, opinion, or persuasion, but faith, which is no less certain than actual personal knowledge. The saints who have thrown off the flesh are to him as near, as dear, as living, as before, and far more so. We do not lose our friends when they die; we gain them, if they die in the Lord. "As I live," saith our Lord, "so shall ye live also." Not for us does the glorious army of saints and martyrs, the bright choir of virgins and purified souls, who honored their Lord in the flesh, exalted the aspirations and hopes of mankind, glorified human nature through divine grace, and consecrated the whole earth,

sleep in the cold grave, or lie torpid in some undefined region, waiting the return of a warm spring morning to wake anew into life and activity. They are now living, full of life, a sweet, joyous life, in comparison with which what we call our life is but death.

Is it that the saints have ceased to love us? To suppose it were to deny or to forget the communion of saints, that saints on earth and saints in heaven make but one holy communion, are all members of one body, members of one head, Christ the Lord, and through him members one of another. The glory of the saints when in this world was in this holy communion, in the intercommunion of life between the member and the body, and between the body and the head. They loved their brethren, and knew that they had passed from death to life because they loved them. They lived in and for this communion when here, and were ready at any moment to pour out their life to obtain blessings for it, or to bring new souls within it. Has all this changed with them now? Do they cease to be members of the church, whom Christ so loved, and whom he hath purchased with his own blood? In being made more like God, in being raised to a participation in a still higher degree of the divine nature, in being assimilated to their head, because seeing him as he is,—do they become all at once indifferent to those whom he loves, and without interest in the great end of the Incarnation, the highest glory of God? It is impossible. We know better. We know they become like the angels of God, and we know there is joy in heaven among the angels over one sinner doing penance, and therefore that saints do still take an interest in our welfare, and in whatever pertains to our real good.

Is it that they have lost their power, and that, now they are perfected in glory, God will no longer hear their prayers or suffer their intercession? What more absurd! We know that he employs the ministry of angels, and that the intercession of the saint must be more acceptable to him, and more effectual with him, than the intercession of the ungodly, or even the imperfect, and therefore the more holy one is, the more pleasing and effectual must be his intercession. Nor can we suppose that they are incapable of hearing and presenting our petitions. It is not *dead* men we invoke, when we invoke the saints, as rationalistic Protestants pretend, thereby unintentionally revealing their own want of faith in the immortality of the soul, and the reality of the future life. They are living men,

shorn of none of their powers by being beatified in heaven. They see God face to face, and they may see all that concerns us, and all that we do, in him, as in a mirror which reflects all. Moreover, beatified spirits are no longer affected by the accidents of space and time which affect us, and which render our communion with one another and with the external world so imperfect. Nothing prevents them from being present to the heart that invokes them, ready to receive our petitions as soon as formed in our own minds and hearts, and to present them to our Lord. They see and hear all in God, by whom they are present to all. We do not see all in God as they do. We see all, indeed, by his uncreated light, which enlighteneth every man that cometh into the world, but much by that light only as reflected to us from sensible things. We see not our guardian angel, yet he as a pure intelligence sees and hears us, and can instantly report all to the company of heaven, or to the saint that we invoke, so that the saint can never be ignorant of the petitions we proffer. In some one or in all of these ways, it is easy to conceive the saint may know what is asked of him. Granting, then, the principle of intercession, as we must, if we ever allow one man to ask the prayers of another, we must concede the propriety of the invocation of saints, and then, evidently, the propriety of invoking Mary, and begging her intercession for us. Hence we find wholly justifiable the worship of Mary as a saint, or that worship which we render her in common with all the saints.

But we worship Mary, not only as St. Mary, in common with all the saints; we render her also a peculiar and a much higher worship. This worship is authorized by her peculiar relation to the mystery of the Incarnation, therefore to our salvation, and is rendered in honor of that mystery itself, that is, in honor of God in his human as well as his divine nature. Those who reject the Incarnation, such as Pelagians, Nestorians, Socinians, or Unitarians, can understand nothing of this worship, and have no lot or part in it; for they can neither worship God in his human nature, nor admit that he really assumed flesh from the flesh of Mary. To them Mary is only an ordinary woman, and holds no peculiar relation to the mystery of Redemption. She has, in their view, nothing to do with our salvation, and is related to the faithful no otherwise than is any other woman. They assign her no peculiar position or office in the economy of God's gracious providence. They are offended when they hear us call

her the mother of God, and sneer at us when they hear us address her as our own dear mother. We have nothing here to say to them. The worship of Mary presupposes the Incarnation, and they who shrink from it show by that fact that they do not really believe in the mystery, and therefore do not really embrace the Christian religion, and at best make only a hollow profession of it. There is and can be no truer test of one's active, living faith in our holy religion, in the redemption and salvation of sinners through the cross, than a firm attachment to the worship of Mary, or a lively devotion to our blessed Lady. This is, probably, wherefore devotion to Mary is commonly regarded by the saints as a sign of election.

The peculiar honor we render to Mary, called by our writers *hyperdulia*, as distinguished from simple *dulia*, or the worship we pay to all the saints, presupposes the real incarnation of our Lord in her chaste womb, and her real and subsisting maternal relations to God made man. Concede the Incarnation, and the worship follows as a necessary consequence, because then Mary becomes truly the mother of God. If you concede the Incarnation, you must concede that Mary is the mother of God; if you deny that she is the mother of God, you must deny the Incarnation. There is no middle course possible. If Mary is the mother of her son, then the relations between mother and son and all that those relations imply subsist and must for ever subsist between them, and she must be honored as the mother of God, and therefore of grace, the grace through which we are redeemed and saved.

In the Incarnation God assumes human nature, becomes man without ceasing to be God, and so assumes human nature that he becomes from the moment of the Incarnation as truly human as he is divine,—perfect man as well as perfect God. It is not that a perfect man is united to perfect God, but that perfect God becomes himself really perfect man, in such sort that the human nature is as truly the nature of the divine person or Word, as is the divine nature itself. The two natures are united in one person, or the one person is the hypostasis or the one *suppositum* of two distinct natures, one divine, the other human. The tendency of Protestants, even of those who profess to hold the mystery of the Incarnation, is to regard the union, not as the union of two natures in one person, but as a simple moral union of two persons, one human, the other God, or the union of human nature in its own human personality with God, which is what

Nestorius taught. Hence, Protestants have a tendency to dissolve Christ, and to cherish the spirit of what the apostle calls Antichrist. But the true doctrine of the Incarnation, which we must admit, if we admit any real incarnation at all, is, that the human and divine natures are united, without being confounded, in one divine person. Person is distinguishable, but not separable, from nature, for no person is conceivable as really existing without a nature; and though human as well as divine nature is distinguishable from person, yet neither is conceivable as really existing without person or personality. The human nature of Christ is not human nature divested of personality; it is a person as much as is the human nature of Peter or John, but its person is divine, not human,—the eternal person of the divine nature of Christ. Hence Christ is two distinct natures in one person, which divine person is God, or the second person of the ever-adorable Trinity.

Now God in his human nature is literally and truly the Son of Mary, and she is as much his mother as any woman is the mother of her own son. She is not the mother of a son united to God, of a human son received into union with God, for that were the error of the Adoptionists, and would imply that the human nature of Christ has a human personality, which it has not, and never had. Human nature cannot exist without a personality, and the human nature of Christ, therefore, was not and could not have been generated without his divine personality. Then that which was conceived in the womb of Mary and born of her was the divine person assuming to himself flesh, or the nature of man, therefore God. Hence, in the strictest sense of the word, Mary is the mother of God, and therefore God is as truly her son as any one is the son of his own mother. Unquestionably, Mary was not the mother of God in his divine nature, that is, the mother of the divinity, for in that sense God is eternal, necessary, and self-existent being, and the Creator of Mary, not her son; but God incarnate is still God, and God having assumed flesh is no less God in his human nature than in his divine nature. And therefore Mary is none the less the mother of God because his mother only in his human nature, for the human nature of which she is the mother is the human nature of God. She is not the mother of the Divinity, but she is the mother of God, for since the Incarnation, God the Son is the one person of both divine nature and human nature, and is as to nature at once God and man.

How God can descend to be the person of human nature, or exalt human nature to be truly his own nature, is a mystery which we do not attempt to explain, which transcends every created intelligence, and which none but himself can fully comprehend. All we know or pretend to know is the fact that he has done so, and thus, although our Creator, has become our brother, flesh of our flesh, that we might be made partakers of his divine nature, and live for ever in a true society with him.

Now Mary, as the mother of God, is something more than an ordinary woman, and holds a place in the economy of grace different from that of any other woman, different from and above that of any other creature. She has been honored by the Creator as no other creature has been, for she alone has been selected by him to be his mother. If God has distinguished her from all other women, if he has chosen her to be his mother, shall not we distinguish her from all other women, and honor her as his mother? What higher honor could God confer on a creature than he has conferred on Mary? Shall we not honor whom God himself delights to honor, and like him give her the highest honor that we can give to a creature? We are to love and honor the Son as we love and honor the Father, and we are to love and honor him in his humanity no less than in his divinity. We cannot dissolve Christ; for "Every spirit that dissolveth Jesus," says the blessed Apostle John, "is not of God; and this is that Antichrist of whom ye have heard that he cometh, and he is now already in the world." (1 John iv. 3.) We cannot dissolve Christ, and worship him in his divine nature only, and refuse to worship him in his human nature. He is one Christ, not two, one human, the other divine,—is two for ever distinct natures in one person, to be loved and honored alike in both natures, and therefore in her from whom he took his human nature. We cannot honor him without honoring her, if we try, nor honor her as his mother without honoring him. Such is the intimate relation between the mother and the Son, that whatever honor we render her as his mother redounds to him, and whatever honor we render to him as her son—that is, to him as come in the flesh —will overflow and extend to her. The two cannot be separated, for the flesh of the son is of the flesh of the mother, and both have one and the same nature, and impossible is it to honor the nature in the one without honoring it in the other.

If we bear this in mind, we shall find no difficulty in justifying the peculiar worship of Mary, or in vindicating the strongest language which Catholic piety has ever used in addressing her. Mary is the mother of God; from her the Son of God took his flesh, his human nature. By this fact she becomes intimately connected with the mystery of our redemption and final salvation. We are redeemed only by God, not in his divine nature, but in that very nature which he took from the womb of Mary. In the present providence of God, man could not be saved and enabled to gain his supernatural end without the incarnation of the Son, that is to say, man could be redeemed only by God in the flesh,—God in human nature; for as the divine nature can neither suffer, nor obey, nor merit, it was only in human nature, in the flesh, become really his nature, that God could perform the work of redemption, that he could satisfy for sin, and merit for us the grace of pardon and sanctification. Mary is thus called, and rightly called, "the mother of grace," for she is it inasmuch as she is mother of the sacred flesh through which grace has been purchased and is communicated to us.

But God did not become incarnate in the womb of Mary without her free, voluntary consent; and thus she by her own will co-operates in the work of our redemption, and therefore, for another reason, may be called the mother of grace and associated with our salvation. Much of what is said of Mary in this respect rests on the fact of this consent. We might reasonably presume, from what we know of the dealings of God with men, that this consent was first obtained; for we cannot well suppose that God would do violence to one he so loved as to choose her to be his mother, or that he would be conceived in her womb against or without her free consent. It is evident, also, from the history given us by St. Luke of the Annunciation, that this consent was asked and obtained. "The Angel Gabriel was sent from God into a city of Galilee called Nazareth, to a virgin espoused to a man named Joseph, of the house of David; and the name of the virgin was Mary. And the angel being come in said to her: Hail, Mary, full of grace! the Lord is with thee: blessed art thou among women. And when she had heard, she was troubled at his saying, and thought within herself what manner of salutation this should be. And the angel said to her, Fear not, Mary; for thou hast found grace with God. Behold thou shalt conceive in thy womb, and shalt bring forth a son; and thou

shalt call his name Jesus. He shall be great, and shall be called the son of the Most High; and the Lord God shall give unto him the throne of David his father; and he shall reign in the house of Jacob forever, and of his kingdom there shall be no end. And Mary said to the angel, How shall this be done, because I know not man? And the angel answering said to her, The Holy Ghost shall come upon thee; and the power of the Most High shall overshadow thee. And therefore also the Holy that shall be born of thee shall be called the Son of God. And behold thy cousin Elizabeth, she hath also conceived a son in her old age, and this is the sixth month with her that is called barren; because no word shall be impossible with God. And Mary said, *Behold the handmaid of the Lord: be it done to me according to thy word.* And the angel departed from her."

Here manifestly is consent asked and consent given, and though given, not given till an explanation has been demanded and received. It is plain from the narrative that Mary was not only a virgin, but resolved always to be a virgin, and she gives not her consent until assured by the angel that she can become the mother of the Son of God without prejudice to her virginity. She knows not and will not know man, but when assured that this is not necessary, and referred to the conception of her cousin Elizabeth as an evidence that no word is impossible with God, then, but not till then, does she give her consent. "Behold the handmaid of the Lord: *be it done to me according to thy word.*" There was then a moment when the salvation of the world depended on the consent of Mary. Man could not be redeemed, satisfaction could not be made for sin, and grace obtained, without the Incarnation, and the Incarnation could not take place without the free, voluntary consent of this humble Jewish maiden. While, then, we are lost in admiration of the infinite condescension of God, that would do such honor to human nature, as in some sort to place himself in dependence on the will of one of our race, to carry into effect his own purpose of infinite love and mercy, we cannot help feeling deep gratitude to Mary for the consent she gave. We call her blessed for the great things He that is mighty has done to her, and we bless her also for her own consent to the work of redemption. She gave to that work all she had; she gave her will; she gave her flesh; she gave her own son to one long passion of

thirty-three years, to the agony in the garden, and to the death on the cross. It is true, God had selected her from all eternity to be his mother, and had filled her with grace; but neither the election nor the grace took away her free will, or diminished the merit of her voluntary consent. She could have refused; and deserves she no love and gratitude from us, who have hope only through her flesh assumed by the Son of God, that she did not refuse? Can we say, in view of this fact, that she has no peculiar relation to our redemption, no share in the work of our salvation? To say so would be simply to deny that we are redeemed and saved by God in the flesh, that the flesh or human nature of our Lord performs any office in the work of redemption and salvation. Here is wherefore to refuse to honor Mary as connected with and sharing in that work is to deny that it is in his human nature that God redeems and saves us, which is either to deny redemption and salvation altogether, or to contend that God redeems and saves us in his divinity, that is, to contend that the divine nature suffered and died!

Mary is really the mother of our Lord, for our Lord did in reality, not in appearance merely, come in the flesh. He is true God of God, and true man of the flesh of the Virgin. Then between Mary and Jesus there was and is the real relation of mother and son. This relation is a subsisting relation, and subsists as really in heaven as it did when both were on the earth; and therefore Mary still preserves all her maternal rights in regard to her Son, and he still owes her all filial love, reverence, and obedience. For if he is God, he is also man, and in his humanity has all that pertains to pure and sinless humanity. This would even justify in some measure the expression,—which, however, does not please us,—said to have sometimes been used, not by the church, but by some Catholics in their ardent devotion to Mary, "Command thy Son." The Son of God in his humanity, not of course in his divine nature, nor in any matter which is proper to him only in that nature, was subject to Mary here, and obeyed her; and as the two natures remain in him for ever distinct, two natures in one person, we know no reason for supposing that the relation, and what pertains essentially to it, between the mother and the Son in his human nature, are not precisely, saving that both are now in a glorified state, what they were when on the earth. We are not to suppose the soul loses in the future life the habits of this, and therefore we must suppose that the habits

of obedience, love, and reverence of our Lord to his holy mother here, are still retained. Therefore, that her will, always one with God's will, because moved by the divine charity, is still regarded by him as the will of his mother, and has that weight with him that the right will of a mother must always have with a good, pious, and loving son.

This much, at least, is certain, that he loves his mother, loves her as his own mother, and delights to honor her. This is no more than belongs to filial affection. We may then see the reasonableness of what many of our writers say, that Mary is the channel through which our Lord dispenses his graces, and that he dispenses none save through her intercession. This, perhaps, is not precisely of faith, but it is a very general opinion of our doctors. There is no reason why it should not be so, and there are many why we should hold it, aside from the authority of the doctors and the general belief of the faithful. She is the channel through which all grace flows to us, inasmuch as she is the mother of the flesh in which God merited grace for us, redeems, sanctifies, and blesses us with everlasting life. But aside from this, to be made the channel through which God communicates his graces to us, whether the grace of conversion or of perseverance, is a high honor to her. And can we doubt that Jesus, as a loving son, would delight to load with honors that dear mother who had borne him in her womb, and in her arms, and nursed him at her breast? Could he confer on her a higher honor than to make her intercession the condition on which he dispenses grace to us while in the flesh? Can we suppose his love for her would not induce him to do so? Did he not, even before conceived in her womb, fill her with grace, make her all beautiful? What then, that can be communicated to a creature, will he withhold from her? He will withhold no good thing from them that love him, certainly not then from his own dear mother, who loves him more than any one else. It would be in strict accordance with the plan of God's gracious providence, which includes the ministry of angels, and adopts throughout the principle of intercession as an integral part of it, for our Lord to place Mary first, and to give her the blessed privilege of interceding in all cases, and of always having her intercession effectual. The whole, under this point of view, rests on the love which God bears to his saints, and his delight to honor them. It would seem, if we may so speak, that his love is so great that he exhausts

his infinite wisdom in multiplying honors to them. And which of his saints should he so delight to honor as his own immaculate and loving mother?

Mary is also *our* mother, the mother of all the faithful. They who never reflect on the mystery of the Incarnation, and who have no faith in redemption through the cross, laugh at us when we call Mary our mother. Yet she is our mother, and, to say the least, as truly our mother as was Eve herself. Eutychianism is a heresy. The human nature, hypostatically united to the divine, remains for ever distinct from the divine nature, and therefore our Lord remains for ever God and man in one divine person. By assuming our nature, the Son of God has made himself our brother. We become, through the nature so assumed, of the same nature with God. Hence he is not ashamed to call us brethren. Now of this human nature in Christ, by which we become united to God by nature, Mary is the mother, and as the human as well as the divine nature is one, she is truly our mother, in so far as we through that nature become united to him. She is not our natural mother in the sense of mother of our personality, but of our nature in God, and in so far as we were raised to brotherhood with Christ her Son, and are made through him one with God.

She is our spiritual mother, for it is only through her flesh assumed by the Son of God that we were redeemed and begotten to the new spiritual life. We cannot too often repeat, that it is the Word made flesh, or God in the flesh, that redeems and saves or beatifies us. It is always through the incarnate Son that we have access to the Father, or that even the saints in heaven become one with God, and behold him in the beatific vision as he is. The life we as Christians live here is the life that proceeds from God in his humanity, and the life we hope to live hereafter proceeds from him in the same sense. To suppose the saint here or hereafter separated from the flesh which God assumed in the womb of the Virgin, would be to suppose his annihilation as a saint, as much as to suppose our separation from God as creator would be to suppose the annihilation of our natural existence. Here is the mystery of godliness which was manifest in the flesh. Then, unless we can make it true that Mary is not the mother of our Lord in his human nature, we cannot make it untrue that she is our spiritual mother. So long as spiritual life is dependent on God in his human nature, so long is Mary truly the mother of spir-

itual life, and so long as she is the mother of that life, so long is she our spiritual mother, and to be honored as such, and honored even more than our natural mother, for the spiritual life is infinitely more than the natural life. Mary is also our spiritual mother, inasmuch as it has been through her intercession that we have been regenerated, and hope to obtain the gift of perseverance.

Mary is called the queen of heaven,—of heaven and earth,—universal queen. Our Lord is king, for to him has all dominion been given. He is king, not merely as Son of God, in his divine nature, but he is king in his human nature, as Son of Mary. Her son is king; then she, as mother of the king, is queen, the queen his mother. As he loves and honors his mother, and must as a good son wish all creatures also to love and honor her, he must have crowned her queen, and given her a formal title to the love, honor, and obedience due a queen.

Here are considerations which, if taken in connection with the mystery of the Incarnation, will fully justify our warm devotion to Mary, and the strongest expressions which in the fervor of our piety we can use. God has honored her and placed her above every other creature, next below himself, and endowed her with all the graces a creature can receive, and exalted her to a rank as near his own as she can hold without ceasing to be creature. She is pure, spotless, all-beautiful, full of grace, full of sweet love, co-operating in her will in the whole work of redemption, and constantly interceding for sinners, and the perseverance of the regenerate. What more can we say? What other creature can have higher, or any thing like so high, claims upon our love and gratitude? And what can be more pleasing to her divine Son, than for us to regard ourselves as her clients, and to render her the highest honor in our power? Considering her relation as mother of our King, the love her Son bears her, the high honor he bestows on her, and the favors he delights constantly to show her, whose intercession can be more powerful, or whom can man invoke with more, or with equal confidence?

The peculiar devotion of Catholics to Mary springs, as all must see, from our faith in the Incarnation. Granting that mystery, all is right and proper, and consequently the fact that we insist on it bears witness to the world that we believe with a firm faith that that mystery is a reality, that Jesus has really come in the flesh, and that by his flesh, or

God in the flesh, we are saved. The worship of Mary is one perpetual festival in honor of that sacred mystery, and the prominent part assigned to Mary in all Catholic worship is only a proof of our faith, that all in Christian redemption and salvation turns on the mystery of the Word made flesh. The daily practice of devotion to Mary as the mother of God, aside from the special graces it obtains for us, keeps alive in our minds and in our hearts this mystery of mysteries, and our dependence on it for every good in the spiritual order. We cannot think of Mary without thinking of Jesus; we cannot honor her without honoring him as her Son; for here the honor of the mother is from the son, not the honor of the son from the mother. We do not honor Mary as separated from her son, but as his mother, and for what she is being his mother. Her name brings at once to our mind his name, and the mystery of the Incarnation, the foundation of all our hope, the source of all our life. We do not connect her with the mystery of Redemption as efficient cause, for the efficient cause is the infinite charity of the ever-adorable Trinity, but we do connect her with it as a medial cause, as an instrument, and as an instrument freely co-operating, and therefore as not without a moral share in the work and the glory of our salvation. As long as we worship her, we can never forget the Lord that bought us, who has redeemed us with a price, with the price of his own blood; and indifference to her worship is always a sign of a want of love to him, and of faith in the Incarnation as a reality. None of those who reject her worship understand, or if they understand believe, the doctrine of salvation through the cross. Her worship is the best conceivable preservative of the essential Christian faith, and to neglect it, as we see from the history of Protestantism, is only to fall into unbelief and mere naturalism.

The pretence of those who consider that this worship of the saints, and especially of Mary, is idolatry, does not move us in the least. So far is it from being idolatry, it is a real and sure protection against idolatry. Idolatry consists in worshipping that which is not God in the place of God, or giving to that which is not God the honor due only to God. We are not commanded to honor, that is, to worship,—for, according to the true sense of the word, *to worship* means *to honor*,—none but God. We are commanded to honor the king, magistrates, our parents, and indeed all men. The heathen were idolaters, not simply because they had images,

and honored them, but because they either worshipped the images as being themselves God, or as symbols of non-existing or demoniacal powers, that is, as symbolizing either what is not, or what is not God. To honor the saints as God, or as gods having a divinity of their own, though inferior to the supreme Divinity, would undoubtedly be idolatry. But we do no such thing. We honor or worship God in his saints, as his work, and therefore the honor we give them redounds to him, for they are saints only by his grace. We do not honor Mary as God; we know she is a creature, and that it is only as a creature we can honor her. The very foundation of the honor we give her is the fact that she is a creature. We honor her as the mother of God, from whose womb he took his flesh, his created nature, and therefore to deny her to be a creature herself would be to deny the very foundation of the honor we render her. The more we honor her, the more, therefore, are we reminded that she is not God, but is, like ourselves, God's creature. We cannot call her our mother, and assert that it is only through the flesh our Lord took from her womb that we come into brotherhood with him, and are united to him by a common nature, without distinctly asserting her to be a creature like ourselves. To suppose her divine, or any other than a true woman of our own race, would overthrow our whole faith in the mystery of the Incarnation, and destroy all hopes of heaven. Truly then may we say, that to honor Mary as the mother of God is not only not idolatry, but the best possible preservative against idolatry, and as Catholics are the only people who really thus honor her, so are they also the only people in the world who are wholly free from all taint of idolatry.

Protestants call the worship we pay to our Lady, in which they have no share, Mariolatry, and, in order to justify their alienation from the family of Christ, seek, under pretext of zeal for the honor of God, to brand it as idolatrous. We are neither moved nor surprised by this. They have lost the deep sense of the Christian religion, and really retain no worship to God superior to that which we pay to him in his saints. In regard to external worship, it is not we who worship Mary as God, but they who do not worship God himself as God. The peculiar distinctive external worship of God is the offering of sacrifice; but Protestants have no sacrifice, as they have no priesthood, and no altar,—even their temple is only a meeting-house, or place of assembling

together. In rejecting the sacrifice of the mass, they have retained nothing more than we offer to Mary and the saints. Consequently they are unable to perceive any distinction between what they regard as the external worship of God, and that which we render to him in his saints,—that is, a worship of prayer and praise. But we have a sacrifice, and are therefore able to distinguish between the highest honor we render to his saints, and the supreme worship we render to him. Supreme religious worship is sacrifice, and sacrifice we offer to God only, never to any creature.

The Protestant may speak of internal sacrifices, those of a broken heart, and of inward justice, but these are only sacrifices by way of analogy, and what should always accompany the sacrifice proper. If the Protestant tells us he has in the interior homage of contrition and real submission of himself a distinct and peculiar worship of God, we tell him, in return, that then he must not call the worship we render to Mary Mariolatry, because this homage and submission, in the sense he means, we never offer to her. If he has something in this interior homage that pertains to supreme worship, the worship of *latria*, he must bear in mind that we do not offer it to the saints, and therefore our worship of them is not idolatry; if he has not something of this sort, then he does not himself offer any worship proper to God, external or internal, and therefore has in no sense any worship to offer to God of a higher order than that which we offer to Mary and the saints. Hence we are not surprised that he should accuse us of Mariolatry.

The simple truth is, that the Protestant rejects the worship of Mary because he does not believe in the Incarnation, and his calling it Mariolatry is only a proof that he dissolves Jesus, and is Antichrist, and does not believe salvation cometh from God in the flesh, from God whose nature is human nature as well as divine nature. The honor we render to Mary is in the last analysis the honor we pay to the sacred mystery of the Incarnation, and either it is idolatry to worship the human nature of Christ, that is, God in his human nature, or our devotion to Mary is not idolatry. The first, none but a Unitarian dare assert, and therefore none other dare deny the last.

The worship of the saints, we therefore conclude, is the worship of God in his works; the peculiar worship of Mary is the honoring of God in the mystery of the Incarnation. As God in both is infinitely adorable, the honor we render

to the saints or to Mary can never be carried too high, and as it is always distinguishable in kind from that worship which we render to him for what he is in himself, as God our Creator, Redeemer, and supreme good, it can never be idolatry, or detract from the honor due to him alone. We love and honor God too little, but we cannot love and honor the saints too much; we are too weak, too cold, and too languid in our love to Jesus, but we cannot be too strong and fervid in our love to Mary, for we can never love and honor her so much as God himself loves and honors her.

We need not say that works on the love and veneration of Mary can hardly be too much multiplied, for that love and veneration cannot be carried to excess. No doubt, wherever there is strong faith and lively devotion, without proper instruction, there may chance to be manifested now and then something of superstition, whether the immediate object of worship be the saints or even God himself; for there is nothing which men cannot abuse. But superstition, except as combined with idolatry and unbelief, or misbelief, is not one of the dangers of our times; and as the worship of Mary is the best preservative from idolatry, heresy, and unbelief, so is it the best preservative from superstition. Her clients will never become spiritual rappers, or abettors of modern necromancy. Her devout children will not be found among those who call up the spirits of the dead, and seek to be placed in communication with devils. The devils fly at her approach, and all lying spirits are silent in her presence. She is queen of heaven and earth, and even rebellious spirits must tremble and bow before her. Demon-worship is undeniably reviving in the modern Protestant world, and especially in our own country, and even in this good city of Boston; and there is no room to doubt that it is owing to the abandonment of the worship of Mary, which carries along with it the abandonment of the worship of her Son, the incarnate God. Where Mary is not loved and honored, Christ is not worshipped; and where Christ is not worshipped, the devils have the field all to themselves. The first symptom of apostasy from Christ and of a lapse into heathenism is the neglect of the worship of his most holy mother, and the rejection of that worship as superstition or idolatry; because that involves a rejection of the Incarnation, which comprises in itself all Christianity. Christianity is held only when the Incarnation is held, and when that is held, Mary is held to be the mother of God, and deserving of all honor

as such. We cannot doubt the propriety of worshipping Mary till we have doubted her relation as mother of God, and to doubt that is to doubt the whole mystery of the Incarnation.

In its bearings on Christian faith and worship, then, we cherish the worship of Mary, and are anxious to see devotion to her increased. But we are also anxious to see it increase, as the best preservative against the moral dangers of our epoch. Mary is the mother of chaste love, and chaste love is that which in our age is most rare. The predominating sin of our times is that of impurity, at once the cause and the effect of the modern sentimental philosophy. All the popular literature of the day is unchaste and impure, and it boldly denounces marriage as slavery, and demands that loose reins be given to the passions. Catholic morality is scouted as impracticable and absurd; law is regarded as fallen into desuetude; intellect is derided; reason is looked upon as superfluous, if not tyrannical; and the heart is extolled as the representative of God on earth. Feeling is honored as the voice of the Most High, and whatever tends to restrain or control it is held to be a direct violation of the will of our Creator. Hence passion is deified, and nothing is held to be sacred but our transitory feelings. Hence everywhere we find an impatience of restraint, a loud and indignant protest against all rule or measure in our affections and all those usages and customs of past times intended as safeguards of manners and morals, and a universal demand for liberty, which simply means unbounded license to follow our impure or perverted instincts, and to indulge our most turbulent and unchaste passions, without shame or remorse.

The sentimental philosophy taught by that impure citizen of Calvin's city of Geneva, Jean Jacques Rousseau, in his *Confessions* and *Nouvelle Héloïse*, and which is popularized by such writers as Goethe, George Sand, Eugene Sue, Thomas Carlyle, Theodore Parker, Ralph Waldo Emerson, Margaret Fuller, and, to some extent, Bulwer Lytton, consecrating corrupt concupiscence, has affected an almost universal dissolution of manners and depravation of morals. All bonds are loosened, and the very existence of society is threatened by the fearful and unrelenting warfare waged upon the family as constituted by Catholic morality. The terrible revolutions which for the last sixty or seventy years have shaken society to its foundations, and which have been repressed and are held in check for the moment only by the

strong arm of arbitrary power, are only the outward manifestations of the still more terrible revolutions which have been going on in the interior of man; and the anarchy which reigns in society is only the natural expression of the anarchy that reigns in the bosom of the individual. In the non-Catholic world, and even in nominally Catholic countries, impurity has gained a powerful ascendency, and seeks to proclaim itself as law, and to denounce whatever is hostile to it as repugnant to the rights both of God and man. Chastity is denounced as a vice, as a crime against nature, and the unrestrained indulgence of the senses is dignified with the name of virtue, nay, is denominated religious worship, and we may almost fear that fornication and adultery may again be imposed as religious rites, as they were in ancient Babylon and other cities of the East.

The last, perhaps the only, remedy for this fearful state of things, is to be sought in promoting and extending the worship of Mary. Society is lapsing, if it has not already lapsed, into the state in which Christianity found it some eighteen hundred years ago, and a new conversion of the gentiles has become necessary. Christian society can be restored only by the same faith and worship which originally created it. Jesus and Mary are now, as then, the only hope of the world, and their power and their good-will remain undiminished. The worship of Mary as mother of God redeemed the pagan world from its horrible corruptions, introduced and sustained the Christian family, and secured the fruits of the sacrament of marriage. It will do no less for our modern world, if cultivated; and we regard as one of the favorable signs that better times are at hand, the increasing devotion to Mary. This increasing devotion is marked throughout the whole Catholic world, as is manifest from the intense interest that is felt in the probable approaching definition of the question of the Immaculate Conception. Nowhere is the change in regard to devotion to Mary as the mother of God more striking, than among the Catholics of Great Britain and of our own country. This devotion is peculiarly Catholic, and any increase of it is an indication of reviving life and fervor among Catholics; and if Catholics had only the life and fervor they should have, the whole world would soon bow in humble reverence at the foot of the cross. It is owing to our deadness, our lack of zeal, our lack of true fervor in our devotions, that so

many nations and such multitudes of souls are still held in the chains of darkness, under the dominion of Satan.

There are two ways in which the love and service of Mary will contribute to redeem society and restore Christian purity, —the one the natural influence of such love and service on the heart of her worshippers, and the other the graces which in requital she obtains from her Son and bestows upon her clients. Mary is the mother of chaste love. The nature of love is always to unite the heart to the object loved, to become one with it, and as far as possible to become it. Love always makes us like the beloved, and we always become like the object we really and sincerely worship. If we may say, Like worshippers, like gods, we may with equal truth say, Like gods, like worshippers. The love of Mary tends naturally, from the nature of all love, to unite us to her by a virtue kindred to her own. We cannot love her, dwell constantly on her merits, on her excellences, her glories, without being constantly led to imitate her virtues, to love and strive after her perfect purity, her deep humility, her profound submission, and her unreserved obedience. Her love checks all lawlessness of the affections, all turbulence of the passions, all perturbation of the senses, fills the heart with sweet peace and a serene joy, restores to the soul its self-command, and maintains perfect order and tranquillity within. Something of this effect is produced whenever we love any truly virtuous person. Our novelists have marked it, and on the strength of it seek to reform the wild and graceless youth by inspiring in his heart a sincere love for a pure and virtuous woman ; and the most dissolute are restrained, their turbulence is calmed, their impure desires are repressed, in the presence of true virtue. If this is so when the beloved is but an ordinary mortal, how much more when the beloved, the one with whom we commune, and whose virtues we reverence and long to possess, is Mary, the mother of God, the simplest and lowliest of handmaidens, but surpassing in true beauty, loveliness, and worth all the other creatures of God!

When the type of female dignity and excellence admired is that of an Aspasia, a Lamia, a Phryne, a Ninon de l'Enclos, society is not only already corrupt, but is continually becoming more corrupt. So when the type of female worth and excellence, the ideal of woman, is Mary, society is not only in some degree virtuous, but must be continually rising to sublimer excellence, to more heroic sanctity. The ad-

vantage of having Mary always before the minds and hearts of our daughters, as their model in humility, purity, sweetness, and obedience, in simplicity, modesty, and love, is not easily estimated. Trained up in the love and imitation of her virtues, they are trained to be wives and mothers, or holy virgins, spouses of Jesus Christ, sisters of the afflicted, and mothers of the poor. The sentimentalists of the day tell us that it is woman's mission to redeem society from its present corruption, and we believe it, though not in their sense, or for their reasons. Woman has generally retained more of Catholic faith and morality than has in these evil times been retained by the other sex, and is more open to good impressions, or rather, offers fewer obstacles to the operations of grace. During the worst times in France, when religion was abolished, when the churches were desecrated, the clergy massacred, and the profane rites of the impure Venus were revived, the great majority of the women of France retained their faith, and cherished the worship of the Virgin. We have no sympathy with those who make woman an idol, and clamor for what they call "woman's rights," but we honor woman, and depend on her, under God, to preserve and diffuse Catholic morality in the family, and if in the family, then in the state. There is always hope for society as long as woman remains believing and chaste, and nothing will contribute so much to her remaining so, as having the Blessed Virgin presented to her from the first dawn of her affections as her mother, her queen, her sweet lady, her type of womanhood, a model which it must be the unremitting labor of her life to copy.

Undoubtedly the worship of Mary is restricted to Catholics, and to those Catholics not undeserving of the name; but this is no objection to our general conclusion. We are too apt to forget that the church is in the world, and that it is through her that society is redeemed,—too apt to forget that the quiet and unobtrusive virtues of Catholics, living in the midst of a hostile world, are always powerful in their operations on that world; and that the world is converted, not by the direct efforts which we make to convert it, but by the efforts we make to live ourselves as good Catholics, and to save our own souls. The little handful of sincere and devout Catholics, the little family of sincere and earnest clients of Mary, seeking to imitate her virtues in their own little community, are as leaven hidden in three measures of meal. Virtue goes forth from them, diffuses itself on all

sides, till the whole is leavened. No matter how small the number, the fact that even some keep alive in the community the love and veneration of Mary, the true ideal of womanhood, the true patroness of the Christian family, the mother of chaste love, adorned with all the virtues, and to whom the Holy Ghost says, "Thou art all beautiful, my dove," must have a redeeming effect on the whole community, and sooner or later must banish impurity, and revive the love of holy purity and reverence for Catholic morality.

For, in the second place, the worship of Mary is profitable, not only by the subjective effect it has upon her lovers, but also by the blessings she obtains for them, and, at their solicitation, for others. In these later times we have almost lost sight of religion in its objective character. The world has ceased to believe in the Real Presence; it denies the whole sacramental character of Christianity, and laughs at us when we speak of any sacrament as having any virtue not derived from the faith and virtue of the recipient. The whole non-Catholic world makes religion a purely subjective affair, and deduces all its truth from the mind, and all its efficacy from the heart, that accepts and cherishes it, so that even in religion, which is a binding of man anew to God, man is every thing, and God is nothing. At bottom that world is atheistical, at best Epicurean. It either denies God altogether, or excludes him from all care of the world he has created. It has no understanding of his providence, no belief in his abiding presence with his creatures, or his free and tender providence in their behalf. Faith it assumes is profitable only in its subjective operations, prayer only in its natural effect on the mind and heart of him who prays, and love only in its natural effect on the affections of the lover. This cold and atheistical philosophy is the enlightenment, the progress, of our age. But we who are Christians know that it is false; we know that God is very near unto every one of us, is ever free to help us, and that there is nothing that he will not do for them that love him truly, sincerely, and confide in him, and in him only.

Mary is the channel through which her divine Son dispenses all his graces and blessings to us, and he loves and delights to load with his favors all who love and honor her. Thus to love and serve her is the way to secure his favor, and to obtain those graces which we need to resist the workings of concupiscence, and to maintain the purity of our souls, and of our bodies, which are the temple of God.

She says, "I love them that love me," and we cannot doubt that she will favor with her always successful intercession those whom she loves. She will obtain grace for us to keep ourselves chaste, and will in requital of our love to her obtain graces even for those without, that they may be brought in and healed of their wounds and putrefying sores. So that under either point of view the love and worship of Mary, the mother of God, a mother yet a virgin, always a virgin, virgin most pure, most holy, most humble, most amiable, most loving, most merciful, most faithful, most powerful, cannot fail to enable us to overcome the terrible impurity of our age, and to attain to the virtues now most needed for our own individual salvation, and for the safety of society.

In this view of the case, we must feel that nothing is more important than the cultivation of the love and worship of Mary. She is our life, our sweetness, our hope, and we must suffer no sneers of those without, no profane babblings about "Mariolatry," to move us, or in the least deter us from giving our hearts to Mary. We must fly to her protection as the child flies to its mother, and seek our safety and our consolation in her love, in her maternal embrace. We are safe only as we repose our heads upon her bosom, and draw nourishment from her breasts. The world lieth in wickedness, festering in moral corruption, and it is a shame to name the vices and iniquity which everywhere abound. Hardly has childhood blossomed into youth, before it withers into old age. We have no youth, we have only infancy and worn-out manhood. What is to become of us? Our help is in thee, sweet Mother, and we fly to thy protection, and, O, protect us, thy children, and save us from the evil communications of this world, lost to virtue, and enslaved to the enemy of our souls!

MORAL AND SOCIAL INFLUENCE OF DEVOTION TO MARY.

[From the Ave Maria for June, 1866.]

It was said by the late lamented Father Baker, in one of his sermons, that "the blessed virgin Mary was greater in that she heard and kept the word of God than in being the mother of God." This seems to be justified by what our Lord himself says to the woman in the crowd, who exclaimed: "Blessed is the womb that bore thee, and the paps that gave thee suck." "Yea rather," he answers, "blessed are they who hear the word of God and keep it;" and also in reply to the one who told him his mother and his brethren stood without seeking him: "Who is my mother, and who are my brethren?" And stretching forth his hand toward his disciples, he said: "Behold my mother and my brethren. For whosoever doeth the will of my Father who is in heaven, he is my brother, and sister, and mother." He thus implies that doing the will of God is more than the closest ties of kindred.

The distinction of being the mother of God was great, and for that all nations were to call Mary blessed; but she was more blessed in always doing the will of God, or in the possession of those virtues which led to her selection to be the mother of God. Her personal merit in always hearing and keeping the word of God was greater than in giving her consent to be his mother; and even the great merit of that consent was in its being given in perfect submission to the will of God: "Behold the handmaid of the Lord; be it done unto me according to thy word." As much as to say: "I am the servant of the Lord; his will is mine."

None but Mary alone can ever bear the honor of being the mother of God. That is hers alone, and forever distinguishes her among all women; but her virtues, those for which God chose her among all women to be his mother, are such as all, whether men or women, may in some degree possess in common with her. None can equal them, for she was *gratia plena*, full of grace; but with the aid of grace they can approach her virtues, like her hear the word of

God and keep it; and she herself did not and could not do it without that aid. She was conceived without original stain, but yet was born of Adam's race and Christ was her Redeemer as well as ours, and she could no more enter the kingdom of heaven without regeneration than the meanest of Adam's posterity. The redeeming and elevating grace was as necessary in her case as in ours; but in her case was applied in the first instant of her conception, which, as I understand it, is the Catholic faith, and the way in which the fathers, doctors, and theologians generally understand the Immaculate Conception. Those virtues for which Mary was most blest, which are the brightest jewels in her crown, and the most brilliant ornaments of her garment of varieties, are then, as to their kind, within the reach of all, and all women may in a measure be blest as she was, by always loving and doing as she did the will of her divine Son.

I have insisted on this view, because the fact that Mary's virtues are the virtues of our own race is a reason why the devotion to her which we Catholics practise has exerted, exerts, and is fitted to exert a most salutary influence on individuals and nations, and on the manners and morals of society at large. Mary's own influence is included in that of her Son, inseparable from it, and nothing would grieve her more than an attempt to separate or even to distinguish it from his, as if she could or would be any thing without him. Her great merit is in willing only what he wills, and in doing only what he inspires and enables her to do. What she does in relation to our salvation or our progress or perseverance in grace is only what he does by her. It is really he who does it, and in crowning her, he crowns his own work. He makes her the channel or medium of his grace and favors to men because he loves and delights to honor her by granting them at her request, but it is he who grants them. She is all powerful with him, and he will deny her nothing she asks for, because she asks only for that which accords with his will, and which he is more ready and willing to grant than even she is to ask. With all the love and tenderness of her woman's nature, and of her mother's heart, she cannot love us so much or so tenderly as he does. A woman may forget her sucking child, but he cannot forget us. He delights to grant her requests for her clients, because she makes no requests which he does not inspire, and because to grant these favors at her request honors her, and gives her a share in his glory. How much the world is indebted

to her intercession with him, we know not, cannot know, and need not to know. Be it more or be it less, it is to him the world owes it, for it is he who filled her with grace and made her the most blessed of creatures, and it is he who inspires and listens to her intercessions, and her work is as indistinguishable from his as is the work of the church herself.

But the fact that the influence of the mother is not distinguishable from that of the Son, does not prevent us from distinguishing the influence on individuals and society of the special devotion we Catholics pay to our Lady, as a part of Christian worship in general. This influence cannot indeed be separated from the general influence of Christian faith and worship, but it may to a certain extent be distinguished, and considered by itself. It leaves everywhere distinct marks of itself, and modern civilization owes to it many of its characteristic features, and much of its immense superiority to that of Greek and Roman antiquity.

The worshipper of God loves, adores, praises, thanks, believes, trusts him, offers himself as a holocaust to him, implores mercy and pardon, gracious protection and help; the worshipper of the saints honors their worth, their holiness, and seeks, as the highest honor he can do them, and as the greatest favor they can do to him, to possess virtues akin to their own, and by constant meditation on them, their life and character, loving, admiring, venerating, and striving to imitate them, he can hardly fail to acquire kindred virtues, because their virtues are those of creatures like himself, and therefore by the grace of God—never withheld from those that seek it—within his reach. In this respect as being wholly human the saints are nearer to us than is our Lord himself, and we can more easily approach them. True, our Lord is "perfect man," but he is also "perfect God," the divine and human, though forever distinct, inseparably united in one divine person, and from what he could do, we cannot infer what we can do. If he is like unto us he is also above and beyond us, and his ability is no measure of ours. But the saints, even holy Mary, the chiefest of them all, are wholly of our race, are wholly human, and their virtues, the grace of God assisting, are not above our imitation. If we cannot equal we can approach their sanctity and worth.

On the principle here asserted, the worship,—to use the proper English word,—the worship of Mary, or the devotion which the faithful render her, must have a direct and

powerful tendency to promote in her clients the virtues which they love, honor, and venerate in her. The devotion to Mary is not that Teutonic worship of woman as a goddess to which this age, where the Catholic faith and worship do not predominate, is strongly addicted, to the great detriment of manliness, and of manners and morals; nor is it precisely devotion to her rank, or dignity as queen-mother, especially with us sturdy republicans, who honor kings and queens only as symbols of just and legitimate authority; but it is the worship of the highest and purest virtues embodied in a real person, living and acting. The virtues of our Lady are not only each perfect in its kind, but they include every Christian virtue, grace, and perfection. Mary and the church are often taken as types, so to speak, of each other. Each presents in her living character, all the virtues, all the graces and perfections honored and rewarded by our Lord. But we cannot speak of them all, for it would require a volume to speak worthily of any one of them. We shall confine ourselves to the three principal virtues or perfections which were most wanting in heathen society, and which are most characteristic of Christendom, namely: humility, maternity, and virginity or chastity. Of these Mary is the perfect type.

1. Humility. The masters of spiritual life tell us that humility is not only a virtue, but the root of all the virtues, without which there is and can be no real virtue. Humility is not servility, meanness of spirit, but is real greatness of soul, and the basis of all generosity and disinterestedness. Pride, the vice opposed to humility, has no magnanimity, no generosity,—is always cold, narrow, selfish, cruel. Yet pride was the most prominent characteristic of the ancient Græco-Roman civilization. The whole philosophical and moral system of the Stoics, the least discreditable of the ancient sects, was founded on pride. The Stoic taught as distinctly self-denial, detachment from the world, contempt of riches and honors, and superiority to all the accidents of fortune, as does the Christian, but from pride, because a man should have too high an opinion of himself to suffer such trifles to afflict him. He scorns to feel, to suffer, because he holds himself too superior to the world and its accidents, and will not admit that any thing has power to affect or move him against his own will. Very different is the Christian. The Christian rises above the world by his humility, not his pride, and proves his superiority to the

world, to fortune, and overcomes it by proving that his capacity to suffer pain, disgrace, degradation even, is stronger than its power to inflict them. He overcomes all the evils and mishaps of life, not by regarding them as trifles to be despised, but by regarding them as the loving chastisements of his heavenly Father, and by making them a means of spiritual progress. The Christian observes the moral law, not as the Stoic professes to do, from a contempt for the weakness that would violate it, but from love of the law itself, and a profound sense of its sacredness, and the justice and love of its Author. The Stoic contemns death, and flies to it as a relief from defeat and disgrace; the Christian meets death, when it comes, with composure, not only knowing that to him it is the entrance into a blissful eternity, but he has the true courage that can bear disgrace, and defeat, and survive the loss of all the world holds dear. The Stoic seeks always to assert his own superiority to fortune, but finds his strength fail, and himself compelled not unfrequently to seek death by his own hand; the Christian feels and confesses his weakness, and seeks strength in one greater than himself, who is ready to help and mighty to succor those who cast their burdens on him. The Stoic fails in his strength, the Christian triumphs in his weakness, or by relying on a strength greater than his own. The Stoic isolates himself from humanity, and has nothing to work with or for him; the Christian unites himself by love with humanity and humanity's Maker and Redeemer, and has with him and for him all that is great, mighty, and good in heaven and earth, and is invincible in his love, all powerful in his humility, and triumphant in all he undertakes.

Now the history of the human race presents us no example of humility so striking, so perfect, so lovely as that of the Blessed Virgin. Lowliest of Jewish maidens, though exalted to the dignity of bride of Heaven and mother of God, not a thought or a movement of pride or vain glory ever assails her. She magnifies not herself, but in the joy of her humility exclaims: "My soul doth magnify the Lord, and my spirit hath rejoiced in God my Saviour, because he hath regarded the humility of his handmaid, for behold from henceforth all nations shall call me blessed; for he that is mighty hath done great things to me, and holy is his name." Not a word in glory of herself; her whole soul is filled with the greatness and goodness of God, whom she gives all the glory of the great things done to her. Who can say how

much the study and meditation of her example, of her perfect humility, to which the honors paid her by the faithful constantly lead, have done to destroy that pagan pride, and to change the pagan idolatry of self into the worship of the living God, and to promote that meekness and sweetness of temper, that respect for the poor and lowly, and that tenderness and compassion, so different from any thing we find in the heathen world, and so characteristic of Christian nations? How greatly has her example helped to realize the truth of what she continues to chant! "He that is mighty hath done great things to me, and holy is his name. And his mercy is from generation to generations, to them that fear him. He hath showed might in his arm; he hath scattered the proud in the conceit of their heart. He hath put down the mighty from their seat, and hath exalted the humble. He hath filled the hungry with good things, and the rich he hath sent empty away."

The whole order of Christian civilization is founded on humility, and on respect for the humble and compassion for the poor and friendless, the needy and the helpless. The Greek and Roman civilization was founded on pride, on respect for the successful, and favored only the favorites of fortune. We find in those proud republics before the coming of our Lord no respect for the poor, no provision made for the needy, no sympathy for the slave. They whom fortune favored not were regarded as cursed by the gods, whom it would be impious to relieve or to compassionate. The Greeks despised the poor and treated their slaves with gross inhumanity. The Romans were no better. The God they worshiped was force. What they honored was success, and no maxim did they more scrupulously observe than the *Væ Victis*. Nothing could exceed, not even in their fabled gods, the atrocious cruelty of the refined and highly cultivated Romans in the republic and in the empire down to the final triumph of Christianity in the empire. The cruelties still practised in the so-called barbarous ages were continued from the empire, and not introduced, as is sometimes pretended, by the conquering barbarians. Goth, Frank, Vandal, Hun could teach the Bas-Empire nothing on the score of cruelty and inhumanity. There was nothing to learn from barbarians, in the way of cruelty, ferocity, pride, contempt for the lowly, the poor, the unfortunate, by a people who found a capital amusement in gladiatorial shows, and in their theatres dedicated to the gods, required the players to exhibit

the vices and crimes represented in the play, in all their naked, disgusting, and horrible reality. It is not till we go back to the heathen nations and make ourselves acquainted with their manners, customs, usages, laws, and religion in their real deformity prior to their conversion, that we can in any degree appreciate the immense change, especially in regard to humility, respect for the lowly, sympathy for the unfortunate, and commiseration for the slave, wrought by that conversion, or the salutary influence of the worship of the virtues of Mary.

2. In honoring Mary as the mother of God we honor maternity elevated to its highest possible dignity. "Blessed is the womb that bore thee, and blessed are the paps that gave thee suck." "Yea, rather, blessed are they who hear the word of God and keep it." Maternity is not all in bearing and nursing a child, nor is that after all the highest and most blessed function of the mother. It is not by a figure of speech only that we speak of spiritual fathers and spiritual mothers. Spiritual paternity or maternity is as real in the order of regeneration as is natural paternity or maternity in the order of generation. The Jews honored maternity, because they held that he who was to come was to be born of woman, as we believe that he who was to come has come and has been born of woman,—of her whom we honor as the Blessed Virgin. The Jews honored as Christians honor maternity in view of the Messiah, for they held the same faith that we do. But among the heathen maternity can hardly be said to have been honored at all, and the mother was prized only in proportion to the number of children, especially of male children, she bore to her lord. Nowhere in ancient or modern heathendom do we find maternity regarded as a holy function, or any conception of its deep spiritual significance. Motherhood had hardly any rights of its own, even with free mothers, and none at all with slave mothers.

It is mainly to the low estimate in which maternity is held among the heathen that we must attribute in both ancient and modern times the prevalence of child-murder, or the exposure of children, as in China, India, and perhaps in all nations on which the light of the Gospel sheds no ray. In ancient Sparta the law ordered all malformed children to be put to death as soon as born, and in Rome the mother had no rights over her new-born child, and the nurse must wait the fiat of the father, to know whether the babe just born is to

live or to be strangled. If the father refuses to own it and to say let it live, it cannot be reared. The father can slay the child with his own hand or with the hand of his slave before the mother's eyes without her having any right to complain, or the law any right to intervene. If the mother herself had any proper respect for the sacredness and dignity of motherhood she could never destroy her own offspring, and infanticide by the hands of the mother or with her knowledge and consent would be an unheard-of crime. If again, the father or society had any due appreciation of the greatness and sacredness of motherhood, the practice of child-murder could never be tolerated, or even connived at. Not only did the low estimate in which maternity was held, an estimate that placed it little above a mere animal function, lead to the toleration or authorization of child-murder, but it tended to degrade womanhood, and to make woman herself a mere accomplice with man in pleasure or ambition.

Under Christianity this estimate is corrected, and motherhood, as a necessary consequence of elevating marriage to a sacrament, is elevated in some sense to the spiritual order, and made a holy function. Woman herself is elevated, ceases to be a mere drudge, or an article of luxury. She is a person, not a chattel, has her own personal existence, rights, and duties. If a wife, she is indeed under obedience to her husband, but the obedience of a person morally free, not the obedience of a slave. If the rights of the father are paramount, they are not exclusive, and the rights of the mother are recognized, and in some cases even supersede those of the father. Under this Christian view of woman and motherhood infanticide and the exposure of children ceased in the nations that became, and just in proportion as they became and remained Christian.

In general terms this change in regard to the estimate in which maternity is held is of course due to Christianity, but it is more particularly due to that element in Christian worship which we call devotion to Mary, the virgin mother of God. In her motherhood was invested with a significance, a sacredness, a dignity, an awe even, never before conceived of as belonging to it. When God himself condescends to be born of woman, and woman becomes the mother of him who is the Creator of heaven and earth, and the Redeemer and Saviour of mankind, motherhood becomes almost a divine function, and something to be treated with reverence and awe, for not only did Mary bring forth him who is Christ

the Lord, but every human mother brings forth a child destined, if true to the law of his Maker, to be one with Christ, one with God, and a real partaker of the divine nature. Satan lied in the sense he intended to be understood, when, in tempting Eve, he said, "Ye shall be as gods;" yet his promise was less than the truth, below the real destiny to which every human soul may aspire, for God became man that man might become God, and the glorified saints partake not only of the human nature assumed, but of the divine nature itself,—are made, as Saint Peter says, *divinæ consortes naturæ.*

Certainly I do not pretend that man ever becomes the Divinity or a divine person. The glorified soul is still a creature, and creature always will be; but it has all of the divine that is communicable, and is joined to God by unity of nature as well as by union of will and affection. The mystery of human destiny through the Incarnation is too great for our comprehension; we cannot conceive what will be the greatness and dignity of man when glorified. "Beloved," says the Apostle John, "now are we the sons of God, and it hath not yet appeared what we shall be; we know that when he shall appear we shall be like to him, for we shall see him as he is." (I John, iii, 2.)

Now in estimating the greatness and dignity of the mother we have regard to the Son. All nations call Mary blessed, because he whom she brought forth was the only begotten Son of God, and for a like reason to that for which we honor maternity in her, should we honor it, though of course in an inferior degree, in every human mother. Every human mother may chant with Mary: "My soul doth magnify the Lord. * * * For he that is mighty hath done great things to me, and holy is his name." It is a great and sacred thing to be the mother of a child, if we look to the destiny to which every child may aspire. The mother who feels it, feels the sacredness of her relation as mother, the high duty it imposes, and studies diligently to train up her child in the fear of the Lord, in sole reference to his lofty destiny. This estimate of her own dignity and sacred function, reacts on the father, and compels him to think seriously on his relation and solemn duties and responsibilities as father, for more is exacted of him than even of the mother.

Now, devotion to Mary, the honor we pay in her to motherhood, brings all these great and solemn truths home to our minds, and our hearts. We are led to reflect on the great

mysteries of the Incarnation, regeneration and glorification, and thence on the awful dignity of motherhood, the sacredness and worth of every child born of woman, and the obligation to reverence the mother, to provide for the child's present and future welfare, and to conform society itself, so far as may be, to the virtues honored in the maternity of Mary. From this it is easy to see that devotion to Mary has and must have a most salutary influence on all domestic relations, and on the manners and morals, and therefore on the progress of society itself.

3. We honor in Mary the virgin-mother; that is, purity or chastity of mind and body, and in nothing in all history have the good effects of the worship of Mary been more evident than in promoting this great virtue. The elevation of motherhood, to which it leads, carries necessarily along with it the elevation of womanhood, for maternity is the special function of woman,—maternity, either in the natural order or the spiritual order, as we learn from the history of her creation. Just in proportion as maternity is honored is womanhood honored, and just in proportion as womanhood is honored are manners and morals elevated. Licentiousness cannot obtain a foothold where the real dignity and sphere of woman is understood and respected. It can prevail only where a low estimate of woman obtains in society, and indeed only where woman entertains a low estimate of herself in relation to the designs or plans of divine Providence. Men, in general, estimate women very much as they estimate themselves, or rather, estimate womanhood as women estimate it, and if women regard womanhood as invested with sacred and awful functions, they will be as averse to wronging her as to the commission of the crime of sacrilege. The maternity of Mary has given sublime moral and spiritual significance to womanhood, as the assumption of human nature by the Word has to manhood itself. Under one aspect the virgin-mother, *mater semper virgo*, vindicates those who take the vow of perpetual celibacy, and devote themselves, for the love of God and the good of souls, to the spiritual functions of fatherhood or motherhood; and under another equally vindicates the possible purity and sanctity of marriage, against all those sects that forbid people to marry, on the ground that matter, and the body as material, is essentially impure. All impurity is in the soul. The married, if they observe the laws of marriage, may have less merit than those who forego it for the sake

of the kingdom of heaven, but they may, with the grace of the sacrament, be equally pure. Virginity may be holy, and so may motherhood. Our Lord, in assuming a body, has redeemed it, consecrated it, made it the temple of the Holy Ghost. Therefore we are to respect it, preserve it pure and undefiled, and to beware of profaning it, or of putting it to any base or vile uses; but this may be done by the married as well as by the unmarried. They who, for the sake of God, forego marriage and maintain, for the sake of God, perpetual virginity, are in a higher state than the married; they are wholly in the order of regeneration, which is above the order of generation.

The Jews honored, as we have seen, maternity, in view of the Messiah who was to be born of woman, but they do not appear to have honored virginity, and, as the Jewish dispensation was in the order of generation, though symbolizing a higher order, they could not; for virginity, in its spiritual sense, is in the order of the regeneration, based on the principle of election by grace. Marriage, with the Jews, was holy, for it is *semper res sacra*, always a sacred thing, but it was not a sacrament as under the New Law.

But in passing from the Jewish to the gentile world chastity or purity, in the Christian sense of the word, and of which we find the type in Mary, seems to have been wholly unknown or utterly disregarded. It seems, at least, not to have been insisted on as a virtue either in man or woman, and if conjugal fidelity was enjoined, which was not always and everywhere, it seems to have been enjoined less as a virtue than as an offering to the pride and authority of the husband. It would be obviously out of place here to attempt by the citation of facts to prove any assertions of this sort. The facts are such as it would be a shame even to name. My pen would blush to describe, and hardly dare allude to, the improprieties of the cities of the plain, or or to those which the manners, customs, laws, and even religion tolerated, sometimes enjoined, in Babylon, and in the luxurious cities of Syria and Phenicia, and I must pass over in silence the Bacchic and Isiac orgies, and the mysteries of the Bona Dea. Voluptuousness was worshipped as a goddess, through nearly all polished heathendom, and nothing could exceed, if what grave historians have recorded is to be believed, the licentiousness and corruption of manners and morals in the very highest ranks of Roman society; and Rome herself, the proud capital of the gentile

world at the time when the church was founded, was foul with the accumulated vices of all ages and nations. The remains of her literature and art, the pictures and sculptures of disinterred Herculaneum and Pompeii, bear but too ample evidence of the corruption of the Roman Empire. No one can read the *De Civitate Dei* of Saint Augustine, who veils rather than uncovers the impurities of what he calls the City of the World, and with which he contrasts the City of God, without ceasing to wonder that God, who is long-suffering itself, could bear no longer with the degenerate Romans, and that in his wrath to them, but in mercy to mankind, he let loose the barbarians against them.

Yet Christianity, wherever it was received, wrought changes in the manners and morals of Roman society, so great, so pure, and so holy, that they would alone suffice, if all other arguments were wanting, to prove its divine origin, its divine truth, and its supernatural energy. The Roman Empire was too rotten to be saved as a state. Long the haughty mistress of the world, foul with the vices, gorged with the spoils, and drunk with the blood of all nations, she needed "the Scourge of God;" she needed to be humbled, and Christianity itself could not avert, could hardly retard her downfall; yet it did much for private morals and manners, breathed into the laws a spirit of justice and humanity hitherto unknown, and in those very classes which, with a Julia and a Messalina, had thrown off all shame, it trained up devout worshippers of the virtues of Mary. That very Roman matronhood, once so proud, then so abandoned, furnished, under the teachings and inspirations of Christianity, some of the purest and noblest heroines of the Cross, who gave up all for Jesus, and won bravely and joyously the glorious crown of martyrdom. Never has the church of God had more disinterested, capable, and devoted servants than she gained from the ranks of the Roman nobility in the city and scattered through the provinces, and their names and relics are held in high veneration throughout Christendom, and will forever be honored wherever purity, sanctity, self-sacrifice, devotion, and moral heroism are honored. Christianity freed and elevated the slave, made him a man, a child of God, and heir of heaven, but none served the church better, none did more to exemplify the truths of the Gospel, and to aid in converting the empire, than the Roman nobility, once so foul and corrupt. Christianity when once she had converted the city to her

own pure and living faith, cleared it of its filth, and changed it from the capital of the empire of Satan to the capital of Christ's kingdom on earth, which it still is, and will be to the end of time. The conversion of Rome from paganism to Christianity, the substitution of the fisherman's ring for the seal, and the freedman's cap for the diadem of the Cæsars, is the grandest event in the history of the church, and is a sure pledge of her final victory over contemporary heresy, and both civilized and uncivilized infidelity.

Devotion to Mary has had its part in effecting and sustaining this marvelous change in manners and morals. Some Anglicans, indeed, tell us that the worship of Mary was unknown at so early an age, and that it is, in fact, a comparatively recent Roman innovation, rather, a Roman corruption; but Anglicans themselves are of too recent origin to be an authority on Christian antiquity. There are obvious reasons why less should appear in the monuments of the earliest ages, when the church was engaged in her life and death struggle with the Greek and Roman idolatry, of that worship of Mary, than in later times, when the victory was won, and the danger from idolatry was less; but it does not follow that it was less known or less generally observed. Many of the mysteries and the more solemn parts of the divine service were placed, as is well known, under the discipline of the secret, lest they should be profaned by the heathen, and there is no part of Christian worship that the heathen would sooner or more grossly have profaned than devotion to Mary. Their gross minds would have been as little able to distinguish it from their own idolatrous worship, as are the minds of our modern sectarians. But I have seen no reason to doubt that devotion to Mary, the virgin-mother of God, was as well known to the faithful, or that they were as fervent in its practice in the earlier as in the later ages of the church. We see and hear more of it as time goes on, perhaps because our information is fuller; but there is no reason to conclude that there has been, in fact, any increase of it, or any great development of it in later times. It would be very difficult in any subsequent age to find or make, even among modern Italians, supposed to be the warmest and most enthusiastic worshippers of Mary, such demonstrations of enthusiasm and joy as were exhibited all through the East, from Ephesus to Alexandria, as the news spread that the Council of Ephesus had declared Mary to be the mother of God,

and condemned Nestorius, who denied it. Nothing equal or similar occurred, not even in Italy, when a few years since, the Holy Father defined the Immaculate Conception to be of Catholic faith. The fair inference is that the position of Mary was better understood, and devotion to her was more lively in the earlier, than in the later period. The fathers knew the faith and all that pertains to it, at least as well as we do.

According to my reading of history, the epochs in which faith is the strongest, piety the most robust, and the church wins her grandest victories, whether in individuals or in nations, are precisely those in which devotion to our Lady, or the worship of her virtue, is the most diffused, the most vigorous and flourishing; and the epochs in which faith seems to be obscured, and to grow weak and sickly, and the church is the most harassed and suffers her greatest losses, are precisely the epochs in which this devotion is the most languid and feeble. All the great saints have been no less remarkable for their tender and assiduous devotion to Mary than for their manly virtues and heroic sanctity, and I suspect that most of us could bear witness, if we would, that the least unsatisfactory portions of our own lives have been precisely those in which we were the most diligent and fervent in our devotion to the mother of God. I claim, then, for devotion to our Lady a full share of influence in rendering Christian society so much superior in all the virtues to the polished but corrupt society of pagan Greece and Rome. As with the pagans the worship of the impure gods of their mythologies could not fail to corrupt the worshippers, so with Christians the worship of the purity and sanctity of the mother of God has not failed to purify and render holy those who in sincerity, earnestness, and simplicity of heart were careful to practise it.

I might take up other virtues of Mary, for she is a Casket of Jewels, and show in like manner how through devotion to Mary they have entered into Christian society and formed its manners and morals; but this every reader can easily do for himself. I have laid down and illustrated the principle, and though I have said not all, rather the least that could be said, I have said enough to show that the influence of this devotion has been and must have been great and salutary on individual and domestic manners and morals, and in elevating and advancing general society.

But I should be wanting to my own faith, and do far less

honor to our Lady than I would, if I stopped here, and limited the effects of devotion, to the natural influence of her example. This influence is great, and we cannot hold intimate, loving, and reverent intercourse with the wise, the great, and the good, without assimilating something to our own minds, hearts, and life. Meditation on the humility, the maternity, the virginity, the immaculate purity of the Virgin of virgins, Mother most pure, Mother most chaste, Mother undefiled, cannot fail to give us something of those virtues so characteristic of her, and of our holy religion; but I do not believe that meditation on her virtues could alone suffice to produce and sustain the effects I have adduced, any more than the simple example of our Lord himself could have sufficed to redeem the world, and elevate souls to union with God. All the peculiarly Christian virtues are in the order of regeneration, as is Christianity itself, though presupposing, as does regeneration, the order of generation, and therefore are impossible without grace or supernatural assistance. Pelagianism, even Semi-Pelagianism, is a heresy, and little would devotion to Mary in reality effect, if we were to leave out all consideration of the supernatural assistance which she obtains for her clients, by her all-powerful intercession with her divine Son. Even faith alone in the mysteries and teachings of the Gospel could not suffice; for the devils believe and tremble, and yet are none the less devils. Most of us know and believe much better than we do. We see, and approve the better, and follow the worse:

Video meliora proboque;
Deteriora sequor.

What we most need is not simply instruction or precept, but strength. We are weak, and our appetites, passions, propensities, are too strong for us, and enslave us. We feel ourselves sinking; the waves are closing over us, and in fear and agony we cry out: "Lord, save us, we perish!" "Holy Mother of God, pray for us, or we are lost!" The soul oppressed with a deep sense of its weakness, of its inability to conquer by its own strength in the battle of life, calls out for supernatural aid, and it is precisely this aid, so much needed, and which enables us to resist and overcome our enemies, that I dare believe, and avow that I believe, the blessed Mary can and does obtain for those who fly to her protection. There is no superstition in so believing. We do not ask Mary to grant nor do we believe that she can

grant us supernatural aid. She is a creature and has no supernatural aid to give. She grants us her prayers, her intercessions, and these she can grant, for so much we can do for one another. The supernatural assistance is granted by God himself, and is the immediate act of the Holy Ghost, the Comforter, the Sanctifier, the Consummator, done at her intercession, which is all-powerful, as we have seen, because it is always in strict accord with the will and pleasure of her divine Son.

No doubt God could grant us the supernatural assistance we need, without the intercession of holy Mary, but as he is a God who heareth and answereth prayer, it is his will that they who need should ask, should pray; and prayer itself is a favor, and is a necessary preparation for the reception of other favors. God uses the ministry of saints and angels in the works of providence and grace, because he would honor them and give them a part in his glory, and there can be none that he more delights to honor than his mother, for there are none whose virtues do or can surpass hers. She is his mother; she is more, for she hears the word of God, and keeps it; she doeth always the will of God. Whom, then, shall he honor, and make the channel of his graces, if not her?

Much is heard of the enthusiasm and extravagance of Italians in their devotion to Mary, and we are gravely told by men who command our reverence by their learning, ability, and virtues, that they will not suit the taste of sober and undemonstrative Englishmen and their descendants, the Americans. I know not whether it be so or not; but faith is faith, and the experience of ages, of generation after generation of Catholics, proves that never have men in simplicity and love sought her protection in vain, and the belief in her ability and willingness to protect and assist us in our dangers and necessities by her all-availing prayers and intercession, is an integral and essential part of that very devotion which we render her, and which is her due.

Including the supernatural assistance Mary obtains for us by her prayers and intercession for us, it would be difficult to exaggerate the individual, domestic, and social influence of Catholic devotion to the blessed Mary, the holy mother of God. I believe not, nor am I required to believe, every legend that floats about among the faithful, nor would I rashly deny them; forms of devotion and expression may sometimes be adopted which I do not find edifying to me,

but if they exceed not the limits of faith I quarrel not with them, for they may be edifying to others, and may be acceptable, for the simplicity and good-will with which they are adopted, to our Lady herself. Pious affection is not required to speak always with the precision and exactness of a theological doctor, and where there is no exuberance there is little life, or an unfertile soil. Love never measures its words, for all words seem too weak for it, and seldom does it, if deep and genuine, fail to express itself in demonstrations that seem wild and extravagant, half-crazy, to those who love not. It is not easy to love our Lady too much; and I have found it always easy to distinguish those who really love her, and are really devoted to her, by their purity of thought and expression, their gentleness and sweetness of temper, and their amiable and obliging disposition, from all others. Devotion to Mary marks itself on the features and even in the complexion. We take note, as soon as we see or hear them, that they have been with Mary. I speak of those who are really her children, not of those light, frivolous, volatile creatures, who practise, by fits and starts, certain little coquettish devotions to Mary, but never reflect seriously, for a single moment, on her virtues, on the solidity of her character, or the dignity of the position she holds in the divine economy of grace. Mary heard the words of the angel; she heard the words, and saw the deeds of her divine Son, and she pondered them in heart. She never fails to assist those who follow her example.

I have spoken of the influence of devotion to Mary in elevating maternity and with it, womanhood. The nations are in need of this influence still. Christendom is lapsing anew into heathenism, and the abominations I have referred to as existing in heathen nations, are reviving in nations that profess to be Christian, and even to a lamentable extent in the bosom of nations that call themselves Catholic. Faith has become weak, charity has given way to a watery philanthropy, and the worship of Mary is branded as idolatry or as besottish superstition. Every thing is profaned, the church, the state, God, man, and woman; and society, while boasting of its progress, seems to be rapidly lapsing into barbarism. Never did the nations more need the church, or the pastoral authority of the vicar of Christ; never was there a greater need of the prayers and intercession of her whom we invoke as Health of the Weak, Refuge of Sinners, Comforter of the Afflicted, and Help of

Christians. No small part of the world, once Christian, and adoring the Cross, needs converting anew. The crescent profanes the sacred dome of Saint Sophia, and more than two-thirds of the population of the globe are infidels or pagans; while heresy, schism, incredulity, indifferentism, dishonor Christ and our Lady in fair lands that still retain the Christian name. The work of converting and purifying the world is not finished, and is apparently, to a great extent, to be done over again.

If there is any truth in the view I have presented of the moral and social influence of devotion to the virgin-mother of God, it is to that devotion, as a powerful means of reconverting and repurifying Christian nations, and of converting and purifying heathen nations, that we must have recourse. The enemy of man to be overcome, is the same old enemy of God. Man would be God, not in God's way, but in his own; he would stand on himself, and suffice for himself. In the pride of his strength, and the light of his own intellect, he refuses to bend to the Highest, and to learn of the Wisest, and his strength turns to weakness, his light to darkness, and his manhood disappears. He loses heart, and likens himself to a worm, and crouches, and grovels. What can restore him? Not to-day need we fear an excess of faith, an excess of devotion. The enemy is a cold, freezing rationalism, which, pretending to be reason, becomes lifeless materialism. Nothing can overcome him but devotion to her who, as the mother of God, was to crush the serpent's head. We must call on Mary to call on God with us, and for us, to help us as he did the first Christians.

In conclusion, I will say that efforts to increase devotion to the Blessed Virgin are, to me, among the most encouraging signs that God has not forgotten us; that there are still faith and love on the earth, and that there is still a recuperative principle in Christian society. I thank God, for society itself, that there are still those who delight to call themselves children of Mary, and to keep alive in our cold, heartless world, the memory of her virtues. While she is loved and reverenced there is hope for society, and most grateful am I to God that the hard reasonings of this reasonless age, and the chilling sneers of the proud, the conceited, the worldly, the corrupt, have not frightened all out of their deep, ardent, and simple devotion to her who is blessed among women. If I have not been able to speak fit words in honor of our Lady, as I fear I have not, let

me at least avow that I honor and cherish, in my heart of hearts, all who honor her, and show their devotion to her, by imitating her virtues. They are the real philanthropists; they are the real moral, the true social reformers, and are doing more for society, for the progress of virtue, intelligence, wisdom, than all our statesmen and philosophers put together. They love and honor God, in loving and honoring his mother, and I love and honor them, and, all-unworthy as I am, I pray them to have the charity to implore her to bestow on me a mother's blessing, and to obtain for me the grace, when my life's pilgrimage is ended, to behold the face of her divine Son, my Lord, and my God.

OUR LADY OF LOURDES.*

[From Brownson's Quarterly Review for July, 1875.]

THERE is to the Christian mind, or to the mind that believes in God, the Creator of heaven and earth and all things therein, no *a priori* difficulty in believing any duly attested miracle, or presumption against it, for God, as Creator, must be distinct from his works, independent of, and supreme over them, their sovereign Lord and Proprietor. They, then, can interpose no obstacle to his working a miracle, if he chooses or judges it proper. To pretend, as some do, that God is tied up by the so-called laws of nature, or is bound in his free action by them, is to mistake entirely the relation of Creator and creature. God, if at all, is supercosmic, and cosmic laws are dependent on him, and subject to his will. They are, therefore, incapable of binding him, or impeding his free action. Creation itself is a miracle, and our personal existence is a standing miracle, for we exist at any moment only by virtue of the continuous creative act of God. God, being free in all his acts *ad extra*, can perform any act he pleases, not intrinsically impossible, or that does not imply a contradiction.

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* *The Wonders of Lourdes.* Translated from the French of MGR. DE SÉGUR. By ANNA T. SADLIER. New York: 1875.

The Christian order, though it supposes nature and completes it, is itself supernatural, and a manifestation of the supernatural power and action of the Creator. Miracles, which are the direct and immediate acts of the Creator, are in some sense in the Christian order. Man and the universe are perfected, or fulfil their destiny, only in the supernatural, that is, in the Christian, order. This order being supernatural and the expression of the supernatural providence of God, miracles have in them nothing anomalous, nothing illogical, or not concordant with it, and hence are as credible as any other class of facts. They serve the purpose or end of the Christian order, and therefore tend to perfect or fulfil the design of God in creation. Being supernatural as to their cause, they express the supernatural order; but being in the natural and even sensible order as to their effects, they are as provable, as facts, by ordinary testimony, as if they were natural facts as to their cause. They prove of themselves their supernatural origin and character.

Our Lord promised that miracles should always remain in the church, and they always have remained. It is of faith that miracles continue with the faithful; and whoever has paid any attention to the subject is well aware that nothing is or can be better authenticated or more conclusively proved than the fact that miracles have never ceased in the Christian Church. Yet we are slow in crediting any particular alleged miraculous fact. Every alleged miracle stands, so to speak, on its own bottom, and is to be received or rejected according to the direct proofs in the case. If we are asked to believe the reality of this or that alleged miracle, we must have proofs which conclusively establish it, and leave no room for a reasonable doubt. We find amongst good people, whose faith is lively and strong, hundreds of things passing as miracles, which, while we by no means deny them to be miraculous, we do not accept as miracles, because we do not find them to be proved as such. The Christian temper inclines neither to incredulity nor to credulity.

The alleged appearance to the shepherds of our Lady of La Salette we have never seen proved to our satisfaction, yet it may have been a real appearance; for we know no reason why our Lady should not appear to mortals, if such is the pleasure of her divine Son. That she has so appeared at different times cannot be doubted, unless we doubt all historical testimony. We know no reason why she should not so appear, if such appearance enters the divine economy,

for nothing hides her or any of the saints from us but a mimetic veil, which nothing hinders our Lord from withdrawing as he did in his own case and that of Moses and Elias, in his transfiguration on the mount in presence of Peter, James, and John.

The Blessed Virgin, the saints, and the angels are not separated from us by space, or hidden from our view by physical distance, as with our false views of space and time we are apt to imagine. The state of the blessed is changed, but not their place, for they dwell in the bosom of God, are made one with him: and he is everywhere present, dwells not in space, but in immensity, and inhabits not time, but eternity. We are apt to forget that space and time are nothing in themselves. Ideal space has been well defined to be the power of God to externize his act, or to create *ad extra;* and ideal time, his power to externize his act successively or progressively. We should never think of God as physically remote from us; or of the Blessed Virgin, the saints, and the angels, as separated from us by distance, unless it be, unhappily, by a moral distance. In all other respects, they are present with us, as is our Lord himself. If we see them not, it is not because they are distant, but because the mimetic veil is before our eyes. Yet we must remember, as Dr. Watts sings, heretic as he was, that

> Angels, and living saints and dead
> But one communion make.

We all profess in the creed to believe in "the communion of saints." They who are separated do not commune. We think of God as here, and of him and the saints and angels as ever present with us. Our God is nigh unto every one of us, if haply we seek after him. The natural order is not separated from the supernatural, but is, so to speak, immersed in it, and forming only one complete whole with it. The natural proceeds from the supernatural, lives in it, is sustained by it, and completed only by returning to it, and becoming one with it, as the Creator and the creature become one in the incarnate Word.

There is nothing incredible in the supposition that, from time to time, the blessed show themselves to the living in furtherance of the gracious designs of God to individuals or nations. We do not reject modern spiritism, falsely called *Spiritualism*, because we doubt that the souls of the departed are still really living, or because we hold it impossible

for them to appear by divine permission to persons in the flesh; but because we have no proofs that the spirits that appear are the spirits of the dead, and not evil spirits, fallen angels, who personate them. The literal facts alleged by the spiritists, or facts of the same order, we do not dispute, though there is connected with them much fraud, and no little jugglery. The proofs of miracles are not more conclusive than are the proofs of the satanic prodigies, that is, as simple facts; and in either case they are sufficient, if we accept historical testimony at all. What we deny in regard to spiritism is, not the facts as alleged, but the induction from them, that the spirits are really the spirits of the departed.

Nothing is more certain than that Satan imitates, as far as in his power, genuine miracles, and seeks to deceive by his prodigies. We must never assume that the superhuman, or what surpasses the power of man, is supernatural and divine. Satan, though a creature, has a superhuman power, and is able to work, not miracles, but prodigies, which imitate miracles, and which the unwary may mistake for them. But Satan, being a creature, has no creative, and, therefore, no supernatural power. He can operate only within the cosmos, and can never exhibit any real supercosmic power; whereas every real miracle is a manifestation of supercosmic, and, therefore, of creative power. There are certain diseases that Satan can heal,—diseases which demand for their cure only the vitality of the diseased; but those which demand more, or a *vis* the system has lost, he cannot heal. Hence he cannot raise the dead, or restore a dead person to life, for that demands a creative power, as much as the production of an existence from nothing. In all cases where there is an exhibition of creative power, we must see the finger of God, not a satanic prodigy; a real miracle, not a lying wonder.

Many of the alleged cures related of persons visiting holy shrines do not surpass the power of Satan; and corresponding cures are recorded as having been effected in the temples of Æsculapius and other heathen shrines. They cannot, therefore, be taken as conclusive proofs, in themselves, of the divine interposition. They are such proofs only when effected under such circumstances as exclude the supposition of their being effected by satanic influence.

We reject the induction of the spiritists, that the spirits they profess communicate with them, because their com-

munications are not truthful, and they prove themselves lying spirits. They teach what we know to be false, and hurtful to the soul. They deviate from the apostolic doctrine, and lead to separation from the apostolic communion. Every thing about them indicates that they are lying spirits, are trying to pass for what they are not, and are practising a gross imposition upon their dupes. In fact, spiritism is only a revived demonism, or the renewed effort of Satan to get himself worshipped as God. Saints and angels, when they appear, come as the messengers of the living God, show themselves to be engaged in his work, in promoting his worship, and leading souls to union with him: the supernatural end for which they are created. Their mission is to enlighten, to elevate, and perfect, or to help man to fulfil his destiny. They calm, they soothe, and they give peace to the troubled soul. They exert a directly contrary influence from that exerted by the lying spirits followed by the spiritists.

Though, as we have said, we are slow to believe this or that alleged miracle, we cannot help believing this of our Lady of Lourdes. The evidence in the case seems to us absolutely conclusive that she actually appeared to the poor girl Bernadette, and that she honors the shrine consecrated to her. We cannot doubt the perfect truthfulness of M. Henri Laserre's book, or that of Mgr. de Ségur, so beautifully translated by our young friend, Anna T. Sadlier, now before us; and which we have read with a renewal of our love and devotion to our blessed Mother, conceived without original stain, who is all fair, without spot or blemish. We cannot doubt the reality of the appearance, or the fact of the many marvellous cures related,—cures often instantaneous and complete; and which are undeniably beyond the greatest medical science or skill, and also beyond any known natural therapeutic agent. We cannot deny them as facts, and are utterly unable to account for them without the supposition of a supernatural intervention.

Yet, as we have already intimated, not all these alleged cures are to us conclusive proofs of miraculous intervention. We had a near relative who for six months had been rendered utterly helpless by inflammatory rheumatism. She was unable to move herself in bed, or even to raise her hand. A Mormon elder asked her husband for a night's lodging, which was refused on the ground of the illness of his wife. The elder replied that that was no reason for refusing his

request, for, if he would let him see his wife, he doubted not he could cure her. He was led to her bedside, where he kneeled down and made a short prayer; at the end of the prayer she was completely cured—as well as ever she was in her life. We do not believe that God wrought a miracle at the prayer of the Mormon elder, nor are we willing to suppose an intervention of the Evil One. There are moral or non-physical causes whose operation we but imperfectly understand, and which produce effects on the physical system that seem to us little less than miraculous. Till we know the extent of these causes, or the moral *vis medicatrix* of nature, we cannot take these sudden and inexplicable cures as conclusive proofs of a supernatural intervention.

But there is a class of facts and cures that are to us conclusive. None but God can work a real miracle, because in every real miracle there is an exhibition of creative power, or the production of something from nothing, or where nothing was before: and God alone has creative power. Now, in the wonders related of Lourdes, we find facts which seem to us to involve the act of creation. When Moses smote the rock and the water gushed forth it was a miracle, for there was no water in the rock; and it was as purely an act of creation to cause the water to flow from the rock where previously there was none, as if there had been no water in existence. So to us, the opening, by Bernadette of the fountain which continues to flow, in the rocks of Massabielle, or Massavielle, seems a miracle of the same kind, and impresses us much more forcibly than most of the cures related.

Taking, as we do, the fact as related, there is all that is necessary to constitute a real miracle, and, therefore, full proof of the actual apparition of the Blessed Virgin, the Immaculate Conception, as she named herself, to the poor child. The continuousness of the fountain, and its copious flow of water still, is a standing proof of the reality of the miracle, or what seems to us an unmistakable miracle, though we are forbidden, if we mistake not, to pronounce it positively a miracle, till declared to be such by the judgment of the Holy See, which, so far as we are aware, has not been rendered in this case, though we are told that it has sanctioned the devotion to our Lady of Lourdes.

When our Lord raised the widow's son to life, or restored Lazarus to his weeping sisters, after he had lain four days in the grave, it was a miracle, and as much an act of crea-

tive power as the original production of life itself, for it was the production of life where there was no life. No power but that which can give life can restore the dead to life. Now, we find a case in these wonders of Lourdes that is marvellously the restoration of the dead to life. Supposing the facts in the case of the little Justin Bouhohorts to be as narrated (pp. 81–86), this is virtually a restoration of the dead to life, and therefore a real miracle.

It must not, however, be supposed because we single out this case, that we recognize no supernatural intervention in the numerous other cures related, and, no doubt, truthfully related, but that this and the opening of the fountain are to our mind decisive. The fountain was supernaturally opened through the instrumentality of the Blessed Virgin; and as the water of the fountain possesses in itself no medicinal properties, the cures effected by its use must be ascribed to the same instrumentality, and therefore be held to be effected by supernatural intervention. They are to be considered as parts of one whole, or integral elements of one and the same supernatural manifestation or event. The fact of the reality of the apparition of our Lady to the child Bernadette, and the opening of the miraculous fountain under her auspices, removes the whole question from the order of facts adduced by the spiritists, places it in the order of divine and supernatural facts, and justifies the faith of those who use the water, or resort to it in their physical maladies. There is no superstition in resorting to it, for, springing from a supernatural cause, and, therefore, an omnipotent cause, the effects sought are from an adequate, not an inadequate, cause.

Why our Lady should seek a special shrine at Massabielle, or why she should favor one spot, or grant her favors at one spot more than another, or why certain pictures and images of her should receive greater marks of her favor than others, we do not know, and by no means attempt to explain. Perhaps, in reality, she does not confine her favors to them, but is equally ready to show favor to her clients anywhere, wherever they invoke her patronage with equal love and devotion to her divine Son, with equal concentration of faith and fervor. These sacred shrines, perhaps, serve chiefly to fix the attention, to intensify faith, kindle fervor, inflame devotion, and prepare the heart for the reception of supernatural favors.

We wish Mgr. de Ségur had judged it advisable to hint,

at least, to his readers that the Blessed Virgin, however powerful as the mother of God with her divine Son, has of herself no miracle-working power. She is, though exalted above all below the ineffable Trinity, still a creature, and as destitute of creative power as any other creature. Not she, but our Lord, wrought the miracle of Cana of Galilee. She has power with her divine Son to obtain from him a miracle by her prayers, for she can ask nothing not in strict accordance with his will, or not inspired by him. Moreover, the relation of mother and son subsists, and ever must subsist, between them. But though she may, by her prayers, obtain favors, and even miracles, for us, it is God who works the miracles and bestows the favors. Every Catholic knows this, and Mgr. de Ségur has probably neglected to state it, because assured that it is a point on which no Catholic can fall into a mistake. But, as it is a point on which non-Catholics suppose or pretend that we do fall into a mistake, and a most grievous mistake, too, that of giving to the creature the glory that belongs to the Creator, we think the author should have expressly guarded, not against our falling into the mistake, but against others supposing it possible for us to do so.

We do not, we may remark by the way, ask the Blessed Virgin to pray for us because we cannot pray directly to God for ourselves, or because we feel that she loves us better than does her Son, and is more ready to favor us, or, as far as depends on her, to hear and grant our petitions. He is as near us as she is, and no less tender and merciful to us, since he loved us well enough to die for us on the cross. It is not because we can more easily approach them, because they have a greater, a tenderer, sympathy with us, or are more ready to help us, that we pray to Mary and the saints, and ask them to intercede with our Lord for us, or to bear for us our petitions to the throne of grace, for our Lord is perfect man as well as perfect God, and God himself is the fountain of all love, mercy, tenderness, and compassion to which we appeal in them. The reason is, the mediatorial character of the kingdom of God, as we have so often done our best to explain. The principle of the order founded by the incarnation of the Word is the deification of the creature, to make the creature one with the Creator, so that the creature may participate in the divine life, which is love, and in the divine blessedness, the eternal and infinite blessedness of the holy and ineffable

Trinity, the one ever-living God. Creation itself has no other purpose or end; and the incarnation of the Word, and the whole Christian order, are designed by the divine economy simply as the means to this end, which is indeed realized or consummated in Christ the Lord, at once perfect God and perfect man, indissolubly united in one divine person.

The design of the Christian order is, through regeneration by the Holy Ghost, to unite every individual man to Christ, and to make all believers one with one another, and one with him, as he and the Father are one. All who are thus regenerated and united, are united to God, made one with him, live in his life, and participate in his infinite, eternal, and ineffable bliss or blessedness. Herein we see the superabounding goodness of the Creator. God is infinite, perfect, in all respects sufficient for himself, and therefore is and must be infinitely happy in himself. He could, therefore, have been moved to create only by his infinite goodness, in order to diffuse his own life, which is the light of men, love, and happiness, *ad extra*, as say the schoolmen. Creation is a manifestation of the love and goodness of the Creator; and as the purpose of God in creating was to give to creatures a share in his own infinite life and blessedness, he must be infinitely more loving, tender, compassionate than any creature, however exalted or glorified. It is from him that the glorified saints and angels draw whatever of love, tenderness, or compassion we appeal to in them.

But the goodness of God does not stop here. He not only permits the glorified creature to participate in his own life, love, and happiness, or beatitude, but he also permits his creatures to be co-workers with him in his work, and to participate in the glory of its accomplishment. He makes, in some sense, the creature a medium of effecting its perfection; that is to say, he uses created agents and ministers in effecting his purpose, and in gaining the end for which he creates them, and thus enables them to gain the signal honor of sharing in the glory of the Creator's and the Redeemer's work, that is, in the glory of the kingdom of God. Hence it is that the true followers of Christ enter into glory with him, or participate in the glory of his kingdom; which they could not do, if they had done nothing towards founding and advancing it. It is not that he needs them for himself; but because, in his superabounding goodness, he would bestow on them the honor and

blessedness of sharing in his work, and of being, so to speak, employed in his service, and meriting his approbation and reward. It is his love to his blessed mother that makes her the channel of his grace; his love to his saints, his friends, that leads him to employ them in his service, that gives them the high honor of being intercessors for us. This is not only a high honor to them, but a great joy and blessedness, for they are filled with his love, and, like him, overflow with love and goodness to all his creatures. The *cultus sanctorum* flows naturally, so to speak, from the principle of the Incarnation, the deification of man or the creature; and in it we not only honor the saints, but show forth our faith in the superabounding love and goodness of God, which permits them to work with him for the fulfilment of his design in creation, and to participate in its glory.

The fact, that God does employ the saints and angels as agents and ministers in carrying on his mediatorial work, is indisputable. If any thing is clear and certain from the Holy Scriptures, it is this. It is implied in the very fact of the Incarnation, which makes the creature one with the Creator. It is only the universal extension of the sacerdotal principle which underlies all religion, and cannot be denied without denying the very principle of the Christian order. Most Protestants would seem to reject it; but most Protestants, whatever they intend, really reject the Incarnation, and cannot be held to be believers in Christ the Mediator of God and men. Yet Protestants, when they send, as most of them do, a note to their minister asking him to pray, and the congregation to pray, for a sick or dying friend, or for a family, or an individual in great affliction, recognize, whether they know it or not, the sacerdotal principle,—the very principle on which rests the invocation of saints. When a Protestant, writing to a friend, concludes with the request, pray for me, he does the same.

Indeed, the whole system of creation is a system of means to ends, and, in fact, could not be otherwise, since its prototype is in the ever-blessed Trinity, which it copies, or faintly expresses *ad extra*, as the three divine peasons express the divine essence *ad intra*. In the Holy Trinity, the Holy Triad, we have principle, medium, and end. The Father is principle, the Son is medium, and the Holy Ghost is end—the consummator. As the *idea exemplaris*, or type of creation, is in the eternal essence of God, it must, through the

free act of the Creator, express in a faint degree, *ad extra*, the Triad which expresses that eternal essence *ad intra*, or which, if we may so speak, constitutes that essence. Then every thing in creation must express, in some degree, principle, medium, and end; and the end is unattainable without the medium or means, as we see all through even the natural world. We are promised seed-time and harvest, but we must cultivate the soil, and sow the seed, or no crop will be obtained. In no case is the end gained but by the proper use of the divinely appointed means.

Now, in the Christian world, founded by the Incarnation, the appointed means to the end is prayer. God grants his favors only to those who ask for them, perhaps because only those who ask have the internal disposition to profit by them. We can, of course, ask him directly for whatever we think we have need of; but when we ask also the saints to ask him for us, we act in accordance with his love for them, and unite with him in honoring them, by engaging them in working out his designs. We also give them the opportunity of serving him in us, and showing forth their love both for him and us. We honor God in honoring with our love and confidence those whom he delights to love and honor; and, in invoking their prayers, we use the appointed means of gaining the blessings we crave, and we enlist, in aid of our own prayers, the prayers of those whose sanctity renders them dear to our Lord and God.

If we have made ourselves understood, we have shown why it is we, in the old sense of the word, worship Mary and the saints, and why it is that God himself, in fulfiling his design in creation, especially the "new creation" or teleological order, uses the ministry of saints and angels, and chiefly, as their queen, his blessed mother, from whose chaste womb he took his human nature. The pretence of Protestants, that, in honoring Mary or the saints, we are robbing God of the honor that is his due, and putting the creature in the place of the Creator, shows, if not absolute want of faith in Christ, an absolute ignorance of the Christian system, or the theological principles revealed in the Holy Scriptures. It overlooks the mediatorial character of the Gospel, and the fact that all in the Gospel grows out of the incarnation of the Word, who was with God in the beginning, and is God. The Protestant objection denies that creation has its prototype in the divine essence, and expresses it *ad extra*. It denies that the divine economy of

creation, so to speak, was, by a free creation, to communicate, *ad extra*, his own life and blessedness, as they are realized *ad intra* in the generation of the Son and the procession of the Holy Ghost. It denies that the end or fulfilment of creation, in the supernatural order, is the deification of man, or the union in one of the creature and the Creator. It denies that God, to honor and bless the creature, admits him to a share in the fulfilment of his design, and, therefore, to a participation in his own divine life and blessedness. The Protestant either knows nothing, or believes nothing, of the Christian system. He fails to perceive that it is in accordance with the divine intention, that of diffusing his own divine life and blessedness, to employ the agency or ministry of saints and angels, who are honored and blessed in being so employed. In invoking that ministry in the *cultus sanctorum*, we only love and honor those whom he loves and honors, and give them, as it were, the opportunity to work with God, and participate in the glory of his kingdom.

The Blessed Virgin is the queen of saints and angels, and, as the mother of God, is exalted above every other creature, and is only below the ineffable Trinity. Whom, then, should God more delight to honor, or more delight to have honored by us? She is the spouse of the Holy Ghost, she is his mother; and nothing seems more in accordance with his love and goodness, and the very design, the very idea, if we may use the term, of his mediatorial kingdom, as revealed in the Gospel, than that he should do her the honor of making her his chief agent in his work of love and mercy,—the medium through which he dispenses his favors to mortals. There is joy in heaven among the angels of God, we are told, over one sinner that repenteth. The saints and angels, filled with the spirit of God, and in perfect concord with the divine purpose in creation, and with the Word in becoming incarnate, are full of love to all the creatures of God, and join with him into whose glory they have entered, in seeking the blessedness of those he has redeemed by his own precious blood. They take an interest in the salvation of souls, the repentance of sinners, and the growth and perfection of the regenerated, and consequently love their mission, and perform their task with their own good-will, and with joy and alacrity. This love, this interest, this good-will, must be greatest in their queen, the ever-blessed Virgin. As she is exalted above every other creature, only God himself can surpass her in his love for his creatures.

We understand, then, why Mary holds so distinguished a place in Christian worship, and performs so important a mission in furtherance of the mediatorial work of her divine Son. Her love is greater, for she is full of grace, greater than that of any other creature. She is more intimately connected with the Holy Trinity, and holds a relation to God which is held and can be held by no other creature. In some sense, as the mother of the incarnate Word, she is the medium through which is effected the deification of man,—the end of the supernatural order. She cannot be separated from that end. We can easily understand, then, why God should assign her a part assigned to no other creature. Her love is only less than his, and her heart is always in perfect unison with the sacred heart of her Son, and mother and Son are strictly united and inseparable. Equally easy is it now to understand why the Christian heart overflows with love and gratitude to Mary; why Christians recur to her with so much confidence in the efficacy of her prayers, the success of her intercession; and why Catholics offer her the highest worship below the supreme worship offered in the holy sacrifice, but never offered except to God alone.

We have not given, or attempted to give, a complete discussion of the great subject we have opened, or rather which the appearance of our Lady of Lourdes has opened. We have only aimed to throw out a few thoughts and suggestions, which, if followed up, will show that such appearances, that miracles, that the love and veneration of the blessed Mary, and the *cultus sanctorum*, as practised by Catholics, are not anomalous, but grow out of the very principles of the supernatural or Christian order, the mediatorial kingdom of God's dear Son; and are in strict accordance with the design or purpose of the ever-blessed Trinity, and tend to further and realize it as appropriate means to an end. The doubts or difficulties of non-Catholics on this subject originate in their rejection or ignorance of the Incarnation, and their never having considered the Christian system as a whole. The heathen retained the primitive revelation, but only in a broken and piecemeal state. Protestants do the same with the Christian revelation as preserved and taught by the church. They have lost the perception of the relation of the several parts to the whole, and fail to recognize their interdependence and strict logical consistency one with another, and with the whole, of which they are integral parts. They,—in fact, the best of them,—understand nothing of

Christian theology. Even Catholics, while their faith and worship is right, do not always grasp the profound and eternal principles which underlie the dogmas they hold, and the worship in which they join.

We repeat, all in Christianity proceeds from, depends on, and clusters around, the Incarnation, in which the design of God in creation, the deification of the creature, is consummated. The devotion to Mary, the veneration of the saints, grow out of the Incarnation, as does the church herself, and tend to keep alive faith in that crowning act of the Creator. We need, then, place no restraint on our love to Mary, or our love and veneration for the glorified saints of God. In loving, venerating, and invoking them, we are acting in accordance with the design of the Holy Trinity.

SAINT-WORSHIP.

[From the Ave Maria for 1865-6.]

I. No one is required by Catholic faith to believe in the literal historical truth of every thing to be found in the legends of the saints. The Catholic mind is as remote from credulity as from scepticism, and in the lives of the saints, as elsewhere, the incidents and events, the sayings and doings recorded are as historical facts to be accepted or rejected according to the historical evidence in the case.

Popular love and veneration delight to ascribe to the great saint, as to the great hero, whatever they find that comports with his character and tends in their estimation to complete it, and in process of time gather around him a variety of incidents which may never have happened to him, and sometimes incidents that may never have happened at all.

Sayings and doings are ascribed to one saint, that in the historical order are true only of another, and sometimes that are literally true of no one. This is natural, and every day happens to every distinguished man, whether distinguished for wit, learning, heroism, benevolence, or holiness; and it would be rash to say that all is false in the theories of our

modern German mythologists, only they exaggerate and misapply the truth they have. Indeed, a vein of truth runs through even the heathen mythologies, though moral and philosophical rather than historical truth. Things of this sort do not offend the pious heart, however much they may the historical critic. Certainly piety is never nourished with falsehood, and it can live and thrive only in an atmosphere of truth, but there is a whole world of truth, and truth of the highest order, above the mere outward sensible fact which is all that is apprehended by the materialist. When our Lord took three of his disciples, Peter, James, and John, ascended Mount Thabor, and was transfigured before them, nothing was changed or assumed in him, and what his disciples saw was only himself as he was at all times and places in himself. The miracle was in partially withdrawing for the moment the sensible veil from before their eyes, enabling them to catch a glimpse of that glory always before them, but ordinarily hidden from their sight. Always is there before us, above us, round about us, and in which is our real life, a truth which transcends the simple, outward, sensible fact. The sensible facts are only the shadow of the truth. The real truth, the real significance of the historical fact, and all its meaning or worth lies in the order that transcends it, in the moral and spiritual order, which is back of it, the unseen, the unchanging, the eternal, and which is symbolized by it. From before the pious and believing heart grace always, to some extent withdraws the sensible veil, and partially discloses the transcendental world, the invisible and eternal, in which is the soul's light and life, its strength and its joy. The regenerate soul has ascended the Mount with its Lord, sees his face shining as the sun, and his garments white as the snow, and falls prostrate at his feet and adores. Having found the truth, having, as it were, reached the object of its love, penetrated to the living reality, symbolized by sensible facts, it has got all they can give, and it can value them only as a means of shadowing it forth to its own sensible nature or to that of others. It interprets the facts, and would make them capable of expressing what it sees, feels, and loves; yet it finds them always too narrow for the glory present to its affections, and has a constant tendency to enlarge or multiply them, to make them adequate symbols of the truth it adores. In this way the legend is constructed and grows. It is not false, but in the highest sense truthful. The truth present

and loved demands for its utterance all the events and incidents of the legend, and renders morally and spiritually true even those events which never historically happened. The legend may therefore always be read with confidence for spiritual edification, for it is always true as far as it goes in the only sense in which the soul understands it, and therefore true in the highest of all senses.

Something of the same principle which idealizes the saint, generates the *cultus sanctorum*, or saint-worship. The heart that is filled with the love of God overflows in its love to all that is godlike or related to God. As God's own love overflows in creation, for creation springs out of the exuberance of his love, so does the love of each one who really loves him overflow to every thing he has created. It loves all that is an object of God's love, all that is dear to God. It loves God in himself, and in his works, as we love the Son because we love the Father. It is the nature of all real love.

All love is demonstrative. It seeks always to express itself, and the expression of love is worship. From love springs alike the worship of God and of all that is godlike or related to the supreme and central object of love.

In every age of the church saint-worship has obtained, never, I believe, by virtue of any positive precept, but from the overflowing of the pious Catholic heart. It is, if I may so speak, a necessity of Catholic piety. The love with which the regenerate and faithful soul is filled, cannot be satisfied without it. That love must worship, and it must worship the universal God, God in himself and God in his works, all of which through his creative act partake of his divine being, and are through the medium of the act identified with him. The worship would seem to it incomplete, defective, if it did not embrace the creature with the Creator, and especially if it did not include the saints, who of all his creatures are the nearest and dearest to him. The heart that does not include them in its love to God, and honor them in its honor to him, may break no positive command, but it may be assured that it has at best only a stingy love, and no reason to applaud itself either for its logic, or the fulness of its devotion.

The Protestant sects regard, or affect to regard, the worship which we render to the saints, especially to the blessed mother of our Redeemer, as idolatry, but this is because they do not consider that to worship God in his creatures, espe-

ially his saints, redeemed by his blood, and sanctified by his grace, is still to worship God, or that the worship which we render to the saints regarded solely as creatures, is never that which we offer to God himself. Supreme worship is due to God alone, and to give it to another is idolatry, is treason to the Most High, to the majesty of heaven and earth; none know this better than Catholics.

But worship is a general term, which includes not only different degrees, but different species. The word is from the Anglo-Saxon *weorthscipe*, which means simply the state or condition of being worthy of honor, or respect, or dignity, and to worship is to ascribe worth, honor, dignity, or excellence to some one or literally to honor, it may be God, the living, the magistrate, or simply a man for his office, station, possessions, acquirements, or virtues. The word itself may with like propriety designate the religious homage one owes to God, the reverence we give to the saints, or the civil respect we pay to magistrates, or to all persons in authority, whether in church or state. Idolatry is not in rendering worship to men, but in rendering to them the worship that is due to God alone.

The Protestant sects overlook this fact, and when they see us unmistakably worshipping saints, and perhaps rendering them as high a worship as that which they in reality render to God himself, conclude, rashly, that we are idolaters, and brand the worship we give to the mother of God as Mariolatry. But they seem not to be aware that the supreme and distinctive act of worship to God is sacrifice, and that we offer sacrifice never to any saint, never but to God alone. Hence it is the worship we pay to saints, even the highest, is never a distinctively religious worship, and it is an open question, or a question not defined by the church, whether it is properly religious worship or not. It is or is not, probably as the term *religious* is taken in a wider or in a more restricted sense. That Protestants should regard our saint-worship as idolatrous is not strange or surprising. Having rejected the sacrifice of the mass, they have no sacrifice to offer, and therefore really no supreme distinctive worship of God, and their supreme worship is of the same kind, and very little, if any, higher than that which we offer to the saints themselves. They see us give to the saints as high a worship as they render to God, and why, then, should they not regard us as idolaters?

Doubtless, so-called orthodox Protestants hold that a sac-

rifice, an all-sufficient sacrifice, has been offered by our Lord in offering himself on the cross, but in their view this sacrifice was completed, finished in the past, and is not an offering continuously made, and therefore made now and on our altars as really and as truly as on Calvary. In regard to men now living, they hold it to be a past and not an ever-present sacrifice, and therefore, according to them, we have no sacrifice to offer, consequently no supreme distinctive worship of God. Hence their churches have a table, but no altar, except by a figure of speech, as it is only by a figure of speech that they commune of the body of our Lord.

Their divine service or religious worship consists chiefly of prayer and the singing of hymns or psalms, and comprises nothing in kind which is not perfectly lawful to offer to men. It is lawful to love our neighbor, to honor the magistrate, to pray to men in authority, to sing the praises of the conquering hero, and to confide in our friends. What in all this is distinctively religious worship, or which can be given only to God?

The simple fact is, that Protestants accuse us of idolatry because they have and believe in no worship higher than our saint-worship. But, because they have and believe in no higher worship, it does not follow that there is none higher, or that we have it not. It is not good logic to argue that because they in their worship anthropomorphize God, we in ours divinize the saints. The canonization of the church is not the apotheosis of the pagans. The church has a perpetual sacrifice, not that the sacrifice on Calvary is repeated or renewed on our altars, but is continued or perpetuated on them in an unbloody manner, without cessation or interruption. This sacrifice perpetuated in the sacrifice of the mass, really and truly, and not symbolically, as in the Jewish sacrifices, is the supreme distinctive worship of God. This Protestants have not; what they have may be good as far as it goes, but it is a worship that may be rendered to God in common with men. As we have the true spiritual worship and offer it only to God, we can accept and encourage the overflowings of the pious heart towards the saints without any danger of idolatry.

The holy sacrifice is never offered to a saint, not even to the mother of God; our churches and altars are all dedicated to God alone. Those that bear the name of some saint are, like all the others, dedicated to God, and are simply placed under the patronage or intercession of the saint.

The saints honored by offices in the church service, are not the direct object of the worship. The sacrifice is offered to God in thanksgiving for them, and the prayers are all addressed directly to God, and only their intercession is invoked. In the authorized litanies of the saints and of the Blessed Virgin, the saints are indeed invoked, but nothing of them is asked but their prayers for us, which is no more than we all ask daily of our pastors, of our friends, and of one another, and why may we not ask as much of a saint in heaven as of a sinful mortal on earth? Is the saint less living, or less dear to God?

But saint-worship does not simply spring from the exuberance of Catholic piety, is not simply an instinct or spontaneous outburst of the Catholic heart; it has a reason in the deepest mysteries of our religion, and there is a profound philosophy in it, undreamed of by those who neglect it. It is no excrescence on the Christian religion, no corruption of the simplicity of primitive worship, but a normal development which has its root in the very essence of the Christian system, or the divine plan of creation, redemption, and glorification. It is defensible not only to pious affection, but to the understanding, and rests on the deepest philosophical and theological principles that we know either by reason or revelation. The Christian religion is catholic, all its principles are catholic, and for every thing in it or pertaining to it there is a catholic reason. Catholic means whole, and universal, because it embraces the whole. The Christian religion is a systematic whole, and all its parts cohere and are inseparable parts of a complete whole. The catechism is supremely logical, is a dialectic whole, and no part can be denied without denying the whole.

The worship of the saints does not stand alone, but rests on a principle as universal, as integral, and as essential as the worship of God. The command, love thy neighbor as thyself, rests on the same principle or ground as the command, love God. There are two senses in which we may consider saint-worship. The first, as the worship of God in his saints; the second, as the worship of the saints for what they are personally, or what nature and they, by the grace of God, have made themselves.

II. No one can be at all familiar with the Holy Scriptures without being struck with the frequency and loving manner in which our God calls upon us to worship him in his works, both in the material universe and in his saints.

The Psalms of David especially are full of these touching invitations.

There is a profound philosophy, as well as true and evident piety in such worship. God is in his creatures as well as they in him. It is he who creates all things from nothing by the power of his own word, and all creatures exist by him, and in him have their being. The pantheist has a truth, a great truth, but unhappily he misinterprets and misapplies it. His truth is, that God is immanent as first cause in all his works; his error is in identifying his works with himself, in denying their real substantial existence.

God does not create existences as man makes a watch, which, when wound up may be left to go of itself. He remains always efficaciously present in them, and it is his creative act that calls and continues them in existence, and gives them their life and activity. Hence the apostle tells us, "In him we live, and move and are," or have our being, which is literally true. No creature has its being in itself, for any existence that has its being in itself, is self-existent and therefore God. The creature exists from God, and therefore has its being in God, or God in its being. Nothing exists without being, and as God is the universal, eternal, immutable, and only being, every creature does and must in its degree participate of God, and be in a participated sense divine.

This is the truth which the pantheist misapprehends and misapplies. The creature is not God, any more than the act is the actor, but in like manner as the act is only by the actor, and the actor enters into the act, so does God enter into his creature, and it exists only by participating of his being. I shall, when I come to speak of the worship of the saints, in reference to their own personal merits or worth, show that creatures have a substantial existence distinguishable, though inseparable, from God, and are, as philosophers say, second causes, capable through the efficacy of the first cause, of acting from their own central life or activity. Here, however, I wish to fix attention on their intimate relation to God, and their participation in his essence. The pantheist is right in asserting the immanence of the creative act, and so far the identity of the creature with the Creator, but wrong in supposing him directly immanent as being, instead of being immanent only through the medium of his creative act, or in the respect that the actor enters into his act, or the act necessarily partakes of the essence of the actor. He

is therefore wrong in supposing that the creature has in himself, in the secondary and relative sense, no real action or productive force. By virtue of the creative act of God every creature participates of the divine being or essence, and as God in his essence is triune, all his creatures in some sense reproduce or imitate, each in its order or degree, the holy and ineffable Trinity. Hence it is that all religions and all philosophers recognize in some form the sacred Triad. It enters into all things, into the human mind, into the human heart, and is the real type and basis in reasoning of what logicians call syllogism. Many a syllogism has been constructed to demonstrate the impossibility of the Trinity, but if there were no Trinity, the syllogism itself would be false; in like manner as if there was no God, there could be no atheist. The creature partakes of, and in some manner conceals, the divine essence. The creature, or the participant, is not God, but that which is participated by the creature is God, is literally, and truly the divine essence. As God in his very essence is the being, as distinguished from the substantive existence, of every creature, he can be worshipped without idolatry in every thing he has made. God is everywhere and in every thing, and nothing is without him, and everywhere and in every thing he is God, and to be worshipped as such.

Moreover, we know and can, till glorified, know, and therefore worship God only through the medium of his works, his works of creation and revelation. We do not and cannot know God in this life as he is in himself, we can know him only as he enters into his works and manifests himself through them, his works of nature and of grace, and our Lord rebukes those who worship they know not what. All such worship is superstition, as Saint Paul implies, when he accuses the Athenians of superstition in erecting an altar to the *unknown God*. God seeks to be worshipped by those who worship in spirit and in truth.

The God manifest in creation and of whom all creatures participate is the one living and true God, and infinitely more than creatures manifest, but we know him only as he manifests himself, and only so much of him as he manifests through them. We know they do not exhaust him, that he is beyond and above them, beyond and above all that the Gospel even reveals of him, but in the respect that he transcends them, he is to us superintelligible, and we can worship him only as he manifests himself in and through

them. Through them,—nature and grace,—we know he is and is infinitely more than they reveal but it is only in them that we, as it were, touch him, and lay our heads on his bosom, or prostrate ourselves before him and kiss his feet.

All things partake of him, and hence in all things is something sacred and divine, and this teaches us that nothing is to be contemned or despised. Something, if I may so speak, of God enters into every creature, into the animal, the plant, the mineral, or as men say, brute matter. All is instinct with life and activity, and in all life and activity is present the power and goodness, the very being of God, the Creator and Preserver. Hence the sympathy of all great saints with the lower creation, and the sort of brotherhood with man which Saint Francis of Assisi recognized in animals, beasts, birds, fishes, and the humble worm,—a brotherhood authorized by the profoundest philosophy as well as by the most ardent and diffusive charity. In a word, God is in the worm, the sparrow, the lamb, the lily, the rose, the ruby, the diamond, as in man and angels, and the true lover of God delights to trace him in all things, and in all to render him homage.

Out of this profound truth that God is everywhere and in every thing have sprung all the beautiful and graceful mythologies of the ancient gentile world. The error of those mythologies was, that they mistook the participant for the participated, or confounded the creature with the Creator. Instead of seeing the one creative divinity in every fountain and grove, they people the fountain and grove with nymphs and naiads, dryads and hamadryads, and make every existence a divinity, and worship the rivers and the ocean, the winds and the storms, the forests and the mountains, "four footed beasts and creeping things," and give to the creature the glory due only to the Creator. The gentiles were inexcusable, they blinded themselves, for the true God was known, since *the invisible things of him, even his eternal power and Godhead, are from the beginning of the world clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made*, yet in all those mythologies the worship of nature, its various objects, and its generative and destructive forces, which gave birth to the most obscene and abominable rites, were at bottom only the perversion of the truth that God is in his works and is to be worshipped in them, and the confusion of the creature with the Creator. The worship of

God in his works, especially in his saints, was older than any mythology, as truth is always older than its abuse or perversion. At the bottom of all mythologies and of all idolatries you will find pantheism, if you look deep enough.

Piety, the true religious spirit, seeks God everywhere and in every thing, and prostrates itself in worship, wherever it finds him. For it, nature, as a whole and in all its parts, is a temple of the Most High, filled with his *shetrinah*, or glory. And in which of his works does he more clearly reveal himself than in his saints? The saint is a far higher creation than external nature, and a single saint is more than the whole external universe, for in the saint is completed the work of which nature is only the initial part. The saint participates of God as creator, redeemer, sanctifier, and glorifier. He manifests God in both his works of nature and of grace, in his initial and completed works, and is the highest and most perfect manifestation of his divinity. How then, without knowing him in his saints, are we to attain to our highest and fullest knowledge of him? or how without worshipping him in his saints, can we give him the worship that is his due, or that fills and satisfies the heart of the worshipper?

The saint is a man sanctified, and he is sanctified and made a saint by the incarnate God, and the humanity, hypostatically united to the Word in the Incarnation is itself, in union with the Word, from whom it is inseparable, an object of worship, and we are to worship the Son incarnated as we worship the Father. The saint participates of the Son in his humanity this it participates of him in his divinity, and therefore to give a full and complete worship to the Son, and to God, we must worship him in the saint, and more especially in her, in whose chaste womb the sacred humanity was taken, the queen or most perfect of all saints.

We do not invoke the intercession of saints because they are nearer to us than God, but for a reason which will hereafter be given. The saints are not nearer to us than God, nor so near. They are not more compassionate or more readily touched by our infirmities, or more disposed to aid us than is God himself. They do not and cannot interpose between us and God, and however ready they may be to succor us, their readiness as their power comes from God, and from him alone. Nothing can be nearer to us than God, for in him we live and move and have our being, *vivimus, movemur, et sumus.* No creature can be more

compassionate or ready to succor us than God himself, who so loved us that while we were yet sinners he gave his only begotten Son to die on the cross, that we might have eternal life and not perish everlastingly. He loves us with an infinite love, compassionates us with an infinite compassion; no mother can care so tenderly for her sucking child as he cares for us, and not even Mary can so earnestly desire our salvation as he does. We must never confound the justness of a practice with the reasons sometimes alleged in its defence.

The principle of all saint-worship is primarily in the fact that God is really and truly in his works, in all his works, but more especially in his saints; and he is to be worshipped wherever he is, not alone on Mount Moriah, or on Mount Garizim. The only point to be observed is, that it is God in the work, not the work abstracted from him, that must be the real object of worship, when worship is taken in its highest religious sense. The worship of God in his works in the sense explained is really the worship of God and in no sense idolatry, and so long as is clearly and distinctly preserved the idea of creation it can never degenerate into idolatry. The heathens became idolaters because they lost the conception of creation, and fell into some form of pantheism, and confounded the creature with the Creator.

I shall further on speak of the relative worship of the saints, which, though it grows out of the worship of God in his works, is distinguishable from it. I will only direct attention now to the new aspect it gives to all creation, when we learn to connect them intimately with the Creator, and to recognize the great fact that he is really and truly in them, and that in them all we may see him, love him, and worship him. If I am right in my view, the coolest philosophy comes to defend and justify the most ardent and diffusive piety, and to prove that a Saint Francis of Assisi, in his most extravagant sympathy with all created things, only proved that his mind and soul lived in the medium of the highest and divinest truth. All thy works, O God, partake of thee, and in thee are sacred, holy, divine, glorious, and truly filled with thy loveliness and glory.

III. The worship of God in his works, therefore in his saints, is the worship of God himself, and is distinguishable from the *cultus sanctorum*, or worship, not of God in his saints, but of the saints themselves, practised by Catholics and authorized by the church—the worship which Protes-

tants object to as idolatry, pretending that it gives to the creature the homage that is due to the Creator. The objection would be valid, if we offered to the saints the supreme religious worship which we offer to God in the saints, or if we worshipped them as God. This, however, is not the fact, as has already been asserted, and as will more fully appear in its place. It suffices here to show that the creature, especially the saint, has worth deserving of honor or worship.

The basis of the worship of saints is the fact that they have real worth, and worth wherever it is found, deserves to be recognized and honored, and to recognize and to honor worth is to worship. The question as to the propriety of saint-worship resolves itself therefore into the question as to personal worth or merit of the saint. Has the saint so far a hand in his sanctity or worth that it may be called his? The question so stated tells us at once why those sectarians who deny free will, or assert irresistible grace, make man purely passive, not personally active in the work of sanctification, must, to be consistent with themselves, reject all saint-worship as idolatry, or as giving to the creature what is due to God alone.

To resolve the question fully we must revert again to the creative act of God. The vital importance of the primal fact that God is creator of heaven and earth, and all things therein, visible and invisible, is not sufficiently felt even by many who call themselves Christians, and perhaps nothing is better fitted to keep it fresh in the memory, and to impress it deeply on the heart, than this very practice of saint-worship, so often objected to as tending to obscure it, for in losing sight of the ability of the creature to act and merit, we lose sight of the creation itself, and fall, consciously or unconsciously, into pantheism.

It is not unworthy of remark here, that the principal thing that distinguished the people of Israel from the surrounding nations was precisely the assertion of God as the creator of every thing that exists as in any sense distinguishable from himself. The gentiles never wholly lost sight of the unity of God, and underlying and hovering over all ancient mythologies is the great truth of the divine unity; but all nations except the Israelites had lost the tradition of creation. Even in Plato and Aristotle, the noblest representatives of gentile wisdom, you find no trace of it. The great gentile apostasy was not primarily in denying the unity of God, as so many suppose, but in denying his creative act. Hence Moses

begins the *Genesis*, by asserting God as creator, and he tells his people, the literal truth, that there is no nation so great, whose gods are so nigh them as their God is to their petitions. The gods the heathen worshipped were not creators, nor held to be such. The modern apostasy is, at bottom, the same with the gentile apostasy. Its essential denial is the denial of creation, which is the essence of pantheism, as that of atheism is the denial of God not only as creator, but as being. There can be no doubt, to the philosophic mind, that the germs of the pantheistic denial were contained from the first in what are called the doctrines of the reformation, especially in the doctrine of the reformers regarding grace, free will, and human merit. For my part, I am more struck with Luther's bad philosophy than I am with his bad theology, and it is some relief to find that so wretched a philosopher held the scholastics as well as the councils of the church in contempt. Protestantism is to-day little else than a tradition or a prejudice, but in its original and essential character, it involved the denial of all second causes, at least in the order of grace, and hence we find the really thinking men among Protestants either tending to return to the church, or pushing onwards the pantheism to which all heresy in every age or nation inevitably tends.

It is therefore of the greatest importance to the cause of truth, sound theology and philosophy, that we revive and keep fresh in our minds and hearts the first verse of Genesis, and the first article of the creed.

I have defended the worship of God in his works by showing that he remains as first cause in them, and that they exist only as they participate through his creative act, of his being. All worship, all religion is founded in the relation which subsists by virtue of the creative act between God and his creatures. Religion is the bond between man and God, that which binds man to God, and there is no bond but the creative act, of which the worship of God is the recognition. Deny that bond and religion would have no real basis, and worship would have no reason in the nature of things, but would be artificial, arbitrary, and false.

But the *immanence* of God in his works as their first cause is not the only fact taught us by the creative act; nor is the fact that God in his works is the one living, eternal, and immutable God the only thing it imports us to consider. We learn, indeed, thus far, that God is nigh unto every one of us, and that it is in him that we live, and

move, and have our being; but if we consider it well, we learn also that we do live and move, do really and truly exist in him. God creates us, but he creates us real substantial existences, inseparable but distinct from himself, not indeed independent existences, when once created, of sufficiency for ourselves, as Epicureans, deists, and not a few modern *savants*, who exclude God from the world and disconnect providence from the creative act, absurdly maintain; but still real substantial existences, which as upheld by him, are capable of acting from our own centre as second causes, or in the order of second causes capable of copying or imitating his creative act, and producing effects of our own.

All created things from the highest to the lowest, are active and really exist so far as active. There is no absolute passivity in nature. Whatever is purely passive is null God, say the theologians, is most pure act, *actus purissimus*. He is act in his very essence, and nothing exists save in so far as through the creative act it participates of his essence. All that exists, even what we call brute matter, is essentially active, instinct with life, and, in the order and degree of its life, resembles, or represents the living and eternal God. All that exists, then, is worthy of honor as resembling, or representing God, the object of supreme worship—of honor, not as God, but as bearing in some sense and degree the likeness of God—as we treat with respect the image or picture of a dear honored friend. All creatures, in that they in their several manners represent or resemble God, have a certain worth and are entitled to some degree of worship. Even the lower creation is not wholly ignoble or worthless, and, if made to be subservient to man, he is to use it with thankfulness, and not abuse it.

The forms and degrees of life and activity are different in the different orders of creation. Some creatures are simply activities, and manifest their activity only by way of resistance to the activity of others. Some act blindly, as minerals and plants that grow, the water that flows, the winds that blow, the lightning that rends the oak, the storms that sweep over the land, rouse up the ocean, and lash its waves to fury. These act to an end which they see not, and will not, and move by what are called physical laws; others from instinct, as men say to hide their ignorance, but as we may say, from simple intelligence, to an end, *ad finem*, as, at least, the higher classes of animals; and others still, including man and all existences above him, if such there

are, act not only from intelligence, but also from reason, for the sake of the end, *propter finem*, not merely *ad finem*.

The characteristic of man, or that which distinguishes him from the mere animal, I take it, is reason, not simply intelligence, for I am unable to deny every degree and form of intelligence to such animals, for instance, as the dog, the horse, or the elephant, to say nothing of the beaver, the rat, the bee, and the ant. The scholastics and theologians generally define man to be a "rational animal," animal *plus* reason. Reason is the moral faculty and includes both intellect and will, sees and wills the end, and acts freely for it. The characteristic of man is not, I should say, activity, life, sensation, intelligence, which he has in common with animals, but reason, the moral faculty, by virtue of which he is a moral existence, capable of moral action.

Moral existences, or existences endowed with reason, are created in the image and likeness of God, in a much higher sense than others are. God is intelligent, intelligence itself, and acts not only intelligently, but rationally, for the sake of an end, and an end supremely good. Both as first cause and as final cause, he acts not only rationally, but freely. He freely wills the end, and freely creates for it. He is not forced to create by any external or internal necessity, because he is independent, eternally complete in himself, and sufficient for himself. He is not forced to create as an internal necessity of his own nature, as Cousin maintains, nor to fill up, complete, or actualize his being, as Hegel, confounding the procession of the three persons in the Godhead with creation *ad extra*, contends. He cannot, indeed, annihilate or contradict his own being, and if he acts externally at all must act as he is, as the apostle assures us when he asserts that "it is impossible for God to lie." But he is free to act, or not to act, and to act as he will, restrained by no internal necessity, and hedged in by no real or imaginary laws of nature.

This freedom of God, which gentile philosophy never understood, and which so-called modern science so rashly impugns, is the archetype and ground of all human freedom, and of this freedom all moral existences participate through the creative act. The denial of the divine freedom in creating is the denial of creation itself, and the denial of all moral existence. The assertion of that freedom asserts that God may, if he chooses, create moral existences, or creatures capable of acting freely under a moral law, and

therefore of having a moral merit or demerit of their own.

That he has created man such an existence, we know from the general assent of mankind, from divine revelation, and from our own consciousness, especially our own consciences accusing or else excusing us, and which we can no more doubt than we can our own existence. Man, then, has a moral nature, and is personally responsible for actions.

This moral likeness to God, in which man is created, and which renders him not only active as all creatures are, not only intelligently active as many creatures are, but morally active, and capable of imitating the divine model in the moral order, is itself, on the principle already established, deserving of honor and respect, of some sort or degree of worship, for the sole reason that it is a likeness, however faint, of the Creator himself.

But this is not all, nor the special ground of saint-worship. God is as creator actively present in all his works, but present as creating them, enabling them in the order of second causes to act, creating and sustaining them as the subject of their own acts, but not present as their direct subject, as Calvin assumes, when he makes God the author of sin. God works in us, giving us the power to will and to do; but the actual willing and doing are our own, both in the order of nature and of grace. Our Lord says, indeed, "without me ye can do nothing," and Saint Paul says, "it is no longer I that do it, but the grace of God that dwelleth in me;" yet though we can do nothing without Christ, it does not follow that what we do by him and for him is not our doing; and though it is grace that does it, it is grace that dwelleth in us, and does it by elevating us above our natural selves, and giving us more than our natural power to do, but it therefore does not follow that grace does it without the participation of our own activity, or the concurrence of our will. The grace in relation to the supernatural end of man creates and sustains the subject as an actor in the order of second causes, enables a man to do what, without it, would infinitely exceed his powers; but, as in the natural or initial order, the doing is his own, and his the merit and the reward, or the demerit and the penalty.

The contrary doctrine taught by the reformers involves precisely the same error in the Christian order or the regeneration that the denial of creation does in the natural or initial order. It denies that the soul is an actor in the work of her own sanctification, or in sanctification the existence

of second causes. It is simply pantheism, and denies the creative act by denying that any thing is created. In the natural order we are nothing but what God makes us, yet we are something, because he makes us something,—an actor in the order of second causes, because he makes us such. In the order of grace, the regeneration, or the new creation, as Saint Paul calls it, we are nothing, but what grace, or Christ, our redeemer and saviour, makes us; yet we are, as in the natural order, something, an actor, because he makes us so. The new creation is not merited, nor was the first; each is the free act, the gratuitous gift of God; and in neither is our freedom as secondary cause impaired, but really sustained and confirmed by the very fact that on the part of God the act is free and the gift gratuitous. We are what we are by the grace of God, but we are none the less for that; we are able to merit only by virtue of his gratuitous gifts, but that does not deprive us of the ability to merit, because those gifts are precisely what gives us that ability.

Now it is on this ability to act and to merit that the propriety of the worship of the saints rests. That worship implies that God has created men substantial existences, has created creatures as second causes, and men as moral actors, and therefore prevents us from losing sight of the fact of creation, and falling into pantheism, as also from confounding the creature with the creator. It is one of our best practical safeguards against the ancient gentile as the modern Protestant apostasy, for the reason and ground of the worship force the worshipper to keep in mind the distinction between the saint as creature and God as creator; and whenever we find any one offended at the worship of the saints, especially of Mary, the queen of all saints, we have reason to fear that his conception of God as creator is growing obscure, and that there is danger that he may go on falling away, and make ship-wreck alike of his faith and of his soul.

IV. I have shown that it is not only meet and proper to worship God in his saints, but also to worship the saints themselves for such personal merits or worth as they have acquired by the voluntary concurrence with the divine action in nature and grace. I intended to proceed directly to consider what is the actual worship which we render to the saints, but I must prove to my readers that the principle of saint-worship is held even by people who accept not the church.

The principle of saint-worship is, that saints have merit, and merit is to be honored wherever it exists,—a broad, and, in some sense a democratic principle, in that it overlooks all the factitious distinctions of birth, race, rank, wealth, or position, to fix the regard on real moral worth. The church has canonized kings, nobles, military officers of high rank, private soldiers, humble shepherds, poor peasants, and day-laborers. Mary is not worshipped as a saint because she was of the royal line of David, but for her personal worth—her real worth acquired by her uniform concurrence with divine grace; and if more honored than any other saint, it is so because her merits are greater, as well as closer her connection with the salvation of man.

I hope some day to point out, the peculiar merits of our blessed Lady, and to show wherefore she is really, as the church calls her, the queen of all saints. In no way can we better learn what are the virtues most precious in the eyes of the church, than by meditating on those of Mary, and in no way can we better aid our own spiritual progress. In meditating on her distinctive virtues we may, perhaps, learn why the church, from the earliest ages, has taken so much care to encourage her worship, and uniformly treats with special indulgence those who prove themselves her devoted clients. But this enters not into my present plan, which is confined to the nature, ground, and character of saint-worship in general.

I have defended or justified the worship of the saints by showing that God has created them second causes, and capable of concurring by their own free will with his divine action, and, therefore, by the assistance of his grace, of acquiring merit. The saints are they who have well merited, and it would be unjust not to acknowledge it, and to render to them the honor that is their due. The principle of saint-worship is admitted, and the worship, to some extent, is practically rendered, even by those who pretend that the saint-worship practised by Catholics is idolatry and superstition. All ages and nations practise in some form and in some degree, what Carlyle calls hero-worship, and in which, in his quaint way he tells us there is a moral fitness and a profound philosophy. No small part of the religion of the ancient gentiles consisted of hero-worship. No doubt the gentiles often honored in their heroes and great men what were really no virtues, and with honors which should never be paid to a creature; but so far as they honored human virtue,

or intended to honor it, they recognized the fundamental principle on which our saint-worship rests, and differed from us only in its development and application.

The modern gentiles, or the non-Catholic world, are further gone than were the ancients, and are less loyal, less sound in principle, and less ready to recognize real worth, and render it the honor it merits. The ancients had right principles, right feelings, and were less dry and hard than the moderns, less self-sufficient, less egotistical, and more generous in their feelings. They, no doubt, obscured and even perverted, what was good in them by their pantheistic error, but the general prevalence among them of hero-worship proves that there was still some freshness left in their nature. God lives and reigns, though men fail to recognize him in their theories, and is active in human nature, though they deny, or attempt to explain away his existence. If God did not exist, and as creator, there would and could be no one to deny or confound him with nature.

Yet even our modern gentiles are not wholly insensible to the principles of saint-worship, and do in their own way, develop and apply it in practice. Did not our Protestant countrymen unite to honor the memory of the late President Lincoln, and almost fall into the old gentile error of divinizing him, by calling him, as many of them did, a second Messiah, that is, God made flesh? Do they not honor, and justly, the military merits of Grant, Sherman, Rosecrans, Sheridan, and hundreds of others who proved themselves brave and successful commanders of armies, corps, divisions, brigades, or regiments? What is the principle of this honor? It is the principle of human worth, of human merit, and far gone is the nation that fails to recognize and honor worth in its servants. Every nation, not lost to all sense of virtue, honors, in some form, its great men. How many American parents have named their children George Washington, John Adams, Thomas Jefferson, James Madison, Andrew Jackson; and how many counties, towns, cities, villages, and city streets in our country have the name of Washington, Adams, Jefferson, Madison, Monroe, Webster, Calhoun, Van Buren, Lincoln, &c., just as in Catholic countries, they have the names of saints.

All this shows that the principle of saint-worship is active in the hearts of non-Catholic Americans, and, I need not say, is a principle that does honor to human nature.

But this is natural, and there is nothing religious in it, while

the worship Catholics render their saints is strictly a religious worship. But I am not so sure that there is nothing religious in the worship our countrymen pay to their heroes and great men. It is, indeed, civil worship or honor, but civil honor is at bottom no more distinct from religious honor, if we take the term *religious* in its broadest sense, than civil duty is distinct from religious duty. All duty is duty to God; and the basis, the fundamental principle of the civil order is precisely that of the religious order. All true civil or political principles have their ground and origin in theological principles, and through the medium of the creative act are joined to God.

We live, and move, and have our being in God, and God by his creative act is in us, in all our thoughts, words, and deeds, for without him we are nothing, and can do nothing. The fundamental principle of all human activity in all orders is one and the same. Hence theologians tells us, grace supposes nature, and it is a Protestant error to hold that grace supersedes nature, or that in the just only grace acts, as I have heretofore shown. Grace takes away no natural faculty and adds none; it simply elevates to a new plane our natural faculties, and gives them a new power and direction, as we are taught by the church, in her doctrine that our free will concurs in the work of our conversion. In conversion, in justification, in spiritual progress, human nature acts and must act, and on this fact we have grounded the possibility of human merit. Nature is not sufficient for herself, is not complete in herself, for she has in herself neither her first beginning nor her last end, and therefore it is that all natural good is imperfect good. But all Catholic theologians teach that, as far as real, it is good, and hence the proposition that "all the works of infidels are sins," is a condemned proposition.

Now as man exists and acts only by virtue of the creative act of God, all his actions, in some sense, pertain to the religious order, as being done by virtue of the principle which is the principle of religion itself. Whatever action is right in the natural order, or in the civil order, is included in religion, and to some extent partakes of its character. The civil virtues are not of themselves sufficient to merit the eternal rewards of heaven, nor are the civil honors we pay to them, or to statesmen, military heroes, patriots, philosophers, scholars, poets, artists, &c., as high as those merited by the great saint, who to the natural joins the supernatural;

but they differ from them not in principle or kind, and are religious in the sense that they proceed from the relations of man to God through the divine creative act. Moreover, it is not of Catholic faith that the worship we pay to the saints is, strictly speaking, religious worship in any other sense. Strictly speaking, no worship is religious that is not offered directly to God. The principle that prompts to the worship of the saint is precisely the same principle that prompts the civil honors paid by all nations to their heroes and great men. The difference is in the virtues honored, not in the honors or the principle on which they are rendered.

The error of gentilism, in its hero-worship, was not as to the principle underlying it, which was the same with the principle of the Catholic saint-worship, a principle natural to the human heart, and authorized, as we have seen, by its relation to the principle of the worship of God himself, but in the virtues honored, and even in the honors paid. There is a vast difference between canonization and apotheosis. Canonization simply attests the virtues of the saint, and authorizes the faithful to worship or honor him *as a saint*; apotheosis placed the hero among the gods, and authorized his worship *as a god*. To the saint we pay only such honors as are due to a man who concurring with divine grace is sanctified and glorified, or completed, made perfect in Christ our Lord; to the divinized hero, the heathen paid divine honors, which are not and cannot be due a simple creature, however great or holy.

Then again the virtues honored by the heathen in their hero-worship were often no virtues at all, or, if virtues, were not virtues of the highest order. Take, for example, Hercules, Theseus, Romulus, Indra, Wodin, or Thor, and the legend presents you no example worthy of imitation, no virtue but simple strength or force, which is, though a good thing, no moral virtue at all, nor any thing for which its possessor deserves to be honored, since it is not a merit acquired by the action of his own free will, with or without the assistance of grace. I say nothing here of the vices, the crimes, the gross demerits ascribed by the legend to the famed heroes worshipped by the gentiles, because the legend is to a great extent mythical, and these things may perhaps be explained in a pantheistic sense, as symbolizing the productive and destructive forces of nature. I speak here of hero-worship proper, or of men deified, not of the worship paid to the gods by nature, who, as the Scriptures in-

form us, were all dæmons, or as we may say, fallen angels, evil spirits, too often in the history of the world adored as divine, as they are in modern spiritism.

The term Messiah applied in the public honors paid to our late president, so barbarously assassinated, and a few years ago to Cyrus W. Field, who it was supposed had succeeded in laying a working telegraph across the Atlantic, prove how prone men are not only to hero-worship, but, when left to themselves, to fall into the pagan error of confounding men with God and God with men, and to convert even civil honors into idolatry and superstition. The heart, when touched by some deep feeling, or acting under strong excitement, is prone to exaggerate, to run into every species of extravagance, and the church, by taking charge herself of saint-worship, forbidding all private or local canonization, and allowing public honors to be paid only to such as she proposes to the veneration of the faithful, and to be worshipped only with such offices as she herself prescribes, offers the only safeguard we can have against this natural extravagance, or against converting the worship into idolatry or superstition. I said that saint-worship is our best protection against pantheism: I say now that saint-worship as authorized and directed by the church is almost our only protection against the superstition and idolatry of gentilism, into which mankind are sure to fall just in proportion as withdrawn from the instructions and influence of the church. It is instructive to note how uniformly in the history of the world men, in proportion as they fall into a low groveling superstition, fancy that they are becoming enlightened and wise, and with what proud and contemptuous airs they look down on those who are really enlightened with the wisdom of God, and really elevated above the highest powers of human nature, by the effectual workings of divine grace. The Gospel was to the Greeks foolishness, and Christianity to the proud Romans "was a hateful superstition." Little did it occur to them that the folly and superstition were in themselves, not in the humble followers of the Cross, the most magnanimous of men. How true is Saint Paul's description: "They became vain in their thoughts, and their foolish heart was darkened. For professing themselves to be wise, they became fools, and changed the glory of the incorruptible God into the likeness of the image of a corruptible man, and of four-footed beasts and creeping things," though "from the beginning of the world the invisible things of God, even his eter-

nal power and divinity had been clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made"! The same thing is observable now in this age of revived gentilism. With what self-complacency do they who call themselves men of the age boast of their enlightenment, their science, their intelligence which scarcely leaves to nature or to God a secret, and with what scorn and contempt do they view that poor mother, who has just buried the last darling of her heart, kneeling before an image of Mary and through her sobs, exclaiming, "Mother of Sorrows, pray for me," or the poor man harassed in body or mind, calling upon the saints to pray for him, that is, join their prayers to his to God for relief, or resignation! They see in it only besotted ignorance and superstition, in which the priests,—the horrible monsters,—study to keep their flocks, the better to control them and to fleece them. And yet these same enlightened and scientific men, can see no God, but the blind forces of nature, and can believe, if in any thing but themselves only, in modern necromancy, or spirit-rapping! There is nothing new under the sun. Modern gentilism but repeats the ancient, and men believe that they are becoming enlightened and wise, just in proportion as they plunge deeper into the darkness of ignorance and superstition, and we may well say of them, as Clemens Alexandrinus says of the Greeks, "they can believe any thing and every thing, but the truth." The ignorance and superstition they pity or despise in us are theirs, not ours, only they are too ignorant to know it; the monster they see in the sun, and which frightens them, is the fly on the end of their telescope, and the greenness that they seem to see spread over the faces of Catholics is the medium through which they look.

The principle of saint-worship is as universal as human nature, and the worship we render to the saints differs from the civil honors paid to heroes and great men, only as to the quality of the virtues we honor, and the fact that the honors paid are by authority, and under the direction of the church instead of the civil government or unguided individual sentiment.

V. I have wished from first to last in this article to show that the order of nature and the order of grace are both based on the same fundamental principles, and are in reality two distinct parts of one complete plan in the divine decree, rather than two separate and unrelated orders. In my view, the order of regeneration is the complement or com-

pletion of the order of generation, and hence I follow, for myself, the theological opinion that God would have become incarnate, even if man had not sinned, though assuredly, in such case, he could not have come to suffer and die for man's redemption. But be this as it may, it is certain that the order of regeneration is teleological and does complete the order of generation; and since man has actually sinned, grace can complete nature only by redeeming it, and redemption and regeneration are, in relation to the individual, simultaneous, whether really distinguishable or not. Now, we know by supernatural revelation that God is three really distinct persons in one essence. The three persons are related to each other in the divine being, operating *ad extra* as principle, medium, and end; the Father is principle, the Son is medium, and the Holy Ghost is end, and therefore proceeds from both the Father and the Son; from the Father as principle, and the Son as medium, and thus, so to speak, completes the divine *pleroma*, or consummates *ad intra* the divine being.

God operating *ad extra* after his own idea, which is his essence, is one and indivisible, and therefore in all operations *ad extra* the three persons necessarily concur, but in diverse respects, the Father as principle, the Son as medium, the Holy Ghost as end or consummation. The Son or Word is the medium of creation, and "all things were made by him, and without him nothing was made that was made." As essentially God, he is the creator; as distinctly Son, he is the medium of creation. Hence the apostle says by or *through* him all things were made. Our Lord himself says the Father doeth nothing without him.

We know, again, from revelation, that in the fulness of time, the Son as the medium of all the divine operations to complete the creative act and to raise man to union with God in heaven, or to redeem fallen man, and in doing it secure him a supernatural beatitude, assumed flesh in the womb of the Virgin Mary, took upon him human nature, and raised it to be truly and indissolubly the nature of God. As God incarnate becomes the Founder of the teleological order, or as Saint Paul calls it, "the new creation," but a creation having relation to the end or fulfilment of what is only initial and inchoate in Adam, in the first order, or the order of generation, there must subsist in this new order between the incarnate Creator and the new creation the same relation that I labored to show subsists between him

and the creature in the first or initial creation. From this we obtain a new ground for saint-worship, and may learn that saint-worship is the best safeguard against that form of naturalism which denies the Incarnation, and with it the whole order of grace, and man's supernatural destiny. In the Incarnation God abases himself to become man that man may become God. In it God takes upon him our nature, and makes it his own nature. Since the Incarnation, human nature is the nature of God; not his divine nature, but his human nature, yet as truly and as indissolubly his nature as the divine nature itself. This is the mystery of the Incarnation—the mystery of God manifest in the flesh, which no created intellect can comprehend, and which, if I may so speak, exhausts the creative power of God, which infinite as it is can go no further. Hence, as our nature is become the nature of God, the nature of the Founder of the new creation, the saints are related to God, not only in the way explained, but also by identity of nature.

By the Incarnation, then, human nature becomes an object of supreme worship. As Christians we honor the Son as we honor the Father, the Son of man as we honor the Son of God, for the Son of man and the Son of God are henceforth one, and the same God is present in his saints, not only by his creative act, and by the gifts of his grace, but by identity of nature. They have a natural relation to him. This nature, human nature itself, in the language of Pope Saint Leo Magnus, has been deified,—*deificata*, and therefore in the order of regeneration, I almost fear to write it, it is to be worshipped as the nature of God. Tremendous thought! What meaning does it not give to the injunction: "Honor all men," and how forcibly it brings home to us the fact that, "if any man says he loves God and hateth his brother, he is a liar and the truth is not in him!"

It is, however, human nature that is deified, not the individuals of the race. Individually it is hypostatically united to God only in the man Jesus Christ himself. As individuals, the saints are sons of God only by adoption, and while their nature is deified and worshipped as the nature of God, and therefore with divine honors, they as individuals can be honored only with a relative or secondary worship, not as God, but as related to him through his human nature; nevertheless, this relation itself deserves to be recognized and honored in them as well as in him.

The itinerary of the soul is from God as first cause, through regeneration in Christ, to glorification, or supernatural union with God as final cause. The saints are those who by their concurrence with the gifts and graces of God have completed their journey, finished their course, and attained to their supreme beatitude, their crown of glory. They are united to God by identity of nature, by spiritual conformity, and the closest union possible, short of that personal identity, and to refuse to recognize and honor it were a gross indignity to the Word made flesh, and to the whole principle of the new creation or order of regeneration. The chief ground of our saint-worship, after all, is in the relation of the saints in their nature to the nature of God, a relation initial indeed in all men, since human nature is one and the same in all, but consummated, completed, or perfected only in the saints, who are individually conformed to and united with God and made "partakers of his divine nature," so that they are really, in a secondary or imitative sense, Christs, and Sons of God, as Christ is the Son of God.

It is now easy to understand the *hyperdulia* or superior worship which we render to Mary. It is not solely because through the gifts and graces of God her personal merits are greater, but because her relation to the human nature of God is closer and more intimate, and therefore entitled to a larger share in the honor we give, and are required to give, to that nature as assumed by the Word. It was from her that God took his human nature, and in doing so, he took that nature to be his own nature, he raised her to the dignity of mother of God. The closest relation save the hypostatic, possible, is that between mother and son, and therefore Mary by her natural relation to the human nature of God, deserves a higher honor than any other saint, and the highest below that given to God himself. We, then, in our *hyperdulia*, on the strictest philosophical and theological principles, give Mary only the honor that is her due, and with our best efforts we cannot so highly honor her as God honors her.

Saint-worship, the worship of the saints in general and of our Lady in particular, being based on the Incarnation which is teleological, or effective in relation to man's final end or supernatural beatitude, has a real religious character, and differs from the civil worship of great men and heroes as the medium differs from the end. Being based on the

Incarnation its practice tends to keep living and active in us the great fact of our religion,—"The Word was made flesh," on which our redemption, our salvation, and all our hopes of final beatitude depend; and almost universally the neglect of saint-worship is followed by loss of faith in the Incarnation. The sects that reject saint-worship, hardly in a single instance remain orthodox on the capital point of our faith.

VI. I have said that it is not strictly of faith that the worship Catholics render to the saints is, properly speaking, religious worship, and I have shown that it has much in common with the civil honors which all nations pay to their heroes and great men. But I mean by this, simply that it has not been defined to be of faith by a formal judgment of the church, not that the worship is not religious.

I do not agree with those theologians who hold nothing is *de fide* that has not been defined and judicially declared to be of faith; nor can I range myself with those who hold that the Catholic is free to defend any opinion which the church has not formally condemned and prohibited.

The church does not teach her faith exclusively, nor chiefly, through her judicial definitions; she teaches it before defining it, and her definitions are judicial acts, performed in her capacity as *ecclesia judicans*, not in her capacity as *ecclesia docens*. They are, moreover, for the most part negative rather than affirmative, tell us what faith is not, rather than what it is, what cannot be held rather than what must be held. The church received the whole faith in the beginning, and she teaches it infallibly, always and everywhere, in its purity and integrity, through her pastors and doctors. Whatever these always and everywhere agree in teaching to be revealed truth, is faith, and binds all the faithful as such, though no definition by pope or council has intervened. Saint Leo the Great somewhere says the Arians were guilty of heresy before the Council of Nicæa condemned Arianism. As the teaching organs of the church are her pastors and doctors, she could not be said to be infallible in her teaching, if they could be unanimous in teaching as faith what is not faith.

I add, to avoid misunderstanding, that the *consensus theologorum* is authoritative only in matters which the theologians themselves testify to be matters of revelation. Their general agreement in scientific and other questions which they do not claim to be questions of revelation, is not au-

thoritative. The geocentric theory was for centuries taught in schools approved by the church, and held by the theologians with scarcely a dissenting voice, as the true system of the universe, but it was held and taught as a scientific theory, not as a Catholic dogma. The very general opinion of theologians and learned professors, as well as what are called "pious beliefs" of the faithful, is entitled always to respectful consideration, but may be departed from for good and sufficient reasons, or controverted without heresy or rashness. In regard to faith, the body of theologians or pastors and doctors, reaching from the apostles to us, are both a competent and a credible witness to tradition, for they are its medium; but in matters of science and opinion, not included in the *depositum*, and which depend on human reason and human prudence, they are, if faith is not impugned, no more authoritative than other men, unless they have superior reason, science, and erudition.

They who restrict faith to what is covered by the formal definitions of the church, are usually much inclined to hold that the contradictory error condemned is defined to be of faith. This is sometimes so, and sometimes not so, and whether so or not must be determined by the wording of the decree and the nature of the case. When the Holy See decided that Gallicans are Catholics, and must not be excluded from the sacraments, she did not define that Gallicanism is of faith or even the sounder opinion, but only that it is not contradictory of the faith, and that they who hold it are not to be disturbed. Some authors who held or wished to hold opinions censured by the congregation of the Index, maintained that they were free to disregard the censure, because the pontifical congregations, being human institutions created by the pope, are not the church, and therefore their judgments are not infallible. The Holy Father has recently censured them, and ordered the decrees of the pontifical congregations to be received and obeyed as the voice of the church; for it is by these that the Holy Father executes his office as supreme pastor and governor of the faithful. Therefore it is concluded that the contradictory of what is censured by a pontifical congregation, is defined to be of faith, whether it pertains to faith or discipline, science or politics, philosophy or history. The encyclical warrants no conclusion of the sort, and nobody I ever heard of claims that even the church is infallible in every thing or in all her decrees. The church has authority to teach the whole faith and all

that belongs to it, and to govern all the faithful in all things pertaining to Christ's kingdom and their spiritual welfare. In teaching the faith delivered to her and in censuring whatever is repugnant to it, she is, by virtue of the indwelling Holy Ghost, infallible: in governing her authority is complete, and full and ready obedience is her due, but that she is inerrable in all her disciplinary or administrative canons, I have never understood to be a Catholic dogma.

The European liberals profess to be laboring to introduce and establish in the royal and imperial states of Europe, popular or democratic governments. The Holy Father has censured them. Therefore, the infallible church has condemned democracy as contrary to the faith, and defined monarchy to be the only orthodox form of government! But the encyclical neither censures democracy nor approves monarchy. Democracy may be perfectly compatible with orthodoxy, and yet the liberals deserve censure for attempting to introduce it by conspiracy, secret societies, insurrection, rebellion, civil war, and revolution. The encyclical censures not civil or popular liberty; it only censures the false and destructive principles on which the revolutionary party defend it, and the unlawful, violent, and iniquitous means they make use of to establish it. The end does not always justify the means.

In the syllabus of errors attached to the encyclical the Holy Father censures those who pretend that the principles and methods adopted by the ancient fathers and schoolmen in explaining and defending theological truths are unsuited to our times. Therefore, we are told, the scholastic theology and philosophy are erected into Catholic dogmas, and all that is left us who live now, or hereafter, is simply to recite them as we do the *Credo!* No such thing is done, or pretended to be done; for neither pope nor council can erect any thing into a dogma of faith not contained in the depositum, and nothing that is only in the order of human science, however true, can be erected into faith. The encyclical condemns the error, and censures the scandal of asserting that the church, for ages has tolerated in her schools and professors principles and methods which are at any time repugnant either to the faith or the true interests of faith. I am free, not to reject the whole body of scholastic theology, and require its reconstruction on a different basis, but I am free to present to my own age the truth contained

in that theology in such manner as in my judgment will best secure it attention and respect.

In reality, under this head, the encyclical censures chiefly, not the free exercise of reason and judgment in presenting theological science to the age in which we live, but on the one hand, the traditionalists who build science on faith and maintain that the use the fathers and scholastics make of reason in the construction of theology, leads to rationalism, pantheism, atheism; and on the other, the historians, who would substitute for the philosophical method of the fathers and schoolmen, the *exclusively* historical method, and reconstruct theology according to their reading of historical facts. An attentive study of the errors censured in the encyclical and syllabus will show any one capable of understanding the subject, that they are, in nearly every case, errors which tend directly or indirectly to undermine reason, destroy science, dissolve the bonds of society, render all real liberty, civil or religious, impracticable, and throw the civilized world back into the barbarism from which the church by ages of suffering and toil had redeemed it.

I hope my readers will pardon my apparent digression, and my presumption in leaping the limits of my province as a layman. Some honest people have supposed that I am myself among those who have incurred the censures of the encyclical, and I have wished to show them that in my own opinion I am not, and that I hold the pope has received from God plenary authority, as the successor of Saint Peter, to teach and rule the church as supreme pastor and governor, and that whatever he condemns as contrary to faith I condemn, and that whatever he forbids me to do, I cannot do without disobeying God.

I have made the remarks I have, because, though I find no condemnation of those who hold that the *cultus sanctorum* is civil rather than religious, I maintain that it is strictly and properly religious worship, though, of course, not supreme religious worship, which is due to God alone and can be offered to no creature without idolatry.

VII. Man's itinerary is from God by way of creation as first cause, and to God as final cause without absorption in him. All religions, the false as well as the true, assert this itinerary, or the procession of existences from God, and their return to him; but the ancient and modern heathen religions, especially the Hindoo and Buddhist, teach that the procession of existences from God is by way of emanation

or generation, which is the radical assumption of pantheism, and that their return to him is absorption in him, the return of the stream to its source, which denies all individual existence, and individual or personal immortality. All the gentiles early lost the tradition and even the conception of the creative act, and Christianity,—counting the Jewish and Christian religions as substantially one and the same religion,—is the only religion the world has ever known that is not pantheistic. It asserts the procession of existences from God to be by virtue of the divine creative act, and their return to him to be without absorption in him, or loss of individual or personal existence. It is I individually, in my own personal identity, that will live again, either in heaven or in hell.

All religion pertains to this second part of the soul or man's itinerary. It teaches man his origin, but as the condition of his knowing and aspiring to his end in God. Its real mission is to show man his obligation to seek that end by the exercise of his reason and will, and to supply him with the means necessary to attain to it. All religion is teleological, and has reference solely to the end, to the perfection, the consummation of man's existence as a creature of God, and a free, moral, and rational activity. The word religion is probably from *re-ligare*, to bind again, for as creation binds us to God as first cause, so religion binds us again or anew to God as final cause.

This return to God as final cause, as our last end, our supreme good, or beatitude, all terms meaning practically the same thing, is possible only through the Incarnation. The Incarnation is the only medium of this return, and final union with God, equally so, whether we hold that, if man had not sinned, God would or would not have become incarnate. The only mediator between God and men is the man Christ Jesus, and there is no name but his, under heaven, given among men whereby we can be saved. He who denies the holy Trinity denies the Incarnation, and he who denies the Incarnation denies the possibility of man's return to God, fulfilling his destiny, or attaining to beatitude.

Saint-worship has, as we have seen, its chief ground in the relation which the saints bear to the Word made flesh, or to the God incarnate. Their worship then pertains chiefly at least to the teleological order, the return of existences to God, and beatitude in union with him. It is there-

fore religious, included in religion as a part of our duty to God, and worship of him. It is something more than the civil honor which the state decrees to its great men and heroes, as much more as the church is more than the state, or religion than politics. I maintain, then, though it has not been formally defined, that it is religious, that every theological reason that can be brought to bear on the question proves it to be really and truly a religious worship in its principle and end, both subjectively and objectively.

I have shown that the worship of saints is founded on the great mysteries of our religion, and is the best possible safeguard of faith in those mysteries themselves, especially the great facts of creation and incarnation, which the heathen lose sight of, pervert, or travesty. Indeed all Catholic practices, growing as they do out of the great principles of faith, have a direct tendency to keep faith fresh, living, and life-giving in the heart and soul. There is profound logic, a living reality in all the church commands or approves. The Real Presence, if I may so speak, is everywhere, at once a particular and a universal truth. Hence it is that our religion is always coherent, self-consistent, and when embraced and observed, is efficient. It is always real, founded on the truth and reality of things. Hence it is that it appears to those who study it without believing it a master-piece of human wisdom. A master-piece of wisdom it is, but of the wisdom of God, not of man, for man was never equal to its invention or discovery.

But not only, for the reasons assigned, is saint-worship religious, and serviceable to religion; it is religious, because the honor we pay to the saints redounds to the honor of God. We worship God in them, and we worship them in God, and for God. We do not honor the saints because they are nearer to us than God, or because they more readily sympathize with us, for this is not true. God is infinitely nearer our souls, and infinitely more tender and lovely than any saint. The saints' power, tenderness, and love come from God, and return to God, and are his. Mary is indebted to God for all those qualities and virtues we love and honor in her. Her personal merit is solely in her voluntary concurrence, by the aid of divine grace, with divine grace. The saints are really inseparable from God, and we ask God himself to grant that they may intercede with him for us. If we honor them in a certain sense for their own merits, we know those merits are only the fruits

of his gifts, and in rewarding them God only crowns his own gifts. Our great reason for honoring them is that God himself honors them. How can we be Godlike if we honor not whom God honors? How can we really love God, if we love not whom he loves? When I love the father I love the son for the father's sake, before loving him for his own. and even when I come to love him for his own, I continue to love him for his father's sake.

The worship of the saints is then connected with the worship of God, and bears the same relation to it, that the saint himself bears to him who has created, redeemed, regenerated, and glorified him. As we cannot love God fully without embracing in our love all that he loves, so can we not give him the honor that is his due, without honoring all whom he honors. Saint-worship is then included in the worship of God, and is therefore essentially religious worship, as will appear more fully hereafter.

VIII. I believe I was wrong in saying that we pray directly to God that the saints may intercede for us: I should have said, that we pray him directly to grant us through their intercession the favors we ask for, or such blessings as we stand in need of. This is the fact I intended to state, and is all that my argument required.

From the fact that we pray God to grant us favors through the intercession of the blessed Mary ever virgin, and of other saints honored with an office by the church, I infer first, that the honors paid to the saints are religious, not merely civil; secondly, that we do not pray to the saints on the supposition that we cannot pray directly to God himself, or that the saints are nearer to us, in closer relations with us, and more ready to hear and assist us; and thirdly, that what in the worship of the saints we ask of them is their intercession, or simply their prayers. We do not ask the saints, not even the blessed Mary, for pardon, for mercy, for grace, or blessings of any sort, as things in their power to grant, we simply ask them to aid us by their prayers, or to intercede with God to obtain these things for us from him, from whom cometh every good and perfect gift.

What we ask of the saints in glory is simply what we may and do ask of one another while living in the flesh. Many years ago, long before I had the happiness of being received into the communion of the Catholic Church, I was, as most Protestants who retain some respect for religion are, in the habit of frequently closing my letters to my friends

with the words, pray for me. One day writing to a very dear friend, but who was not precisely a saint, I concluded, unthinkingly, with the words, pray for me. I did so from the force of habit, but I had no sooner written the words than a sudden thought struck me, and I exclaimed to myself: "There is the justification of the Catholic practice of invocation of saints. Here I am asking a sinful mortal to pray for me, how much rather should I ask the prayers of a beatified saint in heaven, always in the presence of God." From that moment to this I have had no difficulty with the invocation of saints, nor hesitated to ask them to pray for me; and long before my conversion I had specially invoked the prayers of our Lady, and I have no reason to doubt that her intercession obtained me what I needed,—the grace of faith and docility, whether I have profited by it or not; for from that day my mind began slowly to open to the truth of our holy religion, and it seemed as if the dark clouds that had hidden its beauty from my view began to part and roll back and disclose the splendor beyond, and nothing was more easy than to believe.

But still it is asked, what need to pray the saints at all, and why not pray directly to God himself, since he is infinitely nearer to us, and more ready and able to help us than any saint is or can be? In reply, I answer that Catholics do pray directly to God, and perhaps even more than they do who reject prayers to the saints, and I might ask in our turn, why pray even directly to God, since he knows all our wants better than we ourselves know them, knows what we are going to pray for before the prayer is formed in our own heart, and is infinitely more willing to help us than we are to ask his help? The same principle that justifies prayer to God, justifies prayers to the saints to intercede for us, and certainly nothing in religion is more certain than that prayer is enjoined as a duty, and that it, if offered not amiss, availeth much. There is not, and never was a religion without prayer, and prayer is an integral part of every religious service, in every age and nation. On what principle does it depend? Is there a universal or catholic reason for it?

Every dogma and every practice enjoined or approved by the church rests on a catholic or universal principle, and therefore she is really, not merely *called* the *Catholic* Church. She is the Catholic Church because all her doctrines are catholic or universal principles, always and everywhere true,

whether we speak of the order of nature or of the order of grace, and all her authorized practices have their reason in these universal principles. The principles of the order of grace are the principles of the order of nature, for grace does not contradict, extinguish, or supersede nature, but presupposes it—*gratia supponit naturam*, accepts it, and completes, consummates, or fulfils it. "I am not come," said our Lord, "to destroy, but to fulfil." Nature has its fulfilment in grace, generation in regeneration and glorification. God, if I may so speak, creates always after one and the same divine plan, and is both in his ordinary and his gracious providence fulfilling one and the same original design. He is the infinite and eternal logic; and, though infinitely free in all his external acts, alike from outward coercion and inward necessity, he is strictly and rigidly logical, and never illogical, inconsequent, arbitrary, or capricious in any of his works. He never deviates from the plan his own wisdom has devised, never alters or amends it, but carries it out with infinite self-consistency both as a whole and in all its parts.

Hence the uniformity, the regularity, and harmony of the universe, and the universality and immutability of what are called the laws of nature; and hence, too, the difficulty which men who devote themselves to the study of the natural sciences, find in admitting miracles, or the supernatural facts of our religion, which seem to them to be deviations from the uniformity of the plan of creation, inconsequences in the divine action, which are so contrary to reason that no possible evidence can prove them, for no evidence can rise higher than reason itself. Their difficulty arises from not knowing or not reflecting that the miracles and supernatural facts are in the *order* of the supernatural, and that the so-called supernatural order does but carry on in the same line and complete the natural, or in other and more precise terms, that grace simply fulfils nature, or completes what is not ultimate in the world they study, but inchoate or initial, and is no more nor otherwise supernatural, than the creative act itself. Nature is supernatural in its origin and end, and the natural is only that which God does mediately, through the ministry or agency of second or created causes. There is in what we here assert the principle of the harmony of faith and reason, the truths of revelation and the truths of science. The principles of both are the same, and they differ only in the fact that faith reveals their origin and ground in the divine mind, and is the medium of their development and application beyond the power of human reason.

Whenever we find any proposition or fact which we can refer to no catholic or universal principle, we may always rest assured that either it is false, or that we do not understand it,—have failed to seize its real meaning; for every real fact, every true proposition has a universal as well as a particular sense. It is on this ground that the great fathers and doctors of the church, seek always in the Holy Scriptures a more than the simple historical sense, and regard the moral and spiritual sense, which transcends it, as by far the more important sense. We see this especially in Origen and Saint Augustine, though in the works of Origen as transmitted to us there are some grave errors. We see it in all the Christian mystics, from whom, if we know how to read them, we may best seize the spirit and inner sense of religion, for they give us our faith in its synthesis, as a living whole, not simply in detached propositions, and isolated particulars.

All the works of God are at once particular and general, and every particular fact is at once a fact and a sign or symbol, and it is chiefly as a sign, as significant of a universal principle, that it deserves to be studied, meditated. He who sees in the Holy Scriptures only the literal meaning determined by grammar and lexicon has never learned to read the written word of God, and the philosopher who has never looked "through nature up to nature's God," knows as little of nature as he knows of the *Divina Commedia* who has simply learned its letters and syllables, without being able to join them together in words. Nature is real, not merely ideal, or phenomenal, but while real it expresses or symbolizes a higher reality than its own. It is the characteristic of genius to see through the sign that higher reality; and to see and express it under the form of the beautiful is the province of the true artist, the true poet. There is always more in every fact and under all appearances than the minds that stop with the literal material fact, the mimetic, dream of, and it is the good side of modern transcendentalism that it is aware of this great truth; but unhappily it forgets that the material, the mimetic, to borrow a term from Plato, though symbolizing the spiritual, is itself real, not as they hold, a mere appearance.

IX. It is impossible not to pity our poor materialists who see no existence, no reality that transcends the sensible order. How little do they know or dream of the riches and beauty, the life and grandeur of God's universe! For them the primrose by the river's brink is a primrose and nothing

more. It symbolizes to them no reality beyond itself. The unbelieving Jew saw in Mary only a lowly Hebrew maiden or the wife of Joseph the carpenter; and yet, while all that, she was the mother of God, the queen of angels, the most glorious of the creatures of God. The same carnal-minded Jew saw nothing in our Lord himself as he travelled over Judea and Galilee, poor and destitute, with not where to lay his head, but the carpenter's son; without beauty or comeliness that he should desire him; and yet he was the Lord of glory, the Majesty of heaven and earth, the Creator and Governor of the world. To the literalist, who sees nothing beyond the letter, the sacred emblems, the consecrated elements, are simply bread and wine, and yet are they, under the real forms of bread and wine, the body and blood, the soul and divinity, of the incarnate God who gave himself for us. Catholicity teaches and finds, so to speak, the Real Presence everywhere, in every thing; all facts, all events, each in its own order and degree, are symbols of truths that infinitely transcend them, and the elect soul regenerated by the Holy Ghost is really joined by faith to that world of inconceivable joy and bliss which awaits the just, and is the beatitude of the saints; "for faith," says the apostle, "is the substance of things hoped for, and the evidence of things not seen"—*argumentum non apparentium.*

In the great truth I here insist upon, is the key to the marvellous wisdom even in things of the world so often met with in the saints who live wholly retired and in solitude. These men spend not their lives in forming acquaintance with mere outward facts, or with the productions of other men's brains. They meditate on the facts before them, penetrate their meaning, and grasp the universal truth they symbolize. A soul that has learned to meditate finds all nature opened, unveiled to its view, and finds everywhere matter enough to charm, to delight, to instruct, to edify, and elevate it for years in a single spear of grass, for to the heart opened by faith, it is full of God, and God is the fountain of all science, wisdom, life and joy. It is not that the holy man is supernaturally or miraculously instructed in a special manner, but that he looks beneath and beyond the literal fact, penetrates the symbol, and finds himself in living relation with a higher and broader order of truth. Mere external facts give us knowledge and wisdom only as we meditate them and penetrate their meaning. Animals have as keen senses as men, and often keener, and they have be-

fore them as broad a range of sensible facts, but they lack the mind that sees in the sensible fact the sign of an intellectual and spiritual truth, and that can attain by meditation to the truth signified. The great reason why we moderns fall so far below the men of antiquity or of the early ages of the church is that we speculate more and meditate less, and exercise our understanding less when we meditate. We are active, not contemplative.

But I am suffering the attractiveness of this theme to lead me away from the question before me. I have simply wished to call the attention of my readers to the fact that Catholicity is catholic, and that all the doctrines and practices of the church rest on real and universal principles, and that in neither is there any thing narrow, arbitrary, capricious, sectarian, or unreal. Indeed, her dogmas embody the principles, and her practices, her worship in all its parts are designed to keep alive faith in her dogmas, and to realize them in the daily practical life of the faithful.

The principle on which rests the intercession of the saints is that God uses in completing or perfecting his works the ministry or agency of second or created causes, that is, the agency or ministry of creatures. This is seen in the order of nature no less than in the order of grace. We see it in all the facts of generation, the continuance and multiplication of the small kinds of plants and animals, and in the continuance, multiplication, and growth of the human race itself. So universal is this principle, which goes in the unbelieving world under the name of development, and so uniform and necessary is the part of second causes that not a few of our scientific men see no need of a first cause, and recognize no action but the action of creatures. There is a strong disposition in modern science to explain the origin and progress of all creatures and of the globe itself by their pretended laws of development.

God creates alone, by the word of his power, but, without releasing the creature from dependence on him, he makes its existence, growth, and well-being dependent under him on others. The child is not born without society, nor reared without the nurse's aid. It must have food, and that must be supplied from first to last by others, at first by others without, and afterward with its co-operation. Light, air, heat, moisture are all needed, and are administered by nature, also a creature of God. Indeed the whole created system is a system of mediation and intercommunion.

God gives the harvest, and yet the husbandman must till the soil, and sow the seed, or he will reap no harvest. Throughout all orders there are means adapted to the end, and if the means are not adopted, the end is not gained. So with regard to prayer. It is a means to an end, and it is as unreasonable to suppose the end without the means in this case as in that of the husbandman. God knows from the beginning that the harvest is needed, yet he gives it not, unless the appointed means are used. In answering prayer he does not change, nor ordinarily work a miracle; we obtain the blessing because we comply with the conditions on which he bestows it, and are in a state in which we can receive and profit by it. This answers the objection as to prayer.

The intercession of the saints is in accordance with the same principle, a principle of universal application, that of the agency of the creature in perfecting and completing creation, or the return of existences to God as their final cause.

This is seen in the Incarnation, through which, and through which alone, man is redeemed, elevated, and glorified. In the Incarnation God makes himself creature, that the creature may fulfil its destiny, and it is in his humanity that he redeems, regenerates, and sanctifies man, thus making the creature the medium of the whole teleological order. We see the same principle in the institution of the priesthood, and it lies at the bottom of all public divine service. It is clear then that the prayers and intercessions of the saints are included in principle in the original plan of the Creator and harmonize perfectly with both the ordinary and the extraordinary providence of God.

X. I have shown that the principle on which the intercession of the saints may avail us, is that God in developing and perfecting or consummating his works uses the agency of second or created causes, as in man's redemption and salvation; that is, enables and allows his creatures in their several orders and according to their nature to co-operate with him. This co-operation in purely physical natures is involuntary and blind, from internal necessity; in rational and moral natures it is a free co-operation, voluntary,—from reason and free will. Hence God in the natural world uses physical agencies and effects his designs by what is called natural laws; and in moral natures by the ministry of angels and of men. He sends his angel to announce to Mary that

she shall conceive by the Holy Ghost, bear a Son, and call his name Jesus, for he shall save his people from their sins; he sends, too, his angel to deliver Peter from prison, and communicates revelations to Saint John in the Isle of Patmos by a like ministry. He uses men as priests to offer the Holy Sacrifice and to intercede with him for his people.

This is not because he cannot effect every thing by his own direct and immediate action; but because he is good, and delights to communicate himself as far as communicable to his creatures, to make them as near like himself as creatures can be like their Creator, and to honor them by making them co-workers with him, and giving them thus a real title to share in his glory. They who faithfully co-operate with him in winning souls to Christ, and extending his kingdom on the earth, enter when this work is done, into the joy of their Lord, and share his glory. No higher honor can be conferred on a creature than to be permitted to co-operate with God, than to be employed by the King of kings and Lord of lords in his service,—to be sent on his errands, and to hear from him the words, Well done, good and faithful servants, enter ye into the joy of your Lord.

As God delights to honor his creatures by employing them in his service, so he must delight to hear and respond to their intercession for their brethren; for their intercession, though free and willing on their part, and proceeding from their great love of him and of their fellow creatures in him, is a part of the service in which he employs them. Their intercession is the highest honor they can render him. It honors him as the source of all good, as the giver of every grace, and of every good and perfect gift; honors his love, his tenderness, his mercy, his compassion for his creatures, to which all intercession is a direct appeal.

These remarks, it seems to me, remove every difficulty that can be supposed to exist in view of God to prayer in general, and the intercession of the saints in particular. Nothing prevents him, if he chooses, from hearing and answering prayers, whether they are our own prayers for ourselves, or the prayers of the saints in heaven for us. Both are in strict accordance with the order of his providence and the principles on which his works are consummated, souls redeemed, sustained and perfected. In either case, while prayer and intercession are acceptable to God as a loyal recognition of his sovereignty, his freedom, his love, his mercy, and his tenderness and compassion, they are the

greatest privilege, and the highest honor to him who prays or intercedes. Man is privileged. He has at all times access to the presence of his Sovereign, and the ear of his God, and by prayer is elevated, in some sort, to companionship with his Maker. Nothing brings God so near to us, and raises us so near to him as prayer. And what greater honor could even he confer on his saints than to allow them to take part in his providence, by interceding for us, and to listen to their prayers and intercessions for those who invoke them? It is a great good to them, and no good thing will be withheld from them that love him. It associates them with himself in his works of grace.

But, the saints have entered into the joy of their Lord, are completely blest, their happiness is full, and why should they concern themselves with the happiness of others? They are in the presence of God, see him as he is in himself, are filled with him, and how can they have any thought for any one else, or any regard for those they have left behind, or who are still undergoing their probation? The objection implies too much, and also entirely mistakes the nature of the love of God. God is self-sufficing, and eternally blest or happy in himself. His blessedness can be neither augmented nor diminished. He can be no more nor happier with, than without creation. Why then does he create? Because he is love or charity,—*Deus est charitas*—and love delights to communicate itself,—because he would have others love, others share, so to speak, his own blessedness. The saints are not love as God is love, but they are like him, as much like him as creatures can be like their Creator, for they are made partakers of his divine nature—*divinæ consortes naturæ*, and are saints only because they love and participate in his charity. They must therefore delight to diffuse their love, and desire others to share their blessedness. The beatitude of the saints is not an egotistical or selfish beatitude, which were no beatitude at all, but a beatitude that has its origin and ground in pure disinterested love, or perfect charity.

The saints are, indeed, in the presence of their Lord, and are filled, satisfied with his love, but the love of God includes the love of creatures, and in heaven no more than on earth can one love God without loving his brother also. The saint loves all in God, in whom all live, and move, and have their being. The more one loves God the more does he love his brother, and the beloved apostle says: "We know we have

passed from death unto life, *because* we love the brethren." Moreover, our Lord himself tells us: "There is joy in heaven among the angels of God over one sinner that repenteth." The saints in heaven are not then indifferent to us their brethren on earth.

Moreover, it is a mistake to suppose that any real happiness tends to make us selfish, or indifferent to the happiness of others. The reverse is the fact. The miserable are always selfish, and selfish in proportion to the intensity of their misery. The damned, whether angels or men, cannot love, and therefore is their damnation complete, and everlasting. Could they love, could charity enter their hearts, they could repent, reform, rise from hell to heaven, and suffer no more. No man absorbed in the agony of his own soul can concern himself with the welfare of others, can think of their sufferings, or seek to relieve them. If it was from a regard for them that the rich man in hell prayed that Lazarus might be sent to warn his five brothers, his misery could not have been complete, and had some mitigation.

No doubt, we find noble examples of the broadest and purest charity in persons suffering intense physical pain, and even among the poor and destitute, who are in want of the bare necessaries of life; but it were a great mistake to reckon these with the miserable. They are happy in their charity, and have an internal joy and peace which more than overbalances their physical sufferings. It is a mistake to suppose the rich and prosperous who consult no one's good but their own, are happy. I do not find that our Lord ever pronounced them blessed. Saint Lawrence broiling on his gridiron suffers nothing in comparison with what the most successful votaries of fashion and pleasure suffer each hour of their lives. Real happiness is in the soul, and is the greater the more the soul loves, and the soul loves the more in proportion as its happiness is greater.

Hence I conclude that the saints in glory take a deeper interest in our welfare than we do, even the best of us, in the welfare of one another, because they love more, are happier, and are freed from all care or anxiety for themselves. Their beatitude is consummated, and secure. Nothing can destroy or diminish it, and nothing can divert their thoughts to any selfish end. Nothing can divert them from interceding for their brethren, not to augment their own blessedness indeed, or for their own sake, but for the honor of their Creator, and the glory of their Redeemer.

But it is alleged, even by persons who call themselves Christians, that, however well disposed the saints might be to intercede for us, they cannot hear our invocations, and therefore our prayers to them are vain, and even superstitious. If they cannot hear us, our prayers to them are unquestionably superstitious, and not to be tolerated. But wherefore can they not hear us? Are they not living men and women, even more living than when tabernacling with us?

The non-Catholic world is tending everywhere, as might be expected, to heathen rather than Christian views of death. They do not, as a general thing, reject the future life, but they find it difficult to bring it home to them as a reality, as a truer and more real life than the present. They are rapidly losing all real faith in the life and immortality brought to light through the Gospel, and darkness and despair gather for them once more over the tomb. Nothing is so well fitted to keep living and fresh the Christian faith in the future life as the practice of constantly praying to the saints. There is throughout a close union between Catholic practice and Catholic faith, and while the faith imposes the practice, the practice keeps alive and real the faith. We may remark too, that they who neglect or reject the practice of praying to the saints, soon come to look upon the saints as being as dim and as unsubstantial as the shades asserted by heathen darkness and superstition, and even to doubt all real future personal or individual existence. To Catholic faith the saints really live, with a real personal existence, with all the faculties they had in this life, even clarified and strengthened. Wherefore should they be less able to hear us than we are to hear one another? Is it said they are too far from us, or so far removed from us, that our voices cannot reach them? But what mean we by distance, when we speak of saints who have entered into their rest? Are spirits made perfect subject to the accidents of time and space? Time and space pertain only to creatures who are yet on the way, who have not yet returned to God, or actualized their potentiality. When that potentiality is actualized, and their existence is fulfilled or consummated, the angel of the Lord proclaims that for them time is no more, they have entered eternity. Time and space are only relations, and the saints in glory are not subject to them. They are united to God, and in their unison with him are near unto every one of us, nearer, if we love, than they were before they were called home. They are present wherever there is a thought of them.

We must remember that "the communion of saints" is an article of the Christian's creed, and even the Calvinist Dr. Watts sings,

> "Angels, and living saints and dead
> But one communion make."

There can be no communion where there is no medium of communication. We who live have a medium of communion with those who have gone to their reward, and therefore form one communion with them. This medium is Christ himself, who is the head of every man, and whose life is the life of all who are begotten anew by the Holy Ghost. The saints know our thoughts and desires, because seeing God as he is in himself, they see them reflected in him as images reflected in a glass. They are visible in his light, clearly seen and known in it. This is nothing anomalous. Even in this life we see and know things only as mirrored to us by the divine light. We see all things *in Deo et per Deum*, because all have their being in him and are rendered intelligible by the light of his being, which is the light of our reason. There is no more mystery in the way the saints hear our invocations than there is in the way in which we hear one another. Mystery there is, but it is the same mystery in both cases, and it would be absurd to maintain that we do not hear one another because we cannot explain how we do it. There being a medium of communion between us and the saints, and they and we forming only one communion, one body of our Lord, being members of him and members of one another, nothing can be more reasonable, more natural even, than that we should invoke their prayers, and that they should intercede for us. It is in accordance alike with the order of nature and the order of grace.

XI. I have shown that the intercession of the saints is no anomaly in the Creator's plan, but is in strict accordance with his providence, which completes or perfects his works through the agency or ministry of second or created causes. Creatures can have no part in the production of existences, or in their creation from nothing, but God employs them in developing and completing creatures. Hence it is that all existences are active, and strictly speaking, there are no purely passive existences, no pure passivity in nature.

In saying that God in completing or perfecting his works uses the ministry of angels and of men, or employs created agencies, that is, natural causes so called, I do not mean to

be understood that even to this end he never does any thing immediately, directly by himself, without other mediums than his eternal Word, for miracles are well attested facts in all ages of the world, and prove, among other things, that God is his own law, the Master of nature, and not bound by it. The age has much to say of liberty, and no men are more clamorous for liberty than those who suppose God is invincibly bound by what they call the laws of nature; but the basis of all liberty is the liberty of God himself. To suppose him subject to natural laws, or the laws of nature, is to suppose him bound by fate or destiny, as the heathen held their gods to be, and to deny all space for freedom in the universe. Whatever is fixed, invariable, immutable, in nature or the laws of nature, is not nature, but God, not something above him, outside of him, and independent of him, but he himself, in the plenitude of his own necessary, eternal, and immutable being. He is not free not to be, nor free to be other than he is; but he is always and everywhere free to act as he pleases, through ministries or not, as seems to him good. The difficulty in men's minds in regard to the divine freedom grows out of the fact that they always associate what is logical with what is necessary, and cannot easily understand how God can be always logical in his action, and yet free. It may help them to bear in mind that God is himself the supreme logic, logic in itself, and the necessity in the case does not bind him, but the conclusions that follow from the premises he creates, and he is free to create such premises as he chooses. He cannot create the existence man, which at the same time shall be man, and something specifically different from man.

Supernatural intervention or the direct and immediate action of God in the universe, which is what we call miracles, because inexplicable by any natural laws or second causes, as the conception of our Lord in the womb of the Virgin Mary, is not illogical or capricious, but in relation to the divine mind is as orderly as the growth of a plant, or the gravitation of bodies toward the centre of the earth. An act because free is not for that reason anomalous, and a principal great value of miracles is that they vindicate to us the freedom of God, and prove to us that the laws of nature, so called, depend on him, and not he on them, as from their uniformity and constancy we are apt to suppose. They show us God acting freely, directly, without the agency of second causes, and therefore his freedom, self-existence, and

self-sufficingness; they are a direct answer to those who say, "there is no God," or confound God with nature. They are as credible to him who believes in God as are any of the facts of nature, for they have the same cause, and a sufficient cause, and are provable by the same kind of evidence or testimony. They are no more incredible than creation, which from the nature of the case must be the direct act of God.

But the admission of miracles, the direct supernatural action of God, does not in any sense deny or abridge his action through second causes. A miracle is not contrary to the laws of nature, nor does it revoke or even suspend them. It is only the act of a power above them, and not explicable by them; it leaves them to their ordinary operation, and simply proves that they do not exhaust the activity of the Creator, and that he survives them in all his infinity, and in all his inexhaustible freedom of action. The heathen believed in prodigies, the intervention of their gods, but had no conception of miracles in the Christian sense, because their gods were not believed by them to be God, and the God they dimly recognized in the darkness or of whom they retained some faint and fading reminiscences, was no creative God. He was for the most part in their mythologies resolved into fate, necessity, or destiny, which, as says the Emperor Marcus Antoninus, "binds both gods and men." The Christian believes in God the Creator, *Deus Creator*, and therefore can rise to the true conception of a miracle, and understand that God may work a miracle without violating, interrupting, or suspending the so-called natural order. The miracle transcends nature, and reveals the hand, the will, or the power that creates, and sustains nature. God can act through the things that he has made, and he can act without them, without their co-operation with him, as is evident from his having been able to create them from nothing. He in fact does act in both ways, and hence we have always present, in human life, both the natural and the supernatural.

The fundamental mistake of those who object to the invocation of the saints, is in supposing that God in the work of our sanctification and perfection in glory, works always directly, immediately, without any created medium, or any co-operation on our part with him. This was the great mistake of the reformers. In their theory the Incarnation, if not expressly denied, has really no place, and practically

nothing to do with our regeneration, sanctification, and perfection in glory. The most they can consistently admit is that it was necessary to enable the Son to die on the cross, and that it was necessary that he should die on the cross to remove the abstract justice interposed to the pardon of the sinner, or to render it consistent with his majesty for God to pardon and forgive those who had transgressed his law. It has, on their theory, so far as I can conceive, no practical effect on the sinner himself, in redeeming and elevating his nature, and infusing into him a new and higher life, and enabling him to fulfil his destiny, which is union with God in the beatific vision. It is at best an expedient for getting rid of a difficulty which never existed, for it was always competent for God, if he chose, to pardon the sinner on repentance and reformation of life. That he does not do so without the incarnation and redemption through the passion and cross of his Son, is not because he cannot, but because he chooses in his infinite love to do something far better for the sinner, and to make his fall the occasion of a far greater glory. Hence, forgetting this, we find them denying all mediate action of God. Faith is regarded as a direct gift. Regeneration or the new birth, is the direct work of the Holy Ghost, so is the perseverance of the just, and their final salvation. In all God works immediately, directly, sovereignly, and the creature is purely passive, and in no sense co-operative with the Holy Spirit. Hence they reject the priesthood, the sacraments, the whole office of the church. All this grows out of the denial of the mediatorial system of grace which has its origin and ground in the Holy Trinity, rejecting virtually, if not formally, the entire ministry of angels and men. They are in principle, did they but know it, pantheists, denying the reality of second causes, and hence we see everywhere the world of the reformers developing in pantheism. The more advanced portion of them in the Old World and in the New are avowedly pantheists, and place the apostate Jew, Spinoza, far above our Lord Jesus Christ as an authority in religion.

XII. The Catholic system is the system of the universe, and presents the relations of the universe to its Creator, Upholder, and Governor, as they really are, and hence the Catholic is saved alike from either atheistic or pantheistic fatalism or nihilism. He neither makes man God, nor reduces him to a mere appearance, a mere bubble on the surface of the ocean. He believes in God the Creator, and in

the reality of creation, that God gives real existence to his creatures; that creatures really exist, and therefore are in their order and degree second causes, and in their own order and degree co-operative with God in gaining the end for which all things are made. He believes that when created they become ministries and agencies in the hands of God to that end, that they are honored in being so employed, and according to their nature and merit they can and really do share in the glory of God himself. Hence he sees in the intercession of the saints only an integral part of the universal plan of the Creator, as I have heretofore shown, a part of the universal mediatorial order.

There is no idolatry in invoking the saints, for we do not invoke them as God, or gods, but simply as men, united with us in one and the same communion,—not separated from us by death, but, in fact, brought nearer to us, and rendered more able to assist us. There is no superstition in it, because we ask of the saints nothing which they are not able to give, or competent to do. We ask only their prayers, and these they can give, are always willing to give, and their prayers, prompted by pure disinterested love, and having for their end the greater glory of God, must be well pleasing to their and our Lord.

There is nothing in this invocation derogatory to the honor of our Lord, for in it we honor only his friends, those whom he himself delights to honor. Nothing is more pleasing to us than the honors paid to those we ourselves love and honor, and equally pleasing therefore must be to our Lord whatever love and honor we pay to the saints who are his brothers, and whom he deigns to call his friends, for he in his humanity is man in all points as we are, sin excepted. Nay, to refuse to honor them by our prayers, would be a gross indignity, a grave affront offered to himself, for what man of right feeling would not resent a neglect of his friend, more quickly than any neglect of himself. If you love me, love my friends, and a graver insult you cannot offer me than to insult them.

Especially is this true with regard to Mary, the mother of God. Between our Lord and her there is the real relation of mother and son. This relation is as real in heaven as it was on earth, for all real relations that have ever subsisted subsist forever. Our Lord was as much the Son of Mary as any son is the son of his own mother. He too was and is and always will be a good Son. He loves and honors

his mother as his mother, and always will do so. Judge then by your own love and reverence for your mother, if he can be jealous of the honors paid to his mother, if he must not himself delight to load her with honors, and to see all others honoring her. Judge also whether he will count as his friends those who refuse to honor, especially those who neglect or insult her. There is nothing that pleases a good son more than the honors bestowed on his mother, or more quickly and more deeply offends him than an indignity offered to her. Mary never asks any thing not well pleasing to her Son, and nothing she asks will he refuse her.

So far from detracting from the honor due to God in invoking his saints, we honor him in the most pleasing and delicate manner in our power, by showing honor to them. It is to honor them that he permits them to intercede with him for others, and in soliciting them to intercede for us, we only do what he himself does: we honor whom he honors, and the honor we render them is included in the reward he bestows on all who have followed him in the regeneration.

I suppose here that the saints are invoked in love, and that what we ask them to obtain by their prayers for us, is for the glory of God. We may ask for temporal goods, if not to bestow them on our worldly lusts and luxuries, but for the sake of spiritual good, or the true end of our life. We then honor them, show our love and veneration of them, and bring ourselves into closer communion with them, and with their and our Lord. Things improperly prayed for, or prayed for for an improper purpose, will not be granted. "Ye ask and receive not, because ye ask amiss." But when we ask aright we are sure to receive, for no good thing will the Lord withhold from them that ask him.

It is not a little in favor of invocation of saints that it keeps fresh and living in our minds and hearts the reality of the communion of saints, asserted in the creed. It makes us feel that we and those who have preceded us are one communion, members of our Lord's body, and members one of another. It makes us feel that we can still communicate with them, that they are not lost to us, but can still hear us, and aid us, even more effectually than when living in the flesh. There is then an evident fitness in the whole doctrine of saint-worship as taught by the church and practised by her children. It harmonizes with the whole plan of creation and of redemption, and they little suspect how

much they lose, who neglect it, and what indignity they offer to God and his saints, who willfully reject it, and treat as idolaters, as debased and besotted by superstition those who faithfully practise it, and delight in loving and honoring those whom God himself loves and delights to honor, and for whose love and honor he exhausts his own infinite love and creative wisdom.

XIII. I have defended the invocation and intercession of the saints on the principle of mediation, or the fact that God mades all his creatures *media* in developing and perfecting his works, or in effecting their return to him as their final cause, last end, or supreme beatitude. Does not this imply that the saints are mediators contrary to the assertion of Saint Paul, who says: "There is one God, and one mediator of God and men: the man Christ Jesus?" Is it not fair to conclude from this that as there is only one God, so there is only one mediator, and that the man Christ Jesus, not only mediator, but the sole mediator of God and men?

Strictly speaking, there is but one only mediator, the man Christ Jesus. I neither overlook nor contradict this fact, and yet there is a sense in which the saints do really mediate, and share in the glory of the mediatorial kingdom, although they are not strictly mediators, because they mediate only in Christ, and by virtue of their oneness with him.

We have seen, as our faith teaches, that God is Trinity. It is essential to the conception of God, as self-sufficing, and self-existent being, being in its actuality and its plenitude, that he should contain in himself, in his essence, his own principle, medium, end, that is, be indivisibly Trinity. These three relations in the divine essence our faith calls Father, Son, and Holy Ghost. In creating the world the whole Trinity concurs, but the several persons according to their respective relations to one another in the divine essence, the Father as principle, the Son or Word as medium, and the Holy Ghost as end, or consummation. In the second order, or the return of existences to God as their last end, which is, in some sense, a new creation, and which our Lord himself calls the regeneration, the three persons of the Trinity alike concur, for God is one, and the distinction of persons in no sense impairs the unity of his being, but they concur in diverse respects as in the first order, the Father as principle, the Son as medium, and the Holy Ghost as end, or consummation of the new creation.

But there is a remarkable difference between the first order, or between the procession, by way of creation, of existences from God, as first cause, and the second order, or the return of existences, by way of regeneration, to God as their last end, their final cause, beatitude, or supreme good. In the first order, the Son is the medium in his divinity alone, as the eternal Word, who was in the beginning, who was with God, and who is God; but in the second order he is the medium in his humanity, as the Word made flesh, as God become man. There is one God, and there is one mediator of God and men, the Man Christ Jesus. So that in the return of existences, in the regenerator, the creature is raised by the hypostasic union to the dignity of being the medium of its own redemption, regeneration, and final glorification.

In creation God acts solely in his divinity, for creatures do not and cannot co-operate in their own production from nothing. God alone, in his own inherent, essential, and eternal divinity creates; but in regeneration, which presupposes creation, the creature is united hypostatically to the Word, and co-operates with the Divinity, and shares in the glory of his own completion, and return to God. This is the mystery of godliness, of the Word manifested in the flesh, and which fills the angels with wonder and awe, and makes men tremble before the exalted destiny of their race, and the glory and honor with which God in his infinite love and infinite wisdom crowns his creature man. In the regeneration man is on the side of God, co-operates with him, and shares in his honor and glory. What more can even the infinite God himself do? and well may it be said that the Incarnation raises the creative act to its highest possible power, for in it the Creator makes the creature one with himself. In it God becomes man, and man becomes God.

The Incarnation is the assumption by the Word of human nature to be really, truly, substantially, the nature of God. The hypostasic union, or the union of the divine and the human, is by the creative act of God alone, in which, as I have said, the whole Trinity concurs, as in every creative act of God,—and in it the creature has no agency,—in no sense co-operates, for it is God that assumes man, not man that assumes God. This act of union completes the first order, and inaugurates the second. But in this second order, inaugurated or founded by the Incarnation, the creature

enters integrally into the Mediator, and is active and co-operative in the work of mediation, as follows necessarily from the condemnation of the Monophysites and Monothelites, who absorbed the human in the divine. The mediator of God and men is the MAN Christ Jesus, the creature hypostatically united to the Creator.

The Man Christ Jesus holds the same relation to regenerated humanity that Adam holds to generated humanity, and hence the apostle calls him the "second Adam." He is the father of the human race in the order of regeneration as Adam was in the order of generation. As no one can be a man, or pertain to the human race in the order of generation unless born of Adam, so no one can be a man in the order of regeneration, or, what is the same thing, the order of grace, unless born again of Christ, and made a new creature in him. The birth from Adam is by natural generation and is therefore called natural birth, and the order of generation is commonly called the natural order, or simply nature. The birth from Christ, or the new birth in him by the Holy Ghost, is spiritual, and by the election of grace, but it is as really a birth as natural birth, and as necessary in the order of return to God, as the natural birth in the order of the procession from God, and therefore says our Lord to Nicodemus, "except a man be born again he cannot see the kingdom of God,"—cannot enter into the order of regeneration, far less attain to God as his last end, as the fulfilment of his destiny, or his supreme beatitude.

XIV. Now, as all men in the natural order were in Adam, so in the order of grace all are in Christ. All were in Adam generically, and potentially individualized in him we know, because generation is simply explication, not creation, and second, because all sinned in him and in him incurred the guilt of original sin, as faith teaches us. The Blessed Virgin, as of the race of Adam, must have incurred original sin generically in him, but she never incurred it individually, or personally, because she was by special grace, or the anticipated application of the merits of Jesus Christ preserved or exempted from it *in the very first instant of her conception*, so that she was conceived without original stain, *sine labe originali*. At least, so I understand the definition of the Immaculate Conception by our Holy Father Pius IX., and therefore her Immaculate Conception forms no real exception to the fact that all of our race sinned in Adam, and if all sinned in him, all were in him,

for they could not have sinned in him, unless they had been really and truly in him.

But as all men in the order of generation were in Adam, so are all men in the order of regeneration in Christ, as plainly implied by the apostle, when he says: "As in Adam all die, so in Christ shall all be made alive." Entire human nature was assumed by the Word, for our Lord is perfect man, as well as perfect God. He assumed humanity, which was individualized in him as it was in Adam, and hence he is in the order of regeneration "the head of every man," nay, the head of every creature, for the whole lower creation being made for man, is regenerated and returns to God in man. That all are included in him as included in the humanity he assumed, is affirmed by the fact that he died for all and made ample satisfaction or atonement for all. But he makes atonement for men only as their head, and the passion and cross avail us only as we suffer them in him, as his members. There is nothing fictitious or unreal in the Gospel, and nothing is counted so or so which is not really so. To live with Christ we must suffer with him, and to be practically benefited by his passion and cross we must endure them in him, and that we cannot do unless we are in him. He redeems, elevates, restores humanity, because he is humanity, and in him humanity is obedient unto death, even the death of the cross. If all were not included in the human nature assumed, the obedience of Christ could not have sufficed for all, for we can no more obey in Christ, if we are not in him, than we could sin in Adam, if not in Adam. The humanity taken by the Word was as broad, as full, and as entire as the humanity of Adam.

Now, as the Son of God is the mediator of God and men in his human nature, and as the saints are included in that human nature as all men were included in Adam, they certainly are included in the mediator, and therefore are, in a certain sense, mediators, for they only with him constitute what Saint Augustine calls the Totus Christus.

Yet they are mediators in him as all men are sinners in Adam, not personally, but generically. Entire humanity was redeemed, regenerated, and glorified in Christ, and entire creation also as included in man, and was in him, or rather, he in it, the medium of redemption, regeneration, and glorification, but generically, not individually, as all men were included generically, not individually in Adam.

In the natural order the explication of individuals is necessary, and takes place, we have seen, by natural generation; in the order of regeneration it does not take place in that way, for in that order they neither marry nor are given in marriage, but, as I have said, by grace, and are individually or personally born into that order by the election of grace; but the explication is as real and as necessary by grace, as the explication of individuals by natural regeneration. This is wherefore we do not call the saints personally or individually mediators, in the strict and absolute sense of the term. They mediate not personally, individually, in their own independen tright, but in Christ, as included generically in his human nature.

Yet as in neither order the individual is ever without the race, or the race without the individual, the saints who are individual explications by grace of the human nature assumed, and as they have their origin and root in that nature really do, in a relative and secondary sense, perform a share in the mediatorial work of our Lord, not indeed as first cause, but as second causes. If they did not in some sense share with Christ in his mediatorial work, how could he say to them, "Well done, good and faithful servants, enter into the joy of your Lord?" How could he promise them heaven as a *reward?* Can he fail in his promises? Or can he reward men for doing what they have not done? Men are not, as the Apostle James says, "justified by faith alone," and the condemnation of the reformers is that they denied, in denying the merit of good works, and asserting justification by faith alone, and conversion, or regeneration by the direct and immediate act of the Holy Ghost, the whole mediatorial system revealed to us in the Gospel. Perhaps we are all a little too afraid of asserting in sufficiently strong terms the agency of the creature in the second order, and too prone in our feelings of reverence to separate Christ too widely from his saints, and to isolate the humanity he assumed from our common humanity. We cannot use too strong terms to express the intimacy between him and the saints, or conceive a closer relation than really exists between his human nature and our own. He is our elder Brother, and his saints are sons of God as he, the man Christ Jesus, is Son of God.

I think I have said enough to show that the objection has no force, that it either urges nothing that may not be conceded, or it rests on a false principle and a total misappre-

hension of the real Catholic doctrine of mediation. We cannot place the saints higher than God places them; we cannot give them higher honor than he gives them: and in no possible way can we exaggerate their merits. We cannot, unless we confound them with the Divinity, give them too high a worship, or a worship that detracts from that due to God himself; for no man is able of himself to render an adequate worship to God. We worship God acceptably and adequately only by his own gift, only in the Holy Sacrifice, in which the offering to God is God.

XV. In the regeneration, what may be called the order of the end, which is founded by the Incarnation, and in which creation is completed, and man finds his supreme good by being supernaturally united to the supreme good itself, the paternal and filial relations are spiritual, but no less real than in the order of generation commencing with Adam. Our spiritual fathers are no less real fathers than our fathers after the flesh. Priests are called fathers, and really are so, and as fathers of our spiritual life they are fathers of a higher order and in a higher sense than our natural fathers, as much higher as the life of the soul is above the life of the body. Perhaps, in this fact is at least one of the reasons why the church insists on the celibacy of the clergy, and regards with no favor a married clergy even when she allows priests, married before receiving holy orders, to retain their wives. There would be a sort of bigamy in it, for the priest is wedded to the church, his true spouse, and our spiritual mother. The new birth is as really a birth as natural birth, and the priest married in the natural order seems to be a priest of the order of Aaron, rather than a priest of the order of Melchisedech. The spiritual father owes all his love, all his care and tenderness to his spiritual children, and ought not to be burdened with children after the flesh.

They who object to the celibacy of the clergy may find here an answer to their objections. The priest is not really a celibate; he has a spiritual bride, and spiritual children, which develop all the higher and nobler qualities of the husband and father. Nor are those virgins who reject marriage after the flesh, and take the vow of chastity, less really wives and mothers than are wives and mothers in the natural order. They are really espoused in the spiritual order, and of each of them it may be said, in the language of Scripture: "Thy Maker is thy husband." They are

mothers, and "more are the children of the barren than of her that did bear." In this cold and material age we are prone to regard the material only as real, and the flesh only as living, and to treat what is spiritual as unreal, illusory, imaginary, and hence this spiritual espousal, and this spiritual maternity is regarded as a device to cheat the mind and take captive the imagination with words without meaning. We remain in the order of generation, and though we profess to have faith we appear not to have been initiated into the order of regeneration, hardly to believe that there is such an order. And yet our Lord said: "Mary hath chosen the better part." Have we yet to learn that generation is in order to regeneration, and that the real significance of the material is in the spiritual? Have we failed to penetrate the great mystery or sacrament of which St. Paul speaks, and to understand that marriage and maternity in the natural order are symbolical of the higher and more real marriage and maternity?

If then the blessed Mary held to us only a purely spiritual relation she would be really our mother, holding to us, in the order of regeneration, the relation held to us by Eve in the order of generation,—the mother of our spiritual life as Eve was the mother of our natural life. It is so the fathers regard her; they call her the second Eve, through whom life comes into the world as death came through the first Eve, by whom we gain more than we lost by our mother in the order of the flesh. In this sense alone she would be a real mother of the regenerated, the seat of wisdom, cause of our joy, and gate of heaven.

But she is our mother in a sense more tangible to those who have difficulty in accepting spiritual relations as real relations. I have shown that through the Incarnation the regenerated are joined to God by identity of nature, and are, so to speak, the natural brothers of our Lord, and therefore his mother must be really our mother. He took his flesh from her, and she was as truly his mother as any mother is the mother of her own son. She thus became literally the mother of regenerated humanity, as Eve was the mother of humanity in the order of generation.

I say, *regenerated* humanity, because the human nature assumed was not assumed in its own personality, which would have been adoptionism, and because by the very fact of assumption it was regenerated and elevated to its highest possible degree. As we are not by natural generation born

into the regeneration, but by grace infused by the Holy Ghost, only they can really claim Mary for their mother who are born again, and thus so connected not only with natural humanity, as they are through Eve, but with regenerated humanity of which Mary is really and truly the mother. Of all others she is only potentially, not actually the mother, as our Lord himself, though he died for all men and made ample satisfaction for all, and therefore is potentially the Redeemer and Saviour of all men, is actually the Redeemer only of the regenerated, and actually the Saviour only of the elect.

All then who have been regenerated, born anew as begotten by the Holy Ghost, have the right to call Mary Mother, and our Lord himself, Brother. Only in our Lord the human nature is completed, its destiny attained to, while in us it is in its infancy, seeking without having as yet its perfect complement, for we have not yet attained, and as long as in the flesh shall not have attained, to the stature of perfect men in Christ Jesus, and therefore is he called our elder Brother, our Forerunner, who has already entered in, while we remain without, awaiting his intercession for us. All of us, who are born again in baptism, the sacrament of regeneration, and love our Lord Jesus Christ, are really and truly children of Mary, and she is really and truly our mother.

She *is* our mother; for it is the blessed privilege of us who believe in life eternal and the communion of saints to regard the holy ones in heaven as living and present with us. We see them not with the eyes of the body, but with the eye of faith; we embrace them not with our bodily arms, but we embrace them with our love and are embraced by them with their love. They are present to our hearts, and we can speak to them, pour into their open and sympathizing hearts our joys and griefs, and ask and receive their aid as readily and as effectually as when they were present to our bodily senses. They have not departed from us, have not deserted us, and left us desolate. Death has not removed them from us, and there is no need of evocation or necromancy to enjoy their communion, to obtain their advice, or their help. Were all that the spiritists pretend a fact, instead of being, as it is, of the enemy of souls, it would fall immeasurably short of the blessed intercourse every true follower of Christ has with the blessed in heaven. Why can we not learn that the unseen and invisible is more real than the seen and visible!

I have dwelt on this point in order to show that the warm expressions of Catholic piety, in reference to Mary the mother of God, rarely, if ever, exceed the sober truth; even the expressions which many Catholics regard as exaggerations, fall short of the reality, and I doubt if exaggeration be possible. What I have said vindicates most thoroughly from the charge of enthusiasm, superstition, or visionariness those admirable associations of children of Mary in our parishes, colleges, and academies, and also the efforts of earnest priests and devout women to extend and intensify devotion to Mary as the mother of God, the mother of Christ, and as our own dear and loving mother. They are grateful to the nobler and richer sentiments of our hearts, tend to honor her whom God honors above all women in choosing her to be his mother, and serve to keep fresh and living in our souls faith in the Incarnation, on which all our hopes of heaven and even of civilization depend.

In this whole series of articles on saint-worship, if I have written indeed as a believer, I have aimed to write with all the sobriety and reason of the philosopher. I have rarely given way to any devotional impulses of my own, or appealed to the devotional sentiments of my readers. I have no doubt seemed to most readers cold and insensible, a bold speculator to some, and a soulless logic-grinder to all. My aim has been to state and defend the naked truth to the unsympathizing understanding, and to show to the coolest and most exacting reason that the whole system and practice of saint-worship among Catholics is defensible on the most rigid theological reason, and must be accepted or Christianity itself rejected as a delusion. Two topics more remain to be discussed, the miracles of the saints, and the veneration of relics and sacred pictures and images, and the series will close, I fear to the great relief of the readers of the *Ave Maria.*

XVI. "*And is it allowable to honor relics, crucifixes, and holy pictures?* Yes; with an inferior and relative honor, as related to Christ and his saints, and as memorials of them. *May we then pray to relics and images?* No; by no means, for they have no life, or sense, to hear or help us."

So says the catechism, and so the Catholic Church teaches all her children. Relics of saints, crucifixes, holy pictures, and images, may be honored with an inferior and relative honor, because related to our Lord and his saints, and are

memorials of them, and serve to keep them fresh in our memories. And why should they not be? When one is thought to be dying, far from home, among strangers, some dear old lady, who had been kind to him, cuts off a lock of his hair to send to his mother in case he should not recover. The lover wears the portrait of his mistress next his heart, and prizes every thing that has belonged to her. The pious son preserves with tender care the picture of his mother, and will not suffer it to be profaned. The mother preserves the playthings and little coat of her infant boy when his body sleeps in the church-yard, and cherishes, with almost painful fondness, every memorial of her heroic son slain on the battle-field, fighting for his country. Is the saint, the martyr slain fighting for that nobler country, heaven, the true *patria* of the soul, less dear to the memory of the Christian heart?

The republic delights to honor her patriotic sons, those who have fallen in her cause, who have defended her in danger, led her armies to victory, secured her independence, or rendered her illustrious by their statesmanship, and erects monuments to show her deep sense of their worth, and to perpetuate the memory of their civic virtues. Do we not call the national capital Washington, and hangs not a picture of "the Father of his Country" in the house of almost every American? Does not the nation preserve, among its choicest treasures, the very coat and sword he wore? Is there a state in the Union that has not a Washington county, city, or village, or a city that has not a Washington street? Have not innumerable citizens called their sons George Washington, in his honor, and has not a national association, of noble-minded and noble-hearted women, purchased for the nation the land on which stands his tomb, that it may, through all time, be free to the pilgrimage of the grateful sons and daughters of the republic which he had the chief hand in founding? The same honors in kind, though less in degree, are paid to Adams, Jefferson, Madison, Monroe, Jackson, Clay, Webster, Calhoun, and others, who have illustrated the nation by their genius, their talents, and their public services.

The church has her battles, and religion her victories, and should they who battled for her, gained through grace the victory for religion, and came off conquerors and more than conquerors, be regarded as less deserving of honor? Is not the church more than country? religion more than civil vir-

tue? Is there a greater or truer hero than the Christian hero; than he who gives up all for Jesus, and never ceases to do valiant battle against all his enemies? Our Lord judges not so, for to such an one he promises a crown of life, of immortal glory and honor, in his kingdom. The civil hero must add the Christian to his civil virtues, or fail of the heavenly glory. Why, then, should relics, pictures, statues, memorials of the saint, be less deserving of honor than those of a mother, a mistress, a patriot? No people can so regard them, till they have lost the sense of Christian faith, and have sunk, morally and intellectually, below the savage. The principle on which rests the veneration of relics, crucifixes, and holy pictures, is natural and dear to the human heart; and I have shown, over and over again, as the church teaches, that grace does not supersede nature. Most true is it that nature is below the plane of our origin and end, for they are both supernatural, and we can do nothing without the regenerating grace of Jesus Christ to gain or merit eternal life; but grace supposes nature, accepts, elevates, purifies, and directs it. Whatever is true and beautiful in nature or natural affection Christianity hallows and makes her own.

But we are told that the honor paid by Catholics to the memorials of Christ and his saints is superstition or idolatry. Idolatry is not in honoring things for what they really are, but in honoring things which are not, or things which are, for what they are not; superstition is in seeking effects from inadequate causes, or, like our modern atheistic philosophers, seeking effects from no causes. When I ask a saint to pray for me I am guilty of no superstition, for I ask only what he can do; but, if I ask him to raise or believe he can raise a dead body to life, I fall into gross superstition, because that only God can do. God may raise the dead to life in answer to the prayer of the saint, but no saint, not even our blessed Lady, can do it. When I honor relics, crucifixes, holy pictures, and images, only as memorials of Christ and his saints, reverence them only as related to the real worth I venerate, I am neither superstitious nor an idolator; I simply treat things as they are, and for what they are; I simply adhere to truth.

But "Catholics worship them." Yes; as the American worships Washington's coat or sword preserved in the Patent Office at the national capital, as the son worships the portrait of his mother, or the freedman a photograph of Lincoln, Sumner, Phillips, or Garrison, not otherwise. "They believe in the miraculous power of certain relics, pictures, or

statues." The catechism gives the best answer to that: "They have no life or sense to hear or help us." How can we believe that what has neither life nor sense, can have the power to work miracles? The only power that does or can work real miracles, is God himself. He may, if he chooses, work a miracle in honor of the saint who is dear to him, and whom he does not disdain to call his friend; and he may also do so to testify his approval of the honor we render to the saint by carrying a memorial, relic, picture, or statue of him, in solemn public processions. The dead man mentioned in the Scriptures, who was let down into the tomb of the prophet, as soon as he touched the bones of the prophet, rose up alive. It was not the dead bones that restored the dead man to life, but God, as a mark of honor to him whose mortal remains they were.

"But the practice of Catholics is forbidden by the decalogue." I think not. God does not forbid in one law what he authorizes in another. What is forbidden in what Catholics call the first commandment, and Protestants the first and second, is not the making, keeping, or honoring of pictures as memorials, but as gods. "I am the Lord thy God, who brought thee out of the land of Egypt, and out of the house of bondage. Thou shalt not have strange gods before me. Thou shalt not make to thee any graven thing, nor the likeness of any thing that is in heaven above, or in the earth beneath, or in the waters under the earth. *Thou shalt not adore them, nor serve them.*" It is plain what is here forbidden is neither painting nor sculpture, but making of graven things, likenesses, or images of any thing in heaven, in the earth, or under the earth, to be worshipped and served as gods; otherwise every one who has his likeness taken either by the painter or the sculptor, would break the precept. The great gentile apostasy had taken place prior to Moses, and idolatry had become very general in his time. It was one of the main purposes of the Hebrew institute to protect the Hebrew people from the infection of the prevailing idolatry or worship of false gods, and to keep alive with them the knowledge and worship of the one living and true God. Many things were, no doubt, prohibited to them, which otherwise might have been allowed; but it cannot be supposed that Moses understood the prohibition in the rigid Protestant and Mahometan sense, for he himself ordered the construction of the brazen image of a serpent, and of the cherubim, whose outstretched wings over the ark covered the mercy-seat; nor did

the Jews understand it in that sense, for the golden sea in their temple rested on twelve brazen oxen. Evidently the precept is directed against idolatry, the worship of false gods, not against the arts of painting and sculpture.

Moreover, the heathens themselves, as I understand it, did not worship literally that which they believed or knew to be made with men's hands, for none of them seem to have advanced far enough to believe that man makes God. That is a degree of progress attained to only by our modern philosophers. What, in their own minds, they worshipped was the *dæmon* or *numen* which they believed, on the sacerdotal consecration or conjuration, entered into the image, and afterwards dwelt therein. But as this belief was vain, and the *numen* or *dæmon* supposed to inhabit the image, or to be confined within it, was also vain, the sacred writers, who treat things as they really are, without taking notice of what is purely subjective, represent the heathen as literally worshipping gods of wood and stone fashioned by men's hands, because there was, objectively, really nothing else present to be worshipped. As no Christian does or can believe that God, whom the heaven of heavens cannot contain, or even a saint can be shut up in an image made by human hands, or can confound the image with that which it represents, no Christian can, in keeping and honoring holy pictures and images, be in the least danger of falling into the sin of the heathen, or be regarded as violating the precept.

XVII. That the honor we pay to relics, crucifixes, sacred pictures, and images, might, while Greek and Roman idolatry was predominant in the empire, have been taken in a superstitious or idolatrous sense by some only half converted from heathenism, and led the heathens, as it does Protestants in our own day, to regard Christians themselves as idolaters, is not impossible, and it would seem that these memorials, though carefully preserved, were, while the danger of awakening old idolatrous or superstitious associations remained, exhibited with more reserve to the reverence of the faithful, than after Christianity had taken possession of the empire, and the discipline of the secret—*disciplina arcani*—was no longer necessary or even practicable.

It is a great mistake, however, to suppose that the use of images of Christ and his saints in our churches, or the carrying of them, or crosses, crucifixes, and sacred relics, in procession, is itself idolatry, or of itself tends to idolatry in persons who have no idolatrous habits or associations.

The use of images did not originate idolatry with the heathen, nor even occasion that loss or corruption of the knowledge of the true God, derivable by all from primitive revelation and the works of creation, which rendered idolatry possible. No man who knows the true God can confound him with an image made with men's hands, or take the image to be his habitation. The culpable loss or corruption of the knowledge of God preceded the idolatrous worship of images, or the worship as gods of things which are not God. The gentiles had the knowledge of the true God, but "when they knew God they did not glorify him as God, or give thanks; but became foolish in their thoughts, and their senseless heart was darkened; for esteeming themselves wise, they became fools. And they changed the glory of the incorruptible God, into the likeness and image of corruptible man, and of birds, and of four-footed beasts, and of creeping things." But while men retain uncorrupted the knowledge of the true God, they cannot confound him with any thing visible,—with the sun, or moon, or stars,—far less with an image which man has painted or carved; and even Protestants do not ever pretend that the knowledge of the true God is not possessed by Catholics, and constantly taught by the church to all her children. These memorials, so far from tending to obscure that knowledge in the minds or hearts of the faithful, have directly the contrary effect—that of tending to keep that knowledge more clear, fresh, and living in the heart. Nothing can tend more directly to bring home to the mind and heart the great fact both of the Incarnation and the Redemption, on which all our hopes of salvation depend, than kneeling before the image of Christ dying on the cross for us. The son does not forget his mother in contemplating her picture, or the lover his mistress. The patriot does not find his knowledge of Washington obscured, or his love for him or his country weakened by looking on his coat or sword which the nation preserves. Everybody knows and feels that the contrary is the fact. Experience proves that they who object to the relative honor that Catholics pay to the memorials of Christ and his saints as superstitious or idolatrous, gradually lose, themselves, the sense of the Incarnation, and are by no means remarkable for their knowledge and love of the saints and martyrs. Even they also, with an inconsisteney that does them honor, eherish such memorials as they have of Luther, Calvin, and other reformers, who are their saints

and great men. There is preserved in the Wartburg even yet, I am told, the inkstand which Luther threw in the devil's face, and pilgrims are shown the black spot it left on the wall.

But it is said that these memorials are addressed to the senses, and can only tend to give our piety an outward sensible character, and prevent the mind from turning inward and becoming acquainted with the deeper internal spiritual life. The contrary is the fact. These memorials direct the mind at once to the spiritual life, for they are simply memorials of the deepest and truest spiritual life, the life of God in the soul, and they are nothing to the Catholic save as memorials of such life. They are to him external symbols of the interior and spiritual. Perhaps they are not such to the Protestant, for whom the primrose on the river's brink is a primrose, and nothing else, and who has no acquaintance with the deeper spiritual life familiar to every saint, and in some degree to every Catholic. Do not be scandalized, my dear Protestant friend. There are more things in heaven and earth than are dreamt of in your philosophy, or attained to in your pious meditations. Our Catholic worship seems to you external, sensual, unspiritual, because you have in your own spiritual experience no key that unlocks to its mysterious depths. These memorials, so dear and significant to us, so powerful to place us in the presence of God, and to make us feel that we belong to the communion of saints, are to you no memorials at all, and tell you nothing beyond what they are in themselves. But is that our fault?

Then, again, it must not be forgotten that the living man is body and soul united, not body alone, nor soul alone, and the senses in their place and in their proper use are as essential to man as the intellect. Man is not a pure intelligence, and grasps the intelligible only as sensibly represented. He can no more live and act without sense than without reason. For him pure spiritualism is as impossible as pure sensism. Hence the principle and reason of external worship. A purely internal worship is as insufficient as a purely external worship, and experience proves that they who reject all external worship soon come to neglect all internal worship. Worship demands the homage of our whole man. Christianity elevates, purifies, and directs our nature, but rejects no part of it. The whole is from God, and should be returned to him as his due. In all true religion there is indeed a mystic element, but they who seek to be pure mystics,

to live in this world as pure disembodied spirits, mistake the nature of religion, and the capabilities of man. These memorials of Christ and his saints help us precisely because, as music and speech, they are external signs, and are addressed to our senses, and through the senses convey a truth, a spiritual reality to the understanding and the heart.

But in the relics of the saints Catholic worship, we are told by men who esteem themselves wise, dead men's flesh and bones, rottenness and corruption. We do not *worship*, in the sense the objectors mean, the relics of saints; we simply honor them for the worth of the saints to whom they belonged, not for what they are in themselves. But the objection shows how far the age that brings it has departed from the true sense of the Incarnation, and the Christian doctrine of the resurrection. The Christian does not view these relics as do those who lack the Christian's faith and the Christian's hope. This flesh and these bones have been redeemed by our Lord, for he assumed flesh, took upon himself a real human body, not simply a human soul, and in assuming a human body he redeemed all material nature, all the elements of which are included in the human body; hence the ancients term man a microcosm, or world in little. In the Incarnation all material nature has been assumed and purified, and HOLY TO THE LORD, as foretold by the prophet, has been written on every thing. Hence Peter, in the vision, was forbidden to call any creature common or unclean. These relics of the saints have also been cleansed and sanctified by the prayers, vigils, fasts, mortifications, and holy life of the saint,—purified and sanctified by the grace of God, so freely bestowed on the saint, and so frankly complied with by him.

Moreover, these relics are not the flesh and bones of dead men. The saints are not dead; they live, and live in heaven, in the presence of God, and enjoy the glory of their Lord. Have we forgotten that life and immortality are brought to light through the Gospel, and is the future life only a hope and not a reality to men calling themselves Christians, as it was and is to the heathen? But more than this, the Christian knows, not only does the soul live, but this very flesh which once clothed the saint shall rise again, and live forever, for does not the Christian sing with the church, *Credo resurrectionem carnis*—I believe the resurrection of the flesh? The soul does not rise again except spiritually, for it never dies physically; it is immortal. The resurrection

which we believe then is the resurrection of the flesh, of the body, and its reunion with the soul forever. Hence even our bodies should be sanctified and preserved pure, for they are destined to rise again, and to an immortal life. The honor the church pays to the relics of the saints and martyrs is an honor due them as related to our Lord himself through his assumption of flesh, and as having in some sense shared in the holy life and sanctity of the saint, but it serves also to keep alive in our minds and fresh in our hearts the great and glorious article of our faith, the resurrection of the body.

This said, the reason of honoring with an inferior and relative honor, as expressed in the catechism, the pictures and statues of the saints, as well as of our Lord in his humanity, is obvious. They are related to the saints in an inferior degree, but still are related to them, and though feebler than the relics, are yet memorials of them, and keep alive in us the great Catholic principles and virtues the saints honored in their lives, and direct us to that Fountain of Grace whence they drew the strength which enabled them to come off conquerors in the battle of life.

XVIII. In the series of articles on the worship or veneration of the saints, which I began in the *Ave Maria* about a year ago, and which I now conclude, I have had for object not to eulogize the saints, nor to say what has not been said and better said a hundred times before, nor yet to exhibit my own devotion to them or belief in the pious legends which circulate among the faithful, but in the clearest and simplest manner I could to show the principles on which the *cultus sanctorum* rests, and the relation of those principles alike to the principles of the natural order and to those which underlie all the great mysteries of the Christian revelation.

I have written on the assumption that all principles are catholic, and all truth is one, and therefore that what is true in nature is true in grace, and though grace is above nature,—elevates, and completes it, it is in no wise contradictory to nature, or disconnected with it; one and the same dialectic principle runs through all the Creator's works, for all have their archetype in his own indivisible and triune essence, and all are parts of one dialectic and indissoluble whole, for in the divine mind they are already completed, and brought into perfect union with himself. Hence, while I distinguish creation from the Creator, as the act is distinguished from the actor, I do not separate it from God. I distinguish be-

tween nature and grace, but do not separate in the regenerate the one from the other, for both proceed alike from God, and both are alike necessary to the life and perfection of man, or the fulfilment of the divine purpose in his creation.

I have been so intent on showing the connection of grace with nature, and setting forth the rational element of the Christian mysteries in general, and of saint-worship in particular, that some readers may have thought me disposed to rationalize too much, and tending to reduce our faith to pure rationalism; but I have never forgotten that our faith contains mysteries beyond the reach of reason either to discover or to explain, and which every believer receives on faith in God revealing and in the church proposing. I have simply aimed at developing the principle contained in the direction of our Lord, when he bid us "consider the lilies of the field" and "behold the fowls of the air." Our Lord always conveys his instructions by analogies and illustrations borrowed from the natural world, which would not be possible if nature had no analogy with grace, or with the revealed mysteries. I have done what I could to seize these natural analogies, to illustrate and defend by them the worship which we Catholics render to the saints in general, and to our blessed Lady in particular, with how much or how little success, it is for the reader, not me, to determine.

On the other hand, I have aimed to show the reason and propriety of this worship in the admitted mysteries of our faith itself, and to demonstrate that it flows logically from the great mysteries of creation and incarnation. We worship God in his works, because he enters and remains in them by his creative act; we worship God in his humanity because by his assumption of human nature he has made it henceforth and forever his own nature, and inseparable in our worship from his divine nature; we reverence his saints for their imitation, through grace, of his merits, their union, through regeneration, with him, and their inseparability from him in glory. We could not render him a full and complete worship if we excluded his saints, for they make but one with him, and are included in the Totus Christus, as St. Augustine teaches; nor could we give full expression to our love of him, if we did not suffer it to extend to all he loves, or is in any way related to him.

Moreover, as in the incarnation our Lord assumed flesh, a real body, and as in the human body are all the elements of

the lower creation, he has by his assumption united all material nature to him as final cause, as in creation all are united to him as first cause, so that God is all and in all, and all lower orders of creation, since all proceed from God for man and return to him in man, are sacred and entitled in their degree to share in the honor we owe to God in his humanity. The error of the heathens was not that they worshipped nature, but that they worshipped it as God, expressing exteriorly the triune essence of God, not as the handiwork of God. The Christian feels himself more nearly related to exterior nature than the heathen did, and has a sympathy with all the lower orders of creation which the heathen never had, for he sees in them the work of God, and he honors them for God's sake, and as virtually contained in the body he assumed.

I have endeavored also to show that the worship of the saints is the best practical protection of the faithful against the errors of atheism, pantheism, and idolatry, and to keep fresh in their minds and hearts, faith in all the great mysteries of Christian revelation. All the practices authorized by the church are dictated by the Christian *dogma*, and preserve them in our faith by realizing them in our lives. No one who is devout to Mary can forget the Incarnation and what depends on it; no one who prays to a saint can doubt the future life, or regard the joys of heaven as a poetic dream; and no one who honors the relic of a great servant of God, can hesitate as to believing the resurrection of the body. There is a remarkable proof of this in the fact that all the sects that reject the worship of Mary and of the saints, sneer at sacred relics, crucifixes, pictures and statues of our Lord and his saints, invariably lose, step by step, their faith in the Christian mysteries, and fall into naked rationalism, or a vague sentimentalism which depends on no dogma, and respects no dogmatic teaching. The church teaches us our faith and preserves it by training us to live it, and hence the great masters of spiritual life have always considered a tender devotion to Mary and the saints as a sign of election, and the want of it as an unfavorable symptom.

I have endeavored to express myself in clear and intelligible language, and as far as I could in exact language; but I have intentionally avoided the phraseology usually adopted because I think that it has become, in some respects, routine, and hundreds and thousands read it without once seriously asking themselves what it really means; and also because

non-Catholics have read or heard and attached to it a false and erroneous sense, which has prejudiced them against us, and I have wished to use language which would not mislead them, but in fact convey to their minds our real meaning. It has been thought by some that I have failed in this respect, by using the word *worship*. In the restricted sense of the word *worship* commonly adopted, we do not *worship* Mary or the saints, but that restricted sense is not its only or leading sense, and I have been unable to find any other English word that fully expresses what is meant by *cultus* in Latin. I explained at the outset the sense in which I have used it, a proper sense, for worship is of various kinds and degrees, and no intelligent reader can for a moment suppose that I mean that we worship the saint with the same worship that we give to God.

The phrase I used in one of my early numbers, "As God is, in his essence, triune," has been rather severely criticised and pronounced formal heresy; I suppose, because it has been thought to impugn the unity of the divine essence, as if I had said, God is in his essence *three*, instead of saying as I did, he is triune. The three persons are in the essence of God, and that essence is one essence, which is what I meant. The phrase may be unusual, but it is not in my judgment inexact; but, at any rate, my meaning was exact, and strictly orthodox, and I am not at all tenacious of the phrase, and readily surrender it to any one who will supply me with one more philosophically and theologically exact. It never occurred to me that it would be objected to by any English reader; but as it has been I shall avoid using it in future.

I do not intend to take my leave as yet of the readers of the *Ave Maria*, in which I take a most lively interest; but I take leave here of the subject to which for so long a time I have solicited their attention. In leaving that subject I feel that I am parting with an old and dear friend with whom I have long held sweet and most profitable intercourse. If my articles have been profitable to no others, their preparation has been profitable to me, and has given me much peace and serenity of mind, quickened my love to Mary and the saints of our Lord, and rendered dearer both the Catholic faith and the Catholic worship. I bless God for "the communion of saints," and beg them to pray for me, that I may not be lost.

HERESY AND THE INCARNATION.

[From the Ave Maria for 1867–8.]

I. In an article in the *Ave Maria* some weeks since I maintained that my non-Catholic countrymen do not believe the true doctrine of the Incarnation, and therefore can see only superstition or idolatry in our devotion to Mary. Not believing the Incarnation they cannot believe her to be the mother of God; and not believing her to be the mother of God they can see no reason or propriety in honoring her as such. If we, like them, rejected or perverted the mystery of the Incarnation, we should, like them, reject devotion to Mary as superstitious or idolatrous. It is not to Mary as a woman or as a spotless virgin we pay that devotion, but to Mary the immaculate virgin mother of God. But God in his divine nature is self-existent and eternal, and has and can have no mother; he can have a mother only in his human nature, and if not incarnate he has no human nature.

I now propose to go further, and show that the essence of all heresy consists precisely in the direct or indirect denial of the Incarnation. There is a distinction not to be lost sight of between heresy and infidelity. Baptized persons who reject openly and avowedly the whole Christian religion are apostates; an unbaptized man or one who has and professes to have no belief in Jesus Christ is an infidel; a baptized person who professes to believe in Christ, and among his doctrines to hold fast to some, while he misconstrues, misapplies, or rejects others, is a heretic. Pagans, Jews, and Mahometans are infidels, not heretics, nor apostates; only one who has been a Christian can be an apostate, and only one who professes to be a Christian can be a heretic. There is both incipient apostasy and infidelity in all heresy, but heresy itself, while it remains heresy, is neither. The word *heresy* signifies, literally, choice, and is applied only to those Christians who choose among the articles or dogmas of the Christian faith these they will hold and those which they will reject. Protestants, or those Protestants who style themselves orthodox, profess to believe all the fundamentals of the Christian faith, and to reject only cor-

rupt additions which have been made to them, or at most only non-essentials; but as all which they reject as well as what they retain rests on one and the same authority, and belongs to one unbroken whole, they can be governed in their retention or rejection by no rule but their own choice, private judgment, or caprice, and therefore are heretics, whether what they reject is fundamental or non-fundamental.

A man may, also, be a heretic, though he rejects in name no doctrine, but nominally professes to believe them all, if he takes the doctrine in a false or perverted sense, though he may be excused from the *sin* of heresy, if he does it through invincible ignorance and in good faith, for there is no sin where there is no malice. Men may err against faith, not indeed, without heresy, but without incurring the *guilt* of heresy, and it is well for us that it is so, for we are all liable to err. One may be, as the theologians say, a *material* heretic without being a *formal* heretic, and it is not impossible that there are some such in the several sects. Whether so or not it is not our province to decide, and only he who knoweth the secrets of all hearts can decide. All that we can say is that *wilful* heresy is always a sin, whether it be in the denial or the misconstruction of the faith, in the refusal or the omission to elicit the act of faith.

The Christian faith is not made up of separate and unrelated articles, dogmas, or propositions, whereof one or more may be denied without lesion to the others. All in it, so to speak, hangs together, and what we call different articles, dogmas, or propositions are really only so many different aspects of one uniform and indissoluble whole, in which the parts, if parts are conceivable, have that mutual dependence on each other, and that relation to the whole, that the denial of any one part or aspect is, logically considered, the denial of all, or the one faith under every aspect. All heresy is sophistical, and no heretic ever pushes his principles to their last logical results; for if he did he would either renounce Christ altogether, or return to the unity of the faith, and become orthodox, a Catholic. What he retains of Christianity demands for its logical complement the whole faith in its unity and catholicity, and what he denies logically requires him to go further, and deny the whole, or to lapse into complete infidelity or apostasy, as we see large numbers who, bred in heresy, are now actually doing. It is exceedingly difficult for any logical mind to be contented with any

form of heresy, or with any sect, for no sect, no heresy gives or can give full scope or play to man's reason, or intellectual activity. The place is too strait for him to live in; the bounds are too narrow, and he is too pent up to be able to breathe freely. He stifles. He is always, if he narrows at all, in danger of narrowing too far, or not far enough; and nothing is more distressing than the endeavor to maintain, as he must, the true *via media* between consistency and inconsistency, between truth, which is something, and falsehood, which is nothing. The consequence is that those who are resolved to abide in their sect or their heresy obstinately refuse to think or reason at all in matters of religion. They who do reason either run into mere rationalism, which after all affords them no relief, or return to the one Catholic faith, and seek admission into the communion of the old church. Those last are the only real free thinkers.

Sectarians suffer under a singular delusion in imagining, as they do, that they who cannot or dare not reason, are the only really intellectual and intelligent Christians, and that intellect is stifled in the bosom of Catholicity, and that reason expires and finds her grave in the church. Reason demands unity and catholicity, and these are not found where what is received as faith is not all of a piece, but is made up only of ill-assorted fragments, which no power human or divine can mould into one complete, symmetrical, and living body of truth. It is only the Catholic that is aware of the immense injury heresy does to the intellectual development and growth of the nations that reject the unity and catholicity of faith. There is no measuring the distance as to intellect and reason applied to the highest and grandest questions that can interest the soul of man, that Protestant nations have fallen since the birth of the so-called reformation. It is only in the bosom of the Catholic Church that thought is really free, and reason has her full scope, because it is only the faith that she believes and teaches that is all of one piece, that is logical throughout, that can accept the last consequences of the principles which it asserts. The thing the church dreads is not reason, but unreason, not logic, but sophistry, for all her principles, nay, all her dogmas are catholic, universally true, and if they transcend the reach of reason, no reason can ever get beyond them, upset them, or find, so long as it is reason, any ground for doubting them. The sectarian is obliged to bear his sect Atlas-like, on his own shoulders, and sustain its doctrine by

main strength, by shutting his eyes to its defects, and compelling his will to adhere to it; the Catholic finds, on the contrary, that his church can stand without him, and that he can rest on her faith and find it not giving way under him, but able to uphold him.

The reason why many able men, comparing Protestant and Catholic nations think the former more intellectual than the latter, is in the fact that they do not seize the proper terms of comparison. Protestants with an illogical and uncatholic religion are obliged, in a great measure, to turn their minds away from the higher regions of thought, and direct them to the lower regions of the external world and the material sciences. In these they have found a partial scope for intellect, and are not much, if any, behind Catholic nations. But Catholics, able to penetrate those higher regions of thought, virtually closed to Protestants, find in them a spiritual pleasure and profit which render it less necessary for them to seek employment for their reason in the more material world. Compare Protestant nations with Catholic nations in spirituality, in theology, in the higher regions of science, and you will find that Protestants are infinitely below Catholics. In fact, Protestants have nothing in those higher, and vastly more important regions of any depth or soundness for which they are not indebted to Catholic theologians, for the most part to those they stigmatize as idle and ignorant monks, whom wherever they have the power they suppress as the drones of society.

Assuming the Christian faith to be essentially one and indivisible, we may justly ask what is its central principle, its central mystery, from which all in our holy religion proceeds, and to which all returns? This is manifestly the Incarnation, "the Word made flesh." All in the Christian religion is either in order to the Incarnation or proceeds from it as its principle. Christianity is, as I have heretofore maintained, teleological, and taken in its comprehensiveness, is the order of regeneration, or the redemption of man and his return to God as his final cause, his last end, or his supreme good. Whatever is essentially or distinctively Christian is in this order and what it implies. What then is the principle of this order? Here there can be no doubt; it is Jesus Christ himself. This is clear from the unambiguous testimony of Scripture, and is confirmed by the very name, *Christianity*, that it bears. Jesus Christ is the alpha and omega, the beginning and the end, the author and finisher

of our faith. He is not merely its prophet or teacher, but he is its principle, the source of its life, in whom is its very being, in as true and as high a sense as God is himself the Creator of the universe, its upholder, in whom all creatures live, and move, and have their being. Hence St. Paul says to the Corinthians, "I was determined to know nothing among you save Jesus Christ and him crucified," "for," as St. Peter says, "there is none other name given under heaven among men whereby we can be saved, neither is there salvation in any other." Our Lord himself says, "I am the way, the truth, and the life." "He that believeth in me shall not walk in darkness, he that believeth in me, though he be dead, shall live," "because I live ye shall live also," and "without me ye can do nothing." And Jesus Christ is God incarnate, perfect God and perfect man, the Word made flesh and dwelling among us. Hence "every spirit that confesseth that Jesus Christ is come in the flesh is of God, and every spirit that dissolveth Jesus" or separateth the human nature from the divine, "is not of God"—is Antichrist.

This being so, they who reject the Incarnation, as Unitarians and Universalists, reject Christianity itself, and are rather non-Christians than hereties, the more especially as very few of them are even baptized in the name of Christ. The Incarnation thus including the whole of Christianity every heresy must be in some form an error against it. This I shall now endeavor to show by an analysis of the principal heresies.

II. Heresies against the Incarnation are of three classes. 1st. Those that impugn what it presupposes and without which it would not be possible; 2d. Those which directly impugn it as a fact; 3d. Those that indirectly impugn it in its purposes and effects. Since heresy is to be distinguished specifically, though not generically, from simple infidelity and downright apostasy, beyond these three classes no heresy is possible or conceivable.

By the Incarnation is to be understood the mystery of the Word made flesh, that the Son, the second person in the ever-blessed and indivisible Trinity, and who is God, very God of very God, assumed flesh in the womb of the immaculate Virgin Mary, or took up human nature to himself, and made it, by hypostatic union with his divine person, his own nature, as truly and as substantially so as his divine nature itself, so that since the union he has in the unity of

one person, two forever distinct but inseparable natures, the human and the divine, and is perfect God and perfect man, and may with strict truth be called either the Son of God or the Son of man, and since the Son of man is man, and the Son of God is God, we may call him alike God or man for he is both in one person. In his divine nature he is God; in his human nature he is man. He became man, as say the theologians, that man might become God.

The Son of God became incarnate that he might complete the work of creation by carrying, as it is carried in the hypostatic union, the creative act of God to its apex or highest possible point, redeem or deliver man from the bondage of sin and its penalty, elevate him from the natural to the supernatural order, and enable him to attain to the end of his existence, for which he was created or destined by his Creator, and be made a partaker of the divine nature in glory, or one with God his last and his first cause without loss of individuality, and resting in him as his supreme beatitude.

None of the propositions contained in this statement of the Incarnation and its purpose can be denied by any one who professes to be a Christian without heresy, that is, without what theologians call *material* heresy, which, if unintentional, or the result of invincible ignorance, is not culpable, or is excusable; but in this discussion I deal only with material heresy, and have nothing to do with the culpability or inculpability of heretics.

1. It is easy to see from what I have thus far said that all those heresies which deny or pervert the mystery of the Trinity, that deny the three equal persons in one God, the proper divinity of the son, his eternal generation, his equality with the Father and the Holy Ghost, as also those which deny the humanity or manhood of Christ, are indirectly heresies against the Incarnation. For if we deny the distinction of persons in the Godhead we have no divine Word or person to become incarnate, and if we deny the eternal generation of the Son, we deny the proper divinity of the Word or *Logos*, and then deny that the Word which was made flesh and dwelt among us is God. This was done by the gnostics, that is, those gnostics treated by the fathers as heretics, for of those gnostics who were really heathen, and made no profession of Christianity, we say nothing. These did not indeed maintain that the Christ, as they said, was a creature, or deny his eternal generation,

but they denied his supreme divinity, or his equality with the Father and the Holy Ghost, held him to be an Æon, the chief of the Æons or immortalities, or proceeding by way of generation from God, or in their language Byssos, the dark, unfathomable, inscrutable, the infinite void, corresponding to the void of the Buddhists, and the *reine Seyn* of the Hegelians, which, as it admits no predicates, is nothing. The Christ is the first Æon or generation; from him proceed others, by syzygies or pairs, till the void becomes pleroma or fullness. It is not easy to make a statement that will apply equally to all the heretical gnostics, nor is it easy to say what was their precise meaning, but it is not unlikely that their Æons were personified abstractions, or the intellectual and moral virtues which go to make up the perfect gnostic, or man perfected in the *gnosis* or spiritual science, and their teaching when expressed in plain language, without metaphor, and understood in relation to the several processes by which the gnostic is able to arrive at perfect science, was really less absurd than it would seem. They probably did not differ much, save in their symbolism, from modern transcendentalists. Their genuine successors in history are the old Alchemists, who meant by the philosopher's stone very much what the gnostics meant by the means by which one attains to the *gnosis*, or perfect science.

The Incarnation was indirectly denied, again, by the Sabellians, who denied the distinction of persons in the Godhead, and made the distinction of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost the distinction of three attributes, or three aspects of the one God. A Unitarian friend said to the writer one day; that he no longer denied the Trinity. "God is certainly trinne," said he, "for he is in himself the good, the true, the beautiful. These are certainly distinguishable from one another, and yet they are one and the same God, and all equally God." He had attained to a trinity indeed, but it was simply a psychological trinity, existing only in his own mind, for in God the *verum* and the *bonum*, the true and the good are identical and indistinguishable, and are predicable alike of the one divine essence common to all the persons.

The Trinity, the eternal generation and proper divinity of the Son, were also denied by the Arians and Semiarians. According to the Arians Christ was indeed a superangelic being, before and above all worlds, but nevertheless

a creature; the Semi-arians distinguished him from God, allowed him to be of a like substance with the Father, but denied that he was of the same substance, and therefore they denied his divine sonship. The Son is necessarily of the same substance with the Father, and if the Word was of a different, though a like, substance with the Father, then he who was born of the Virgin Mary was not God, and God did not become incarnate. Denying the Word to be of the same substance with the Father, the Arians must say either that he was a creature or that there are more gods than one. They could not say the latter or maintain that there are two divine substances; they were obliged therefore to say that he was created, and however high they exalt him in the scale of creation, he was still a creature, and consequently to honor the Son as we honor the Father, according to the command, was simply idolatry. Hence Arianism not only denied the Trinity, the divinity of the Word and therefore the Incarnation, but it was a return toward heathenism and the worship of the creature as the Creator. It was, as is all heresy, a retrograde movement, and St. Athanasius, its great opponent, was alike the champion of orthodoxy and of the real progress of the race and of civilization.

The Incarnation is denied by those who deny the humanity or manhood of Christ. This was done by the gnostics who denied alike the supreme divinity and the proper humanity of Christ, and made him, if any thing but a personified virtue or abstraction, a sort of inferior divinity like the good dæmons of Plato. It was done also by the Docetæ, a gnostic sect, or at least akin to the gnostics, who denied that our Lord had a real body, and maintained that he suffered on the cross only in appearance. If he had no real body he could not have taken flesh, and there could have been no real incarnation, for there was no hypostatic union of human nature to the divine person.

2. There is no need to dwell on those heresies that directly deny the fact of the Incarnation. Among these the earliest noted in history is that of the Ebionites,—a sect of uncertain origin, and apparently never very numerous. These held our Lord to have been simply a man, the son of Joseph and Mary, with nothing miraculous about him. They honored him as a great and good man, and revered him as their master and teacher. They of course could recognize no incarnation, not any more than do modern

Unitarians. These, with the Socinians, now nearly extinct, deny the fact of the incarnation, and see in our Lord only his human nature, and count him only a providential man, inspired indeed, but only as is or may be every man who will take him for a model, and follow his example. Some of them in the beginning recognized his miraculous conception, but the greater part of them at least, now reject it, and hold that he was conceived and born in the natural way; consequently Mary is with them a worthy woman, a good and loving mother, but entitled to no special honor or regard, not due to any good mother of a distinguished son. The late Theodore Parker held that our Lord, though a remarkable Hebrew youth, who strode full a thousand years in advance of his age, was nevertheless ignorant in comparison with men in the nineteenth century, and not wholly free from sin, in which he is followed by the more advanced Unitarians, or, as they choose to call themselves, liberal Christians. They can hardly be called heretics, for they really take lower views of Christ and his mission than do the Mahometans, who hold him to be a prophet and surpassed only by Mahomet, and should, perhaps, rather be called unbelievers or apostates, than a Christian sect.

The Nestorians, who deny that Mary was mother of God; the adoptionists, who hold that the human nature assumed had its proper human personality; the Eutychians, who absorb the human nature in the divine or fuse the two into one theandric nature; the Monothelites, who deny to our Lord a human will; all directly deny the Incarnation as a fact, as every theologian knows. The other heresies which obtained during the first six or seven centuries, were only various forms of the heresies already mentioned. Those also deny the Incarnation as a fact, who in our days take it as symbolic of the general relation of all men to the divinity, or interpret it to mean that God exists only in humanity, and that out of humanity there is no God.

III. 3. We have considered those heresies which impugn the Incarnation directly by denying it as a fact, and those which impugn it indirectly by denying or perverting what it presupposes, and without which there could be no Incarnation. We are now to consider those which impugn it by denying or misrepresenting its effects. Among these are to be reckoned the heresies taken up and propagated by the so-called reformation, as well as the false principles as to the relation of the church and the state which led to the Greek schism.

The first heresy to be noticed in this class is that which denies the divine origin, life, and authority of the church. The reformation did not absolutely deny that our Lord instituted the church, or a church, but it either denied its visibility, or made it, as did the old Donatists, consist of the elect only. It connected it either with the divinity alone, or with the humanity alone, never made it proceed from and live the life of the incarnate Word. It saw in the church no expression of the life of God in his human nature, but either a soul without a body, or a body without a soul, an aggregation of individuals, living only their own individual life, bringing life to the body, but deriving none from their union with it. The church is not a mere aggregation of believers, nor is it a mere external institution founded by a transient act of our Lord, and simply dependent on his external appointment. It is as intimately connected with him as is the natural order to God the creator. It grows out of the Incarnation, and is in some sort its visible continuation. The apostle calls it the body of Christ, and says Christ is its head, and believers members of his body, members of him, and members one of another. These expressions all imply a real, vital, and living union of the church with the Word incarnate, and of individuals through the church with him. He himself says, addressing his apostles: "I am the vine, and my Father is the husbandman. * * * Abide in me, and I in you. As the branch cannot bear fruit of itself, unless it abide in the vine, so neither can you, unless ye abide in me. I am the vine and ye are the branches. He that abideth in me and I in him, beareth much fruit." This sustains the same conclusion of a living union between our Lord and the church and her living members.

Our Lord abides, dwells, lives in the church, and it is because he lives in her that she lives, as he says, "because I live ye shall live also." As our Lord is one and the church lives in him, and by him, the church also must be one. His body is one, not many. Hence they who break the unity of the church by contending that there may be many churches or more than the one body of our Lord, do really deny that the church is his body, and lives in his indwelling life, and consequently the incarnation as the principle of our Christian life. The same must be said of those who deny the authority of the church. The authority of the church does not rest exclusively on

the external commission given to the apostles, but also on her interior constitution and life. Her life is the life of the Word made flesh, and she lives that life, and as that life, since it is the life of God, is divine and authoritative, so must she, living, speaking that life, be divine and authoritative, for what is hers is his, and what is his is hers, since his life and hers is one and the same. Hence too her infallibility. She is infallible, because he whose life she lives, in whom she abides and who abides in her is infallible. As he cannot err, she cannot err. Hence, again, her indefectibility. As he cannot fail, she cannot fail, because she lives in and by him, and he lives in her. Individuals may fail, but the body cannot, and whatever she utters through the Word incarnate dwelling in her, constituting her a living organism, must be infallible and authoritative, because it is he that lives and speaks in her. To maintain the contrary would be to impugn the divinity of our Lord, and to deny that in Jesus Christ God became incarnate.

Now the reformers denied all these points. They maintained that the church not only could err, but that she actually had erred, both as to her own constitution and the truth revealed to her and kept fresh in her memory by the Holy Ghost. They thus denied the divinity of our Lord, and the office of the Incarnation in the church, and therefore in the work of salvation. They really dissolved Jesus Christ, or separated the divinity from the humanity, and recognized in the church only our Lord's human nature, which separated from the divinity is no *suppositum*, no *subsistentia*, for the Word did not assume the human personality, or a human person, which would have been adoptionism, not incarnation. They thus lose the divine character of the church, and suppose in it only a human character, make it purely human, an aggregation of individuals, a self-created human society for religious purposes, and no more the body of Christ than is a Bible society or a religious tract society. They then deny the Incarnation by denying the church as its effect or creation.

The Greek schismatics are not usually counted as heretics. It is true they do not admit the *Filioque* in the creed, but they do not deny while asserting that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father alone, as principle or first principle, that he proceeds also from the Son as medium; they deny also the papal supremacy, but the church has never formally defined it to be of faith, has never formally

defined it to be a fact of divine revelation, though she doubtless holds it to be so. Yet the principle on which they separated from the church is an heretical principle, and there is more in their schism than simple disobedience to the authority of the Roman Pontiff. Their schism was caused by the assertion on the part of the Greek bishops, under the influence of the bishop of Constantinople and the Greek emperor, of the dependence of ecclesiastical authority and dignities on the empire. Here was clearly a heresy, for our Lord had said, "My kingdom is not of this world," that is, it neither rests on the principles on which are founded human governments, nor does it hold from them. It indirectly impugned the incarnation. The princes of this world, it may be said, hold their power from God, but if so, they hold it from God as creator in the natural order, not from God incarnate in the supernatural or teleological order. If we make the authority of the church or ecclesiastical rank or dignity depend on the civil power, we necessarily exclude the human nature of God, and make the church either purely human or derive from the Word as creator, not as made flesh. God in his human nature would not be its founder, its authority, and its life. It would then impugn the incarnation by denying, as we have said, its effect, what it creates, or what grows out of it. The incarnation originates and sustains the church, that is, God does it in his human nature.

Many people, who by no means intend to deny the incarnation, are yet unable to understand why the denial of the church should involve the denial of that great mystery. This is because they do not comprehend the strictly and profoundly logical character of the whole Christian or teleological order. The whole order is bound in one by the most rigid and invincible logic. All is dialectic, and in this fact we have a conclusive proof that it is from God, and is known to us only by divine revelation, for man could never have invented or imagined it. All the parts cohere, and no one can be taken away without virtually destroying the whole. Jesus Christ is the Word incarnate, God in his human nature; that is, Jesus Christ is the church, as Adam was the human race, and as Adam and the whole human race only make up the total Adam, so Jesus Christ and the church only make up the total Christ. The relation of the church to Christ is not mechanical or magical, but real, living. Christ is explicated, and so to speak, realized in the

church by regeneration, as Adam is explicated and realized in the human race, by generation,—the one natural, and the other supernatural. To deny the church is to deny the effectiveness of the Incarnation, to deny Christ as a living Christ, and to assert him at best only as a dead Christ: as to deny the human race would be to deny the productiveness of Adam, and to assert him only as a dead Adam.

Moreover, to deny the real and intimate relation of the church to the incarnation is to deny to it all divine character, every supernatural element, and to place it in the same category with nature. Without the church the man Christ Jesus could not be the mediator between God and men, for he would effect no mediatorial work, have no mediatorial kingdom, and there would be no order of grace distinguishable from the order of nature. The initial and the final would be identical. In the divine and in every act of God in his divine nature alone the eternal Word is the medium between the Father as principle and the Holy Ghost as end, but between God in his human nature and man either the church is the medium or there is no medium. If there is no medium there is no action, and all part in the incarnation is denied, for where there is no medial cause there can be no first or final cause.

If these positions be correct, it follows that all errors against the church indirectly impugn the Incarnation. It is well to remember, as St. Thomas teaches, that God is *similitudo rerum omnium*, or is in himself the type or archetype after which every thing is made. In the material order every thing copies or imitates, after its manner. he Creator as Trinity, or three distinct persons in one being; analogy, then, requires that the church, which is the supernatural order, of which the Word made flesh, God in his human nature, is the creator, should copy or express the hypostatic union of the divine nature and the human—express him both in his divinity and his humanity, and thus have its divine side and its human side. Hence the church is at once and indissolubly human and divine. Her personality, so to speak, is divine, and must copy or express the divine personality of our Lord, which is one. This is done, according to Saint Cyprian, by the union of the faithful with the pastors, and of the pastors with their chief, St. Peter, who lives, teaches, and governs in his successor, the Bishop of Rome. The Greeks in the grounds of their schism impugned alike the Incarnation and Christian char-

ity, for those grounds really denied God to be in his human nature the Creator of the church, and therefore excluded from it the divine or supernatural element, and assumed it to be a purely human or natural institution. The principle of the Greek schism, if followed out, absorbs the church in the state, and makes it a part of the civil government of the country, as we see it in Russia and in Great Britain. The pope standing at the summit of the hierarchy completing its personality represents with the hierarchy the divine person of Jesus Christ, and therefore the indepen dence and authority of him who is King of kings, and Lord of lords.

IV. The proposition I have undertaken to maintain is that all heresies impugn the Incarnation either in itself or in what it presupposes or in its effects. The first two classes of three into which I have divided them have been considered already,—and I proceed now to consider the third class, those which impugn the Incarnation in its effects.

The design of the Incarnation is to redeem man from sin, both original and actual, by making a full satisfaction to divine justice, to create a regenerated humanity, to ennoble human nature by elevating it to be the nature of God, and to enable us by the assistance of grace to attain to perfect and eternal beatitude in intimate and supernatural union with God, as our final cause or last end. All those doctrines which deny the unity of the species or that all men proceed from Adam by way of natural generation, indirectly assail the Incarnation, by denying the unity of the human nature assumed by the Word with the human nature of all men, and also by denying redemption from original sin, for without the unity of the species there is and can be no original sin from which the race needs to be redeemed. If there is no original sin there can, of course, be no redemption from original sin.

The Pelagians, Socinians, Unitarians, and modern Universalists, deny the fall, and recognize no original sin, or sin of the race, and consequently, when logical, no redemption; others who have no heterodox intention, think very loosely on both original sin and the unity of the species. We find men devoted to the study of the physical sciences, who deny that all men have proceeded from Adam, and yet imagine that they do not impugn either the dogma of the unity of the species or that of original sin. They fancy that they can assert without impugning either dogma, the creation of

many Adams, one for each separate and distinct locality, each of whom becomes the progenitor of a family, all having the same nature. But they deceive themselves. The duplication of Adam, or the multiplication of Adams by original creation, denies the unity of the species even if the sameness of nature be supposed, for there is no unity of species where all the individuals of the race have not proceeded by way of natural generation from one and the same progenitor; and if we suppose more than one Adam we cannot assert original sin, for the dogma asserts that original sin was committed by Adam, and is transmitted from him to all men by natural generation, which is not possible, if all men have not proceeded from one and the same progenitor. Original sin is the sin in which we are born, the sin of origin, the sin of the race, and all men have incurred it, because all, as the race, were in Adam, and sinned in his sin. The entire race was in Adam, so that Adam's sin was at once actual and original, his own personal sin, and the sin of the race individuated in him.

Original sin is properly sin; not merely a misfortune, but a fault, for the race voluntarily committed it in Adam, since Adam's will was that of the species as well as of the individual, and have incurred its penalty, which is death, death physical, spiritual, and eternal. In it the whole race has offended God, been morally averted from him, has lost communion with him, and become captive to Satan, so that, the mother of the incarnate God excepted, we are all conceived in sin, and born in the language of Scripture, *filii iræ*, children of wrath by nature. But this could not be so unless the race really sinned in Adam, and they could not have sinned in Adam, if they were not in him, or if the entire race were not individuated in him, which is possible only on the supposition of the unity of the race, and of Adam as the progenitor of all men. Adam then must have been in the order of generation the only and the real head of the human race.

The Calvinists, or at least the old-fashioned Calvinists, though asserting original sin in words, really deny it. Their doctrine is that God, when he made Adam, entered into a covenant with him, in which it was stipulated that he should be the federal head of his race, represent it and be responsible for it. If he stood, his posterity were to stand; if he fell, they were to fall with him. He fell and they also. But Adam only sinned. Very true, but by virtue of the

covenant his sin was imputed to all men, and reckoned to be theirs. But as only Adam sinned, and the race did not really sin in him, how can we be really born in sin, for no putation of one man's sin can make it the sin of another? They also deny original sin who make it consist solely in the loss of certain privileges, whether natural or supernatural, which were gratuitous gifts, and never due to man's nature as such. Such loss by the race and through the prevarication of Adam, would be a great damage, a great misfortune no doubt, but if the race did not really participate in Adam's sin, how could it be sin in the race? And how could the race participate in Adam's sin, if it was not in him really as well as putatively? But there was in original sin more than the loss of supernatural or superadded privileges; there was a loss by the race of innocence, of communion with God, and of the subjection of the inferior nature to the higher, the body to the soul, the appetites and passions to reason.

Original sin is also denied by those even who though they assert the species was completely in Adam, yet deny that it is "distinct from his individuality," and maintain that humanity is completely in every individual in like manner as it was in him. Humanity in the sense of human nature is complete in every man, but in the case of the species or race it is not; because no man in the natural order but Adam is the progenitor of all men. The species is not *separate* or separable from individuality, but to say that it is not *distinct* from individuality, is in scholastic language to confound the universal with the particular, the *humanitas* with the *Socratitas*, and really to deny the universal, the genus, the species, the distinction marked in all languages between man and men,—is to deny generation by denying the generic man, and to make every individual man a direct, distinct, and original creation, and the human race nothing but an aggregate of individualities bound together by no natural tie of blood or kindred. It really denies the "one blood," of which "God hath made all the nations of men to dwell on all the face of the earth." It denies the unity of the species, the solidarity of Adam and his posterity, for an aggregate or totality includes the idea of multiplicity or many, and excludes that of unity. The race can be one only on condition that there is an indissoluble unity that is above all individualities, and persistent in multiplicity of individuals. But I have dwelt long enough on this point.

and longer than I intended; yet perhaps not too long, when we consider how prone even great and good men are in seeking to escape the Protestant doctrine of the total corruption of human nature by the fall, to run, unintentionally, into the opposite extreme, and virtually to explain error by original sin, or to make it, because not personal sin as the sin of the race, no sin at all, but simply a misfortune.

The Incarnation supposes the unity of the human species, for though the Word assumed an individual man, or human nature *in individuo*, he yet assumed the human nature of all men, and thus became in the supernatural order the real head through the election of grace, or progenitor of the regenerated human race, as Adam is the real head through natural generation of the human race in the natural order. The regenerated race was individualized in the human nature assumed, and all individuals of regenerated humanity were potentially in him, which could not be the fact if the race were not previously one in Adam, and all individuals born or to be born were not potentially in him, for grace supposes nature. Hence the denial of the unity and reality of the species not separable but distinguishable from individuals, not only denies original sin from which our Lord died to redeem us, but really the Incarnation itself, as I ought to have shown when treating of the heresies which impugn what the Incarnation presupposes.

The heresies which deny or misrepresent the grace of Christ, the church, the sacraments, regeneration, justification, sanctification, and eternal life are all heresies against the Incarnation, for they all deny or misrepresent its *media* and effects. Grace,—I mean the grace of Christ that redeems, justifies, sanctifies, and renders us pleasing to God, —proceeds from the Incarnation or God in his human nature, and is communicated to us by the Holy Ghost through the sacraments as its *media*. Those who, like the Pelagians and semi-Pelagians, Socinians, Unitarians, and modern Universalists, deny the new birth, or the order of regeneration and assert the ability of nature without supernatural elevation or assistance to attain to its destiny or beatitude in God, of course deny the grace of Christ. They are really naturalists, and have of Christianity only its name. The same may be said of all who mistake simple human faith for divine faith in the teachings of our Lord and his apostles, or suppose they are united to Christ because so far as simple human faith elicited by the motives of credibility

addressed to our understandings is concerned, they are orthodox, for "the devils believe and tremble." These are really Pelagians, for they overlook the fact that faith is the gift of God, and is elicited only by the assistance of the grace of Christ infused into the soul by the Holy Ghost.

But even those who assert the new birth, the necessity of regeneration, and call their doctrines the doctrines of grace by way of eminence, yet deny the church and the sacraments as media of grace, and hold that the soul is regenerated by the direct, immediate operation of the Holy Ghost, deny the Incarnation in its effects, because the direct, immediate, and irresistible operation of the Holy Ghost is God operating in his divine nature, not in his human nature, and of that operation the *man* Christ Jesus is not the medium or mediator. The human nature of God has nothing to do with it. The grace of God as distinguished from the grace of Christ may operate to bring us to Christ, as our Lord says "no man can come unto me except the Father draw him," but we must be regenerated in Christ through grace as we are generated by nature in Adam. A soul converted by the Holy Ghost without God in his human nature as the medium, is not born of Christ by the election of grace as we are born of Adam by natural generation, and no conceivable office in the justification and sanctification is performed by the *man* Christ Jesus; every thing is superseded or denied that could warrant the parallel which St. Paul draws between Adam and Christ, and we could not say, "As in Adam all die, so in Christ shall all be made alive," nor that "there is salvation in no other. For there is no other name under heaven given to men whereby we must be saved." I know well that Christ is God and in his divinity is not distinguishable from God, but his human nature is distinguishable from his divine nature, and it is in his human nature that he is the one "mediator of God and men." If he could have saved us and enabled us to attain to the beatitude in store for them that love, serve, and obey him, by operating in his divine nature alone, why did he assume human nature? *cur deus homo*? as St. Anselm asks.

V. In continuing my remarks on the heresies that impugn the Incarnation in its effects, I may add to those already mentioned those that assert imputed righteousness and justification by faith alone, as held by the modern Evangelical sects. Adam's sin was the sin of the race because the race was all in Adam, and Adam stood not by

covenant only, but really and in nature, for the whole human race. Adam was at once an individual and the generic man, an individual man and the race or species. Hence his sin was the sin of the race as well as his own individual or personal sin, and death hath passed upon all men because all men sinned by nature in him.

Now Christ, the incarnate Word, is the second Adam, and bears to the human species regenerated by grace, or mankind in the supernatural order, a relation strictly analogous to that borne to the human race by the first Adam in the order of nature. As the sin of Adam was really the sin of the race, so is the justice or righteousness of Christ the real justice or righteousness of the regenerated; and therefore as we live the life of Adam through being born of him by nature or generation, so we are redeemed and justified or live the life of Christ by being born anew of him by grace. This as I understand it is the Catholic doctrine; but the doctrine of imputed justice is the counterpart of the doctrine of imputed sin, and as imputed sin denies that the race really sinned, so does imputed justice deny that men are really justified in Christ, and therefore exclude from our justification all action of God in his human nature.

How on the principle of imputation, whether of sin or of justice, could our Lord make full satisfaction to divine justice for our sins original and actual, and make us personally and intrinsically just? The Evangelicals say indeed Christ died for us, and fully atoned for the sins of the whole world, yet how could he do it, if we have only a covenanted or putative relation to him? And if he did it, how comes it that those who die unregenerate suffer the penalty of original sin, as well as of such actual sins as they may have committed? The demand of justice is that I who have sinned should suffer the penalty of sin; and this demand is not and cannot be satisfied by proxy, by another's suffering in my stead. The counting of his satisfaction to divine justice as mine, is simply counting as true what is really false. So, counting by way of imputation the justice of Christ as mine, is also false, for it is not mine, if it is simply imputed to me, and does not become intrinsically mine. So, on this supposition, then, no satisfaction is really made to divine justice, and nothing is effected in relation to redemption, justification, and sanctification by the Incarnation, and all that is effected by it could have been effected just as well without as with it. God could just as easily

and with just as much satisfaction forgive us without the merits of Christ as to impute those merits to us when they are in no sense ours, and then for their sake forgive us. He could justify us without the justice of Christ, as well as with it, if that justice is not really but only putatively ours. Indeed, on the Evangelical doctrine there is no real connection between the justice or merits of Christ and our pardon and justification. This is the fatal heresy of Evangelicalism.

Christ could merit in his human nature by his obedience, because in his person he is God and owes no obedience on his own account. His merits he could make over to us, but they can be really ours and avail us to salvation only by our union with him as our real head. He made complete satisfaction for the sins of the whole human race, but the satisfaction is due from us who have sinned, not from him who was innocent, and his satisfaction can avail us only as we are in him by grace as we were by nature in Adam, and atone in him as really as we sinned in Adam, and his justice can justify us only as we are in him as our real and not simply putative head. We are not and cannot, indeed, be in him in his divine nature, for in his divine nature he is our creator, but not our head, as was Adam. To suppose it is to suppose the regenerate to be not sons of God in his human nature, but sons of God in his divine nature, in the sense the eternal Word is the Son of God, and equal by nature with the Father and the Holy Ghost, which were impossible and absurd, not to say, blasphemous, for we are creatures. The merits of Christ can pass to us only as we are one with him in the unity of his human nature, only as he is not only an individual man, but in the order of grace the regenerated human race, as Adam was the human race in the order of nature, so that we obey in his obedience as we disobeyed in the disobedience of Adam. He is our real head in the order of grace and we merit in his merits as the member merits in the head.

No doubt the Holy Ghost regenerates the soul, but through the Word made flesh as the medium, as God in his divinity creates every man, but through generation in Adam as the medium; not originally, directly, without God in his human nature as the medium of the regeneration, for the man Christ Jesus is the mediator and only mediator of God and men. The man Christ Jesus is the father of the regenerated race, and the fountain and medium of the life of God in

the soul. As in regeneration and the life of the soul in God, Evangelicalism recognizes no real intervention of God in his humanity, it really impugns the Incarnation by making it of none effect; and we may say of those sects who talk so much about the doctrines of grace, and venture to accuse Catholics of Pelagianism, that they never recognize the grace of Christ or the new birth in Christ at all. Hence one reason why sectarian revivals are so barren of real Christian results. There is nothing supernatural in them.

The heresies against the church undeniably impugn the Incarnation. The church is founded by the Incarnation, and is what we have called the regenerated human race, which is born, as we have seen, of God in his human nature, and lives in him and by him his life, as men live in the order of nature the life of Adam. St. Paul tells us the church is the body of Christ, and St. Athanasius identifies the universal church with Christ in his humanity. If the church is the body of Christ he is himself the soul of the church, and her body must be individual believers assimilated to her by grace, and united through her to Christ the soul. She in some sort continues or represents visibly on earth the Incarnation. Hence St. Augustine says Christ and the faithful, who are his members, are Christ, the whole Christ, *totus Christus*. Christ is the church, the whole body of believers, the whole regenerated race in its unity and universality, as Adam was the entire human race in the natural order. Hence we may predicate of the church in her interior life, her informing principle, and in her body, all the attributes predicable of Christ himself and his human body. She is therefore one, holy, catholic, visible as well as invisible, authoritative, indefectible, and infallible, for he as perfect man, and perfect God, is all this.

All errors that impugn these attributes of the church or any one of them are errors against the Incarnation, and all the heresies or sects actual or possible do in some form impugn them. The Evangelical sects having on their system no office, in the economy of salvation, for the humanity of Christ, have, of course, none for the church, and really recognize no church at all. The church is the medium of the union of individuals with the man Christ Jesus, and to be born of him they must be born of her. Hence St. Cyprian says, "He cannot have God for his father who has not the church for his mother." But the Evangelical sects, such as the Presbyterian, Baptist, Methodist, Lutheran, Dutch and

German Reformed and low-church Episcopalians, hold that the church is nothing but the aggregation of believers, of individuals who must be born of God prior to their admission into the church, or to their being born of her, and that she receives her life from her members instead of their receiving their life from Christ the head through her, as his body through which he carries on his mediatorial work, and therefore really hold, whether they know it or not, that we are regenerated by God, in his divinity not by God in his humanity, consequently deny the reality of the regenerated race, of whom Christ is by grace the progenitor in the supernatural order. They therefore impugn the Incarnation by denying that the human nature of God has any effect in the regeneration or the new birth.

We live the life of Christ through the church, by being assimilated to her as his body, of which he is the soul, the *forma*, or informing principle. We become united to her that we may be united to him, and live his life, and become one with him, a living member of the race of which he is the real father and head. We can become members of him only by being born by grace of him as we are born by natural generation of Adam. The medium of this birth in Christ is grace, and the *media* of grace are the sacraments of the church. The sacraments are visible signs signifying a communicating grace, the grace of our Lord Jesus Christ or of God in his human nature. Various graces, transient graces as they are called, may be granted prior to sacramental grace, but the grace of regeneration, the grace that translates us from the state in which we are born into the kingdom of God, and makes us citizens of the commonwealth of Christ, or members of the regenerated human race, is communicated to us by the Holy Ghost only in the sacrament of baptism, thence called the sacrament of regeneration.

All modern sects deny sacramental grace. The reformation was brought about by various causes,—political, social, and national, rather than religious,—but the great aim of the reformers as theological reformers or innovators was to eliminate the priesthood and the whole doctrine of sacramental grace, and therefore from the church every element of the supernatural, and to make it a purely human body, or in which God is operative as in nature only in his divine nature. They did not deny, they asserted, the fact of the Incarnation; they did not deny, they asserted, the super-

natural; nay, they seemed to be and in one aspect of the case were exclusive supernaturalists; but they sought to refer every thing in the Christian order to God in his divinity, which was only an indirect way of denying all distinction between generation and regeneration, by denying a distinction between generation and creation, and asserting the fundamental principle of pure naturalism, into which we see their children everywhere falling. Extremes meet, and the exclusive supernaturalism of the reformers by eliminating the man Christ Jesus, the only mediator of God and men, was virtually exclusive naturalism or the reduction of Christianity and the church to the purely natural order. The adherents of the reformation are inevitably in religion either fanatics or Pelagians, that is, persons holding the sufficiency of nature without the grace of Christ.

But to eliminate the sacramental, was to eliminate from Christianity God in his human nature, and to leave us as to the means and mode of salvation, precisely as we should have been if the eternal Word had not assumed flesh or human nature. There is not a Protestant sect that really admits sacramental grace, that holds baptism in any sense essential to salvation, or the sacrament of Orders necessary to the being of the church. Some of them call the holy Eucharist a sacrament but even these do not admit that it is a medium though it may be the occasion of grace, and the consubstantiation or impanation asserted by Lutherans and Puseyites, but as a theorem rather than as a dogma, can scarcely be said to form an exception to the universal rejection of sacramental grace by all who really adhere to the reformation. Heresies against the sacraments are all heresies against the church, and against the Incarnation, because they deny the operation of God in his human nature. The same may be said of all the other heresies or heretical propositions condemned by the church, as I hope to show more particularly in what follows.

VI. Heresy, intellectually considered, originates in the habit of studing Christianity, if I may so speak, in sections, or detachments, instead of studying it as a whole, in its principle, in its unity and integrity. We dissect the living body of truth, we break it into minute fragments, and we take each of these fragments and study it as if it were a complete whole in itself, and capable of being understood and appreciated in and by itself alone, without seeing it in its relation to the real whole of which it is only a part. Men

seize upon a particular truth, take it out of its living relations, and supply its manifest deficiency from their own fancy or ignorance, and thus fall into heresy.

Every new heresy or heretical proposition requires a new definition of the church, which consists in opposing to it the particular truth, or the special aspect of truth, which condemns it. Hence while the definitions of the church render the faith clearer on the special points impugned by heretics, it can hardly be denied that they tend to obscure it to the ordinary mind as a whole. Definitions are rendered necessary by insurgent errors against faith, and since heresies will arise, we are and should be grateful to the church for making them; but they are desirable only in relation to the heresies against which they are directed, and the church makes as few as possible, and never but with reluctance, or with regret for the necessity. They have almost an inevitable tendency to leave even the theologian to study the truth under particular aspects, rather than as did the fathers, as a whole, as a living synthesis, and hence much of the fathers' superiority over the greatest theologians of modern times.

Christianity is a whole, all its parts cohere, all are dialectically bound to its grand central principle, from which the whole radiates, so that he who attacks the faith under any particular aspect really attacks the whole, the very principle itself. He who scoffs at holy water, or the blessing of domestic animals, not only contradicts the apostle who says "every creature may be blessed by prayer," but levels a blow at the Incarnation and the very principle of mediation on which our redemption and salvation depend. It is only when we see the Catholic faith in its principle, and see that it is a life, and that all in it proceeds from the vital principle as the branch proceeds from the vine, that we can understand the reason, in the truth itself, of every thing the church approves or disapproves.

Christian faith is not a dead doctrine, a collection of isolated dogmas. it is the truth embodied in the church, living in her and in every one of her living members: it is the living truth, living and operating as the life of the church individually and collectively: so that the believing and the saintly have in their own interior life a test of orthodoxy, a Christian instinct, so to speak, that, though they may be unlearned in the schools, warns them of the approach of heresy, and makes their minds and hearts close to it, as the eyelids instinctively close to the blow that threatens the eye.

They feel that it is not in harmony with the faith they have received, nor with the life of Christ they live, even when they find it difficult to explain or even to understand why it is not. It is the Christian religion as a whole, in its unity and integrity, in its central principle in which the whole originates, and from which all in it radiates, that unbelievers and misbelievers do not see, do not understand, do not contemplate; for if they did, they would see that all the intellectual objections they urge against it are without force or relevancy, and that they must object to it as a whole and in all its parts, or not at all. But this no man can find it in his heart to do. I have never found any one so perverted or debased as not to admire the truth and beauty of the sermon of our Lord on the Mount, and yet there is nothing in that sermon that is practicable without the grace of the Word-made-flesh, or that can be detached from the mystery of the Incarnation without losing its meaning.

There is no Christian dogma that is more offensive to our latitudinarian age, and even to many who claim to believe in our Lord Jesus Christ, than the dogma of exclusive salvation, or, that out of the church there is no salvation—*Extra ecclesiam nulla salus.* It is denounced as illiberal, uncharitable; and Rousseau says, in his *Contrat Social*, that the man who holds that there is no salvation out of the church should be banished out of the commonwealth as an enemy to society. Take the dogma out of its place and consider it by itself alone, as detached from the Christian plan of salvation, it no doubt must seem harsh, cruel, and wholly indefensible, but considered in its place in that plan, in relation to the office of the church as the body of Christ in the work of salvation, its objectionable character at once vanishes, for without being affiliated to the church we cannot be affiliated to Christ, or live his life, which is the life of God in his human nature, and without living that life no salvation is possible. We say no more when we say, out of the church no salvation, than we do when we say, out of Christ no salvation. The church is the medium of our union with Christ; and it would be really a contradiction in terms to assert that we can be saved without union with him, for our salvation is precisely in that union perfected. To assert that there is salvation without the church, is only asserting in other words, that there is salvation without the Incarnation, or asserting salvation without the intervention of God in his humanity, the man Christ Jesus, who is the

mediator of God and men, which would be on Christian principles absurd.

The same dogma under another aspect asserts, that only believers can be saved, or that "without faith it is impossible to please God, for he that cometh to him must believe that he is, and is a rewarder of them that seek him," and is equally offensive when taken by itself alone. Faith, we are told, is belief; belief is an intellectual act, which depends on evidence, not on a man's free will: we believe as we can, not as we will. Will is free, but reason is not; man therefore is not responsible for his beliefs or his opinions, and is neither blameworthy nor praiseworthy, let them be what they may. Nothing can be more unjust, then, than to punish a man for not believing, when to believe was never in his power; or to reward him with heaven for believing when he was never able to disbelieve. He is punished for no fault and rewarded for no merit. So put and so understood, the dogma is unquestionably repugnant to our natural sense of justice, and wholly indefensible; but so put and so understood it is no Christian doctrine. No one is saved for having, or punished for not having, faith in the sense of the objection.

Faith implies an intellectual act, but the faith which is here in question is a virtue, a theological virtue which consists in believing, explicitly or implicitly, without doubting, all that God has revealed, on the veracity of God alone, and as a virtue it implies an act of free will; but as a Christian virtue, it is a supernatural virtue, and not possible without the assistance of grace. Even human faith, *fides humana*, is not always without moral character. A man is not always irresponsible for his opinions, for he may hold erroneous opinions because he has not desired or sought diligently for the truth, and which with a proper exercise of his faculties he might have found. But the faith that saves, and without which it is impossible to be saved, is the gift of God, through which the man is regenerated, born into Christ, and united to him as his living head, so that Christ becomes our life and his merits our merits. If there is any truth in Christianity, if the Incarnation, which is applied to us through faith, is essential to our salvation, nothing is more certain than that without faith in Christ it is impossible to be saved. We must then accept the dogma or deny the Incarnation as the medium of our salvation.

But they who are damned are not damned for their want

of faith which it was never in their power to have, but for sins which are not remissible, or for the lack of virtues which cannot be acquired, without faith. No injustice is done them, for they are deprived of nothing to which they have any right by nature, by gift, or by promise, and their punishment is meted out by the measure of their iniquity, and for not a few it may be the pain will not be more intolerable, except as to the deprivation of hope, then the sufferings of their life. On the other hand, they who are saved, are not saved precisely because they have believed, for we are told "the devils believe and tremble," and yet are not saved. They are saved not for their simple belief, but for virtues of which faith in Christ is the medium, and which no one without it can elicit. To suppose them elicitable without faith is to suppose them elicitable without union with Christ, and therefore that men can be saved without the Incarnation.

The objection arises from confounding the life and immortality brought to light through the Gospel, with the simple future existence of the soul. The soul is simple, immaterial, and indissoluble, and can cease to exist only by the will of him who has created it. In this sense it is naturally immortal. Supposing this to be the immortal life promised by Christianity, it is difficult to understand why any conditions of happiness hereafter should be imposed, which are not included in nature, and therefore why one cannot be saved in any faith or in none, with or without the church. This latitudinarianism or indifferentism is becoming very general among the sects, and simply because they have lost the Christian conception of Christian salvation, and take the life and immortality brought to light through the Gospel to be the simple continued existence of the soul and a natural beatitude, or the natural reward of virtue hereafter. To this no conditions are necessary except those imposed by nature. Yet this continued existence and beatitude is not the life and immortality of the Gospel. It is no more than the heathen heaven, the heathen Elysian fields, or the happy hunting grounds of the Indian. It does not rise to the level of the Christian heaven, or above the level of the Christian hell. The unregenerate will receive in their future life all the natural good they are capable of, and suffer no punishment not deserved by their sins. Satan is very likely as happy and as little miserable as he can be, being what he is. The sinner makes and bears in him his own hell.

But the life and immortality of the Gospel is glorification in heaven, the consummation in Christ, God in his human nature, of the life begun in regeneration, which is not and never could be our natural destiny, or that of any creature, and never was and never could be possible to man without the Incarnation. Hence as faith and the church are necessary conditions of regeneration, or of our affiliation to the Word-made-flesh, they are necessary conditions of salvation or of the life and immortality of heaven. It is not possible in the nature of things to attain to a supernatural end by natural means. There is, then, nothing arbitrary, despotic or unjust in requiring compliance with the conditions not included in nature or imposed by the natural law. Christ cannot elevate us to the glory to which he destines us by natural means. The beatific vision is too high and too perfect for that, for it consists in supernatural union with the incarnate God, our head, our joy, our glory.

It is clear, then, that the objections to the necessity of faith to salvation and to the dogma: No salvation out of the church, are really objections to the Incarnation, and the latitudinarianism or indifferentism of the age, which affects more or less even many weak-minded Catholics—called by heretics and infidels "enlightened Catholics,"—who have no suspicion of their want of rigid orthodoxy, is, like every other heresy I have brought before my readers, really heresy that impugns the mystery of the Word-made-flesh, and a heresy which no one who believes that mystery and knows that it is the central principle of every thing distinctively Christian can for a moment entertain, save at the expense of his logic.

It need not be objected that faith is supernatural and therefore not naturally elicitable, for all can have faith if they will. True, faith is not elicitable without grace, but the grace of God is given to all men. "Ask," says our Lord, "and it shall be given you; seek and ye shall find; knock and it shall be opened unto you." So if any one remains without faith or out of the church, it is his own fault, for the grace to ask, to seek, to knock is withheld from no one who resists it not.

VII. It was my intention to take up a large number of condemned propositions apparently the most remote from the Incarnation, and to show that each one of them impugned that great mystery under one or another of the three heads named, but that would extend this essay to an undue length,

and probably enough has been said already to establish the position taken. The position is evident enough *a priori*, for whatever is distinctively Christian centres in the mystery of the Incarnation and radiates from it, and it is impossible that any error against Christianity should not be directly or indirectly an error against the Incarnation.

In proving this position I have wished to prove to those sects that claim to be orthodox, that profess to believe in the Incarnation, and to hope for salvation through the mediation of the man Christ Jesus, the only mediator of God and men, that they really do reject the mystery of the Word made flesh, and are not a whit more orthodox than their Unitarian or Socinian brethren. The latter lose our Lord's divinity, and the former lose his humanity. Both dissolve Christ, and pertain not to Christ, but to Antichrist, according to 1 St. John, chapter iv. The so-called orthodox Protestants have no reason to boast over those Protestants they are in the habit of denouncing as heterodox. And the Unitarian is as near Christianity as the Calvinist or Methodist, and perhaps even less logically inconsistent.

But we have also had another objection in view, and more strictly in accordance with the special design of the *Ave Maria*. We Catholics look to Mary as the help of Christians, or their protector in their struggles against heresy, and by her intercession with her divine Son enabling us to triumph in the end over all the enemies of the cross. There is a reason for our faith and hope in this respect, and a special propriety in looking to her as our help against heresy and heretics. All heresies strike at her maternal love, for if we deny that the Word was made flesh by denying either the divinity of Christ or his humanity, we deny that she is the mother of God, and wholly, as the Protestant world does, disconnect her from our salvation. Her love for her son, and jealousy, if I may so speak, for his glory, cannot fail to enlist her against all heresy, and cause her to intercede for the conversion of all heretics.

The principle of this intercession I have heretofore explained and established in my essay on *Saint-worship*. Our Lord delights to honor his saints: he admits them to his glory, employs them in his work, and hears them when they intercede for those who are still in the flesh, and to none can he listen with more love than to his own mother, and the intercession of no one can be more pleasing to him or more effectual. From her pleadings he will never turn

away. Then we must remember that faith is the gift of God, that conversion, whether from infidelity to faith, or from heresy to orthodoxy, or whether from sin to holiness, is the work of grace, and that even we aid to convert more by our prayers than our arguments. Where the disposition to seek and embrace the truth is wanting we reason in vain. The men who are puffed up with the pride of their own intellect and science, and close the aperture of their minds to the influx of light, instead of opening them to it as the sunflower opens her bosom to the sun, and receives its genial warmth, are not moved by our reasons, and nothing that we can say will convince their understandings or touch their hearts. Paul may plant, Apollo may water, but God alone giveth the increase.

Faith indeed is not produced in us against our reason or the convictions of our understanding any more than against the consent of our will; but grace is needed to incline the will and to open and illumine the understanding. It is not always the greatest philosophers, the most learned theologians, the ablest reasoners, or the most eloquent preachers that have the most converts, or that are the most effectual in drawing the intellectual, the cultivated, and the refined into the church. Often where these fail, the meek and humble servant of God, who counts himself nothing, succeeds; for God is jealous of his honor, and he will not bless the efforts of those who would appropriate the glory to themselves. Books, journals, tracts, sermons, are all good in their place, but for the conversion of unbelievers and sinners confraternities of prayer are better. It is rare that one will not find in some form instruction within his reach, when grace has disposed him to receive and profit by it. No confraternities of prayers can be worth more than the saints in heaven, and among them none can avail so much as she who is the mother of God and their queen.

But as all possible heresies impugn the Incarnation, devotion to Mary as the mother of God is the best conceivable protection against falling into heresy, for it brings the fact of the Incarnation home to the mind and fixes it in a devotion peculiarly dear to the Christian heart. The heterodox pretend that the devotion we Catholics pay to Mary robs Christ of his due, for they assume that we substitute her for him; but this is because they forget themselves that God is to be worshipped in his human nature, for God in his human nature is no less God than God in his divine nature.

Their difficulty is that they do not really believe, even when they profess to believe the Incarnation, that God has really assumed human nature and made it as really and truly his nature as the divine nature itself, or that Christ is really the two natures forever distinct hypostatically united in one person. If they worship God at all it is God in his divine nature alone, and thus either divide Christ with Nestorius or convert the human into the divine with Eutyches. They in either case fail to recognize the fact that the Son of Mary is God, and deserves the supreme worship alike in his humanity and in his divinity, for the two natures in the divine person though distinct are inseparable, are one person.

The devotion we pay to Mary instead of obscuring this fact keeps it constantly before our minds and in our hearts, for the peculiar devotion which we pay to her, the devotion distinguished from that which we pay to other saints, is paid to her as the mother of God, that is, the mother of God in his human nature, for God in his divine nature was never born, has no mother, but is eternal. As the worship due to the Son is the worship due to God, and as we never offer that to her, the devotion we do pay to her robs not him of his due, and in no sense implies that we substitute her for him. Her glory is reflected from him, and it is only as his glory is reflected from her that we are devoted to her. It is impossible for us to substitute her for him, when she is an object of our devotion precisely because she is his mother, and is glorious only in his glory, and when the devotion we offer her keeps him before our eyes and hearts as perfect God and perfect man in one divine person. The objection has no sense, for the natural effect, so to speak, is the very reverse of what it supposes.

Amongst Catholics it is often said that love or devotion to Mary is a sign of election. It may or may not be so, but it is a sign of strong faith in the Incarnation, the great central Christian mystery, because no one can feel and manifest it unless he believes firmly that the Son of Mary is at once perfect God and perfect man. We never find any real devotion to Mary as mother of God among heretics, and, if they ever pretend to worship her, it is as a symbol of maternity, virginity, as some say, of beauty or holiness, or, with others, of femineity, that is, they make her an idol, and offer her a vain and idolatrous worship. "You Catholics," said a strong-minded female the other day, "worship woman in your worship of Mary, and therefore you ought to sup-

port the women's rights movement." Madam, I honor woman in the sphere where God places her, and respect her rights, but there is no affinity between the devotion I pay to the mother of God, and what you call the worship of woman. I do not generalize that devotion, for it is devotion to the mother of God, and only one woman is the mother of God. No other of her sex can be what she is, but all may imitate her humility, her poverty, and her virtues, and thus merit to be honored, not because they are women, but because they are faithful to God, and from his hand shall receive a crown of life, and join the choir led by his mother.

Heretics of all classes instinctively shrink from devotion to Mary, and if they ever worship her at all it is never as the mother of God, but as a woman, or as a symbol, that is, their worship is always idolatry. But I am not aware of any class of heretics that does not refuse her the honor that is her due. Even Dr. Pusey, the leader of "Anglo-Catholics," finds in our devotion as Catholics to Mary one of his principal objections to the church. The Papacy and devotion to Mary, which he calls Mariolatry, are the two *Romish* corruptions which he considers justify his refusal to leave the church of England for the church of God. The Ritualists make bloody war on Protestantism, and yet for the most part shrink from rendering due honor to the mother of God, proving thereby that they have not yet attained to full faith in the Incarnation, and that they are after all guilty of heresy as well as schism. The schismatic Greeks are devoted to the mother of God indeed, and call on the Panagia on every occasion, in a way that to a Catholic seems a little superstitious; but the Greeks though schismatics are not, strictly speaking, heretics. Heresies of various sorts have, no doubt, crept in among them, but the official faith of the Greek schismatics is orthodox, for though they reject the *filioque* they do not reject the truth expressed by the words. The Greeks hold that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father as principle and the Son as medium, and only deny that he proceeds from the Father and the Son as from two principles, which no Catholic holds. Being separated from the centre of unity the schismatics, if not misrepresented, abuse devotion to the mother of God, and run more or less into superstition; but, nevertheless, they retain the *cultus*, and with it the mystery of the Incarnation. It is worthy of note that however strenuously the high-church Anglicans accuse us of Mariolatry, they show themselves quite ready

to form a union with the schismatic Greeks, thereby proving that in their eyes idolatry is less offensive than the papacy.

But to return. The devotion we pay to Mary as the mother of God is a safeguard against heresy because it keeps alive in us our love for her Son, and before our minds the great fact of the Incarnation. I cannot ask her to pray for me without making in some sort an act of faith in the Incarnation, that my Redeemer and Saviour is God in his human nature, and that I live as a Christian the life of God in his humanity, not the life of God in his divinity. The devotion to Mary also protects the Catholic from the error of the Evangelicals who dismiss, if I may so speak, God in his human nature with the death on the cross, and deny the continuity of his sacrifice for us, and of his work as the mediator of God and men, as I have heretofore explained. It is not only an act of faith in the satisfaction rendered to divine Justice by his obedience and death, but also an act of faith in regeneration and glorification by and in his life. Hence it is that they who are noted for their devotion to the mother of God, seldom, if ever, lose their faith; and heresy, when it originates, almost always originates with those who look with coldness on that devotion, who have never had any sympathy with it, or have lost it if they had it.

But I would not have my readers suppose that while I recognize the natural influence of the devotion to Mary in preserving the faith, that I recognize no other. It is well in all parts of our religion to trace the elements of nature, the natural relation of cause and effect, for grace supposes nature, and the Christian religion is not exclusively supernatural. But if not exclusively supernatural, it is not exclusively natural. God is hedged in or impeded in his free action by no natural laws. He can and does hear and answer prayer at his pleasure. There is no doubt that for the love to our Lord manifested in our devotion to his blessed mother, she obtains from him graces and favors for us, and among those graces and favors may well be not only our own preservation from heresy, but the conversion of heretics, as a reward for our profound devotion and ardent charity. One great obstacle to the conversion of those who reject our Lord is our want of charity. Devotion to Mary not only evinces charity on our part, but inflames it, and inspires us with an intense longing for a still closer union with our

Lord, and a still more ardent desire to have all the world taste his love and become one in him. Such intense longing, such ardent desire inspired by charity can hardly fail to obtain the powerful intercession of Mary to obtain from her divine Son the favors we seek, whether for ourselves or for others.

RELIGIOUS ORDERS.

[From the Ave Maria of 1871.]

I. It is not my intention to treat the question of religious or monastic orders either historically or theologically, but in its practical relations to the wants and evil tendencies of our age and country.

This age is far from appreciating the real worth and services rendered in past times to religion and civilization by the monastic orders, and the title monk or nun, even to some cold-hearted and worldly-minded Catholics, is far from being a title of honor. The active orders, those engaged in teaching and preaching, in nursing the sick, in taking care of the poor and the infirm, or in spreading the Gospel in heathen lands, are tolerated, perhaps even commended; but the contemplative orders who like Mary choose "the better part," sit at the feet of Jesus, listen to every word that falls from his lips, and spend their whole lives in praying and fasting, in vigils and meditations, and continued efforts to attain to the highest Christian perfection are looked upon as having deserted their posts in society, as having neglected their duties to the world, to their families and their country, as a set of useless drones, living in idleness and ease, in fact as nuisances which every enlightened and liberal government will lose no time in abating or suppressing, as we see in Italy, Spain, and other nations as they emerge from the ignorance and superstition of the "dark ages." Yet without a considerable portion of their time devoted to retirement, recollection, meditation, prayer, and ascetic discipline, the members of the active orders would soon lose their robust virtues, neglect or slight their active duties, and be distinguishable only

by their habit from people of the world. They are strengthened for their corporal works of mercy only by prayer and meditation.

The church on earth is always and everywhere the church militant,—always and everywhere in the midst of powerful, subtle, bitter, and sleepless enemies who incessantly assail her, and seek her destruction. Her enemies, as the enemies of every individual soul, are the world, the flesh, and the devil. These are at enmity with God, and can never be reconciled with him, or subjected to his law. They give neither her nor the soul any rest by day or by night. She must be constantly on her guard against them, and ready to repel their assaults, come they from what quarter or in what form or guise they may. She can make no peace or even truce with them, but must crush them or they will crush her. They are always hostile to her, because they are the enemies of souls, and hate the Christian virtues.

There are some people who would fain persuade themselves that the devil is dead, that he has lost his malignity, or that he tempts poor man no more; that the flesh has lost its enmity to God, has become pure and holy, and may be safely trusted as a guide of the soul to God and heaven; and that the city of the world has become the city of God. Even some Catholics, liberal Catholics, as they are called, illumined by the effulgent light of this glorious nineteenth century, think the warfare against the world ought to be discontinued, and that the church might advantageously for herself and for civilization, society, and the state, form an alliance with the spirit of the age, and move on in harmony with it. They persuade themselves that the world has been christianized, that the spirit of the age,—only another name for the spirit of the world,—is really the spirit of Christ moving the minds of the people outside as well as inside of the church, and would be recognized and accepted as such were it not for the undue influence with Catholics of the Jesuits and other *oscurantisti*.

I must myself confess, to my shame and deep sorrow, that for four or five years, ending in 1864, I listened with too much respect to these liberal or liberalizing Catholics, whether at home or abroad, though I had previously written against them, and sought to encourage their tendency as far as I could without absolutely departing from Catholic faith and morals. I had been taught better, and my better judgment and my Catholic instincts never went with them; but

I was induced to think that I might find in the more fondly cherished tendencies of my non-Catholic countrymen a *point d'appui* for my arguments in favor of the teaching of the church, and by making the distance between them and us as short as possible greatly facilitate their conversion. My faith was firm, and my confidence in the church unshaken, but I yielded to what seemed at the moment a wise and desirable policy. All I gained was the distrust of a large portion of the Catholic public, and a suspicion among non-Catholics that I was losing my confidence in Catholicity, and was on the point of turning back to some form of Protestantism or infidelity. But I was not long, through the grace of God, in discovering that the tendency I was encouraging would, if followed to the end, lead me out of the church, and as soon as that became clear to me I did not hesitate to abandon it, and bear as well as I could the humiliation of having yielded to an uncatholic and dangerous influence.*

The Holy Father, in the Syllabus, that great act of our century, shows what the church thinks of liberal Catholics, that she can make no compromise with the world, and that she meets the errors of an age or nation only by opposing, directly in their face and eyes, the truth that condemns them. She has nothing to learn by the lapse of ages, and nothing to accept from the world outside of her. She is catholic, and catholic not only because she subsists in all ages and teaches all nations, but because she teaches all truth. All her principles are universal, and every one of her dogmas is based on a universal principle, which has its reason and necessity either in the Creator's own essence or in the constitution of the universe he has created and governs. There is no truth outside of her not included in the truth she holds and teaches. Outside of her there may be views of truth, theories, opinions, but she holds and teaches the truth itself. Evidently, then, she can form no alliances with any thing

* This humble confession indicates more nobility of soul and real heroism than any thing else contained in these volumes, and it goes far towards neutralizing any evil effect of the writings during the period alluded to. Although nothing contrary to faith could be found in those writings, after examination by the proper authorities at Rome, to whom they were sent with the accusations against them, yet their tone is uncongenial with true Catholic feeling, and very unlike that of the author's earlier and later writings. This passage of the text should be borne in mind when reading the first two articles of this volume, and in general those taken from Brownson's Quarterly Review from 1860 to 1864.—Ed.

outside of her, and accept nothing from the world which, if true, she has not already in its unity and universality. What modern civilization has that is true and good she holds and cherishes, and what it has that she opposes or refuses to accept is neither true nor good. So at least every loyal Catholic does and must believe and maintain.

Such being the case the church corrects the errors of the age by flatly condemning them. The Syllabus does not condemn all modern civilization, as it has been pretended, but it does condemn what in it is false or hurtful, and in fact nearly all that is peculiar to it, or that is appealed to as evidences of modern progress, except in the purely material order. The Holy Father knew the age, and knew the outcry that would be raised against the Syllabus, so directly opposed to the most fondly cherished prejudices of the age, the wrath and hostility it would excite in many who thought themselves good Catholics; but he did not hesitate on that account to publish it. He opposed to each error the Catholic truth that condemns it, whether the adherents of the error chose to accept the truth and abandon the error or not. This is the only policy the church adopts in dealing with the world, and she regards always and everywhere the distinct, bold, and uncompromising utterance of the truth, though to some it may be not a savor of life, but a savor of death, as the highest and only true expedience.

The church does not stop even with opposing to the errors of the age or nation the truth that condemns them, but embodies that truth in institutions, and founds in its honor and for its preservation feasts, confraternities, associations, which render it practical, and cause it to enter into the daily life of the faithful. When she finds the age losing sight of the sublime mystery of the Incarnation and forgetting that Mary ever virgin is the mother of God, she institutes the feast of the Immaculate Conception, declares that Mary was conceived without stain, approves the devotion to the Sacred Heart of Jesus, which condemns alike those who see in our Redeemer only the divinity and those who see in him only the humanity. They sin alike against the Incarnation who see in Christ only a man, or who exclude his humanity from all share in the work of redemption, regeneration, and glorification. It is God in the human nature assumed, as well as God in his divine nature, who is the Author and Finisher of our faith, as no one can forget who practises the devotion to the Sacred Heart.

The church has in every age and country found the world the great obstacle to her efforts to promote Christian perfection, and perhaps in no age or country has she found it a greater obstacle than in our own. It is all the greater and the more difficult to surmount because in our times and country, it seems to have enlisted Christianity itself, or what passes with many for Christianity, on its side. The mass of our countrymen believe themselves to be Christians, count on reigning with Christ in heaven, and would be greatly shocked were we to tell them that they are really heathen, and, in their practice at least, no Christians at all. Like the heathen they live for this world alone, and are anxious only "for what they shall eat, and what they shall drink, and wherewithal they shall be clothed." They despise the poor, treat poverty as a misfortune, as a crime, or at least as a disgrace. They hold, as the heathen did, the unfortunate and the unsuccessful in relation to this world's goods as cursed of the gods, and to be avoided. They worship material success, and see the heroes and saints of the race in the millionaires. No sooner will a Commodore Vanderbilt, an A. T. Stewart, or a Daniel Drew die than he will be canonized.

No doubt there is much philanthropy, especially of that sort that grows rich by unscrupulous scheming, by robbing the widow and the fatherless, by monopolizing or forestalling the markets, by betting on stocks, by defrauding labor of its wages, and then makes a donation to found a theological seminary in which the students will be taught to sing its praises and to worship mammon, or even give large sums to the poor or to found hospitals and asylums; but very little of that charity without which alms-deeds and faith itself are of no avail, and are but sounding brass or a tinkling cymbal. Even the very faith and piety of our age are cast in a worldly mould and interpenetrated by a worldly spirit. Even Catholics are more or less affected by the same spirit, are encrusted over with the world, and in but too many instances as greedy of the world, as fond of its pomps and vanities as are non-Catholics, to whom they yield nothing in either snobbism or flunkyism.

It avails comparatively little that we are told to set our affections not on things of the earth, but on things above, and to live not for the visible and perishable, but for the unseen and the eternal,—to be conformed not to the world, but to Christ who is not of the world, and whom the world hateth. The truth needs to be instituted, and practically ex-

emplified in the lives of men and women in our midst who voluntarily renounce the world, retire from it, take the vows of poverty, chastity and obedience, and lead a life of prayer, meditation, humility, mortification, and sacrifice, as I shall proceed to show.

II. St. Augustine, in his *De Civitate Dei*, shows us that there are two cities, the one the city of the world, the other the city of God. These two cities are founded in different principles and are governed by different maxims. They stand each over against the other, perpetually at war with each other, with no peace or truce even possible between them. Hence our Lord said, "My kingdom is not of this world," that is, does not hold from this world, is not based on its principles, and does not follow its maxims. He further said: "I am not of this world, and therefore the world hateth me." "Ye," said he to his disciples, "are not of the world, even as I am not of the world; for if ye were of the world the world would love its own."

Gioberti and liberal, that is, worldly-minded Catholics, of which there are always too many, doubt the necessity of this warfare between the cities or kingdoms, or between gentilism and Christianity, and think peace might be established between them, with great advantage to both. Gioberti tells us the church and the world are simply the two opposite parts of one dialectic whole; that the earth so far from being opposed to heaven is a means to heaven, nay, is itself heavenly, is in heaven, since it is one of the celestial bodies, and that it is only a narrow and one-sided view of Christianity or Catholicity that places it in antagonism with the world or gentilism, and that was the severe asceticism insisted on by the monastic orders. But Gioberti, who if a profound philosopher and a learned theologian, was, nevertheless, a great admirer of the Italo-Greek civilization, and had a warmer admiration for the gentile than for the Christian virtues. Intent as he was on bringing about a more perfect accord between the church and the modern world, he did not disdain the sophistry that concludes from what is true of the world in one sense what must be true in another and a very different sense. Undoubtedly all the works of the Creator are dialectic, and considered physically, as the work of the Creator, there is no antagonism between earth and heaven. Both are but parts of one stupendous and harmonious whole. But it does not follow from this that there is no moral antagonism between a life lived for

the world and a life lived for God. The antagonism is moral, not physical, and is removable only by the renunciation of the world, detachment from it, and placing our affections on the unseen and eternal.

I am aware that the religious orders undertake to follow the evangelical counsels; but I have never learned that there is any contrariety between the counsels and precepts of the Gospel. The counsels exact more than the precepts, but both have the same starting-point and proceed in the same line or direction towards the same end. It has pleased the Law-giver not to exact of every one perfection as the condition of eternal life, and to leave a large margin, so to speak, to the love and voluntary offering of individuals, but the counsels only perfect what the precepts leave imperfect or incomplete. They are, in fact, only the complement of the precepts. What the precepts enjoin then is of the same kind as what is counselled, and differs from it only in degree. Monastic virtues differ then only in being more perfect from the virtues exacted by the law of all Christians. The principle of both is one and the same. It is then without reason that Gioberti rejects monastic asceticism as one-sided or as exclusive, and charges it with aiming, while we are on the way, at what is possible only when we have attained to union with God in heaven, or have reached our eternal home.

The gentiles lived for this world alone, as if it were the end for which they were created. They had some natural virtues, but they were virtues only in relation to this life, and therefore meriting only a temporal reward. The old Romans had in their best days the virtues, such as courage, fortitude, and temperance, which fitted them for empire, and God gave them the empire of the world. When they lost these virtues, became cowardly, licentious, effeminate, corrupt, he took the empire from them, and gave it to the barbarians, who for their sobriety, courage, and other natural virtues were more deserving of it. But the gentiles had not supernatural virtues, and had virtues only in relation to this world. They struggled not against the world, but conformed to it. They loved and honored riches. Crœsus, King of Lydia, thought himself the happiest of men because he regarded himself the richest. Christianity, on the contrary, declares, blessed are the poor, and commands the Christian to love and honor the poor. Gentilism regarded poverty as a misfortune, and the poor, as the unsuc-

cessful generally, as under the curse of the gods; Christianity honors poverty, and counts poverty neither a crime nor a misfortune, and the poor to be the more, not the less favored class. Consequently, while it relieves distress with a prompt and liberal hand, it never seeks to remove poverty itself by making the poor rich.

The principle of gentile morals is pride, as we see in the *Lives* of the noblest of the Greeks and Romans transmitted to us by that charming old gossip Plutarch; the principle of every Christian virtue is humility, the forgetfulness of one's self in the greatness and goodness of God. The saints seek to lose themselves in God, their Creator, their Redeemer, and their beatitude. They would give themselves entirely to him, as he gives himself entirely to them. It was because she was the humblest of Jewish maidens that God chose the blessed virgin Mary to be his mother, and exalted her to be the queen of heaven. The gentile loves them that love him, and hates them that hate him; the Christian loves them that love not him, loves and forgives his enemies, returns not evil for evil, does good to them that hate him, and prays for them that persecute and calumniate him. All this is of precept. How then is it possible to effect a reconciliation between Christianity and gentilism, or the church and the world? Or who can read the sermon on the Mount and doubt that the city of the world and the city of God are mutually opposed one to the other, and that the one can exist only by the subjugation of the other? We cannot serve God and mammon.

The point I wish to make here is that the religious orders whose members follow the evangelical counsels and do not restrict their virtues to the bare precept, are necessary in every old Christian community that they may by their example of voluntarily renouncing the world, and freely binding themselves by their vows to a life of poverty, chastity, and obedience, to a life of prayer, meditation, spiritual exercise, self-denial, and sacrifice, lift the bulk of ordinary Christians in their aspirations above the world, and stimulate them to practise with earnestness and fidelity at least the virtues necessary to insure them the inheritance of eternal life. We who live in the world, engaged in material pursuits, engrossed with the production and acquisition of earthly goods, mingling in the contests of politicians, the scramble for office, burdened with the cares and responsibilities of statesmen, and with occupations of our several

states or callings in life, are apt to lower our standard of virtue even below the requirements of the law, to contract a love for the low, the visible, and the perishing, to become crusted all over in our souls with the world, to forget our eternal destiny, and to live as if this life were our only life. We need not only to be reminded by the words of the preacher of spiritual things, but to be stimulated to seek after them by the example of men and women, who, before our eyes, have given all for God, and live for him, and for him alone.

In the apostolic age and the next succeeding it, there may have been less necessity than now, for the religious to separate from the general Christian communities. The circumstances in which Christians were placed then, the sleepless persecution to which they were exposed, their ability to profess and practise their religion only at the risk of their property, their worldly honor, and their lives, compelled all earnest souls to live lives as detached from the world, as mortified, as self-denying, and as devoted to God as the life of the religious. It is somewhat the same with our missionaries in heathen lands now, in China, Japan, Oceanica, or among the North American Indians. They would hardly enter upon a more perfect state by entering a religious order of the strictest rule. Nothing better wins our affections from earthly things or more firmly fixes them on things of heaven than suffering for our religion. We always love most that for which we suffer most; people love their country very much in proportion as they suffer for it, and we expect no ardent patriotism from those who have made no sacrifices for their native land, for which they have never suffered, shed their blood, or their tears. We see this principle exemplified in the Catholics of both England and Ireland. A tithe of the devotion to the Holy See and of the fervor we witness in English Catholics under Elizabeth and James, if displayed under the Edwards and Henrys would have prevented that once Catholic island from lapsing into heresy and schism, and being lost to the church.

The religious orders when true to their vows and faithful to the monastic principle voluntarily lead unworldly and self-sacrificing lives, voluntarily suffer for the kingdom of God a moral crucifixion for their religion, and thus in some sense become redeemers of their fellow-Christians. By their example and influence, their prayers and fastings,

their sacrifices and spiritual exercises, they kindle the zeal, exalt the fervor, elevate the souls of the worldly above the world, and open their minds and hearts to the real glory of religion. So true is this that in all Catholic nations the decline of the religious orders or of the monastic spirit, invariably, be it the cause or consequence, marks the decline of further piety. This is seen in the history of the last four centuries, as the contrary is seen in the new orders and congregations that have sprung up during that period.

III. The religious take the three vows of poverty, chastity, and obedience, and are thus voluntarily vowed to the three virtues, in their perfection, directly opposed to the three dominant vices of our age and country. In this we see the method of the church in dealing with the world, and the sort of concessions she makes to its demands. She not only condemns its most fondly cherished errors, as in the Syllabus, but in her religious orders opposes to its most popular vices and besetting sins the example of the virtues it most detests, and is the least disposed to practise. Surely, God's ways are not man's ways, and he effects his purposes by means the most remote possible from those which human wisdom would counsel.

I propose in my future numbers to treat of the vows of chastity and obedience in their bearing on the immorality and impatience of restraint of our age and country; in the present number, and perhaps one or two more, I shall confine myself to the vow of poverty, and its effects on individuals and society.

Our countrymen are not remarkable for their covetousness, or their greediness of wealth for its own sake. There are few misers among them, and they are in general as free in expending their money on themselves or others as they are eager and persevering in its acquisition. But they have a horror of poverty, and have no respect for the poor. With them poverty is a misfortune or a crime. They do not honor the poor. They may have much kindness of heart, much compassion for actual distress, and be ready and liberal to relieve the want they see; but they have not learned that poverty is better than riches, and that the poor are more to be envied than the rich. They may say so, for they have retained some reminiscences of the teachings of their Catholic ancestors, and abound in good words and holy maxims; but their conduct proves that they do not believe it, for their whole effort is to escape poverty as the greatest of evils and to acquire

riches and honors as their chief good. The acquisition of material goods they seem to regard as the end for which they have been created, and those who are most successful in the pursuit of the wealth and honors of this world as the most deserving to be taken as models by the young and aspiring.

I was some time since talking with an eminent scientist, a Catholic and a convert, about what are called self-educated men. He contended that the greatest men of the world have been self-educated, and have had no advantages of schools or universities. "But," I asked, "were St. Augustine, St. Thomas, St. Vincent de Paul, Bossuet, and Fénelon, self-educated men in your sense of the term?" "I was not thinking of them," he replied, "I was thinking of the great *benefactors* of mankind, such as Watt and Fulton." It never occurred to him, Catholic as he was, that the great saints and eminent divines I named were infinitely greater benefactors of mankind than Watt and Fulton, with Franklin and Sir George Stephenson, Newton and Leibnitz, Cuvier and Alexander von Humboldt thrown in. What is a Stephen Girard, a John Jacob Astor, an A. T. Stewart, or a Cornelius Vanderbilt in comparison with the humble priest of God who is instrumental in converting but a single soul? The salvation of a single soul is infinitely more than the whole material universe. What was Watt or Fulton beside the poor Belgian maiden who founded the Congregation of the Little Sisters of the Poor, or the foundress of the Sisters of Notre Dame.

Yet the remark of my Catholic friend is instructive, and shows that even Catholics can sometimes so far forget the teachings of the church as to place the physical sciences above the science of sanctity, and to count the mechanical invention of the steam-engine, the steamboat, or the railway, a greater benefit to mankind than the setting forth in their order of the great truths of our holy religion, and bringing them in their scientific relations within the reach of all nations. No uninspired men who have ever lived have done more to benefit mankind, both in this life and that which is to come, than St. Augustine, St. Gregory the Great, St. Thomas Aquinas, and other eminent fathers and doctors whose sublime thoughts, divine science, and noble sentiments have become the life and thought, and all that is great or good, to the modern world.

Hawthorne in his *Celestial Railroad*, published some years

since in the *Democratic Review*, has satirized the spirit of the age with equal wit and truth. The age is riding along smoothly on a celestial railroad to the city of the Blest, with their sins snugly stowed away in the baggage car, and Apollyon for engineer. The passengers congratulate themselves on the new and easy way found out by modern genius of getting to heaven, without the burden, the toil and trouble, the repentance, and the self-denial of poor Christian; but all at once Apollyon drives the car into a dismal and noisome lake which lies between the railroad terminus and the Celestial City, and the frightened passengers learn when it is too late that they had been rushing along with railroad speed,—not to heaven, but to the other place! It is even so in a temporal point of view. The nations, like England and America, that have devoted themselves the most exclusively to material interests have not succeeded in escaping poverty. If England is the wealthiest of modern nations, she is also the poorest, and in no modern nation is there such a mass of pauperism and squalid wretchedness. There are large estates and great wealth in the hands of the few, but she has over a million of paupers, without counting those of Ireland and Scotland, or those relieved by private charity.

We in this country do our best to follow in the track of England, and to rival her in trade, commerce, and manufactures. Owing to the vast extent of our territory and the low price and fertility of our wild lands hitherto easy of access, we have not yet the amount of squalid misery, and may not have for some generations to come, that stares us in the face in England, but every crisis, and a crisis occurs every few years, in the business world concentrates the accumulated wealth of the country in fewer hands, and augments the number of the miserably poor who need the assistance of charity or the public in order to keep soul and body together. France for the last twenty years has followed the English and American industrial and mercantile system, and devoted all her activity and energy to material prosperity, and a six months' war has consumed all her gains, and made her poorer than she was at the downfall of the first Napoleonic Empire. Nothing is more certain than that they who live for the world lose it.

In addition to all this we must take into account the dishonesty and fraud, the vices and crimes destructive of all confidence of man in man, and almost of society itself. The pomp and parade of wealth, the deference it commands, the

honors paid to it, the social influence it exerts, render the poor discontented with their lot, and create a universal desire and scramble to get rich, honestly if one can, but at any rate to get rich. Nobody is contented to obtain simple food, raiment, and shelter by honest and continuous labor; all would have the luxury, the ease and consideration consequent on the possession or the command of wealth. Public opinion is little scrupulous as to the means employed to gain it, or to obtain control of it. Hence dishonesty in private life, dishonesty in public life, and a wide-spread system of fraud and iniquity by which men who have nothing seek to transfer the property of others to themselves, and if in public life, to use the confidence of their constituents and the power with which they are entrusted for their own private ends, or the private interests of their friends. Offences against the person which spring from heated blood or untamed passion are bad enough, but nothing like so bad as the cool, deliberate offences against the rights of property, which are the chief characteristics of modern society, and so numerous and on so gigantic a scale have they become that the strongest governments are impotent to redress or to restrain them.

Statesmen, however wise or well disposed, are powerless to repress the growing evil; the press, so powerful when it finds a *point d'appui* in public opinion, so powerless when it seeks to resist the spirit or tendency of the age, can do nothing against it; public lectures and even sermons, however true or eloquent, can do little to correct the moral devastation, and incline men's hearts to the virtues of honesty and fair dealing. The most effective way of warring against it is precisely this vow of poverty, freely and voluntarily taken by the religious. They who take it are seldom the poor, or individuals of no social position; they are almost exclusively persons of condition,—not unfrequently of the very highest social position, and the inheritors or possessors of great wealth, cultivated, refined, and brought up in ease and luxury. These, when they take the vow of poverty, make a voluntary sacrifice of what the world holds most dear, and forego all that it regards as worth living for. They actually follow the example of Him who though rich became poor for our sakes, and made himself of no repute. They show that they hold there is an order of things higher than this world, a good to which the riches of this world are but dung and dross; that they really believe that it is more blessed to be poor than to be rich, and that men who know all that wealth

can give, and might aspire to all the pleasures and honors of the world, can, the grace of God inspiring and assisting them, prefer poverty, to have nothing they can call their own, and to expose themselves to the severest labors and sufferings of this present life.

Their example cannot fail to command attention. They may be ridiculed as quixotic, laughed at as pious fools, be called eccentric, extravagant, or any thing else the world chooses; but their renunciation of the world, its riches, its pleasures, its pomps and vanities, their choice of poverty, of an obscure and humble lot, a life of toil and hardship, of prayer and sacrifice, cannot fail to make a deep impression upon all reflecting people, and even on the thoughtless and vain. Their example and their life tend to render poverty honorable, and to create a respect for the poor. They honor the poor by choosing poverty, and thus tend to reconcile the poor to their lot, and to make them content with their state in life. They thus exert a powerful influence in checking the eagerness for wealth, and in removing the temptations men have to seek wealth by dishonest or unworthy means. They humble the pride of the rich, and make them feel that their wealth adds nothing to their real dignity as men, or to their merit as Christians. They bring home to those who pride themselves on their wealth, and esteem men according to the extent of their worldly possessions, the fact that the beggar at their gate is dearer to God than they themselves. Lazarus when he died was carried by angels to paradise, while Dives at whose gate he lay, begging to be fed with the crumbs that fell from his table, when he died went to hell where he was grievously tormented. They set up, practically, the kingdom of God on the earth, and introduce among men the divine standard of judgment. They make the world blush to overlook the poor wise man who by his wisdom saved the besieged city, while it honors the rich man who caused its destruction.

We know from history that in those ages when the monastic institutions were most flourishing, and the monastic virtues were in their greatest vigor, wealth was not supreme in society, and wisdom, though barefooted and in a coarse serge habit, made itself heard in the castle of the noble, and heeded even in the palace of the king. They were not perfect; no ages here below are perfect; but wisdom and virtue were held in higher honor than riches and worldly power, and the highest in the land would tremble at the bold rebukes of the

barefooted friar, who had given up all for God, and by daily crucifixion had risen above the world, and become dead to the fear of men. We know also that whatever might be the rivalries of princes and nobles, or the wars and fightings among them, the claims of the poor were rarely forgotten, and more rarely still was their poverty treated with contempt, or as a vice or a crime. Princes and nobles, men of large estates and ample means, followed the evangelical counsel; sold all they had, gave it to the poor, took themselves the vow of poverty, and followed Christ in his humiliation and suffering.

The eternal Son of God when he would redeem Adam's fallen race, and raise them to union with God for whom they were created, made himself man, descended to their level, and elevated their nature by sharing it, so the religious, imitating him as far as in him lay, when he would redeem poverty from disgrace, and render it honorable, voluntarily parted with his wealth, made himself poor, and shared with the poor their poverty and privation. As the Son by becoming man honored human nature and elevated man to God, so the humble religious by making himself poor honored poverty and elevated the poor to the full dignity of manhood. As God redeems us by preserving us as human, not by converting us into another species of creatures, so the religious by their vow of poverty redeem the poor by preserving their poverty, not by making them rich, as our modern reformers propose to do, which would only augment the evil already too great. They relieved poverty from the contumely of the rich and proud, all that is really evil in it, by making it honorable, and even more respectable than riches.

IV. The problem, what to do with the poor? becomes every day of greater gravity in all modern states, especially in all the leading industrial and mercantile states. In Great Britain the increase of poverty, in the midst of an unexampled appreciation of values, and vast accumulation of wealth, is truly appalling, and, to say nothing of the relief afforded by private charity, the public tax for the support of the poor, collected in great part from rate-payers who are themselves but one degree better off than downright paupers, is enormous and a most grievous burden. In the states of continental Europe there is more poverty, but less squalid wretchedness, save as an incident of war and revolution, than in the British Isles.. In this country the causes that

produce so much unmitigated poverty and destitution in the old world are all in operation, and if we have not yet experienced the same effects it is owing to the vast tracts of rich, fertile, unoccupied lands we had in the beginning, for the most part easily accessible, and obtainable almost at a nominal price. Yet the problem here, especially in our cities and large towns, is daily pressing for solution.

Political economists, politicians, philosophers, philanthropists, statesmen, and legislators have racked their brains to find a solution of this terrible problem, and to get rid of poverty and want. Malthus attributes the growth of poverty to an overplus of population; maintains that population has a natural tendency, in every country, to outrun the means of subsistence; and proposes as a remedy to check by moral restraints the increase of population. His recommendation has been followed so far as to check in several countries the growth of population very perceptibly by grossly immoral and criminal means; but no diminution of poverty has resulted. Philanthropists and statesmen have looked to universal suffrage and universal education. But such education as the state by its own authority can give only multiplies the number who seek to live by their wits, and consequently only augments the amount of crime in the community without lessening the amount of poverty. Universal suffrage, in practice, is only a contrivance to enable the many to govern for the benefit of the few.

Robert Owen proposed to get rid of poverty by abolishing religion, marriage, and property, and inducing all people to live in parallelograms, with all things in common, and succeeded only in reducing himself to poverty. Fourier devised a scheme of passional harmony, and the reorganization of society in phalanxes which would not only remove poverty, but cure all the ills that flesh is heir to, by providing for the free and full indulgence of all our natural propensities, appetites, and passions; but could never obtain the means of getting his scheme into practical operation.

The operatives and artisans of the cities and large towns of France, aided by a few briefless lawyers and literary dreamers, look for a solution in a socialistic republic, based on political and social equality and an equal division of property. But an equal division of property, if effected, would not last for a week. It would not remove poverty. Wealth is the power to purchase and enjoy the labors of others. If none were rich no one could purchase labor. If

all were equally rich there would be no labor to be purchased. Practically, to make all equally rich is the same as making all equally poor, for no one would or could have any thing but what he produced for himself by his own labor. All exchange of products would cease, all industries be suspended, and the civilized world would lapse into a state below that of the lowest savages. Nothing is more false or absurd than Proudhon's saying: *La propriété c'est le vol.* If property is not recognized and secured, there can be only universal poverty; if it is, there will be inequality, and the equality contended for is impracticable.

Nothing can be done to remove poverty by any possible reorganization or new constitution of society, and just as little by legislation. There is far less pauperism in Russia or Turkey than in England or the United States. Wherever the British system obtains, poverty increases. The burdens imposed on the people of India by the British Government are heavier than those officially imposed by the despotic native princes. The people of India are probably much poorer than they were before they came under British rule, and find it more difficult to obtain the means of subsistence. All legislation that can affect the question must tend to facilitate the acquisition of property and to secure its possession to the proprietor; but all such legislation tends also to aggravate, not to lessen, inequality; for only the few have the capacity or are in a condition to profit by it. Hence it is that all the schemes of social reformers, philanthropists, projectors, political economists, statesmen, and legislators, looking to the establishment of a greater equality of conditions, necessarily fail.

The failure is due to the fact that all their schemes are based on the assumption that poverty is an evil and its removal the end to be sought. The poor, our Lord said, you have always with you. Poverty can be mitigated, and actual distress relieved, but there must be always the poor in the land. There is not wealth enough in the world, if equally divided, to make all rich; and I have shown that if all were equally rich all would be equally poor. We can go far towards removing the evils of poverty, but not poverty itself. The schemes of social reform or reorganization, the discussions, and even the political and legislative action looking to the social and political elevation of the poorer and more numerous classes, do only harm; they feed the poor with vain hopes, and render them discontented with

their lot. The poorer and more numerous classes have gained nothing by what is called modern progress. The peasantry of Europe were happier, were more contented with their lot, better educated, though unable to read or write, more religious, more solidly virtuous in those old Catholic times when they wore the same fashion of garments, from father to son and mother to daughter, without dreaming of dressing like the rich and well-born, or aspiring to equality with them, than they are now.

The whole ideal of modern, uncatholic society, is false, and the efforts to realize it result only in injury to all classes. The tendency to what is called democratic equality is any thing but the indication of social progress. No greater misfortune can befall a nation than the loss of its aristocracy, as we may see in France in her present prostrate condition. Had she retained in their influence her old noblesse, she could easily recuperate. But woe to the nation that exchanges an aristocracy founded in birth, land, education, manners, and eminent national services, for an aristocracy founded in trade and industry, capital or credit. The net result of modern progress has been to weaken or destroy the old aristocracies of Europe, to establish the aristocracy of mammon, composed chiefly of successful traders, manufacturers, or bankers, brokers, stock jobbers, railway managers, and other business corporators, and the development in the poor, and in the laboring classes generally, of new wants out of all proportion to the new means of supply created.

The remedy is to be found only in the old Christian principle of self-denial and sacrifice. The age is all wrong, as all experience proves, and as we are told by infallible authority, in the Syllabus, that great act of the nineteenth century. But we cannot at once arrest its tendency, and perhaps it would not be desirable, if it were possible, to restore the old order of things which modern *enlightenment* has destroyed; but it is possible to revive the virtues of past times, and to sustain religious communities whose silent but powerful influence will gradually but surely, by the blessing of God, recall the world to the great, immutable principles of Christian life and thought, so long forgotten or neglected.

There is probably no people in the world so little disposed to self-denial and sacrifice, so averse to the ascetic or monastic virtues, as the American. Yet perhaps America is not

more indisposed to them than England was when St. Austin and his companions landed on the Isle of Thanet, Scotland when St. Columba erected his cell on the Isle of Iona, or Germany when St. Boniface laid the foundations of the Abbey of Fulda. The world opposed relies on its wealth; we must rely on self-denial and sacrifice, which are mightier than wealth. As our religious houses multiply and spread over the land,—if not too prosperous in this world's goods, and if the vow of poverty be religiously kept,—the tone of public sentiment will gradually change, people will begin to understand that there are other things than riches worth living for and laboring for. Wealth will lose somewhat of its importance, and while abundant charity will be prompt to relieve distress and check the growth of pauperism, the poor will no longer be despised, and no longer discontented.

The revival and multiplication of the monastic institutions, which the reformation demolished when it trampled on the Cross as the symbol of idolatry, will not remove poverty, but they will go far towards making poverty honorable, and the removal of its evils. They will make it more blessed to be poor than to be rich, for the poor will then have "the Gospel preached to them." Never were monastic institutions more needed than now, and never was there a more glorious opportunity for self-denial and sacrifice.

V. My apology to the readers of the *Ave Maria* for having delayed so long the continuation of the series of articles commenced, is that I have been prevented by ill health and other pressing engagements. In making engagements I am apt to forget that I have not the robust health and the capacity for continuous labor which I had as a younger man, and consequently am apt to undertake more than I am always able to perform. Yet at no period of my life have I been more industrious, or written and published more than since I discontinued my *Review* in October, 1864. though very little of what I have given to the public has appeared under my own name.

This fact, that my name has not been given, accounts for the impression I am told that a portion of the Catholic public have, that since the discontinuance of my *Review* I have been doing nothing, and what is worse, that I have virtually ceased to be a Catholic, or at least an orthodox Catholic, and have become indifferent, if not hostile, to Catholic interests. Those who have read during the last

five years my articles in the *Catholic World* and the New York *Tablet*, to both of which I have been a constant contributor, to say nothing of my articles in the *Ave Maria*, and my two publications, the *American Republic*, and *Liberalism and the Church*, published with my name, should be convinced that the impression in both respects does me injustice. I am a Catholic—a thoroughgoing Papist, and no one has any right to call me a *liberal* Catholic. If for a moment I went too far in my efforts to conciliate Liberalism and the church, I have long since corrected my error, I have uniformly defended the *Syllabus*, I accept *ex animo*, the Papal supremacy and infallibility as defined by the Council of the Vatican, and I wrote, the editors of that periodical will forgive me for saying, the article on "Sardinia and the Pope," in the *Catholic World* for this present month of June. I do not go with the Döllingers, the Hyacinthes, or even with my late friend Montalembert, in the last year or two of his life. I may err, I may sin and lose my own soul, but I have never had since my conversion even a temptation against faith, have never experienced the slightest repugnance to obey any command of the church or the Holy Father, as soon as made known to me, and if ever I have sought to restrict the papal authority to its minimum, it has never been for my own sake, or because I wished for myself a larger margin for private judgment. I dared not exact of those without more than the law required.

I hope the readers of the *Ave Maria* will pardon me this personal explanation, as they are the only public I at present address under my own name, and between whom and myself there are any personal relations. In writing to them I merely think aloud, for I regard them as true, warm-hearted friends. My reputation as a man and a writer is a matter of indifference; but my reputation as a Catholic, a loyal Papist, and a devoted son of the church, I hold very dear, and cannot suffer to be tarnished. All my hopes for my country as for my own salvation are centred in the church, the living body of Christ, who only hath the words of eternal life. But enough and perhaps too much of this.

My readers are aware that in my articles on the Religious Orders I am not giving their history, nor attempting to set forth the ascetic life of the cloister, to neither of which I am competent; but am considering them solely in the light in which they illustrate the uncompromising way in which the church deals with the world in every age and

country, opposing always to it the truth or an institution that condemns its dominant error and in its practical operation effectually roots out its dominant vice and establishes the opposing Christian virtue in its place. We have seen how she does this in the vow of poverty. In this vow she condemns the grasping and avaricious disposition of those who make haste to be rich, strips wealth of its prestige, and gives to poverty the place of honor,—a practical illustration of the beatitude, "Blessed are the poor, or the poor in spirit." In this the church reverses the rule of heathenism, and even of Protestantism, that the poor are the unfortunate classes and that riches are to be sought as the source of honor and distinction. The world despises the poor, treats them with contumely and contempt, as does even modern philanthropy, which honors them not as poor, but seeks to elevate them by assisting them to escape this poverty and to become rich: the church honors the poor, regards them as the jewels in her crown, even as poor in this world's goods.

No less striking an illustration of the same uncompromising principle is found in the vow of chastity which the religious take. This vow is fully as much in the face and eyes of our own age and country as the vow of poverty. For permitting it to be taken by her religious, and exacting it of those who wish to enter religion, the world accuses her of that mark of apostacy designated by St. Paul, that of "forbidding to marry." I remember well when I verily believed that the church looked upon marriage as a defilement, and that she actually condemned it as sinful, and forbid it to her children. I was so taught by the books I read, and the community in which I lived. It was an absurd error, since the church holds matrimony to be always a sacred thing, *res sacra*, and under the New Law, a sacrament, a mystery symbolizing the union of Christ and the church. The church forbids the persons who aspire to a certain state of life to marry, but she compels no one to enter that state, and prohibits any one to enter it except from choice and special vocation. What she exacts is that they who voluntarily and from deliberate choice take the vow shall keep it, in obedience to the command, "Thou shalt not forswear thyself, but thou shalt perform unto the Lord thy vows." A vow solemnly taken is a solemn thing, and cannot be broken without grievous sin; but no one is obliged to take it, and not every one is allowed by the law

of the church to take it. This is not forbidding to marry, in the sense of the apostle, or treating marriage as unclean and sinful. It only, while recognizing marriage as a sacrament, and therefore as holy, recognizes a higher and still more perfect state, a state like that of the angels of God, in which they neither marry nor are given in marriage, to which some are specially called.

Under the Old Law maternity was held in the highest honor, for the promised Messiah was to be born of a woman, and the synagogue or congregation of Israel was propagated by natural generation; under the New Law, virginity holds the highest rank, for our Lord was born of the Virgin Mary without prejudice to her virginity, and the church is propagated by the election of grace, by spiritual births, not by natural births. Spiritual maternity under the Christian order must necessarily be higher and more nearly connected with births unto Christ than natural maternity. There are other reasons why under Christianity virginity should take precedence of maternity, and celibacy for the kingdom of heaven's sake should take precedence of marriage, but these are sufficient for my present purpose.

There would also be great impropriety in taking the vow of poverty, if not accompanied by the vow of chastity. This vow means something more than simply keeping the body as the temple of the Holy Ghost pure, undefiled; it means that, and also the renunciation of the right to form family relations and obligations, the renunciation of natural for spiritual marriage, of natural offspring for spiritual offspring. He who is not free to make and does not make this renunciation, has not the right to take the vow of poverty, or to renounce the right of private property. They who have family obligations are not free to take the vow of poverty, for "he who provideth not for his own household is worse than an infidel, and hath denied the faith."

The vow of poverty and family relations would not and could not go well together; and every experiment made to couple them together, in or out of the church, has proved a disastrous failure. If marriage is retained, private property must be retained. Even Plato, when, in his imaginary Republic, he proposed a community of goods, held it necessary to abolish marriage—and the Communists of our day do the same—and couple the community of goods with the community of wives, an abomination too horrible for any Christian man to contemplate.

The vow of poverty, if taken at all, must be coupled with the vow of chastity in its furthest and most comprehensive sense, of the entire consecration, body and soul, to the heavenly Spouse and the complete renunciation in the natural order of family ties or relations; otherwise, the communities formed would be as fatal to morals as the proposed parallelograms of the Owenites, the phalansteries of the Fourierists, or the Oneida community of perfectionists. Any attempt to reform society by the renunciation, forced or voluntary, of private property on the maxim of the late M. Proudhon: *La propriété c'est le vol*, without the complete renunciation implied in the three monastic vows, will not only prove abortive, but in the last degree deleterious. The communism of modern reformers is based on the principle of indulgence; the monastic communism is founded in the contrary principle of self-denial —of giving up all, houses and lands, wife and children, to Christ—all sensible goods and enjoyments for the goods of the spirit, in order to imitate our Lord in his humiliation and suffering. The monastic principle effected a real reform, and was the principle of that marvellous progress of European civilization and society from the downfall of the Western Empire in the fifth century to the rise of Protestantism in the sixteenth,—a progress unequalled in any other period of human history; the principle of indulgence, or of providing for the gratification of the senses and the passions or lusts, acted on by modern liberals and reformers, has resulted in replunging most modern nations into the barbarism, the vices, the crimes, and the abominations of ancient Greece and Rome, Syria and Babylon, even Sodom and Gomorrha.

We need not wonder at the contempt of the modern world for monastic institutions and virtues, or its hostility to the devotion so fervently practised by the religious and all good Catholics to blessed Mary, ever virgin, the immaculate mother of God. They are not of the world; they are a rebuke to it, and it hates them as Satan hates the living God. Under the influence of the reformers or prophets who run without being sent, the world has relapsed into paganism, and it sees and can see no attraction in self-denial, no heroism in sacrifice, no beauty in the purity and sanctity of the virgin mother. Those things are hateful to it, for its heart is corrupt, and its light has become darkness. How should it be otherwise? Yet one

of the encouraging signs of the times is the recent revived and increased earnestness of devotion to Mary the immaculate, and the growing number of vocations to the religious life. These vocations are not as yet as many as we could wish, especially among our own countrymen, to the priesthood; but they are numerous enough to make us hope that the world has reached its lowest step, and is on the point of being redeemed, and ascending through grace once more to him who died on the cross to save it.

VI. The Puritan, who had the principal hand in shaping the moral and religious character of the Anglo-American colonies, was rigid enough in moral exactions; and while he was absorbed in his war against priests and monks, and in clearing away the forests, subduing the soil, making himself a home in the wilderness, and defending it against his savage enemies, he succeeded in keeping himself for the most part, exteriorly at least, within the limits of the moral law. His absorption in the struggle of life, the excitement of the fight, the rigid discipline he introduced from the Mosaic Law and from Calvin and Knox, enforced by the vigilant espionage of church members over one another, the ruling elder, the tithing man, the constable and the magistrate, all enabled him actually to maintain, at least as to exterior acts, the community he founded far purer in manners and morals than it has remained.

But with the relaxation of the struggle, the growth of wealth and luxury, discipline was relaxed, the church members became less prompt in acting as spies on one another and reporting each other's sayings and doings to the congregation or the session; the ruling elder disappeared, the tithing became a myth, and the magistrate abandoned morality for politics, or looked after it only so far as it might affect his political interests. Puritan morality then broke down, or survived only in various philanthropic associations and movements, which made little or no demands on the private or domestic virtues, or personal purity of heart or body. It never had any interior life, and when its exterior supports were knocked from under it nothing remained to sustain it. It attempted the impossible. It would convert the evangelical counsels into laws, and maintain the strict life and discipline in general Christian society of the convent or monastery, without seclusion, celibacy, or the assistance of supernatural grace. Separated by its heresy and schism from the Fountain of supernatural life, grace it had

not and could not have, except that common grace given to all men; celibacy it condemned and abhorred as a sin against nature; and marriage, which it encouraged and made all but obligatory upon every Christian, could not be kept pure and holy by unassisted nature. Puritanism exacted of nature without grace, especially when coupled with its doctrine of total depravity and moral inability, more than nature could give, and necessarily got less.

The failure of Puritanism to maintain all the strictness and severity of the religious life with marriage and without the grace of vocation, has very naturally been followed by a fearful reaction which even threatens to engulf the American people in the vortex of vice and immorality. By condemning celibacy as contrary to nature and impossible, by sneering at virginity as something, if not sinful, at least far below the conjugal state, and by reducing marriage from a sacrament to a civil contract, and dissoluble by the order or permission of the civil magistrate, it destroyed the very conception of Christian marriage, or of marriage as *semper res sacra*, as always something sacred, extinguished the Christian family, undermined the domestic virtues, on which public virtue and the very existence of society depend, and perverted both the public and private conscience.

The Puritan, probably, did not foresee the consequence of denying marriage as a sacrament, and making it a civil instead of a religious institution. Society depends on the family, as we are taught when the Scripture says: "And God created man in his own image; male and female created he them." The family depends on marriage, by which "the twain are made one flesh." The reduction of marriage to a civil institution, and the denial of its sacramental character, is the elimination of religion from the family and, consequently, from the very basis of society. It is to leave society without any divine law or support, to be sustained by the state, and the state to be sustained by unredeemed and unassisted nature alone. By denying the sacredness and indissolubility of marriage, placing it in the category of human institutions, Puritanism, as all Protestantism, eliminated religion from the government of the marriage relation, and found itself reduced to the necessity of sustaining both the family and society, the domestic and social virtues, without God.

The consequence has been that these virtues, having only a natural and civil support, are rapidly disappearing, if they

have not already disappeared, from the entire Puritan community. Eliminating religion from morality, reason becomes the slave of passion, and the only supports left to virtue are the natural sentiments, instincts and inclinations, and these are precisely what, when unrestrained by religion, lead to vice, crime, immorality,—every species of sin and iniquity. The adoption of the principle of divorce, and reducing marriage to a simple civil institution, leaves the relation of the sexes, as all human institutions, and the civil law itself, when religion is eliminated, to the direction and control of the passions, sentiments, inclinations, instincts of an imperfect and fallen nature, to the concupiscence or carnal mind which works all the evil in individuals, in families, and in nations. These have lost Christian marriage and the Christian family, and have made marriage, through the liberty of divorce, no longer what God made it, that is, of "the twain one flesh," but in several of the states what somebody has not inaptly called "successive polygamy," and, it may be added, what is still worse, "successive polyandry."

By eliminating religion and all sense of duty from the relation of the sexes, the road is short and straight to the popular doctrine of the day, that the marriage is in mutual love, and any couple who mutually love each other are truly married in the sight of God, and those whose hearts God has united, no man should dare put asunder. Hence powerful and energetic combinations of strong-minded women, *esprits forts*, and weak-minded or ambitious men, at work day and night, under the specious pretext of woman's rights, to abolish all marriage laws, and leave the relations of the sexes to the operation of unrestrained sentiment or passion, dignified with the name of Free Love. If marriage is essentially in the mutual love of the man and the woman, it can have no regard to the birth and education of children, but must look solely to the self-indulgence and pleasure of the married couple, to which children would be a great incumbrance, and hence we see already, to a fearful extent, the maternal instinct stifled in sensuality, and mothers, in order to be free from the cares and duties of maternity, not only consenting to but actually seeking the destruction of their offspring before they are born. So far is this carried that we see it in the more decidedly Puritan states of the Union telling on the population, which but for recruits from abroad would rapidly diminish.

Chastity, as a Christian virtue, can hardly be said to be any longer recognized, and if it exists at all in our Puritan community, it exists, not as a virtue, but as an instinct, or as a matter of temperament. The moral corruption of our society, if seen in the interior, is something fearful, and falls little short of that of the heathen, as referred to by St. Paul in the first chapter of his Epistle to the Romans, or that which proved the destruction of the earliest civilized and most renowned nations of antiquity. The evil is great and alarming, because it follows logically from the principles which are almost universally accepted as the basis of American society, and is really only the natural development of the anti-Catholic civilization of our age, and which like all false civilizations contains in itself the seeds of the most utter barbarism. But is there any remedy? If so, where and what is it?

I approach the answer to this question with some diffidence, not from any doubt as to what the answer is, but from distrust of my ability to make it clear and convincing to the general reader. It is certain that the preaching and even the example of what is only of strict law, as the highest ideal of Christian chastity, cannot suffice even to arrest, much less to cure the evil. Even the truth retained by false religions is turned into a lie and deprived of its value. The cruelty and licentiousness in which all heathen religions terminate are, intellectually considered, only misapplications and perversions of the great and fundamental principles of the true and primitive religion they have retained. A nation, as the soul, can be redeemed only by an expiatory sacrifice. It needed the expiatory sacrifice of the God-man on the cross to redeem the human race, and it is only by the expiatory sacrifice of those he loves and who love him, voluntarily made in him, and for him, that a nation can be redeemed and restored to Christian life and virtue, and therefore in the ordinary providence of God, not without the religious orders which Puritanism so violently denounces.

They that marry do well, says the Puritan with St. Paul, but he forgets to add with the same blessed apostle, that they who do not marry do better. Marriage is lawful, is honorable, but it is not the highest state nor the highest ideal of Christian perfection. In assuming that it is, and placing virginity, or celibacy for Christ's sake below it, the Puritan placed before him, not the highest but in reality

the lowest ideal. He who aims only at the lowest is sure never to attain to the highest, but is not unlikely to miss even the lowest. Marriage involves no idea of expiation or sacrifice; it was instituted in the garden before sin entered into the world and expiation was necessary. It has no redeeming or elevating character, though they who enter into it from pure motives and faithfully observe its laws are blessed in themselves and their children, yet they make no sacrifice, offer nothing to God, indulge only a chaste and lawful love, which, however, is in itself only the love of the creature, not of the Creator, and as represented in the popular literature of the day, is pure idolatry.

The Puritan in adopting marriage as the Christian ideal excluded the life of sacrifice, of expiation in imitation of the life of Christ on earth, and therefore placed himself out of the condition of being a fellow-laborer and fellow-sufferer with Christ in redeeming, purifying, and sanctifying the race or a nation. The principle on which the religious orders are founded is that of sacrifice, of expiation, and intercession, in imitation of our Lord himself, whose life and passion they seek to renew in themselves, not to atone for their own sins, not as a penance for their transgressions, but as a sacrifice, an expiation, and a continued intercession for others, for the love of God and the good of souls. It is therefore that I look to the religious orders as the instruments in the hands of God to arrest the country in its downward tendency, and replace its vice and immorality by holy purity and Christian chastity.

VII. There is quite an erroneous notion prevailing in the popular mind, and which is favored by popular literature, with regard to the Religious Orders and the religious life. Many look upon the convent or monastery as a hospital for infirm souls, as a place of refuge in which one may conceal one's shame or one's trouble, do penance for one's sins, or find solace for one's wounded or disappointed affections. I have read Catholic novels even which favor this notion, and send the jilted hero or heroine to a monastery or convent to find amends for a lost human love in good works and pious exercises. It is not unusual for the new converts, if possessed of a talent for writing, and more commendable for their faith than for their knowledge of Catholic thought and interior life, to make the jilted heroine a Sister of Charity, to place her in charge of a hospital, and to send into it after many years of wandering and sin, sick and dying,

the man who had won her young affections and deserted her, to be nursed by her care, and through her words and the influence of her example brought to repentance, and, under the grace of God, converted to the faith and enabled to die a happy death. This is very charming no doubt, very romantic, but gives a very false notion of the religious life, as well as of the proper motives for entering it.

It may be the convent or the monastery serves in some cases as a hospital for infirm souls, a refuge in which wounded souls hide their grief, a retirement in which life-long sinners may do penance and endeavor to save their soul; but this is not its original design, and such are not its fitting inmates, or proper persons to take the religious vows. It may be a useful retreat for them, but it is very doubtful if the assumption of the vows and obligations of the religious life would not prove of more injury than benefit to them. None but the most healthy and robust souls, souls detached from the world by the love of God, not by disappointment, or disgust, are moved by an ardent love of heaven and of souls to make the sacrifice implied in their vows of poverty, chastity, and obedience.

The true idea of the religious life is that of giving up all for Christ, of an expiatory sacrifice in imitation, I may say, in the spirit of his expiatory sacrifice on the cross for the redemption of the race. In this sacrifice the religious unite themselves to Christ, become one with him, and therefore are called spouses of Christ, which is their endearing and affectionate appellation. This power of sacrifice of expiation by the wedding of the soul in the Holy Spirit to Christ is the blessed privilege of the true religious, or those who follow the evangelical counsels in addition to the evangelical law,—a privilege which those who know not our blessed religion have, and can have no conception of. It belongs to a religion of purity and perfection higher than they are able to raise their aspirations, and marks the radical difference between Christian asceticism and that found outside the church or among the false religions of the East or the West, and with which too many ignorantly confound it.

Our Lord did not give himself in an expiatory sacrifice for mankind because he hated them, despised them, or was disgusted with them; but because he loved them and would redeem and beatify them. He gave himself for us because he loved us, and loved us with an infinite love. So the religious do not give themselves to Christ in their vows be-

cause they hate the world, despise it, or are disgusted with it, nor because they are too sensitive and weak to live in it, but because they love it and so would redeem and sanctify it. They do not take the vow of chastity because they regard the body as unclean or matter as impure, like the Manicheans or the Platonists, nor because marriage, chastely observed, is not lawful and holy, and blessed of God; but because the life of sacrifice is a more perfect, more Christlike life, and by living it they serve him and mankind, society and souls, more effectively than they could by living in the world the ordinary Christian life. They sacrifice for Christ their earthly affections and pleasures, not as unlawful, but that they may transmute them into spiritual affections, and pleasures which are higher and nobler. The motive that moves them to the sacrifice is love, the love of God and our neighbor, not hatred of any thing God has made nor of any of the relations his law allows or his love sanctifies.

The besetting sin of every country requires expiation, and can be arrested only by pure souls, healthy and robust souls who do not shrink from the burden of the cross, voluntarily sacrificing what they are abundantly capable of enjoying, and devoting themselves to prayer and good works, in expiation of their neighbor's transgressions, and in obtaining for him the graces he especially needs. It is, then, a mistake to suppose that the religious in their abnegation of the world and its temptations forget for the love of God the love of the neighbor, the second great commandment in seeking to fulfil the first, since the sacrifice is to procure through love of God not only their own perfection, but graces for their neighbor and the salvation of his soul. The more we love God the more do we love our neighbor, and the more we strive to imitate Christ the more do we give ourselves in sacrifice for souls, and consequently the more do we through grace effect for their salvation. The vow of chastity does not discredit marriage or any thing that is lawful, but expiates its abuses and procures from God graces to enable the married to keep it holy and to discharge faithfully its duties. In retiring from the world the religious do not desert it as many suppose, nor throw off their duties towards it; and in point of fact, as well as in principle, there are no people who so abound in the love of their neighbor as the religious, even of the contemplative orders, who love and serve us as do the saints whom we invoke, and

in some respects even more effectually; for the saints aid us *now* only by their intercession, and the religious can aid us not only by their prayers but by their expiatory sacrifices, as the saints did while in the flesh.

But I may seem to have allowed myself to be drawn too far away from the point I proposed from the first to illustrate by considering the vows taken by the religious orders. I certainly intended to say all I have said, but not precisely in this place. I intended to reserve it for the closing article of the series. But perhaps it was just as well to say it here.

The age and country we live in is as remarkable for its unchastity and impurity as for the excessive worship of wealth and horror of poverty. Very sensible people are apt to think the true way of meeting the evil is to present not the highest Christian ideal, but to withhold the counsels, and be content with looking no higher than what is of strict law or absolutely necessary to inherit eternal life. When people are so far gone as to pronounce the vow of chastity a vow against nature, an outrage on humanity, and impossible to be kept; when marriage ceases to be held as a sacrament and indissoluble, and is regarded as more honored in the breach than in the observance; when to honor the virgin mother of God and to invoke her prayers is held to be idolatry, or gross superstition, these people would tell us not to insist on too high an ideal, to be content to present chaste marriage as the ideal, and to say nothing of virginity for Christ's sake as a more perfect state than that of married life, and not to aim at the spiritual paternity or maternity, or any thing above the relations of husband and wife, parent and child in the natural order. Any higher perfection will be sneered at as impracticable, as superstitious, or as lunacy. This would, perhaps, be sensible advice, if in the Christian order we had to rely on nature alone, and had no resource but to follow public opinion or popular tendencies. But the missionaries of Christ, the apostles of nations, by whose labors the heathen have been converted, the misbelieving reclaimed, the fallen recovered, and the weak strengthened, while they have always been careful to make allowances for men's ignorance and weakness growing out of their previous life and habits, and to exact of them no more than the law itself, liberally interpreted, demands as the condition of inheriting eternal life, have never failed to set forth the evangelical counsels, nor hesitated to place before the newly converted the highest Christian ideal or to encourage aspirations to Christian perfection.

Our age and country have not fallen lower and are not further removed from the Christian ideal than were the Germanic races prior to the conversion of Clovis in the fifth century, the arrival of St. Austin and his forty monks in England in the sixth century, or in Germany proper in the seventh and eight centuries. The love of gold is not greater, the insubordination, indocility, hatred of discipline and horror of obedience, or sins of the flesh are not greater or more discouraging, and yet the religious went as missionaries among them—heathens, barbarians, cruel and grossly licentious as they were—with the three vows, established religious houses, lived the monastic or cenobitical life in accordance with the evangelical counsels, and succeeded by their holy preaching and self-denying lives, the grace of God assisting, in christianizing them, in diffusing the spirit of peace and love, the virtues of purity, chastity, temperance, and holiness, and peopling heaven with saints.

The Roman Empire was converted by the apostles and the bishops who succeeded them, but all the outlying barbarous nations that have since been brought within the fold have been converted through the labors of the religious orders, or colonies of monks and nuns; and it was not till these orders had lost their fervor, and ceased to live the life of self-denial and sacrifice, or till they had been decried or covered with ridicule by such humanists as Reuchter, Von Hutton, and Erasmus, that any of those nations apostatized. I do not despair of the conversion of my own countrymen, but it will not be effected by simply preaching from the pulpit or the press what is of strict law, but by the religious orders and congregations presenting in their lives a higher ideal or perfection than that of marriage or even the lawful life of the world.

There is amongst us a sad perversion of Christian doctrine, but this is no obstacle to conversion in comparison with the terrible moral and spiritual corruption that underlies it, and which no reasoning can amend. It can be done —with the grace of God always understood—only by the living example of those who are not only bound by their state to aim at the highest Christian perfection, but actually attain to it, and show it in their daily walk. It was the picture of Christ dying on the cross for love of men that touched the heart of the barbarian chief, and made him prostrate himself and cry out for pardon and help. It is only by the living picture of the spouses of Christ nailed

to his cross in imitation of him, and exemplifying in their lives in its perfection the virtue that the most directly opposes the dominant vice or besetting sin of our age and country, that the corrupt heart can be touched, and melted and purified by divine love.

VIII. The third vow taken by the religious is that of voluntary obedience to their superiors in all things not repugnant to the law of God and the rule of their institute. The vow requires them to have no will but the will of their superior, or the entire abnegation of self, in imitation of our Lord who humbled himself, took the form of a servant, and became obedient unto death, even the death of the cross; who always willed only what his Father willed, and said, "Father, not my will, but thine be done." All Christians are, no doubt, bound to humble themselves, for humility is the root of every Christian virtue, and to obey the law of God unto death, even the death of the cross; but the religious take voluntarily an additional obligation of obedience in all things not of sin, however hard, arbitrary, or apparently capricious, to their superiors, that they may acquire and maintain the habit of perfect obedience, even beyond what the law strictly enjoins.

It must not be forgotten that the whole life of the religious is in the order of the evangelical counsels. "If thou wouldst enter into eternal life, keep the commandments, but if thou wouldst be perfect, go sell what thou hast, give to the poor, and come and follow me." The religious aim to be perfect, and by their vows voluntarily taken are placed in a state in which for them the counsels cease to be counsels, and become law. They are bound then by their state to practise perfect obedience as Christ did, and a more perfect obedience than is necessary for those not in their state to inherit eternal life. Without this obedience for Christ's sake to superiors they would practise no more perfect obedience than is enjoined on all Christians. Besides, I hardly need add, the religious community could not subsist, and the religious state would prove an entire failure without this entire submission of the religious to their superiors.

Some people outside of the church, who fancy they know much better what is or is not moral than the church does, contend that a man has no right to abdicate his own will, and vow obedience to another, for by so doing he virtually shirks his responsibility for his own acts, and shifts it to another, which is not right. This objection takes no account of the

intention or internal act, and regards only external acts. It overlooks the fact that the vow of obedience is voluntarily taken, and is therefore an act of the will, and consequently presupposes the will and its persistent activity. The will does not simply act in taking the vow, but continuously, as long as the vow is kept. The will is to will only what the superior wills, and hence the obedience is voluntary, and therefore is a continuous act of the will, and therefore again he who vows it does not cease to be a moral agent, or to be responsible for his acts. The error arises from supposing the abdication of the will implied in the vow is the cessation of all voluntary activity, but this is a mistake. The abdication is simply the abdication of the right to will any thing not willed by our Lord and the religious superior. The saint who wills only what God wills, or, as is said, has no will but God's will, does not thereby cease to will, or to act as a moral agent. The objection, therefore, is unfounded. In vowing obedience to his superior for Christ's sake, or to have no will of his own, the religious does not cease to be responsible for his acts, for his perpetual vow is a perpetual act of his will, which persists in every act of obedience he performs to the will or order of his superior; and as his will is to obey his superior for Christ's sake, his act of obedience is an act of obedience to God, and meritorious as such.

It would, undoubtedly, be wrong to take a vow of obedience to the superior of an institute not approved by the Holy See, as is the oath taken by Freemasons, Odd Fellows, or the members of the various other secret societies spread over Europe and America; for the obedience vowed would be to men unauthorized to exact it, and have no religious significance. It would not be obedience to Christ in the persons authorized by him to receive obedience in his name. It might also be a rash vow to bind one to obedience to superiors who might command things opposed alike to the church of God and to society, and to natural justice, as actually is the case with the secret societies. But in the vow of obedience to superiors in an institute approved by the Holy See no danger of this sort is to be apprehended, because the superiors are themselves responsible to the church for the orders they give, and if they should happen to give an order to do any thing sinful or wrong according to the infallible teaching of the church, the vow does not bind to obedience, but the very purpose for which it is taken—namely, Christian perfection—forbids the religious to obey

the order. The religious are therefore amply protected by a higher authority than that of the superiors of the religious order. Should the general of the Society of Jesus command any thing against the teaching of the church or the law of God as she defines it, and which is as well known by every Jesuit father as by the general himself, no Jesuit would be bound to obey him, but every one would be forbidden to do so by an authority higher than that of the general, and which he himself is bound to obey.

The vow of obedience does not and cannot bind any religious to do any thing wrong or contrary to faith and morals as taught and defined by the infallible church. On that score the vow can be taken in all security of conscience. But may not superiors be unjust, and require their subjects to suffer wrong? Such a thing is very possible, and no doubt often happens in religious houses. But the evil is not in suffering the wrong, but in doing it. The religious, who does no wrong, is not injured by any amount of injustice that may be done to him, or that he may be called upon to suffer, if he receives it in the proper spirit. What does one enter the religious life for, but to become like our Lord, and to suffer with him and for him? Did not he suffer unjustly, and to an extent which our powers are too feeble to estimate? Does not one enter the religious life for the very purpose of suffering, and suffering cheerfully for Christ's sake, and of suffering every sort of indignity or injustice that may be encountered? They who inflict it may have a terrible account to answer for, but they who receive it and bear it should rejoice, and with the greater joy the greater the indignity or injustice,—because, if they bear it for Christ's sake, it only serves to advance them in the way of perfection, and to enhance their merit,—to make them more like Christ himself. They who see in this an objection to the vow of obedience, forget or do not know that the evil is in doing the wrong, never in suffering it, and that he who does the wrong is the party to be pitied, not they who suffer it, for their Father in heaven will reward them. It is the sinner that is to be wept over, not his victim. What else means the glory of the cross?

There could be nothing more directly in contradiction to the spirit of our age and country than this virtue of obedience to which the religious are vowed. There is, no doubt, much obedience practised, nay, willingly yielded, to unlawful chiefs, or persons engaged in unlawful enterprises, in

plots or conspiracies for overthrowing the church or the government and subverting the constitution of a state, as is proved by the innumerable secret societies and organizations for such nefarious purposes; but obedience to lawful authority is just now rarely to be met with in the world. The idea of self-government, which rightly means, politically, national independence or the government of a nation by itself and not by another, and applied to the individual, self-restraint, or the subjection of one's passions to the law of God, has come to mean the absolute sovereignty of each individual man or woman and the denial of all authority but one's own, —that is to say, that each one is God, independent, supreme, and free to do whatever one wills, or to live as one lists.

It is not generally denied that there is a God, but the God admitted is either an Epicurean God who concerns not himself with the affairs of this world, or only a collective name for the laws or forces of nature, and identical with our own passions, affections, inclinations, appetites, and instincts. Hence the transcendental obedience to God, as Mr. Ralph Waldo Emerson has it, is "Obey thyself," and the transcendental rule of moral conduct is, "Act out thyself." In any other sense, obedience to God is held by the men of "advanced views" to be degrading and immoral. There is prevailing a general spirit of disobedience of man to his Maker, of the wife to the husband, children to their parents, the flock to their pastor, of the citizen to the state. To obey any will but one's own, even if the will of the highest, is regarded as slavery in our enlightened age and country, and unworthy of a man, and to be submitted to by no one who has the spirit of a man. Was it not said "ye shall be as gods, knowing good and evil?" What need then of a master?

Yes, it was said so, but it was by Satan, who was a liar from the beginning, and the father of lies; and a pretty set of gods men have become by hearkening to him and disobeying God who made them after his own image! The act of obedience to Satan was an act of disobedience to God, and brought sin, death, and all our woe, into the world. The lying spirit that seduced our first parents seems now to have seduced nearly our whole generation from their allegiance and deluded them with the belief that pride, not humility, is the root of every virtue, of true manhood and magnanimity. We hear talk only of liberty—none of authority but to reject it; of rights—the rights of the people, the rights of man, the rights of woman—but very little of duties, except to spurn them.

Nothing is more needed, then, than the example of the obedience for Christ's sake vowed by the religious. It opposes to the children of this world the virtue which directly condemns them,—humility to pride, submission to insubordination, obedience to disobedience. And by offering an obedience more perfect than the law exacts, they hope by uniting their obedience with that of our Lord to expiate their pride and obtain for themselves the graces that will make them humble, docile, and truly great.

IX. I have treated as fully as I proposed to myself the three ordinary vows taken by the religious, and in them we have seen the protest of divinely inspired and directed souls against the three prominent and most dangerous vices of our age and country, perhaps of every age and country. To those three vows the Jesuits add a fourth, that of strict obedience to the orders of the Holy Father. The idea of St. Ignatius was that of raising a company of soldiers of the cross, armed and disciplined for any kind of service in the church militant, and to place it at the command of the pope, ready at any moment to enter upon any duty in any country near or remote, safe or dangerous, in which he might see proper to order them. The company soon grew, so to speak, to a *corps d'armée* with a strict military organization under its general, provincials, and rectors, always ready for active duty in any field where their services were most needed or would be the most efficient against enemies of God and his Christ, each one, from the general down to the simple spiritual coadjutor, ready to die in the cause of the church, as a true soldier under the orders of the King, who is King of kings and Lord of lords, in whose service he is enlisted.

This military organization creating a body of men placed at the special orders of the supreme pontiff has rendered the Jesuits one of the most efficient orders, if not the most efficient of all in the church. Other orders have had their special mission and their special work, as the Friars Preachers that of preaching the word, the Friars Minors that of especially exemplifying holy poverty, but the Institute of the Jesuits embraces the special objects of nearly all the others, preaching missions among tepid Christians and among the heathen, the refutation of heresy and recovery of heretics, literature and science, schools and colleges, and the general interests of education, and the direction of souls in the way of Christian perfection. With so compre-

hensive an institute, distinguished by no peculiar habit, with the learning of the Benedictine, all the freedom of action of the secular priest, all the grace and polish of the man of society, and the virtues of the cloister, the Society, always at the special orders of the Holy Father, could not fail to render important and efficient service in the war which the church continually wages with the world, with ignorance, false science, indocility, and every species of vice and iniquity.

Their organization, their zeal and efficiency may have provoked opposition among lukewarm Christians, and the wrath and hatred of the enemies of the church of God, and they too may not have been always faultless in every individual member of the Society, yet I think it will always be found that the Jesuit heart is open to every one whose spirit is truly Catholic, and who places the interests of religion above all other interests. I have never found the Jesuit afraid of zeal when accompanied by docility and humility, or damping the ardor of a young soul seeking only the greater glory of God, by the chilling counsels of a worldly prudence, which have cut short so many noble spirits in the very beginning of their career. Prudence is a virtue, but what the world calls prudence oftener leads to death than to life. The Jesuits are thought by their enemies to be sly, cunning, astute, always crafty, and the word jesuitical has a bad meaning in English literature and English dictionaries, but if they are as prudent as serpents, they add to it the simplicity of the dove, and their prudence is never a cloak for indolence or timidity, and degenerates never into a low expediency. Nothing is less applicable to the Jesuit than the epithet *jesuitical* in its popular sense.

But I intended to speak of the additional vow, not of the Jesuits specially. In the early ages of the church, and especially in what are called the middle ages, there was no call for a vow of special obedience to the pope. There was always in those ages enough of disobedience to the Holy Father on the part of professedly Christian sovereigns, princes, nobles, and even bishops, but there was at the same time the recognition in principle of the papal supremacy. No doubt, during the feudal ages there was in the church a tendency to apply the principle of feudality which governed in the state to the relation of bishops to the Holy See, and of parish priests to their respective bishops, and to regard the pope as suzerain rather than as sovereign, but still that obedience was due him was not denied, and the disobedience was illogical as well as sinful.

The reformation was the attempt of the disobedient to erect their disobedience into a principle; and as they were too perverse to conform their practice to their principles, they sought to conform their principles to their practice. The reformers had no intention of warring against the church; educated under feudalism in the state, they imagined they could throw off the suzerainty of the pope without injury, nay, with positive benefit to the church, as a feudatory of the monarch might in some cases throw off the suzerainty of the emperor or king, with positive advantage to his estates. The event has proved, what should have been foreseen and understood, that in casting off the papacy the reformers cast off the church herself. The reformation has lost the church, and necessarily, because the pope is not merely suzerain, but under God, the sovereign of the church. Our Lord built his church on Peter, and Peter, the Rock, removed, it had no foundation; it was only a house built on the sand, and when the winds blew and the rains came it must fall. The papacy is essential not merely to the order but to the very being of the church, and hence it is the point at which all the sects, misbelievers and unbelievers, direct their attacks. Satan knows that if he can break down the papacy, he can reverse the victory won over him by the cross.

There was a divine inspiration, then, in the thought of St. Ignatius, and a special propriety in enjoining on the members of the Company he organized this fourth vow, or vow of special obedience to the pope. It was a solemn protest against the very principle of the reformation, and made the Company a standing assertion of the papacy, and a living monument of devotion to the Holy See. By it St. Ignatius specially devoted the Society of Jesus to the defence of the papal supremacy, or the supreme authority of the bishop of Rome, as the successor of Peter, and true vicar of Christ, to feed, direct, and govern the universal church, the truth specially denied by the reformation, and the truth most in need then and ever since of defence, because the truth most assailed and the most essential to the very existence of the visible church. Some provinces of the Jesuits, engrossed in the work of education as in France, under Clement XIII., may have for a moment lost sight of their distinctive principle, their reason of being as a distinct order, expressed in their fourth vow, for after all the Jesuits are human; but as a rule they have been in the fore-front of the battle for the

papal supremacy and the infallibility as finally declared by the Council of the Vatican, though they have not been alone there. Yet they are justly entitled to no little of the glory of the victory which has been finally won through the divine assistance.

That fourth vow was, as I have said, a solemn protest against the principle of the reformation. The holy and œcumenical Council of Trent condemned the particular or special heresies of the reformation, but it did not explicitly condemn its principle, for its principle was not then fully disengaged, and rendered apparent to the whole world. It is only latterly that even Protestants themselves have understood it, and were able to formulate it. Nobody saw from the first, that Protestantism was wholly concentrated in the rejection of the papal constitution of the church; hardly did anybody see it before the present century and during the present generation. It is only just now that Protestants have shown themselves willing to fraternize with the eastern churches separated from Rome, and which differ from the Catholic Church in no important points, but in rejecting the supremacy or primacy of jurisdiction of the pope, without asking any change of doctrine or worship on the part of those churches. We have seen and we see now multitudes of Protestants, like the Puseyites and Ritualists, who accept and defend all Catholic doctrine, except the papal supremacy and infallibility, and nearly the whole Protestant world would cease to oppose the church, if she would only give up the pope. They would accept willingly the play of Hamlet with the part of the Prince of Denmark left out. The fourth vow of the Jesuits pledged them to a direct and necessary warfare on the essential principle of the reformation, and for the essential principle of the constitution of the church. No wonder that the instinct of Protestants has made them hold the Society in especial dread, and prompted them to slander it, calumniate it, and do all that desperate man can do to break it up and destroy it.

St. Ignatius was the great Catholic opponent of Luther, and met him with an organization which was destined one day to bruise his head, and crush him to death. The principle the saint incorporated in the fourth vow was the condemnation and involved the death of Protestantism, which the solemn assertion and declaration of that principle by the Council of the Vatican carries into effect. The defini-

tion of the papal supremacy and infallibility puts an end to Protestantism by putting the seal of infallible authority to its condemnation of its essential principle. Hence the Protestant rage against the Jesuits, as well as against the council, in which St. Ignatius has triumphed over Luther. It was the first explicit condemnation of Protestantism in its principle by an œcumenical council, and it will prove effectual. The vow has done its work, and Protestantism, if it survives, will survive only as infidelity.

X. I should be sorry if any one inferred from the line of argument I have for the most part pursued, that I held that service rendered by the religious orders is exclusively or chiefly the natural influence of their doctrine and example. The power of sound doctrine and holy example is very great, but it was not sufficient to redeem the world. The religious serve their neighbor or society, as I have shown, by protesting against the besetting sins of the age and country, and exemplifying in their lives the Christian virtues of voluntary poverty, chastity and obedience; but this is not all the service they render, nor the greatest or chief part of it, though, unhappily, it is nearly all that the majority even of Christians in our times are able to appreciate.

There are in the worst of times faithful witnesses for God; and when the defection is greatest the Lord reserves to himself at least seven thousand who have not forsaken his altars or bowed the knee to Baal. Protestants, though they retain the words, have lost the sense of mediatorial grace, of expiation, vicarious suffering, intercession. They recognize—some of them do—a Mediator who died on the cross, but no living mediator. They have lost the sense of the Communion of Saints, and understand nothing of the solidarity of life between the Head and the members in the mystical body of Christ. They see no principle in the Gospel by which a soul can unite with Christ and share with him in his mediatorial and expiatory work, and so share with him in the glory of his kingdom. They treat as absurd the doctrine that the expiatory works and sufferings voluntarily undergone by the religious can avail any thing for others than themselves. When we honor Mary as the mother of God, and beseech her to intercede for us, they tell us it is idolatry, and that we give to the mother what is due only to the Son; and when we honor the saints, who, through their faith and virtue have overcome the world, and ask them to intercede for us, they tell us our prayer to them

is vain, that they are dead and cannot hear us, and that we are robbing Christ of his glory and giving it to dead men, as if the saints are not more truly living than when they were on the earth, and as if it could rob Christ of his glory to honor for his sake, and as dear to him, those whom he himself loves and honors.

The effects of this cold and freezing Protestantism are felt beyond the limits of the Protestant world, and influence many Catholics, and obscure in their minds the deeper and more supernatural truths of the Catholic faith, and chill in their hearts the devotion these inspire. There are large numbers of Catholics even who are almost scandalized by such a work as St. Liguori's *Glories of Mary*, and can see, at best, only a "sublime folly" in the fearful austerities practised by the saints and the religious of the penitential orders. They are willing to tolerate the active and especially the teaching orders, except the Jesuits, but have almost a horror for those devoted to contemplation, prayer, and penitence. Far be it from me to speak lightly of the active orders, devoted to the corporal works of mercy; they have their work, and they must join prayer and penitence with it, if they would effectually perform it; but Mary, who sat at the feet of Jesus, chose "the better part."

The world sees no use in the contemplative orders, and considers them as lost to society, as rendering no service to their neighbor. This is because the world has no faith in the vicarious atonement, or in vicarious expiation. The principle or fundamental idea of the religious orders is that of bearing the cross with our Lord and following him in his expiatory life. The religious life is founded on the text, "If thou wouldst be perfect, go sell what thou hast, give to the poor, and come and follow me." All Christians are required to follow Christ, in the sense of believing in him and the truths he taught, and of keeping his commandments. The religious, as aiming at perfection, must follow him not only in this, but imitate him, as closely as man may, in his work of expiation and intercession. The religious life is thus essentially an expiatory life,—a life of prayer, penitence, and intercession, as was the life of our Lord himself. What is meant by this is seen when we read of a saint or a holy religious who in order to obtain the grace of conversion for some great sinner takes to praying and fasting, to the chastising of his own body, inflicting on himself the severe punishments due only to the sinner, as

when St. Ignatius would deter a young man from keeping a sinful appointment he plunged himself into a half-frozen pond of water up to his neck, where he stood for hours and hours praying earnestly for the poor sinner, and begging that his penance might avail him.

It is to be noticed that the most conspicuous religious, and those who led the most austere lives and inflicted the most severe mortifications on themselves, have pertained to the nobler or often to the wealthy classes, who, in becoming religious, voluntarily sacrificed rank, position, wealth, ease and comfort to follow Christ in his poverty and humiliation. Christ was rich, but he became poor for our sakes, and had not even where to lay his head; he was God, and yet he disdained not to take up the form of a servant, and to be obedient as a servant even unto death. It is the voluntary sacrifice, it is the voluntary poverty, self-annihilation, and mortification, that constitute the likeness of the religious to Christ, and that merit. These give up their possessions, their worldly positions, their own bodies, and even their own wills for Christ, and voluntarily suffer with him that they may reign with him. The more they have voluntarily surrendered, and the more perfect their humility, the greater their merit. Persons who give up nothing, and enter religion as a means of distinction or of securing the means of living, have little merit. They live in the religious community, but not its life.

The expiations, prayers, intercessions, have, of course, no merit or efficacy except as inspired by faith and charity, and united to those of our Lord; for without him, of ourselves alone, we can do nothing, merit nothing. But united to his, they have both merit and efficacy. Now, it is as leading an expiatory and penitential life, and through their prayers and intercessions, that the religious fulfil the second great commandment: Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself. By such a life they serve, and powerfully serve society, while withdrawing from the world, secluding themselves from it, and despising its riches, its honors, distinctions, and pleasures. They have bread to eat the world knoweth not of; God feeds them with his consolations, loves them, visits them, blesses them, and hears them.

Why God requires to be importuned by prayers and intercessions since his goodness is unbounded, his mercy is exhaustless, and he is always ready to bestow his graces and blessings upon all, when asked, is a mystery that we can ex-

plain only on the principle that he wills the glory of our salvation should redound to his well-beloved Son, and that the Son wills that the members should share in the glory of their head as being united through love to him in his mediatorial work. Perhaps, also, he would have us understand that he is hedged in by no natural laws, that he is as free as he is good, and wishes us to feel that we owe all to his mercy, and are immediately dependent on his love. The pagan Greeks and Romans believed in one God infinitely above gods and men, but they identified him with Fate, and regarded him as incapable of any volition or free action. Modern philosophers bind him fast with imaginary laws of nature, which they suppose to be inflexible and unalterable, which is only to identify him with the *Fatum* of the old pagans.

The supreme God of the pagans was inaccessible to all emotions of pity or compassion. No prayers, intercessions, sacrifices, or expiations of gods or men could bend him, or obtain any mercy or redress for outraged and suffering humanity. Hence he is never with them an object of worship, and his service finds no place in their ritual. But the God of the Christian is not a blind, inexorable, and unbending fate: He is good, loving, full of tenderness and compassion, who hears any of his children when they cry unto him, and is more ready to answer than any one is to ask. He is, what this age denies, infinitely free, and his providence extends over all the creatures he has made, not by fixed, invariable, and inflexible laws, but by the free and unconstrained exercise of his own will. I shall never forget the singular emotion, I may say rapture, I felt one day, while wandering in the mazes of error, when suddenly burst upon my mind, for the first time, this great truth that God is free, and that what most needs asserting of all liberties is the liberty of God. It struck me as a flash of light in the midst of my darkness, opened to me a new world, and changed almost instantaneously not only the tone and temper of my mind, but the direction of my whole order of thought. Though years elapsed before I found myself knocking at the door of the church for admission, my conversion began from that moment. I had seized the principle which authorizes faith in the supernatural. God is free, I said, then I can love him, trust him, hope in him, and commune with him, and he can hear me, love me, and raise me to communion with himself, and blessed be his name.

We know that God hears and answers prayer. We know

also he hears and approves the intercession of the just for the unjust. We read in Job, "the Lord said to Eliphaz the Themanite: My wrath is kindled against thee, and against thy two friends, because you have not spoken the thing that is right before me, as my servant Job hath. Take unto you therefore seven oxen, and seven rams, and go to my servant Job, and offer for yourselves a holocaust: and my servant Job shall pray for you: his face I will accept, that folly be not imputed to you." In this the Lord showed his love for Job, gave him an opportunity of exercising his charity toward those who had treated him harshly and unjustly in his afflictions, and to share in the honor of their reconciliation to God.

Now without underrating the value of the example of the religious, and the important lessons it teaches, I wish my readers to understand that there is a much higher view to be taken of the religious life, and that it is chiefly to be regarded as a life of voluntary penitence, expiation, prayer, and intercession, united to the expiatory life and passion of our Lord, and efficacious in reconciling souls to God, and extending the kingdom of his Christ. It is the greatest possible blessing to a nation that in its cities and villages, in its valleys and on its mountain-sides, in its plains and forests, there should rise religious houses, filled with the *élite* of the race, of either sex, who are devoted day and night to the works of charity and expiation for its sins, and prayers and intercessions for the conversion of the unbelieving or misbelieving, the reformation of the ungodly, and an increase of fervor to the tepid. It is only from the extension of the religious life in its purity and its burning charity that I hope for the conversion of the country. Ten just men, if they could have been found in them, would have saved the cities of the plain from destruction.

I have now concluded, in a very imperfect manner, what I proposed to say of the religious orders. When I began I was wholly unaware how little I knew of the subject and how utterly incompetent I was to treat it with any sort of justice. The effect has been to teach me to remember and master a subject before attempting to discuss it. The subject has opened as I proceeded, but I soon perceived that it was too vast and too holy for a pen so feeble and so unsanctified as mine. It is not enough to have mastered something of the external life and relations of the religious orders: none but one who lives the life of a religious can treat the subject with any degree of justice.

HOLY COMMUNION—TRANSUBSTANTIATION.*

[From Brownson's Quarterly Review for January, 1874.]

We have at present no concern with Father Dalgairns's masterly and highly approved work on Holy Communion, except with the first or philosophical part, which treats of the theory of substance, and seeks to demonstrate by reason the possibility of transubstantiation. But to prevent all misunderstanding on the subject, we state in the outset, that our faith in the Catholic doctrine of the blessed Eucharist, as defined by the Council of Trent, rests on and can be affected by no philosophical theory of body or substance. We hold the doctrine as one of positive divine revelation which cannot possibly be false, and it is to us personally a matter of perfect indifference whether its possibility can be demonstrated by philosophy or not. For ourselves we do not believe its possibility is demonstrable by reason; the most that reason can do is to recognize her impotence to demonstrate its impossibility.

Father Dalgairns, unlike most educated Englishmen of the present day, whether Catholics or non-Catholics, writes on philosophical subjects in a language which we recognize as our mother-tongue, and which we are able to understand. This, we presume, is owing to the fact that he has got beyond psychology, and regards philosophy as the science of real objective principles or things, not as merely the science of concepts or abstractions. In the unobjectionable sense of the word, he is an ontologist or realist, and there is some satisfaction in following him through his learned and luminous pages. If he has not fully succeeded in showing the real accord between modern science and faith, he has made an honorable attempt and gone far in that direction, for

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* *The Holy Communion, its Philosophy, Theology, and Practice.* By John Bernard Dalgairns, Priest of the Oratory of St. Philip Neri. New York: 1868.

2. *The American Church Review.* Hartford, July, 1873. Article V. Philosophy of the Eucharist.

which we beg him to accept our congratulations. We doubt if any one can go further or do much better.

Yet Father Dalgairns would have pleased us better if he had been less rhetorical, and more concise and scholastic in his statement of the church's doctrine of transubstantiation, and of the philosophical objections urged against it. We are not able from his statements to determine whether the church teaches that the substance of the bread and wine is changed into the substance of the body of our blessed Lord, or simply that the substance of these is removed, consumed, or annihilated, and the substance of the body of our blessed Lord substituted, so to speak, in their place. If the former, we must confess, that to our mind, the learned and philosophical author does not show that the change or conversion of one substance into another, in any other sense than that of substitution, is possible, or that it does not involve a contradiction. If the latter, that the substance of the material elements is simply removed and its place taken by the substance of our blessed Lord's body, how can the Council of Trent say the change is well expressed by the word *transubstantiation?* There would be a substitution of substance, but no conversion, strictly speaking, of one substance into another. The change of substance would in this case be complete indeed, but the transubstantiation would be then only the change of the substance of the species or accidents. This implies no contradiction indeed, but is it the doctrine of the church, or the proper sense of transubstantiation? We wish Father Dalgairns had on this point been more explicit, or in other words, that he had defined with a little more precision and distinctness what we are really to understand by transubstantiation as applied to the blessed Eucharist.

The author successfully refutes the objections to the real presence brought from the Cartesian doctrine, that extension is the essence of body, and from the atomic theory of matter. The vulgar notions of space and time are borrowed from the senses, and are inadmissible by the philosopher. Space and time are relations, not entities, and are really nothing prescinded from the *relata*, or objects related. Space is nothing but the relation of coexistence which creatures bear to one another, and therefore, as distinguished from them, like all abstractions, is sheer nullity. Time, again, is nothing in itself, and is real only in the actual succession, or rather successive explication, or prog-

ress of existences. To say that a body occupies space, means simply that it bears a certain relation of coexistence to other sensible objects; so also to say of any thing that it exists in time, means simply that it bears a certain relation of successive explication to certain other things. Ideal space is the power of God to externize his acts; ideal time, on which sensible time depends, is his power to complete his works, on their side, by successive or progressive explication. Neither space nor time, therefore, can interpose any restriction on bodies, or any obstacle to the action of God. Both, as distinguishable from himself, as sensible space and time, depend on his creative act and are therefore subject to his free will, as is the creative act itself, not restrictions on it. The free will of God is restrained only by his own essence or necessary and eternal being. Nothing is impossible to God but to contradict or annihilate his own being, or cease to be, as Fénelon has well proved in his *Réfutation* of Malebranche.

We are well aware that some of the scholastics, and the approved contemporary philosophers of the illustrious Society of Jesus, hold that creatures have an objective possibility outside of God, *hors de Dieu*, but as Fénelon says, it must at least be conceded that this possibility depends on the divine power, in such sense that what God has no power to produce, is not even objectively possible.* This pretended objective possibility may be dismissed, for there is and can be no possibility without God, and with God every thing is possible that does not contradict his essence, that is, his own eternal and necessary being, as we have shown in our *Refutation of Atheism*.† The great trouble is, to persuade a certain class of philosophers that nothing is nothing, not something; or that a possible existence differs in no respect at all from simple non-existence or nothing.—But a possible existence is that which may exist. Yes, by the creative power of God, not by any intrinsic power or energy in itself; otherwise we must suppose nothing can make itself something. We know nothing so misleading as the scholastic dissertations on possible existences. Nothing, we repeat, is possible, without the infinite power of God, and with his infinite power every thing is possible that does not deny that power itself; for

* *Réfutation du P. Malebranche*, chap. iii.

† See Vol. II, pp. 76–81.

there is no distinction *in re* between the power, or any other attribute, of God and the essence of God, or between the divine essence and the divine *esse* or being. The distinction recognized by theologians is a distinction *quoad nos*, not *quoad Deum*, and grows out of the inadequacy of our faculties to take in, in one view, all that is knowable or known of God.

Hence we maintain that all things are possible to God but to cease to be, and that nothing is impossible to him that does not imply his own annihilation. It is absurd to suppose that the freedom of his action is or can be restricted or impeded by any thing he has created, or by any properties or attributes with which he has endowed it. As space and time depend on himself, it is absurd to suppose that they can offer any obstacle to his perfect freedom of action. The only question we have to ask with regard to the possibility of transubstantiation is, does it, as the church understands or asserts it, offer any repugnance to the divine being? If not, it is possible, for the divine power is commensurate with the divine *esse*, itself commensurate, if we may use the term, with the divine *essentia*. No philosophical objection can then weigh against transubstantiation whatever view may be taken of substance, for all created substances are under the absolute dominion of the Creator. Nothing prevents God, if he sees proper, by an act of his sovereign power, from removing in the blessed Eucharist the substance of the bread and the wine, and substituting the substantial body and blood of our Lord, without any change in the sensible properties of the bread and the wine. If this is the doctrine of the church, we are incapable of appreciating any philosophical objection which assumes that it is impossible.

Whether Father Dalgairns's doctrine of substance and accidents is acceptable or not, is another question. He follows St. Thomas, who, in one of his *Opuscula*, which we have tried in vain to understand, attempts to demonstrate that the accidents or properties can subsist without their substance or subject. This exceeds our comprehension. We can conceive that by a miracle they may subsist without their natural subject, but not without any subject, for that would imply to our understanding that they are not accidents or properties, but substances, or substantial existences, which would be a contradiction in terms. We can understand that their natural subject may by a miracle

be removed, and another subject supernaturally supplied, which sustains them, and they thus remain unchanged, but not how they can subsist without any subject or substance.

We accept the doctrine of Leibnitz that substance is a *vis activa* or active force as fully as does Father Dalgairns, but we are utterly unable to perceive that it throws any light on the sacred mystery, or facilitates its explanation. Leibnitz was, no doubt, a great man, and he has rendered an important service to science by his definition of substance, his refutation of the Cartesian doctrine that the essence of substance is extension, and his rejection of the atomic and the assertion of the dynamic theory of matter; but we must not forget that Leibnitz was no Catholic, and was the veritable father of German rationalism. Nobody but a Frenchman, like M. Émery, could see in his unfinished work, published long after his death under the title of *Systema Theologicum*, any evidence that he believed or had any tendency to believe in the Catholic Church. He was willing to advocate a sort of political union with the church, if assured that she would accept his views as Catholic. We have studied, even recently, his exposition of the mystery of transubstantiation, but with very little satisfaction. Father Dalgairns seems to accept it, and to find in the Leibnitzian doctrine of substance the scholastic doctrine of substantial forms, which we are not disposed to dispute. The peripatetic or scholastic doctrine, as distinguished from that of Aristotle himself, who recognized no creative act, and held the pre-existence of matter, makes the *forma substantialis* the real existence, for it makes *materia informis* simply passive, in *potentia ad formam*. But pure passivity is nothing, for every real existence, in as far as it is existence, is active. The form is the substance or active principle of the thing, is the thing or existence itself; the passive matter, *materia informis*, being mere possibility—and therefore a nullity—adds and can add nothing; otherwise we should be obliged to assert with Aristotle the pre-existence of matter, and therefore to deny that God creates all things from nothing. If we identify substance with the substantial form of the schoolmen, we make it the real existence, whether we speak of corporeal or incorporeal substances. We accept the identity; but does it bring us any nearer to an explanation of the mystery of transubstantiation?

Suppose the substantial form of the schoolmen is identical with what modern philosophy calls substance, and that sub-

stance is inextended and rightly defined by Leibnitz, *vis activa* or active force, what do we gain? What are accidents or sensible species of the bread and wine after consecration, or change of the substance? Accidents cannot originate in or be produced by the substance, in the scholastic sense, for if they were, they would not be accidents. The scholastic definition of substance, as that which stands under or supports accidents, supposes substance to be independent of its accidents and capable of existing without them and independently of them. But abstract from substance its accidents, qualities, or properties, and what remains? In this case substance would be the *reine Seyn* of Hegel, confessedly the equivalent of *das Nicht-Seyn*, or no being at all. The *Church Review* urges that modern philosophy takes substance in the concrete, for nothing exists *in abstracto*. How will Father Dalgairns answer the objection?

Father Dalgairns distinguishes with the schoolmen substance and its accidents, identifies the accidents with the sensible qualities or properties of the substance, and holds that these qualities or properties are effects produced on our senses by the substance. Nothing hinders that by a miracle the substance of the body of our Lord should produce on our senses the effect that is produced by the substance of the bread. No doubt of it; but where then are the species that remain after the conversion, and which can subsist without their subject, as St. Thomas maintains? Then, again, are we to hold that the sensible properties of the bread exist only in our senses, and that the bread has them not, when the loaf is hidden from sensible observation? Father Dalgairns seems to us in his exposition to make the species mere appearances or sense-shows, and to deny them all objective existence. We cannot on his principles understand how it can be said that the substance of the elements, even holding as we do, that it is intelligible not sensible, can be changed and its sensible properties, as Theodoret asserts, remain unchanged; for if he is right, nothing remains unchanged, since the sensible properties of the bread do not remain over as produced by the substance of the bread, but corresponding sensible effects are produced by the substance of our Lord's body, which does not seem to us to be the doctrine of the church.

We, perhaps, are only betraying our own ignorance and philosophical ineptness, when we say that we have never

seen a philosophical explanation of this tremendous mystery of the blessed Eucharist that met all the difficulties in the case. The scholastic philosophy, borrowed from the old pagan, Aristotle, with its passive *materia prima* and substantial forms, is as far from solving the difficulties in the case as is Cartesianism; and Leibnitz and Father Dalgairns, while they remove numerous vulgar objections, leave the mystery as unapproachable as ever. For us it is the mystery of mysteries, and all we can do is stand before it in silent wonder or bow down in profound adoration. All the mysteries of the Gospel are concentrated in it, and while our faith grasps it with love and joy unspeakable, our philosophy stands aghast before it. Only God himself can comprehend it, and none but God could have taught it; no human reason could have devised it, and no human reason can lift the veil that covers it. All that men or angels can do is to wonder and adore.

Yet we deny not that some difficulties in the way of receiving the doctrine, interposed not by reason but by the senses, may be removed by explanations. We discussed the subject in our reply to objections to the Catholic doctrine alleged from the fathers by E. H. Derby in his *Letters to a Young Kinsman*, and we refer the reader to what we there said.*

The late Dr. Kenrick, the illustrious archbishop of Baltimore, assured us that he accepted our statement of the doctrine and philosophy of St. Augustine, but considered our use of the terms *corporally* and *spiritually*, liable, though qualified, to be misunderstood, and construed into a denial of the real bodily presence of our Lord in the blessed Eucharist. But we used them in the sense of St. Augustine. St. Augustine says there is a visible body and an invisible body, or distinguishes in body two parts, one visible and the other invisible. The visible part is the corporeal species; the invisible part, that which is not seen, but understood, he calls the intelligible, and sometimes the spiritual body. This is wherefore we use the terms objected to as liable to be misunderstood, and deny that our Lord is present *corporally*, that is, sensibly, or with his sensible species, and assert that he is present only spiritually, that is, in his invisible, intelligible, or noetic body. He is really present in his invisible body, but not in his visible or sensible body.

*Vol. VII, pp. 398–405.

Which, we take it, is St. Augustine's doctrine, and as far as we know orthodox.

Now the invisible or intelligible body which is not seen but understood, is precisely what the schoolmen, Leibnitz, and Father Dalgairns call *substantia* or substance, and treat as the *causa essentialis*, or as that which produces the species, or *makes* the sensible body. We dare not say they are wrong, but their doctrine, as we have already hinted, appears to us to deny all real subsistence to the species or sensible body, which seems to us not to accord with the doctrine of the fathers, and, as far as we can see, would render pointless the argument of Theodoret against Eranistes, the Eutychian. It seems to us to deny all reality to the mimesis, or sensible, or to reduce it to a mere sensible appearance, without any objective reality. When our Lord was transfigured on the Mount he partially lifted the mimetic or sensible veil, which concealed from mortal eyes his glory, a glory which he habitually bore about with him, and inseparable from his divine person: but was that veil which concealed his glory nothing? Are the sensible species of the bread and wine nothing but effects produced on our senses by the substance of our Lord's body really present in the Blessed Sacrament?

We may be very wrong, but, as at present informed, we think the philosophy that is represented by St. Augustine is more in accordance with the Catholic dogma, which never varies, than either the scholastic philosophy or our contemporary philosophy. As Father Dalgairns does not go beyond the scholastics, the philosophical part of his treatise on Holy Communion does not in all respects satisfy us. This may be our fault; but though we prefer Aristotle, as a philosopher, to Plato, we do not think any thing has really been gained by casting philosophy and theology in a peripatetic mould. We reverence St. Thomas on this side of idolatry, but St. Augustine is more congenial to the age in which we live, and, we confess it, to our own mind and temperament. We prefer him also, as he presents his thoughts in his own free and unrestrained way, to what he is when compressed into the scholastic mould, or made to move and speak as a peripatetic. He is less remote from the modern world, and more intelligible to it than are the mediæval scholastics.

The *American Church Review* examines, under the head of *The Philosophy of the Eucharist*, Father Dalgairns's book with such ability as it has, and the usual arrogance and

presumptousness of an Anglican, or Episcopalian, but its objections are less to the Catholic doctrine itself, which, of course, it rejects, than to the author's philosophy and attempt to show that its principles are supported by modern science. It cites a passage from Father Dalgairns's book, (p. 66) on which it proceeds to make its comments.

"'St. Thomas had grounded the doctrine on the idea that substance is not to be discovered by the senses, but is the object of the intellect alone. It is absurd to argue that our senses tell us that the object before us is bread, and that nothing can stand against the evidence of sense. St. Thomas had shown us that the senses tell us nothing whatsoever about the substance of bread, and that, therefore, they are not competent witnesses. Modern philosophy corroborates St. Thomas, by establishing that the idea of substance comes not from experience, but from intuition. St. Thomas had said that the accidents were separable from the substance, and, therefore, that God could leave the color and taste of bread after the reality was gone. In the language of science, the accidents are now called phenomena, or appearances; and it considers them to be, not the substance itself, but the effect of its active forces on our organs. Who will deny that God can cause these effects to continue, when the force itself is gone? It is a miracle; but who will dare to place it beyond his power?'

"There is," says the Reviewer, "a sophistry and disingenuousness about this argument of which Father Dalgairns, we would hope, was unconscious, but which must, nevertheless, be exposed. In the first place, there seems to be an attempt to smuggle in the Scholastic idea of substance, as if recognized by modern philosophy. Our present modes of thought know substance only in the concrete; and not as an entity distinct or distinguishable from the mass in which it inheres. The above quotation uses the word in the Scholastic sense, to provide for a change in the substance of the bread and wine What was formerly spoken of as substance, is now called force. 'In the language of science, the accidents are now called phenomena, or appearances; and it considers them to be, not the substance itself, but the effect of its active forces on our organs.' That is, in the language of science, there is a substance in the bread which puts forth active forces; and the phenomena are the effects of the active forces which the invisible substance of the bread puts forth. Surely, the author must know better than to attribute any such conception to modern science. Science knows substance only in the concrete. Here is a mass of bread, composed of flour and water, modified by heat. Here are three natural forces employed in its construction. As a mass, it has a force belonging to itself. This force is what stands for the Scholastic 'substance.' Of this we do know something, not by intuition, but by its effects upon our senses. The only intelligible meaning to be attached to the dogma is, that this force is

withdrawn, and another substituted. If the force is withdrawn, surely its effects must cease; but this, again, is contrary to fact, for the bread does not cease to produce its natural effect upon the senses. There is a fallacy, or something more objectionable, in the following suggestion, that 'the phenomena are "only" the effect of its active forces on our organs.' As if there were not real effects of the forces in the very existence of the phenomena. The wheat, the water, the bread composed of them by the use of heat, are phenomena apart from our senses. They are things which are *made to appear*, remaining whether the human organs are brought into contact with them or not. What meaning, then, is there in the question, 'Who will deny that God can cause these effects to continue, when the force itself is gone?' Does this mean that the force which produced the bread has expended itself, and is thus gone, while the effects remain? This it plainly does not mean. It means that the natural and proper force which belongs to the mass of bread is withdrawn, so that it shall not produce the natural effects which bread may produce, and that another force is introduced. This is a thing which we will not deny to be within the power of Omnipotence—*i. e.*, to change the inherent force, while appearances remain—but it is not within his power to effect contradictions. So long as the bread produces effects, not only on the organs of vision, which might well be averted, but also on the organs of taste and nutrition, which are proper to bread, how is it possible to believe that the proper force (substance) of bread is withdrawn? We can believe that something is superadded; but that will not answer the terms of the dogma. 'It is a miracle,' says our author. That is no miracle which cannot be discerned by the senses; for we depend upon the senses to prove the grand miracle of the Resurrection.

"This is one side of the problem. The other relates to the non-extension of matter, with especial reference to the body of Christ. Here there is a continual interchange of the terms matter and body, as if they were identical.

"'According to modern philosophy, so far is it from being certain that matter is identical with extension, that, on the contrary, its ultimate elements are by many held to be unextended, and bodies to be made up of unextended forces. In other words, it is no more a contradiction in terms, that a body should be in many places, than that a soul shall be whole and entire in each particle of the body.'

"If a man will use common terms, which have a fixed technical sense, in an arbitrary way, there is not much use in reasoning with him. We may use the term body in an abstract way, as expressing the vital essence of any known subject; but when we speak of *a* body, we confine ourselves to something which has extension, and occupies space; and to attempt to argue from the non-extension of matter to the non-extension of *a* body, which, *ex vi termini*, is matter extended in space, is manifestly a contradiction and an absurdity. This assertion is made in support of the

statement of Aquinas, that 'the body of Jesus in the Blessed Sacrament is beyond the ordinary laws of space, so that it can be whole and entire on tens of thousands of altars at once.' Such a statement seems to imply a material conception of the presence of Christ in the Sacrament, which is equally removed from a reality to the imagination, and a mystery to faith. The body of Christ is not an abstraction, not a mere unextended force. Christ, as a man, has an existence in an organized body, which has its abode in space. His body, therefore, including also his soul and divinity, is extended. We cannot conceive of him as a man otherwise. Divinity we cannot conceive of as limited by extension; but our Lord is a man. Now, in heaven, at the right hand of the Father, he has (though glorified) the same body virtually with which he ascended from Mount Olivet. To assert, then, that God can impart to the body of the exalted Christ the property of non-extension, is to say that he can make a thing to be and not to be at the same time. A conception of the presence of Christ in the Eucharist, therefore, such as this, involves a contradiction. It does not belong to Omnipotence to cause a thing to be and not to be at the same time.

"In effect, the author rests his cause, philosophically considered, upon the recognition of the Scholastic idea of substance. 'The terms in which the blessed doctrine is theologically expressed, have never been proved to be empty words, conveying only a semblance of meaning. They have never been expelled from human philosophy. As for the existence of substance, it is much under the mark to say that it has never been disproved. Its belief is guaranteed by physical science. The utmost which some few metaphysicians say is, that its existence cannot be proved, while the same men reassert it under the name of force; and all scientific men who believe in matter, believe also in substance, for matter is but the one permanent reality which is the cause of phenomena.

" 'Again, though no one believes in absolute accidents, yet no one who acknowledges an eternal reality disbelieves in phenomena as distinct from substance. There is nothing, therefore, inconceivable in the notion that these appearances remain by Divine power, after the substance is gone' (p. 80.)

"It would take more space than we can allow to show the sophistry of these statements. In implying that there is any thing in modern philosophy that answers to the Scholastic notion of substance and accidents, or that any one can conceive of a substance in bread apart from the chemical forces which made it what it is, the author is trifling with the intelligence of his readers, or imposing upon their credulity. There is not a word of truth in the statement fairly understood. No modern philosopher, as a philosopher, conceives of the existence of forces and phenomena apart from each other. No one would dream of giving utterance to such a theory, except under pressure of a necessity for defending the dogma of Innocent III, proclaimed in A. D. 1215.

"And, in fine, all that is claimed as the result of the discussion is some proof of the bare *possibility* of the asserted change. In the next chapter, the author begins: 'The Blessed Sacrament is possible. . . . If it be possible, it is.' Even granting that the author's review of modern philosophy had left it credible that such a change as is involved in transubstantiation is possible, it would remain to be shown that this was the only mode in which the presence of Christ in the Sacrament could be rendered possible. The difference between Roman and Anglican theology, on this point, is not as to the fact, but as to the mode. It is practically admitted by the Roman theologians themselves, that the mode is not declared in the language of Scripture. The mode becomes an article of faith by virtue of the decree of Innocent III. We know when the notion which was finally formulated in that decree sprang up. We know that it was amid the worst and darkest period of her history that the Church of Western Europe has ever known, and we see that the theologians who set themselves to work to explain and defend it, moil as men who have little proclivity for their task, or who feel as if they were 'laboring for the wind.'

"What, then, is a true and adequate representation of the presence of Christ in the Eucharist, which shall be free from these logical objections, and yet recognize it as a reality—as a real, and not a rhetorical, presence?"

We are not disposed to accept Father Dalgairns's philosophy, nor any other philosophy as proving the possibility of transubstantiation; all we contend is that philosophy cannot prove it to be impossible, for it cannot prove that it impugns the necessary and eternal being of God, or that it implies its annihilation. But we are not keen-sighted enough to detect the fallacy the reviewer alleges. We grant that mere abstract substance without any qualities or properties, is nothing, or the equivalent of no substance at all. Substance, again, is not, as one view of the scholastic philosophy seems to us to imply, the mere substratum underlying the accidents, species, or properties; but is the thing itself with all its natural and essential properties or qualties. The difference, between the substance we call salt and the substance we call sugar is essential, substantial, not simply accidental. Prescind the *differentia*, and you will not have a generic substance common to both, but will lose, except in words, the genus, and have neither salt nor sugar, the substance of neither. In this sense, and this sense only, is substance to be taken in the concrete.

The reviewer does not take it in this sense. By concrete substance, he does not understand substance with its essen-

tial properties or attributes, but as an entity indistinguishable "from the mass in which it inheres." This is not very exact, for the substance does not inhere in a mass, but the essential properties inhere in it, and substance is taken in the concrete when and only when it is taken with these inherent properties or attributes, without which it is nothing. The fact that several substances combine to form the bread, or that they are separable by chemical analysis, amounts to nothing; for the substance of the bread, how many substances may enter into it, is so far forth as bread one substance, and, if dissolved into its components it is no longer bread. Chemistry tells us that water is composed of oxygen and hydrogen, yet the moment the hydrogen and oxygen are separated, there is no more water, and the substance of the water, as water, is destroyed. The objection that bread is composed of several substances is not well taken, for bread in the concrete, as actual bread, has a single substance, which has its own proper attributes, and its transubstantiation presents no more difficulty than if it consisted in a single natural element. Where then is the fallacy of which the reviewer accuses Father Dalgairns?

Supposing, again, that the sensible qualities or properties of bread are simply the effects produced by the invisible or non-sensible substance, as active force upon our organs, the fact that the substance of the bread is composed of wheat, fire, and water, does not in the least affect the author's reasoning. The body of Christ really present, may by the power of God produce the sensible effects that would be produced by the bread if it remained, as well on the supposition that the substance of the bread is chemically separable into several substances as if it were formed from a single element, since, as the substance of the bread, it acts as a simple force. The reviewer's objection that the sensible properties of matter or body are not simply effects produced by the invisible substance or force, may be well founded, but not for the reason he alleges. We have already urged, for other reasons, the same objection.

Father Dalgairns resolves the visible or sensible body into phenomena of the invisible or intelligible body. Now we do not think the visible body and the intelligible body are adequately expressed by substance and phenomenon, or force and its effects on our organs. We do not believe this is the doctrine of St. Thomas, for if it were, we cannot understand how he could pretend that the accidents or species could

subsist without their subject. It would be to pretend that the effect can subsist without its cause. Nor can we reconcile it with the teaching of the fathers, that, while the elements in their substance are transmuted by the words of consecration into the body of our Lord, the sensible and natural properties of the bread and the wine remain unchanged. Now we see not how this can be said, if we say these sensible and natural properties, or if you will, effects, on our sensibility produced by the bread are simply reproduced or produced anew by the present body of our Lord. There would be a reproduction of the species, but we could hardly say they remained, or survived the conversion of substance.

Besides, though we may be out in our philosophy, we are not prepared to admit that the mimetic or sensible is purely phenomenal. The sensible, we admit with Plato, copies or imitates the ideal or intelligible, but we are not prepared to admit that it is a mere appearance, or that it is absolutely unreal. We believe it real in its own order, not simply, as the transcendentalists maintain, an appearance or sense-show. The sensation is subjective, but the sensible is objective, and does in no sense depend on the affection of our organs of sense in order to exist. We reject the doctrine that denies the intelligible, or deduces it from the sensible or the material; but we equally reject the doctrine that makes the sensible merely phenomenal. We hold it to be real. We hold with St. Augustine, that in all bodies there is a visible or sensible body, and an invisible or intelligible body, and that it is the invisible or intelligible body of the bread and wine that is converted in transubstantiation into the invisible or intelligible body of our Lord, while the visible or sensible body of the bread and wine remains unchanged. This asserts the real presence of our Lord in the Blessed Sacrament, but in his intelligible body, not in his sensible body. Father Dalgairns terms this intelligible body, whose presence is discerned only by faith, the substance of our Lord's body, which it undoubtedly is, but we prefer St. Augustine's explanation, because it permits us to hold the sacred mystery without deceiving or belying the senses.

St. Augustine's philosophy is older and, in our judgment, profounder than that of St. Thomas, Leibnitz, or Father Dalgairns. After St. Paul, who was an inspired apostle, we regard St. Augustine as the profoundest philosopher that has ever lived. St. Thomas was profound, but he labored especially to mould the philosophy of Aristotle, which he

found in vogue, and which denied creation and asserted the eternity of matter, and God as the soul of the world, into harmony with Christian faith and theology. St. Augustine engaged in no labor of the sort, but framed his philosophy from sacred tradition, the Holy Scriptures, especially from the luminous Epistles of St. Paul. If naturally no profounder than St. Thomas, his genius was less cramped by the old pagan philosopher, and he drew more directly from fresher and more living sources. At any rate his philosophy is to be preferred to the eclecticism of Leibnitz. Perhaps we do not understand him, but he satisfies us better than any other uninspired writer.

The reviewer (p. 407) says, as bearing against the "Roman doctrine" of the blessed Eucharist, that "it is difficult to conceive how any one, who has any apprehensions of a spiritual existence, can be brought to regard a material symbol as identical with the spiritual reality which it symbolizes." We are very much inclined to agree with him, and hence we have never been able to believe that the heathen actually worshipped the material image, which they knew was the work of the carpenter, the mason, the carver, or the painter, but the dæmon or numen, whom the incantations of the heathen priests induced or compelled, as they supposed, to take up his residence in it. Even the North American Indian does not literally worship the bear, but the manitou of bears. Hence, too, we have always considered the Protestant charge of idolatry against the respect which Catholics pay to sacred pictures and images as exceedingly absurd as well as ill-natured. We do not know but there are Protestants stupid enough to confound the symbol with the symbolized, for Protestant stupidity in matters of religion is unfathomable, but we are sure no Catholic ever commits so gross a mistake.

To Protestants who do not believe our Lord when he says, "This is my body," the bread and the wine, after consecration as before, are simply material symbols of Christ's body, and they receive only a symbolic communion, that is to say, no real communion—only a make-believe or sham communion. But Catholics do not regard the material elements as symbols, but hold them to be converted by the words of consecration into the real body and blood of our Lord. We hold them to be transubstantiated into the intelligible body of our Lord itself under the species of bread and wine, consequently there is and can be in the

Catholic mind, no identification of the material symbol with the spiritual reality symbolized.

Our criticisms on Father Dalgairns may be unwarranted and even rash, but they are made in good faith, and must be taken simply as a statement of our own difficulties in accepting his attempt to show that transubstantiation involves no contradiction of the principles asserted by modern science. We think he does not show it, and cannot show it without denying all objectivity to the sensible, and reducing it to a mere affection of our organs, which favors pure idealism, and perhaps the heresy of the Docetæ. But this does not affect our faith in the stupendous mystery, first, because we have little confidence in modern science, and second, because our faith rests on the word of God, proposed and defined by the church—a higher authority than any philosophical or scientific theory has or can have.

Indeed, as we grow older and less daring in our speculations, we are more and more disposed to receive the revealed mysteries with the simplicity of faith. Philosophy may remove some obstacles to their intellectual acceptance, but as a rule we believe it creates more difficulties than it removes. Philosophy, divorced from faith and theology, and operating by the sole light of nature, is comparatively worthless. He who deduces his philosophy from the Holy Scriptures, the teachings of the church, and the traditions of the race, will have the highest and best of all philosophies, but his philosophy will bear a theological form, and be expressed in theological terms. Reason may at times appear to bring the mystery nearer to our understanding, but it is only in appearance. No reasoning can create faith in those who have it not, for faith is the gift of God. The soul to whom grace is not given, is insensible to argument, but the soul to whom grace is given hardly needs argument. Simple instruction is all such a one needs; the difficulties in the way of faith vanish of themselves, and he believes almost as spontaneously as he breathes.

THE TRUE CROSS.*

[From Brownson's Quarterly Review for January, 1860.]

A VERY good friend has sent us this Calvinistic tract, with an urgent request that we should review it, and point out its errors and fallacies. It is hardly necessary to do that, for there is no error or fallacy of Calvinism that may not be found refuted over and over again in our controversial literature; nevertheless, it may not be wholly useless for us to make the tract the subject of a few comments. The tract is ably and skilfully written, and is not ill-calculated to mislead the simple and uninstructed. Its apparent object is to exalt the glory of the cross, and to show that we Catholics, though we make an idol of the cross, look for salvation through some other name than that of Jesus Christ. It is written mainly in the form of a conversation between a traveller and an old man, and, contrary to good taste and Scripture counsel, the old man is represented as the learner, and the traveller, a spruce young Presbyterian parson, remarkable for his self-conceit, is the teacher. We give entire the opening chapter:

"On one of the most beautiful peaks of the Jura, not far from St. Laurent, and near a wood of beeches and firs, stands an old cross, at the foot of which several paths meet.

"This perishable monument of a love which never will end, should recall to him who contemplates it, the eternal sacrifice of the Son of God, and draw his thoughts towards the inheritance the Saviour bequeathed his church at this great price.

"But how few hearts understand the language spoken by the cross—that sign of the Redemption! How few Christians, beholding it, turn their affections towards the Lamb of God, who taketh away the sins of the world! How many rather revile, and wag their heads, and confirm their unbelief in the great Sacrifice of the church, when they look upon this suffering-place of the Holy and Just One!

"But how many souls there are also who call upon the name of the

* *The True Cross.* Translated from the French of the Rev. C. MALAN. New York: 1858.

Son of God, and who, deceived by prejudice or ignorance, seek in the useless and dead wood of a material cross, that which is alone found in this all-powerful Saviour, who died, it is true, on the accursed tree but who is now with his Father in glory.

"When the children of Israel were destroyed in the desert by the fiery serpents, Moses, by God's command, raised before them a brazen serpent, and whoever looked upon this symbol, was immediately healed. It was God himself the faith of the Israelite beheld, when he turned his eyes towards the serpent raised on high. This work of man's hand was far from being, for a believer, what superstition afterwards made it. In the desert, and in the midst of the afflicted camp, the brazen serpent proclaimed the promise and the mercy of the Lord, but, seven centuries afterwards, it had become an idol. Israel offered sacrifices to it, and even those who turned from their Maker adored this useless metal, this dead sign of a benefit they had forgotten. As the deluded Israelites looked upon the brazen serpent, so do an ignorant or unbelieving people look this day upon the cross. Jesus was sacrificed there, and the promise is made also, that every soul that beholds this victim in faith shall be saved from the death his sins deserve. The believer looks to Jesus and lays hold upon the promise, but the idolater offers incense to the Cross, and while he bends his knee before this symbol, forgets and repulses the benefactor this monument recalls.

"Such were my thoughts while I rested my weary limbs on the thick turf at the foot of the cross. I had just ascended the mountain, and before returning to my distant home, I paused to take breath, while my heart dwelt upon this great God and Saviour that the Christian finds every where, on the mountains, among the plains, and in solitude, as in an assembly of his true worshippers.

"'Holy Spirit,' said I in my soul. 'O! raise my heart towards my Father! Jesus, my Shepherd, look upon one of thy flock who calls thee, and may thy voice speak to me sweet words of peace and of hope!' At this moment two countrymen passed, followed by an old man, whose exterior betokened that he belonged to the higher class of society. The countrymen took off their hats, made the sign of the cross, and passed on. The old man stopped, kneeled, and bent his head reverently, while his white hair was stirred by the breeze.

"'O Lord!' cried I in my heart, 'take pity on this soul, and if thy true cross is still unknown to him, show him, I beseech thee, thy salvation!'"—pp. 5–8.

The old man's ignorance of the significance of the cross is concluded or suspected from his stopping, kneeling, and saying a prayer before it. One would think the fact a very good proof that the old man did understand the significance of the cross, and that because he regarded it as the symbol of man's redemption he knelt and prayed before it. But

these Calvinistic travelling parsons have a way of reasoning of their own. "But how many souls there are who call upon the name of the Son of God, and who, deceived by prejudice or ignorance, seek, in the useless and dead wood of a material cross, that which is alone found in this all-powerful Saviour, who died, it is true, on the accursed tree, but is now with his Father in glory." Indeed! and how many are they? and who are they? The intention of the Rev. C. Malan is undoubtedly to represent that Catholics confound the material cross with him who suffered on it, and expect salvation from the wood, not from him who was nailed to it. But even the author of this tract is himself able to distinguish between the wood of the cross and him who was crucified, and we doubt if there is in the whole Calvinistic world a single individual come to the age of reason that could not do the same were the question fairly presented. How, then, pretend that Catholics cannot or do not? We are, it is to be presumed, as intelligent and as capable of making the distinction as they are, and their quiet assumption of being able to make distinctions which we cannot, only indicates on their part a very great ignorance, both of themselves and of us. Why, even the heathen never fell into the gross absurdity of mistaking the material image their own hands had carved, or moulded, for the god it was intended to represent. They worshipped the image only because they supposed it inhabited by the *numen* they adored. How long will men give currency to such absurdities, and how long will Protestants remain unthinking and unreasoning enough to be imposed on by them? We reverence the cross as the symbol of man's redemption, but we are not such fools as to confound the material cross with him who expiated on it our transgression, and made satisfaction to divine justice for our sins. The simplest Catholic that ever made the sign of the cross knows that it is not the wood that avails, that it is only the God-man, who died on the cross, that saves. We reverence the cross from its relation to him, and from its relation to our salvation. The death of our Lord on the cross has made the cross for ever honorable, and that in which every true Christian does and must glory. It recalls the passion and death of our Lord; it reminds us of what he suffered for us; at what price we were purchased, and it brings our Saviour fresh before us, pierced in his hands, his feet, his side, for our iniquities; brings to our hearts his deep humility, his obe-

dience, his sacrifice, his great mercy, and his infinite charity,—things which we, who are redeemed by his blood, are none too prompt to remember with all the aids to our recollection we can obtain.

But let us hear our traveller a little further:

"The old man having finished his prayer, raised his venerable head, and leaning his hands on his staff, turned cordially to me, and asked if I was a traveller, and if I came from a distance.

"'I am only taking a ramble among the mountains,' replied I. 'But I am no less a traveller, for we are all journeying towards eternity, and every day brings us nearer our journey's end.'

"The old man looked at me silently, as if to satisfy himself as to what manner of man it was who made this serious answer; then sitting down on the grass by my side, he said with a little reserve: 'Am I wrong to ask you what religion you profess?'

"'The religion of Heaven,' I answered quietly; 'that which the only Son of God himself brought us, and which he confirmed forever, when he shed his precious blood on a cross like this.'

"The interest of the old man seemed still more excited by this new answer. I perceived plainly that he was reflecting on what he should say to me, and that many thoughts were passing through his mind.

"'Allow me to ask you,' said he at last, with some quickness, 'if you are Roman Catholic or—Protestant.'

"'I only know,' I answered respectfully, 'one name under heaven, which has been given men whereby they can be saved. This beautiful, great name is that of Jesus Christ, the Son of God, and it is by his name alone that I call myself. I am a Christian.'

"These words embarrassed my questioner a little, and smiling as one who was afraid of acknowledging a mistake, he said: 'I also bear this name, because I also believe that the Lord Jesus Christ has saved me, by dying for me on this cross. At least,' he added humbly, 'I hope so.'

"'A *hope* is very little,' I answered gravely, 'when the question is one of life or death. Uncertainty, and even a doubt in this respect, is a very serious evil; for we know not from one moment to another, whether we have time left to seek or to wait for assurance of it. And what a terrible answer is that the Bridegroom himself makes to the foolish virgins who have no oil in their lamps, when he says, 'The door is closed, depart from me, for I never knew you!'"—pp. 8–10.

The old man gives the true answer: "I also bear this name, because I also believe that the Lord Jesus Christ has saved me by dying for me on this cross." Only he really said *has redeemed*, instead of *has saved* me, for redemption is already effected; but salvation is in the world to come, as we may infer from the fact, that only they who persevere

unto the end are saved. "At least," he added, "I hope so." The writer makes the old man talk nonsense. "I believe the Lord Jesus Christ has saved me, at least I hope so." The old man never said that, for we do not hope for that which is already effected, but for that which, with regard to us, is still future. The old man might have said, and said very truly, "I believe the Lord Jesus Christ has redeemed me, and I hope for salvation through him." "A *hope*," adds the traveller, "is very little, when the question is one of life or death. Uncertainty, and even a doubt in this respect is a very serious evil." There is no doubt of the fact that Christ has redeemed me, none that he has given me all the means of salvation, if I properly use them, by concurring with the grace given to me and to all men; but that I shall properly use them and finally be saved, is to me only a matter of hope, and can be only hope in this life, since the fruition is not here, and hence the apostle tells us, now in this life "abideth faith, hope, charity." Faith excludes doubt, and a well-grounded hope, though not certainty, excludes anxiety and perturbation. But what is the mighty evil in our remaining uncertain whether we shall be finally saved or not? The uncertainty implies no doubt of the truth of Christianity, the mercy of God, or the sufficiency of divine grace; but simply a doubt of ourselves, whether we shall or shall not persevere to the end, and comply with all the requirements of the Gospel. Self-distrust is more consonant to the Gospel than self-conceit, and the publican who smote upon his breast, saying, "God be merciful to me a sinner," went down justified rather than the self-complacent Pharisee, who thanked God that he was not as other men, and made a boast of his virtues. It is an evil and a sin to despair of God's mercy, but it is no less an evil, and no less a sin, to presume on his mercy. And the answer of the bridegroom will be, perhaps, even more terrible to him who has never allowed himself to doubt his final acceptance, and been all along flattering himself that he was perfectly safe,—"The door is closed; depart from me, for I never knew you." We are admonished to make our calling and election sure, to work out our salvation with fear and trembling; and St. Paul, though he had been carried in his ecstasy to the third heaven, plainly intimates that it was still possible for him to become a castaway. It is at least as possible that, as well satisfied as our Calvinistic friends are with themselves, and as magisterial as is the wave of their hand, or the tone

with which they say to the humble Catholic, "Stand by, for I am holier than thou," they may find in the end that their confidence of safety is only a sinful self-assurance, only an unpardonable arrogance, or a miserable self-delusion. After all, tender consciences among Calvinists are very far from being at ease, and though Calvinists may hold, that once in grace always in grace, and that the elect are sure to be saved, it is sometimes more than they can do to persuade themselves that they are of the number of the elect, or that they really have once been in grace; and the number of timid souls, we would say, modest souls, who among Calvinists are driven to despair, and even to insanity by the fearful doubt of their acceptance is by no means small, and what is more deplorable still, these are decidedly among the most exemplary and least un-Christlike in the Calvinistic ranks, and those who have far less reason for despair than those who are never troubled, and take it for certain that they belong to the elect. But let us read on.

"So it was this interesting man made me see how ignorant he still was of the grace of God, and that the gift of the Father in Jesus Christ had not been revealed to him. He had truly pronounced the beautiful word salvation, but he had never yet understood the meaning of it, since he spoke of meriting it, as if his safety had been a benefit it was necessary to gain by works and efforts.

"I wished to be sure that such was his opinion, and for that reason I asked him if he hoped he was approaching the desired end, or if he feared he was still distant from it.

"'It is not fitting that any sinner should glorify himself,' he replied humbly, 'and to me less than any one. But notwithstanding my great weakness, may I not hope that the good God who says of himself that he is love, will have pity on me, on my ignorance, alas! on my misery; and—shall I say it? that he will accept what I have been able to do, or at least desired to do, to gain his favor?'

"These words left me no longer in doubt as to the spiritual state of the old man. His confession of faith was unequivocal. He had just declared that he expected pardon for his sins, and an inheritance in Heaven, as a recompense for his works: a glorious recompense it is true, but merited, at least in part, by a succession of works or of sacrifices. 'Well!' perhaps you say, reader, 'was he not right? Does it not become the sinner to seek the pardon of God? and will he not have deserved it, when, after having turned from evil, he shall by his good conduct repair his former errors, and go forward in the path of uprightness? Would God be more inflexible in his justice than men in theirs? And among men does not he who ceases to do evil, and learns to do well, obtain grace?'

"Not grace, for a grace is not deserved. If, then, you speak of grace, do not even pronounce the word merit, at least not to say that you mean by that a salary, or a reward; and if that is the meaning you give it, do not even name grace, for then it no longer exists.

"A gift is no longer a gift when it is purchased, and a benefit disappears when it becomes a salary."—pp. 13–15.

Perhaps the traveller was still more ignorant of the grace of God, than his imaginary old man. If, as we must suppose, the author intends to represent in the old man, one instructed in the Catholic faith, and looking for salvation through faith and obedience to Jesus Christ, as set forth by the church, he falls into a few rather important mistakes. No Catholic ever speaks, unless loosely, of *meriting* grace, for *gratia est omnino gratis*, is always gratuitous, unmerited, a free gift; neither does any one speak of meriting salvation by his own works and efforts, meaning thereby, works and efforts in the natural order, by our natural light and strength. But we touch here one of the fundamental differences between Catholics and Protestants, and the reason why we have always been so careful to draw the line between the natural and the supernatural, and to insist on the fact that the supernatural in the Christian sense is not simply a power or influence above nature, but an order of life and immortality, which, though in some respects, running parallel with nature, yet lies in a plane above nature, and to which nature, by her own powers, can never rise. The Protestant does not, as far as we have been able to discover, really recognize the supernatural order of life and immortality, and consequently, whatever he may say, does not recognize any such thing as regeneration, or the new birth,—the birth by the Holy Ghost in Christ. In order to understand what Protestantism really is, we must take the reverse of what Protestants most loudly profess. Protestantism from first to last is a delusion, a self-deception, which, like iniquity, always lies unto itself.

If there is any one thing Protestants profess to hold, it is the reality of the new birth, and if there is any thing of which they profess to be well assured, it is that they themselves have been born again, or, as they sometimes express it, "experienced a change of heart;" but what they call the new birth is really no new birth, nay, no birth at all, for it is no introduction into a new order of life, or into any order of life above that of our natural life. All Protestantism that speaks of regeneration, teaches that the regenerate

are justified forensically only, or at least, they are not justified because intrinsically just. Both Luther and Calvin teach that the regenerate sin, every breath they draw, and therefore, that, intrinsically, they do not in any respect differ from the unregenerate. In regard to the law they remain in themselves the same as before experiencing the so-called change of heart. They are in themselves sinners as before, and are only putatively just. In their case God does not impute sin, does not count their sin to be sin; covers it with the robe of Christ's righteousness, and conceals it from his sight. He justifies them for Christ's sake, that is, he counts or reputes the righteousness of Christ their righteousness, and, well pleased with that, he pardons and justifies them, without its being really theirs. The justification is simply forensic, and their justice as theirs is putative,—in plain terms, a legal fiction. It is evident, then, that the so-called regenerate are not regenerated, are not born again, are not created anew in Christ Jesus, and translated into a new order of life, or the kingdom of God's dear Son. Hence, as the natural cannot merit or do any thing towards meriting the supernatural, the Calvinist is perfectly consistent with himself in denying all merit.

The Calvinist is obliged also to deny all merit, and all idea of recompense or reward, because he holds that man's nature is totally depraved. Instead of retaining the Catholic doctrine—that man by the fall did not lose any of his natural faculties, or undergo any positive interior corruption of his nature, but simply lost the grace through which he was constituted or established in a state of justice, or what is technically called original justice, and certain gifts annexed thereto, which, though not raising man above the order of nature, yet are not his due as pure nature, such as exemption from pain, sickness, and death, the subjection of the body to the soul, the appetites and passions to reason, &c., he maintains that man lost his natural spiritual faculties, and became corrupt in his whole nature, alienated from all good, incapable of thinking a good thought or of performing a good act, and bent on evil, only evil, and that continually. He does not mean that by original sin man fell back into a state of pure nature, attenuated by being despoiled of original justice, and therefore incapable of thinking a single thought, or performing a single act which is good in relation to the supernatural order, or our supernatural destiny; but that he became incapable of thinking

a good thought or of performing a good act in relation even to the natural order. Hence he maintains, and is forced to maintain, that all the acts of unbelievers, or the unregenerate, are sins, and as the regeneration he asserts is forensic, not intrinsic, he can, of course, recognize only sin in every proper human act, and must necessarily deny all idea of merit, and therefore of reward.

But the Calvinist forgets that where there can be no merit, there can be no demerit, and where there is no reward there can be no punishment. Hence his doctrine, however he may attempt to explain it, takes man entirely out of the category of moral beings, and denies the retributions of eternity, or of the life after death. If the Calvinist were to hold to the strict logical consequences of his doctrines, he would be excluded from testifying in our courts of law on the same principle that atheists are excluded, and sometimes Universalists, that is, of believing in no future retribution. If the Protestant believed in the supernatural order of life and immortality brought to light through the Gospel, and in the reality of the new birth or regeneration, he would find no difficulty with the Catholic doctrine of merit, or with the Scriptural doctrine of rewards and punishments, which he now glories in denying. Certainly, St. Paul always represents the Christian as running for a prize, as fighting or struggling for a reward, and he tells us expressly, as the Protestant version has it, "He that cometh to God, must believe that he is, and that he is the *rewarder* of them that diligently seek him."—Heb. xi. 6, 7. He says of himself, "I have fought the good fight, I have finished my course; I have kept the faith; and there is laid up for me a crown of justice, which the Lord the just judge will render unto me at that day; and not to me only, but to those also, who love his coming."—2 Tim. iv. 7, 8. What means the future judgment, if there be no rewards to be distributed? What means our Lord, when he says, "Whosoever shall give to drink to one of these little ones, a cup of cold water in the name of a disciple, verily, I say unto you he shall not lose his reward."—Matt. x. 42. Or when, in bidding us, when suffering persecution for his sake: "Be glad and rejoice, for great is your reward in heaven?"—Luke vi. 23. God will reward every man according to his works, whether they be good or whether they be evil, and reward implies merit, desert. Nothing is more certain than that our Lord promises to reward his

followers; he promises to reward them with eternal life, with a crown of glory, that fadeth not away, eternal in the heavens. Nothing, then, is more certain than that the Christian can perform works that through the grace of God merit eternal life.

The Calvinist falls into his error by not understanding the Christian economy of salvation. We suppose him moved with the strong desire not to rob Christ of his glory, or to detract from the merits of the cross. He supposes, or affects to suppose, that the merit, we, as Catholics, attach to good works, does tend to rob Christ of his glory, and really implies, that the way of the cross is not the only way of salvation. Making no distinction between the two orders, he understands by good works only works done in the natural order, from natural motives, and for natural ends. Now to pretend that works of this sort, even though not sinful, or even good in relation to natural beatitude, merit *de condigno* or even *de congruo*, any thing in relation to eternal salvation, is to set aside the cross, and to rob Christ of his glory. But when we Catholics speak of merit, we have no reference to works of this sort, but sole reference to works done in Christ, from the infused habit of grace, that is, from a supernatural principle, for a supernatural end. These are not works done out of Christ, but in Christ,—not from nature alone, but from grace which flows to us through the Holy Ghost from the Word-made-flesh, or the God-man, our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ, enabling us to perform acts of a supernatural value. Their merit flows from the grace freely bestowed on us, not from us regarded as standing in the natural order, so that grace is their principle, and God, in crowning us with eternal life, does, as St. Augustine teaches, but crown his own gifts.

The difficulty of the Protestant grows out of his not understanding that God, in making himself man, not only expiates man's sin in his cross and passion, and makes full satisfaction to divine justice, but founds a new and supernatural order of life—a divine-human life, and into which we must be born, or created anew, and thus live the life he lives. "As the Father hath life in himself, so he hath given to the Son also to have life in himself." Therefore our Lord says to his disciples: "Because I live, ye shall live also." The Christian life is the life that flows from the Word-made-flesh, and is hid in Christ. By living it we be-

come united to him as our head, by unity of life members of his body, and through him members of one another, and, as his members, suffer with him, and joy with him, expiate in him our sins, and share in the merits of his life, his obedience, his cross, and passion, as we hope to share with him in the glory of his kingdom. The foundation or source of the Christian life is the Incarnation, and we live it only in Christ our head, or in being united to him as living members of his body. It is on the principle that the life of the head is the life of the members, and that what is done or suffered by the head is done or suffered by the members, that Christ redeems and saves us. But when united to him as living members, he living in us, and we living in him, making up what St. Augustine calls the complete Christ,—*totus Christus*, we live in his life, love in his love, and merit in his merit. In this way, and in this way only, can we be truly said to be saved by his merits, and to be made just in his justice, sanctified in his sanctity.

Now, as prior to regeneration, we are only natural men, we cannot live the divine-human life, we have, and can have no communion with it, and therefore have practically no part or lot in his merits, until we are regenerated or born again. Living only a natural life we can merit only a natural reward. We can merit nothing in relation to eternal life, because we merit in that relation only in the merits of Christ, and to merit in his merits, we must be in him. This coming into union with him, so that we can live his life, and merit in his merits, is regeneration or the new birth. It is a spiritual birth by which we are born into the supernatural order, or the life of Christ, as by our natural birth we were born into the natural order, or made a living member of natural humanity. Regenerated, or born into the Christian order, as we are in the sacrament of baptism, we are made members of Christ's body, come into living union with our head, and live his life, the life begotten in us by the Holy Ghost. Living his life, we are one with him, and therefore, as long as we are one with him, merit in his merit. As the whole begins and ends with the Word-made-flesh, as we can neither create ourselves anew in Christ, nor merit any thing of ourselves in the supernatural order, or at all, save in him, we do not see how we do or can rob Christ of his glory, or depart from the way of the cross. All the glory is in asserting the merit of

good works done in him, and for him. All the merit is his, for it is only in his merit we merit, as it is only in his life we live.

The Protestant thinks he honors God by denying all merit to man, but he so thinks only because not recognizing the human-divine life of our Lord, he cannot see how we can merit, without detracting from the merit of Jesus Christ himself. He does not see that it is Christ, who, by elevating us to his own life by his own merit, enables us to merit, and therefore, that our merit is only an application and continuation of his. "Without me ye can do nothing," he says; but, adds St. Paul, "I can do all things through Christ strengthening me." As God enhanced his own glory by creating man a free agent, and therefore able to acquire merit in virtue or obedience, so Christ enhances his own glory by preserving us free agents in the order of grace, and thus rendering us capable of meriting through him an eternal reward. On the Protestant scheme there are and can be no supernatural virtues. There is, according to him, in the supernatural order, no human activity; grace operates irresistibly, and man, instead of concurring with it, co-operating with his Saviour, is a mere passive recipient of salvation. If this were so, we might say, man undergoes grace, but not that he lives it. There can, then, be no life of grace, and it matters not what a man does. Let him do his best as a natural man, it can avail him nothing: his best acts are sins, and sufficient to damn him to all the pains of hell for ever: let the man, once justified, do the worst he can, it harms him not, for once in grace always in grace, and to the justified God does not impute sin, however grievously they may transgress. And this doctrine which denies all human virtue, natural or supernatural, which sends men to hell or admits them into heaven without any moral merit or desert on their part, is put forth as that which especially honors God and augments the glory of his Son, our Saviour.

We can rob the Son of his glory only by asserting the merit, in regard to eternal life, of the natural virtues, and open heaven to all well-behaved heathens who have never been regenerated, or born into the kingdom of God's dear Son, or in whom the new life has never been begotten. But that no Catholic, who knows his faith, ever does or can do. We must be begotten anew in Christ Jesus, and made one with him in the unity of his human-divine life, or we can have no hope in the life and immortality revealed in the

Gospel. But once so united, all our works, proceeding from his meritorious life as their principle, and done for him as their end, partake of his merit, and, through his infinite love, are meritorious of the reward of heaven. We can then render all the natural virtues supernatural and meritorious. A cup of cold water, given to a child from motives of supernatural charity, ensures a supernatural reward. Patriotism, which, in the natural order, is only a natural virtue, the Christian, who loves and serves his country in Christ, and for Christ's sake, raises to the rank of a supernatural virtue, meriting a supernatural reward. So of all the natural virtues, performed from Christ, in him, and for him, they are all elevated to the rank of the supernatural order.

The Calvinist fails to recognize the Christian order of life, by failing to recognize sacramental grace as a divinely infused principle of action. Regarding the grace of regeneration as operating forensically, and denying it to be an infused virtue elevating man to the supernatural order, and regarding man, in all the operations of grace, as purely passive, as acted upon, and not as acting, he can recognize in man no principle of merit, because he can recognize in him no virtue, no human activity. The principle of merit in man is not nature; it is not something born with us in natural generation, but it is grace infused into our hearts by the Holy Ghost, which supernaturalizes our nature, making it, what theologians call, *natura elevata*. This grace is not merited by our works, but has been purchased for us, and is freely given us by our Lord. He has merited it, not we, and he gives it to us, not as a reward of merit, but as the principle of merit. We have not merited it, but by it we are enabled to perform acts meritorious of eternal life. All our merit flows from grace, and therefore has its first cause and principle in the merits of Christ. Hence, he says, without me ye can do nothing—and it is true. We can do nothing without grace,—prayers, alms-deeds, spiritual and corporal works of mercy are meritorious by virtue of this new principle of life; but as this principle is grace which flows from the God-man through the cross, it is plain, that, in asserting their merit, we no more make void the merits of Christ, or reject the cross, than we deny the creative power of God by saying he has created us active beings. We assert no merit out of the merits of Jesus Christ, and it is false to allege that we put good works in the place of grace, when it is only by virtue of grace we can perform good

works. According to the Catholic, the grace of regeneration is not a mere external and transitory act of the Holy Ghost, but the infusion of an interior, habitual, and permanent principle of a new and higher life, and therefore, a man may always act from grace as the principle of supernatural life, as he acts from natural reason and affection, as the principle of his natural life, and the merit of his acts done from grace is his merit, because, though done from grace and for grace, they are done from a principle made his by the infused gift of God, and also by the assent of his understanding and the co-operation of his will, through grace assisting. If the Calvinist understood the sacramental grace he denies, and that, flowing from the cross and infused into us, it is in us the principle of the new and higher life, he would see that we defend, to say the least, as much as he professes to do, the merits of Christ, and that all his charges against us are false and absurd. In simple truth, it is he who rejects the Christian economy of salvation, not the Catholic.

We can do nothing towards our salvation till we are regenerated, for we must be born into the Christian life before we can live it. But how can we be born into this life? The Calvinist is here wholly at fault,—has no fixed and regular order by which one can be regenerated or enter into this life. Confounding regeneration with conversion or change of disposition and affection, he recognizes no human activity in the fact of turning to God; he compels the sinner to await the moving of the Spirit, and to depend entirely on the irresistible grace of God. Suppose the man, in the order of nature alone, to be fully convinced of the reality of the Christian order of life, and of the fact that he can secure heaven only by living it; how is he to be born into it? He can do nothing, he can make no step in advance, but must wait till God chooses to work a miracle in his behalf. Then, again, all life needs sustentation, and how is your Calvinist to sustain his Christian life, supposing that by a miracle he is born into it? He has no answer to either question. God is wise, and works by rule and measure; all his works are perfect. He leaves nothing unprovided for. He sends his grace to excite, move, and aid the will to approach the sacrament of baptism, in which, by the grace, always attached to the sacrament, one is cleansed from his sins, and introduced into the Christian order of life, and united by the living bond of charity to Christ the head. Here is the door through which whoever will may enter into the new order

of life, and become a member of Christ. By the sacrament of the holy Eucharist, he who will may find the sustentation his life needs, the very flesh and blood, soul, and divinity of our Lord himself, and in that of penance, the means of recovering the life lost, of being reconciled and united to God anew in the bonds of charity. For all the wants of this supernatural life, from its inception here to its expansion into the beatific life of heaven, God provides by these and the other sacraments, which are not, any of them, mere rites or ceremonies, but real channels or mediums of grace. All is preserved, provided for, and the means of being born again, of entering into life, and securing heaven, are placed within the reach of every man; and while all flows from God and honors his grace, the freedom of man and the merit of good works are preserved in the order of grace as they are in the order of nature. In other words, though Jesus Christ is the first cause, he creates man a second cause in the order of grace, as he originally created him a second cause in the order of nature. Hence, a man is saved by grace, yet not without good works; for grace leaves a man his free will, at the same time that it becomes in him the principle of merit.

The Rev. C. Malan understands nothing of all this, and in his blindness rejects it. But let us read on :—

"The old man had not yet understood me; he did not see his error; for at my question, if he thought the pardon of sins and life eternal was a free gift of the goodness of God, he answered me without hesitation:

"'I have no other persuasion, and that is my faith. Certainly salvation is a gift of God; and I do not think any man can be saved otherwise than by Him who died upon the Cross.' I should have been surprised to find this inconsistency in a man whose language and manners showed a mind of much intelligence and cultivation, if I had not perceived in what he said, the same reasoning I had used myself, and which is so often used by Christians in our day.

"In truth, if we ask the greater part of those who profess to believe in the Lord Jesus Christ, what is their hope of eternal safety, they will answer almost, without exception, that they expect the mercy and grace of God in Jesus Christ, and that it is in order to acquire it, and to make themselves worthy of it, at least as much as that is permitted to men, that they frequent churches, that they fulfil the duties of religion, that they dispense their alms, and that they abstain from all wrong conduct.

"That is to say—on one hand they use the words Saviour, mercy, free pardon, the gift of heaven, but on the other they study to merit and to gain by themselves this forgiveness of sins and this unspeakable happi-

ness. They thus imitate the folly of the released debtor, who gloried that his king, in person, had freed him from all debt, but who, notwithstanding, hoarded even his bread and water, lest, said he, he should be imprisoned, if he did not pay all himself.

"Such was the error of the old man. I wished to show it to him; but I thought if he could first declare it more plainly, the truth would afterwards strike him with greater force.—a necessary precaution in a case of this kind; for if one shows the pupil, in drawing, the beauty of a model, and assists him in copying it, before he has well understood the faults and deformities of his own design, it is to be feared he may afterwards feel some regret at having destroyed what he at first drew with so much satisfaction, and which in his eyes compared favorably with the work of his master."—pp. 15–17.

We see no error on the side of the old man in this. Salvation implies pardon of sin, but the simple pardon of sin is not all that is meant by salvation, because the end contemplated by the Incarnation is not simply pardon of sin, or the reparation of the damage done by sin, but in pardoning sin, if you will, the elevation of man to a new and higher order of life than that in which he was created. The error is on the part of the Calvinist, who denies this order of life, and fails to understand the Catholic doctrine. The Catholic does not understand how a man, come to the use of reason, can be saved, can enter into the kingdom prepared for the blessed, even though he has been born into the new life, unless he lives that life, and elicits the acts of faith, hope, and charity. A man may have been born again, may be a Christian, and yet, unless he lives the Christian life, keeps the commandments, and does whatever the Gospel requires of him, not be permitted to enter into the joys of heaven, or be finally saved. A man by natural generation is ushered into natural life, but he is not entitled to natural beatitude, unless he keeps the law of that life. So in the supernatural order. We do not by our works attempt to do what Christ has done, or to pay the debt he has paid or forgiven us, but we attempt to secure to ourseves the benefits of what he has done, so that in our case it shall not turn out that he has died in vain. Throughout the whole ract we find this same fundamental error of Calvinism, that man is not and cannot be, in the order of grace, an active creature or second cause; and this comes from the fact that Calvinism denies him to be a second cause or a free activity even in the natural order. Calvinism, under one aspect, is a revival of Manicheanism or oriental dualism, and, under an-

other, simple pantheism. According to it, under the latter aspect, all our actions are simply divine operations, and modern transcendentalism, which divinizes all our natural instincts, and identifies even our lusts with the interior operations of the Holy Spirit,—a doctrine which meets us in nearly every contemporary novel or romance,—is only a logical development of Evangelicalism, of Protestantism as taught by Luther and Calvin, and refined by Edwards and those of our New England divines who have followed him.

But let us hear out tract-writer still further:

"'I do not think so, either,' I answered. 'But what I wish to ask is, whether the good you have done, either secretly or in behalf of your neighbor, has been for the honor of religion, to show your love to God your Saviour, or only an expression of your desire to gain thus the favor of the Eternal One, the forgiveness of your sins, and finally the safety of your soul?'

"My question addressed itself to the conscience of this honest man. He pondered over it some minutes—then answered by this acknowledgment: 'I perceive that a man thinks of himself, when, in doing good, he seeks the reward which comes from God. I have fallen into this error, and I confess your remark has made a deep impression upon me. But I beg you to tell me whether to do what God commands, not with an ostentatious pride, but to obtain one day the approbation of heaven, "Well done, thou good and faithful servant," is not right, and if this motive is not the one God himself wishes us to have?'

"I answered: 'As long as I, a rebellious soldier, seek to be governed by the commands of my king, for fear that my revolt will conduct me to death, or in order that the king, at last perceiving me worthy, may give me his favor, however modestly or secretly I carry out my resolutions and my efforts, I am always acting for myself, and only work for my own safety. The law which makes me act is that of constraint and not that of liberty; still less that of love; and if I rise and go forward, it is because two swords drive me, namely, these—fear of pain, and hope of reward.'

"Reader! how difficult it is for the heart of man to understand this concerning his obedience to the commands of God! We perceive it clearly if an inferior seeks to gain the favor of a superior, and we call every token of submission or zeal *interested*, when actuated by such a motive. But when we are speaking of the sinner and the Eternal One, the same motives change their appearance and their name: and we say, we preach and we publish, 'that the man who forsakes his vices, because he is afraid of the last judgment, that he who dispenses his superfluous wealth, who gives himself to strict devotions, or who spends his life in penances, in order to blot out his previous faults and to gain heaven,

does it for love of God,' as if love could be united to fear; as if he *loved* any one but himself.

"The old man felt that my answer contained this reproach, for he said very gravely: 'Sir, if I understand you rightly, you wish to say that if I follow my religion in order thus to gain the approbation of God, and by that even the forgiveness of my sins, I have acted for myself and not at all for God; and, in fact, I see it is so, and perhaps, my works, when deprived of all ostentation, have had secretly this impure character. It is a very serious thing, and I question myself if a single man exists who can be virtuous otherwise than by this motive—of interest.'

"'Do you not think,' I answered, 'that if it please the king to remit my faults, by a pardon full and complete I should have the certainty that the law can no longer touch me; and that from this moment my obedience would flow from quite a different source from that which produced it before he had granted me mercy?'"—pp. 18–21.

The tract is undoubtedly right in saying that our good deeds should be done for God, *propter Deum*, as their last end, but its author forgets that no act can be done for God as final cause, unless it is done from him as first cause; so no act can be done for the God-man, our Lord and Saviour, unless we are united to him as the first cause, or fountain of life in us. We cannot act for him as our end, unless we act from him as our beginning. To tell a man, not regenerated, that his acts are not Christian virtues, because not done for the sake of Jesus Christ, is to talk without knowing well what one says. They are not virtues in the supernatural order, not solely because they are not referred to him as their last end, but because they do not proceed from him as their principle. Proceeding only from the principle of natural life as their *terminus a quo*, they cannot reach a supernatural end or *terminus ad quem*. You must elevate your agent to the plane of the supernatural end, before it is possible for him to act to or for such an end. Here is a point the Calvinist overlooks, or fails to meet, in his doctrine of regeneration, because, according to his doctrine, the grace that regenerates does not lift man out of the order of nature, and become in him a supernatural principle of action; it simply conveys to him an assurance of forensic pardon, and acceptance, but leaves him, as to the principle from which he acts, a mere natural man as he was before. The man, should he refer all his acts to God, could refer them to him only as the author and end of nature, and, consequently, would only fulfil the law of nature, without performing any supernatural or strictly Christian virtue.

The objection the tract makes to the old man, then, can be got over only on the Catholic doctrine of infused grace as the principle of a new and supernatural life,—a doctrine the author of the tract denies.

The author, in consequence of his bad philosophy, and worse theology, can see no virtue in acts done from a hope of reward. He does not see that the hope of reward in the Christian is the hope of possessing God as our supreme good, and, therefore, necessarily includes a love of God. Acts done from the simple hope of the enjoyment of heaven, or simple fear of the torments of hell, though they dispose to virtue, are not themselves perfect Christian virtues. But to hope for heaven in God, or to fear hell because it is alienation from God, and loss of God as our supreme good, is a hope or a fear that has its principle only in the love of God, and therefore is a virtue, as St. Paul teaches, when he says, "Now abideth faith, hope, charity, these three; but the greatest of these is charity." 1 Cor. xiii. 13. Our author cannot, however, on his doctrine, regard hope as a supernatural or Christian virtue, because he recognizes no infused grace in man, which is the principle of supernatural virtue. Hope with him is simply the hope of happiness, and fear is simply the dread of pain, in which God, instead of being honored, is dishonored, because he holds all acts done out of grace are sins,—a doctrine we certainly do not accept. But suppose the man elevated by indwelling grace to the supernatural order, that is, brought into living union with Christ his head. Suppose that he hopes to possess him, to be one with him, because he is his supreme good, and that he fears hell because hell is the utter loss of that good, you must concede that both his hope and his fear are virtuous, for they proceed from grace, the root of charity, as their principle, and, proceeding from it, necessarily partake of its nature. Hope loves and desires God, because he is our supreme good. In it, we no doubt have this much of interestedness, that it is as our good we desire him, but we have also this much of disinterestedness, that in it we desire our good in him, and in him only. It is then a virtue, though not so high or so perfect a virtue as charity, which loves God because he is not only our supreme good, but because he is the supreme good in itself. Yet love itself is not absolutely disinterested under all its phases. Its real nature is to unify, to make one, the lover and the beloved. If, on the one hand, the lover would give himself wholly to the

beloved, he would, on the other, take the beloved wholly up into himself. So charity would give all to God, and at the same time it would wholly possess him,—have, so to speak, all of God. Hence God gives, in the Incarnation, all to man that can be given, and in return asks man to give himself wholly to him.

IS IT HONEST?*

[From the Catholic World for May, 1868.]

A BRIEF tract, issued a short time since by The Catholic Publication Society, seems to have produced an unusual commotion among our non-Catholic brethren, and has called forth reply after reply from the sectarian press and pulpit. The tract is very brief, and consists only of a few pointed questions; but it has kindled a great fire, and compelled Protestants to come forward and attempt to defend their honesty, in uttering their false charges and gross calumnies against Catholics and the church. It has put them on their defence, made them feel that they, not the church, are now on trial before the public. This is no little gain, and they do not have so easy a time of it, in defending their libels, as they had in forging and uttering them, when Catholics had no organ through which they could speak, and were so borne down by public clamor that their voice could not have been heard in denial, even if they had raised it. Times have changed since those sad days when it was only necessary to vent a false charge against the church, to have it accredited and insisted on by a fanatical multitude as undeniable truth, however ridiculous or absurd it might be.

Since our sectarian opponents have been put upon their defence, we trust Catholics will keep them to it. We have acted on the defensive long enough, and turn about is only

* Sermons in answer to the Tract, *Is it Honest?* By Rev. L. W. BACON. *The Brooklyn Times*, March 9th, 17th, 24th, 1868.

fair play. They must now prove their libels, or suffer judgment to go against them. They feel that it is so, and they open their defence resolutely, with apparent confidence and pluck. They have no lack of words and show no misgiving. This is well; it is as we would have it, for we wish them to have a fair trial, and to make the strongest, boldest, and best defence the nature of the case admits.

In our remarks we shall confine ourselves principally to the justification attempted by Mr. Bacon, in his sermons, as we find them in the *Brooklyn Times*; and we must remind him in the outset that the assumption with which he commences—that the tract, in appealing to the good sense of the public, whether it is honest to insist on certain charges against the church as true, when the slightest inquiry would show them to be false—makes an important concession, or any concession at all to the Protestant rule, is altogether unwarranted. He says: "This submitting of the questions in dispute to the public, man by man, after the Protestant, the American fashion—concedes at the outset one great and most vital principle, to wit, that the ultimate appeal in questions of personal belief, is to each man's reason and conscience in the sight of God." Quite a mistake. There is no question of personal belief in the case. The question submitted to the public by the tract is not whether what the church teaches and Catholics believe is true or false, but whether it is honest to continue to accuse the church and Catholics of holding and doing what it is well known, or may easily be known, they do not do, and declare they do not hold? This is the question, and the only question, submitted. Is it honest to continue repeating, day after day, and year after year, foul calumnies against your neighbor, when the proofs that they are calumnies lie under your hand, and spread out before your eyes so plainly that he who runs may read? We think even the smallest measure of common sense is sufficient to answer that question, which is, on one side, simply a question of fact, and on the other, a question of very ordinary morals. The competency of reason to decide far more difficult questions than that, no Catholic ever disputes. We think even the reason of a pagan can go as far as that. "Why even of yourselves judge ye not what is right?"

"But this tract," the preacher continues, "is a plain assertion that no man ought blindly to accept the religious opinions to which he is born, nor the instructions of his re-

ligious teachers; but that he is bound, in honesty and justice, to hear the other side, and decide between them by his own private judgment." If by opinions is meant faith, it does no such thing; if by opinions are meant only opinions, it may pass, though the tract neither argues nor touches the question. The Catholic always supposes man is endowed with reason and understanding, and that both are active in the act of faith as in an act of science. There is and can be no such thing as *blind* faith, though blind prejudices are not uncommon. Men seek or inquire for what they have not, not for what they have. They who have the faith do not seek it, and can examine what is opposed to it only for the purpose of avoiding or refuting it. Catholics have the faith; they are in possession of the truth, and have no need to make for themselves the examination supposed. Non-Catholics have not the faith; they have only opinions, often very erroneous, very absurd, and very hurtful opinions, and they are therefore bound, not by the *opinions* they have received from their religious teachers, or to which they were born, but to seek diligently, with open minds and open hearts, for the truth till they find it. When they find it, they will not be bound to seek it, but to adhere to it, and obey it. There is no Protestant teaching in this, and it is nothing "different from what the church of Rome always teaches her followers."

The tract says: "Americans love fair play." The preacher says:

"I believe it is no more than the truth. If there is one thing rather than another that Americans do love, it is this very thing—absolute freedom and fairness of religious discussion. Curious, isn't it? How came Americans to 'love fair play'? Englishmen seem to have a similar taste. Catholic or Protestant in England can speak or write his thoughts, on either side, without hindrance or constraint. The same thing may be remarked, in a measure, in Northern Germany. How can you account for it? What is the reason, do you suppose, why they don't 'love fair play' in Spain? or in Austria? or in Mexico? or in Rome? This injured innocent stands in New York, at the corners of the streets, bemoaning himself that he is treated 'dishonestly, and unjustly,' because the public will not buy and read his books; and all the time, in the Holy City itself—under the direct fatherly government of the pope—a subject is not allowed to be (as this tract says) 'honest and just' toward Protestant Christians by examining both sides, except at the peril of being punished as for an infamous crime! 'Americans love fair play.' Why do all Roman Catholic nations suppress it? Why does

the pope forbid it in his own dominions? And what reason have we to believe that, if these who are clamoring for 'fair play' should ever hold the power in this country, they would put it to any different use here, from that which prevails in Catholic countries generally?"

We are not aware that there is any less love of fair play in Spain, Mexico, or Rome, than in the United States, England, or North-Germany, in Catholic than in non-Catholic countries, only there is more faith and less need to seek it, or to examine both sides in order to find it. As a matter of fact, though we cannot regard it as any great merit, Catholics are generally far more ready to hear both sides, and to read Protestant books, than Protestants are to read Catholic books. We have never met with intelligent Catholics as ignorant of Protestantism as we have generally found intelligent Protestants of Catholicity. There is nothing among Catholics to correspond to the blind prejudice, deplorable ignorance, and narrow-minded bigotry of sectarians; but we are happy to believe that even these are mellowing with time, losing many of their old prejudices, and becoming more enlightened and less bigoted and intolerant; there is still room for improvement.

"Let us understand in the outset," says the preacher, "that the charges against Catholics and the Catholic Church that are complained of in this tract, are conceded by the writer to be of grave importance. The prohibiting of the Bible to the people—the belief that priestly absolution has efficacy of itself, and is not merely conditional on the sincerity of the sinner's repentence—the paying to images of such worship as the heathen do—all these are declared by this writer to be 'detestable and horrible.' So that if it should appear that any one of them is proved against Catholics or the Catholic Church, the case is closed against them. He is not at liberty to go back and apologize for the doctrine or palliate it. He has declared it to be 'false doctrine'—'detestable and horrible.'"

What the tract regards as important or unimportant, is nothing to the purpose; what the preacher must prove is, that it is honest to continue to repeat charges against Catholics and the Catholic Church which have been amply refuted, and the refutation of which is within the reach of every one who would know the truth; or at least he must show that the refutation is insufficient, and that the charges are not false, but true. He will not find us shrinking from the truth, apologizing for it, or seeking to get behind it or around it. We, however, beg him to understand that he is

the party accused, and on trial, not we, and that we are probably better judges on doubtful points, of what is or is not Catholic doctrine and practice, than he or any of his brethren. He will do well, also, to bear in mind that the question raised by the tract is not whether the doctrine of the church is true or false, but whether it is honest to persist in saying that it is what the church and all Catholics affirm that it is not. What he must prove, in order to be acquitted, is that the church and Catholics do hold what the tract denies, and denies on authority, or that there are good and sufficient reasons for believing that they do so hold.

1. The tract asks, "Is it honest to say that the Catholic Church prohibits the use of the Bible, when anybody who chooses can buy as many as he likes at any Catholic bookstore, and can see on the page of any one of them the approbation of the bishops of the Catholic Church, with the pope at their head, encouraging Catholics to read the Bible, in these words, 'The faithful should be excited to the reading of the Holy Scriptures,' and that not only for the Catholics of the United States, but also for those of the whole world." Mr. Bacon does not meet directly the facts alleged by the tract, nor plead truth in justification of the libel; but undertakes to show that even if false, yet Protestants may be personally honest in uttering it; and he adduces various circumstances which he thinks may very innocently induce Protestants to suppose that the church does prohibit the use of the Bible. We have not the patience to take up in detail all the circumstances alleged, and refute the inferences drawn from them; most of them are mere inventions, perversions of the truth, misapprehensions of the facts in the case, and none, nor all of them together, justify the inference, in face of what the tract alleges, that the church prohibits the use of the Bible; and it is easy for any one who honestly seeks the truth to know that they do not.

The facts alleged by the tract are accessible to all who wish to know them. He who makes a false charge through ignorance, when he can with ordinary prudence know that it is false, is not excusable; and it is not surely in those who claim to be the enlightened portion of mankind to attempt to defend their honesty at the expense of their intelligence. They are the last people in the world, if we take them at their estimate of themselves, to be permitted to plead invincible ignorance.

The *Newark Evening Journal* is bolder and more direct

than Mr. Bacon. It asserts that the church actually forbids the reading of the Scriptures, and boldly challenges the fact alleged by the tract. It says: "On the very page from which are taken the words, 'The faithful should be excited to read the Holy Scriptures,' are quoted, it is also said, 'To guard against error it was judged necessary to forbid the reading of the Scriptures in the vulgar languages, without the advice and permission of the pastors and spiritual guides whom God has appointed to govern his church.' How then can it be false to say that the church prohibits the use of the Holy Scriptures?" Simply because to forbid the *abuse* of a thing is not to prohibit its *use*. The faithful, for the promotion of faith and piety, are excited to read the Scriptures; but to guard against error or the abuse of the sacred writings, those who would wrest them to their own destruction are forbidden to read them in the vulgar languages, except under the direction of their spiritual guides. A prudent and loving father forbids his child, who has a morbid appetite or a sickly constitution, to eat of a certain kind of food except under the direction of the family physician, lest the child should be injured by it; can you therefore say that he prohibits the *use* of that kind of food? Certainly not. All you can say is, that while he concedes the use, he takes precautions against the abuse, which is in no sense inconsistent with any thing asserted by the tract.

Mr. Bacon, referring to reported cases of the confiscation of Bibles, circulated by the Bible Society, found in the hands of the laity, says the French Bible confiscated was the Catholic version of De Sacy; that the Polish Bible circulated by the Bible Society was, word for word, the copy of the version published two centuries before, and approved by two popes; the Italian Bible, for reading which the godly family Madiai were persecuted and imprisoned, was the Catholic version [not so] of Martini, Archbishop of Florence, published with the approbation and sanction of Pope Pius VI. Suppose this correct, it does not prove that the church prohibits the use of the Holy Scriptures, but is very good proof to the contrary. These versions were made and published for the people, and would have been neither made nor published if the use of the Scriptures was forbidden. And how can you say that popes prohibit what you show they approved and sanctioned? There was a German Bible before Luther, and our Douay Bible was published before the version of King James.

"But I am not willing," continues the preacher, "that this effrontery [what effrontery?] of this question should be let go even with this answer." We can easily believe it. "I am ready to call witnesses." Well, dear doctor, your witnesses; we are ready to hear their testimony. "Who ever heard of a Catholic Bible Society multiplying copies of the Bible?" Nobody that we know of. But how long is it since Protestants had a Bible Society? Prior to that, did they prohibit the use of the Holy Scriptures? "Popes have fulminated their bulls against Bible Societies, denouncing them as an invention of the devil." Not unlikely; but it is one thing to denounce Bible Societies, and another to prohibit the use or the reading of the Bible. Your witnesses, Rev. sir, do not testify to the point. Besides, all the facts, or pretended facts, you bring forward are too recent for your purpose. The accusation that the church prohibits the use of the Scriptures was made by Protestants long before any of them are even said to have occurred, and therefore could not have originated in them. *Ex post facto* causes are not admitted in Catholic philosophy. The charge brought against the church betrays no little folly and ingratitude. If the church had prohibited the use of the Scriptures, how could the reformers have got a copy of them? They certainly purloined them from her, and could have got them from no other source.

The preacher concludes his first sermon by saying: "I am glad the time has come when it is understood on both sides that, if the Roman Church is to commend itself to the American people, it must begin by repudiating, as horrible and detestable, the teaching and practice for three hundred years of the church." What has for three hundred years been falsely alleged by her enemies to be her teaching and practice, agreed; but what has really been her teaching and practice, denied. "Let it but make good this new claim, and we thank God for the new reformation, and welcome it to the platform of Protestantism." There is no *new* claim in the case; what the tract asserts has always been the doctrine and practice of the church; she has always encouraged the use and opposed the abuse of the Holy Scriptures. That the preacher should desire a new reformation can be easily understood, for the old has well-nigh run out; that he will ever be able to welcome the church to the platform of Protestantism is, however, not likely; for she is not fond of standing on platforms, and prefers to remain seated

on the rock. The reverend gentleman may be shocked to hear it; but it is, nevertheless, a fact, that the Bible and reason are not special Protestant possessions; they were ours ages before Protestantism was born, and will be ours ages after Protestantism is dead and forgotten.

2. In his second sermon—in a note to which he corrects his assertion that it was the Catholic version of Martini, and states that it was the Protestant version of Diodati, that was used by the godly family of the Madiai—the preacher confines his efforts to questions raised by the tract with regard to the worship of images and pictures, and of the Blessed Virgin and the saints. The tract asks:

"Is it honest *to accuse Catholics of paying worship to images or pictures as the heathen do*—when any Catholic indignantly repudiates any idea of the kind, and when the Council of Trent distinctly declares the doctrine of the Catholic Church in regard to them to be, 'that there is no divinity or virtue in them which should appear to claim the tribute of one's veneration;' but that all the honor which is paid to them shall be referred to the originals whom they are designed to represent?" (Sess. 25.)

"The answer to this question," the preacher says, "is to be found by asking two others: 1. What sort of honors do the heathen pay to images? 2. What sort of honors do Roman Catholics pay to them? When we have got answers to these two, we can compare them, and shall be able to say whether they are the same."

We respectfully submit that neither of these questions need be asked; for so far as pertinent, both are answered in the tract itself. The accusation against Catholics which the tract implies cannot be honestly made, is that we pay *divine* worship to images and pictures, as the heathen do; what the tract then denies is that Catholics pay *divine* worship to images and pictures; and what it asserts is, that the heathen do pay them divine worship; but this assertion is simply illustrative, and should it be found inexact, it would not affect the formal denial that the worship Catholics pay them is *divine*. As to what sort of worship Catholics do render to images and pictures, the answer in the tract is explicit, that it is a "certain tribute of veneration paid them in honor of their original. The worship is not divine worship, and the honor paid is not paid to them for any virtue in them, but is referred solely to their originals." The catechism puts this clearly enough. "*Q. And is it allowable to honor relics, crucifixes, and holy pictures? A.* Yes;

with an inferior and relative honor, as they relate to Christ and his saints, and are the memorials of them. *Q. May we then pray to relics and images? A.* No; by no means, for they have no life or sense to hear or help us."

The preacher labors to show that this inferior and relative honor is precisely what the heathen pay to the images of their gods; but this, if true, would not prove that we do, but that the heathen do not, pay divine honors to images. He cites various authorities, Christian and heathen, to prove that it is not the brass and gold and silver, when fashioned into a statue, that the heathen worship, but that through the statue or image they worship the invisible gods; that is, they worship the image as the visible representation of the invisible divinity. This is, no doubt, in some respects, the actual fact; nobody pretends that they worship precisely the material statue, but the numen or god, the prayers, invocations, incantations, and the other ceremonies of the consecration of the statue by the priests compelled to enter the statue and take up his abode in it. But to this image, which for them contains the god, the heathen offer sacrifices and other acts of worship which are due to God alone, which makes all the difference in the world, though we have no doubt that the type copied, perverted, corrupted, and travestied in heathen worship is the Catholic type; as all heathenism is a corruption, perversion, or travesty of the true religion, or as Protestantism is a corruption, perversion, or travesty of the Catholic Church.

The heathen images and pictures represent no absent reality, and are not memorials of an absent truth, like our sacred images and pictures; and the heathen, then, can honor only the material substance or the supposed indwelling numen or dæmon. The gods they are supposed to bring nigh, represent, or render visible, are either purely imaginary, or evil spirits; hence the Scripture tells us that "all the gods of the heathen are devils." And finally, to these idols, which are nothing but wood and stone, brass and silver, or gold, which represent, if any thing, demons or devils, the heathen pay divine honors; while we simply honor and respect images and pictures of our Lord and his saints for the sake of the originals, or the worth to which they are related. Here is a difference which we should suppose even our Protestant doctor capable of perceiving and recognizing.

The preacher forgets that what is denied by the tract is,

that we pay *divine* honors to sacred images and pictures, and cites ample authority to prove that we do not pay divine honors to them or through them. We offer them no sacrifices, and we offer them no prayers or praises, even as symbols or as memorials of a worth they represent. They are never the media through which we honor that worth; but we honor them for the sake of the worth to which they are related, as the pious son honors the picture of his mother, the patriot the picture of the father of his country, or the lover the portrait of his mistress. The respect we pay them springs from one of the deepest and purest principles of human nature, and can be condemned only by those who hold that there is nothing good in nature, and condemn as evil and only evil whatever is natural.

The minister thinks that, even should enlightened and intelligent Catholics understand the question as explained by the catechism and defined by the Council of Trent, yet ignorant Catholics may not; and with them the honors paid to images and pictures actually degenerate into idolatry. He asks:

"But how in this respect do the people of modern Italy differ from those of ancient and heathen Italy? Do the practices of the people there correspond to the doctrines of the theologians, or have they, as of old time, 'bettered the instruction?' Do they pay no special veneration, as if there were some special virtue in the image itself, to those images that are reputed to bleed or sweat, or to the pictures that wink? If it was only as a guide of the thoughts toward the person represented that the image or picture served, then one image would serve as well as another, except that those in which the skill and genius of the artist had most excelled to represent in touching and vivid portraiture the object of the worship, might be preferred above ruder and coarser works. But as I have passed from church to church in those lands in which the Roman system has had unlimited opportunity to work itself out into practice, and have 'beheld the devotions' of the people, I have seen certain statues frequented by a multitude of worshippers, and visited by pilgrims from afar, who had come to bow down before them, and hung with miriads of votive offerings—waxen effigies of arms and legs and other members that had been healed in consequence of prayers to that particular image. And one fact, which I did not then appreciate the bearing of, was constantly observed by myself and my companion—that these objects of special worship and veneration were *never* works of superior art, but commonly rude, and sometimes even grotesque. The inexpressibly beautiful and touching statue by Bernini, of the Virgin holding upon her knees the body of the dead Jesus, is in the crypt of

St. Peter's, and admiring critics go down to study it by torchlight. But the image which is *adored* is a grimy bronze idol above it in the nave of St. Peter's, which is so venerated as the statue of that apostle that the toes of the extended foot have been actually kissed away by the adorations of the faithful."

It is very evident that the preacher, whatever opportunities he may have had, knows very little of the Catholic people in general, or of the Italian people in particular, and his guesses would deserve more respect if made in relation to his own people. Protestants have no distinctive worship which can be offered to God alone, and are therefore very poor judges of what they may see going on before their eyes among a Catholic people. The church is responsible only for the faith she teaches and the practices she enjoins, approves, or permits. If the people depart from this faith and abuse these practices in their practical devotion, the fault, since she takes away no one's freedom, is theirs, not hers. The worship that Catholics render to God, the honor they pay to the saints, and the respect they entertain for sacred images, differs not, as all worship with Protestants must. simply as more or less, but in kind, and not even a Protestant community can be found so ignorant as not to be able to distinguish between an image or a picture and the saint or person intended to be represented by it. For the many years we lived as a Protestant we never met any one of our brethren who mistook his mother's portrait for his mother herself, or the statue of a distinguished statesman for the statesman himself. Who ever mistakes the equestrian statue of George Washington in Union Square for George Washington on horseback, or confounds Andrew Jackson himself with Mills's ugly equestrian statue of him in one of the squares of Washington? Who could mistake the bronze horse on which the image of the old general is placed, and which you fear every moment is going to tilt over backward, for a real horse? Well, my dear doctor, however ignorant these Italian people may be whom you see kneeling before an image or a picture of the Madonna, they know more of the doctrines of the Gospel, more of God, and of man's duties and relations to him, more of his proper worship, than the most enlightened non-Catholic community that exists or ever existed on the earth. They may not know as much of error against faith and piety, of false theories and crude speculations as non-Catholics; but they know more of Christianity, more of what Christianity

really is, what it teaches, and what it exacts of the faithful, than the wisest and most learned of your sectarian ministers, not even excepting yourself.

With regard to bleeding, sweating, or winking pictures, if you find people believing in them, you will never find among Catholics any who believe that they bleed, sweat, or wink by any virtue that is in the picture itself; but that the phenomenon is a miracle, which God works by the saint pictured. You may doubt the miracle, but not reasonably, unless on the ground that the evidence in the case is insufficient. Whoever believes in God believes in the possibility of miracles, and there is nothing more miraculous in a picture of the Madonna winking, sweating, or bleeding, than there was in Balaam's ass speaking and rebuking his master. It is simply a question of fact. If the proofs are conclusive, the fact is to be believed; if insufficient, no one is bound to believe it.

If you find the people flocking to a particular image or picture and bringing to it their votive offerings, it certainly is not, as the preacher takes notice, on account of its merit as a work of art; for the Italian people, with all their love and exquisite taste for art, do not, like so many non-Catholics, confound artistic culture with religious culture; nor is it because they hold that there is any hidden virtue in that particular image or picture itself, but because the saint whose it is, has or is believed to have specially favored those who have invoked him before it. They may or may not be mistaken as to the fact, but the principle, on which rests the special devotion to our Lady or a saint before a particular shrine is a correct one; and there is in the practice no special honor to the image or picture for its own sake, and consequently nothing necessarily superstitious or idolatrous.

Even if, as there is no reason to believe, the statue of St. Peter in St. Peter's at Rome, and which the preacher calls a "grimy bronze idol," was originally, as he tells us some say it was, a statue of Jupiter, the honor paid to it by the faithful would not be paid to Jupiter, while intended to be paid to St. Peter. But the toes of the image have been worn away by the kisses of the worshippers; and do not these kisses prove that Catholics adore the image? The heathen adore their gods by kissing the feet of their statues; and when Catholics kiss the feet of the images of their saints, how can it be said that they do not worship or adore images as the heathen do? The heathen use incense in the

worship of idols; Moses prescribes incense, and the Jews use it in their worship of the true God; therefore the Jews are idolaters! The preacher forgets that what the tract declares to be dishonest is the accusation that Catholics pay *divine* worship, that is, the worship due to God alone, to images and pictures, as the heathen do. To kiss the feet of the statue of St. Peter, from love and devotion to the saint himself, the prince of the apostles, on whom our Lord founded his church, is not to pay divine worship to the image, nor even to Peter himself. Were we so happy as to find ourselves at St. Peter's in Rome, we are quite sure that we should kneel before the statue of St. Peter, and kiss its feet, running the risk of its having been once a statue of Jupiter, and we should do it as a proper method of expressing our love and veneration for the great apostle, and as simply and innocently as the mother kisses the carefully preserved portrait of her beloved son slain in battle for his faith or his country. As to using the forms used by the heathen to express affection or devotion, if proper in themselves, we have as little scruple as we have in using the language which our ancestors used in the worship of Woden or Thor, in our prayers and praises to the one ever-living and true God.

3. The sermon next takes up the false accusation that Catholics pay divine worship to the Blessed Virgin and the saints. The tract asks:

"IS IT HONEST *to accuse Catholics of putting the Blessed Virgin or the saints in the place of God or the Lord Jesus Christ*—when the Council of Trent declares that it is simply useful to ask their intercession in order to obtain favor from God, through his Son, Jesus Christ our Lord, who alone is our Saviour and Redeemer—

"When 'asking their prayers and influence with God,' is exactly of the same nature as when Christians ask the pious prayers of one another?"

The preacher says, "At the outset let me remark, that the question what Roman Catholics *do* is not conclusively answered by quoting what the Council of Trent declares." This supposes that the same rule must be applied to Catholics, who have an authoritative church, that is applicable to non-Catholics, who have none, or to people among whom every one believes according to his own private judgment, and does what is right in his own eyes. But this is not permissible. Our faith is taught and defined by authority, and to know what we as Catholics believe or do, you must be

certain what the church authoritatively teaches or prescribes. We cannot go contrary to that and be Catholics. No doubt Catholics may depart from the faith of the church, and disobey her precepts; but when they obstinately persist in doing so, they cease to be Catholics in faith and practice, and their belief or their practice is of no account in judging what is or is not Catholic doctrine or practice. They who believe or do any thing contrary to what is declared by the Council of Trent, are *pro tanto* non-Catholics. To know what is Catholic faith and Catholic practice, you have only to consult the standards of the Catholic Church—not every individual Catholic, as you must every individual Protestant when you wish to ascertain what is Protestant opinion and practice. Our standards speak for themselves; and in determining what Catholicity enjoins or allows, you must consult them, and them only.

Mr. Bacon and his brethren have as free access to our standards as we ourselves have, and they must remain under the charge of dishonestly misrepresenting us, or prove by our standards that the church offers or authorizes or does not forbid her children from offering divine worship to the Blessed Virgin. Their surmises, their conjectures, their inferences from what they see among Catholics, but do not understand, must be thrown out as inadmissible testimony. There are the standards: if they sustain you, well and good; if not, you are convicted, and judgment must go against you. This is the case presented by the tract, and which Mr. Bacon and his friends are to meet fairly and squarely.

Now, the tract shows from the standards, from the Council of Trent, which is plenary authority in the case, that the accusation against Catholics of "putting the Blessed Virgin or the saints in the place of God or the Lord Jesus Christ," is an accusation so manifestly untrue that no one can honestly make it. Here also is the catechism, which the church teaches all her children. "*Q.—Does this commandment* [the first] *forbid all honor and veneration of saints and angels? A.*—No; we are to honor them as God's special friends and servants, but not with the honor that belongs to God." The Council of Trent declares that "it is good and useful to ask the saints who reign together with Christ in heaven, to pray for us," "or to ask favors for us from our Lord Jesus Christ, who alone is our Redeemer and Saviour." We ask the saints in heaven, as we ask our friends on earth, to pray for us. Here is the whole principle of the case.

The Council of Trent, Sess. 22, c. 3, defines that, "though the church is accustomed to celebrate masses in honor of the saints, yet she teaches they are never to be offered to them, but to God alone." *Non tamen illis sacrificium offerri docet, sed Deo soli, qui illos coronavit.* Now, with Catholics the distinctively divine worship, the supreme worship due to God alone, and which it would be idolatry to offer to any other, is sacrifice, the highest possible sacrifice, the sacrifice of the mass, which our priests offer every day on the altar; the one unbloody sacrifice which was offered in a bloody manner on Calvary. This is offered to God alone; all else that is offered to God in worship, prayer, praise, love, veneration, may, in kind at least, be offered to men. We honor the chief magistrate, whether called king or emperor, president or governor; we honor the prelates whom the Holy Ghost has placed over us in the church; we pray to or petition rulers and men in authority; we chant the praises of the great and the heroic; we love our country, our family, and friends; we venerate the wise and the good, who, in services to the cause of truth, morals, and religion, prove themselves godlike. That Protestants, who have no sacrifice, no priest, no altar, no victim, should mistake the nature of our *cultus sanctorum*, is not surprising, for they have nothing in kind to offer God that we do not offer to the saints, especially to the queen of saints, the blessed mother of God. But this is their fault, not ours; for it is easy for them to know—for our standards tell them so—that we as Catholics place the supreme act of worship in the sacrifice of the mass, holding that only God is an adequate offering to God, and that the sacrifice of the mass is never offered to the saints or to any but God alone. There is a marked difference between our *cultus sanctorum* and that with which men like Mr. Bacon, of Brooklyn, seek to identify it. The heathen offered sacrifices, the highest form of worship they had, to their idols, their demigods and heroes; we offer the highest worship which we have—and we have it only through God's goodness—to the one, living, true God only. This proves that the accusation against Catholics of putting the Blessed Virgin and the saints, as objects of worship, in the place of God, is a false accusation, so well known or so easily known to be false, that no one of ordinary intelligence can honestly make it.

But the preacher supposes that Catholics, in other respects,

put them in the place of God. This is impossible. Catholics hold that the saints, with the Blessed Virgin at their head, are men and women—creatures whom God has made, has redeemed with his own blood, and has elevated, sanctified, and glorified by his grace, and therefore they cannot identify them with him or substitute them for him. We hold that Mary is the mother of Christ, and that he is her Lord as well as ours, and that it is through his merits alone, applied beforehand, that she was conceived without original stain; and can anybody, so believing, mistake her for her Son, in any respect put her in his place, or assign to her his mediatorial work? The very fears expressed by our Protestant friends that we do or are liable to do so, prove that even they are able to discriminate between her and her Son; why not then we?

The reverend gentleman continues:

"4. We are invited to several inquiries. First: Is it true that the prayers that are offered by Roman Catholics to departed saints, and especially to that holy woman whom we with them in all generations unite to call the blessed, are only of such a nature as we might offer to a fellow-Christian here upon the earth in soliciting his prayers in our behalf? Secondly: Are these supplications only for favor and influence, or are they for the direct gift of blessing and salvation? Do they put Mary into the place of Christ, the one Mediator between God and man; making of the All-Merciful Saviour who inviteth all to come unto him, an inaccessible object of dread and terror, whom we dare not approach except through the mediation of Mary? Do they ascribe to her the glory due to Christ, the only name given under heaven among men whereby we may be saved? Do they profess faith in her alone for salvation? Do they put the saints in the place of the Holy Ghost, by supplicating from them directly the divine gift of holiness and the renewal of the sinful heart?"

We have answered these questions by anticipation. It is probable that Catholics believe somewhat more distinctly and more firmly in "the one mediator of God and men, the man Christ Jesus," than do the sects, and are less likely to forget it, seeing that all their practical devotions, public and private, the great honors given to Mary and the saints are founded on it and tend directly to keep us from forgetting it. Catholics do not pray to Mary because they regard the all-merciful Saviour as inaccessible, or as an object of dread and terror; nor because she comes in between them and him, represents him, or enables them to approach him through her, as is evident from the fact that we not un-

frequently directly beseech him to grant that she and other saints may pray for us. We honor her as the mother of God in his human nature. We pray to her to pray to him for us, not only because she is our mother as well as his, but because she is dear to her Son our Lord, and he delights to honor her by granting her requests. For a like reason we invoke the saints, that is, ask them to pray for us. We must then be more ignorant and stupid than even our sectarian ministers believe us, if, in praying to them because as his friends they are dear to him, we substitute them for him from whom what we seek can alone come. If we believe they themselves give it, why do we ask them to pray him to grant it? Cannot our acute and ingenious doctor see that the invocation of saints renders the error he supposes Catholics fall into utterly impossible in the case of the most ignorant Catholic, and that it tends to fix the mind and the heart directly on the fact that every good and every perfect gift is from above and cometh down from the Father of lights? Can he not see that the intercession we invoke is a clear confession of the truth he thinks it obscures or obliterates? If we think the good comes from them, why do we ask them to intercede with Christ to bestow it? Why not ask it of them?

But is it true, as the tract affirms, that we ask nothing of Mary and the saints in heaven that it would be improper to ask of our fellow-Christian? This is not precisely what the tract asserts. It asserts that asking their prayers and influence is exactly of the same nature, that is, the same in principle, with what Christians do when they ask the pious prayers of one another. To this the preacher replies:

"I hold here a volume of 800 pages, almost every one of which contains an answer to these questions, so far as I honestly read it, in the affirmative. It is *The Glories of Mary,* by St. Alponsus Liguori, approved by John, Archbishop of New York. I scarcely know where to begin quoting, or to cease.

"'O Mary, sweet refuge of miserable sinners, assist me with thy mercy. Keep far from me my infernal enemies, and *come thyself* to take my soul and present it to my eternal Judge.' 'All the mercies ever bestowed upon men have come through Mary.' 'Mary is called the gate of heaven, because no one can enter heaven if he does not pass through Mary, who is the door of it.' 'As we have access to the eternal Father only through Jesus Christ, so we have access to Jesus Christ only through Mary.'

"'Mary is the peacemaker between sinners and God.' 'My Mother

Mary, to thy hands I commit the cause of my eternal salvation. To thee I consign my soul; it was lost, but thou must save it.' 'Thou art the advocate, the mediatrix of reconciliation, the only hope, and the most secure refuge of sinners.' 'I place in thee all my hopes of salvation.' 'She is the advocate of the world and the true mediatrix between God and man.' 'Blessed is he who clings with love and confidence to those two anchors of salvation, Jesus and Mary. 'Deliver me from the burden of my sins; dispel the darkness of my mind; banish earthly affections from my heart.' 'O Lady, change us from sinners to saints.'"

Tastes differ, and not every Catholic would employ every expression used by St. Alphonsus in his *Glories of Mary*; but none of these expressions convey to the Catholic mind what they do to the Protestant mind; for Catholics have a key to their meaning in their faith in the incarnation. The strongest of them is justified by the relation of Mary to that great mystery in which centres and from which radiates the whole of Christianity. From her was taken that flesh, that human nature, in which God redeems and saves us; and being taken from her, she has a relation to God, our Saviour, and consequently to our redemption and salvation, which no other woman, no other creature, has or can have. This relation explains the passages in the Litany of our Lady of Loretto, and those passages of St. Alphonsus and other Catholic writers which assert that all mercies and graces come from God through her. They all come from God in his human nature; and as that nature was taken from her, they must in some sense come through her. They come through her, because they come from God as born of her. They also come through her, because God, her divine Son, who gives them, loves her as his mother, and delights to honor her with the highest honor a creature can receive; he therefore confers the favors mortals pray for only through her intercession. But as all the special honor done to her is done only in consequence of her relation as his mother, the higher we carry that honor the more clear, distinct, and energetic our conviction of the fact of the incarnation, and the more impossible it must be for us to put her in the place of the incarnate Word, or to substitute her for her Son, who is the one mediator of God and men, the man Christ Jesus. To do so would be not only to rob him of his glory, but to deny her title to that very honor given to her as the mother of God. Catholics are not capable of any thing so illogical and absurd.

The key to the other expressions objected to in St.

Alphonsus is in this same relation to the incarnation and the confidence of the saint in the power and efficacy of Mary's prayers or intercession for us with her divine Son. He confides to Mary, leaves in her hands the cause of his eternal salvation, as the client confides his cause to his advocate or counsel. "My soul," he says, "was lost, but thou must save it"—by thy intercession with thy Son, who will deny thee nothing thou dost ask, because thou canst never ask but what he inspires thee to ask, and what is agreeable to his will, and he delights to honor thee before heaven and earth by granting thy requests. In the same way understand the expressions, "the advocate," "the mediatrix of reconciliation," and all the rest. The term mediatrix is not the best possible, because it is liable to mislead not a Catholic, but a non-Catholic, who believes little in the incarnation, and refuses to interpret the language of Catholics by the official teaching of their church. The Catholic always knows in what sense it is said, and for him the explanations are never necessary; still less are they necessary for him who sees and knows the thoughts and intents of the heart before they are even formed. It is the duty of non-Catholics to consult the standards of the church and to explain what seems to them difficult or inexact in the warm and energetic expressions of Catholic love and devotion by them; and it is not honest to found a charge against Catholics on such expressions without having done so. The preacher continues:

"'Is IT HONEST to accuse Catholics of putting the Blessed Virgin or the saints in the place of God or of the Lord Jesus Christ? You have the answer. You know the place which God claims for himself, the 'honor which He will not give to another.' You have heard from the very words of the Roman Catholics themselves the place to which they exalt the spirits of departed men and women."

Yes, you have the answer such as your minister gives; and we have shown that his answer misinterprets facts which he does not understand; that it refuses to interpret them by the key furnished in the official teaching of the church; that it contradicts itself, and proves, if any thing, the falsity of the very charge it undertakes to establish, and therefore clears neither him nor you, if you accept it, from the charge of dishonestly bringing false accusations against the church of God.

5. "IS IT HONEST *to assert that the Catholic Church grants any indulgence or permission to commit sin*—when an 'indulgence,' according to her uni-

versally received doctrine, was never dreamed of by Catholics to imply, in any case whatever, any permission to commit the least sin; and when an indulgence has no application whatever to sin until after sin has been repented of and pardoned?"

The preacher has the air of conceding that this charge is unfounded, and says, "If it is made, it does not appear to be sustained; yet he maintains that indulgences really remit the punishment due to sins committed after the indulgence has been bought and paid for; for they are alleged to preserve the recipient in grace till death, in spite of subsequent sins." And he cites the case of Tetzel, in the sixteenth century, in proof. He adduces what purports to be a form of absolution published by Tetzel, and offered for sale in the market-places of Germany. The form of absolution alleged is manifestly a forgery, and a very stupid forgery; and besides, absolution and indulgences are very different things, and the indulgence affects only a certain temporary punishment that remains to be expiated after the absolution is given or the eternal guilt is pardoned, and is rather a commutation than a remission of even that temporary punishment, which, if not commuted or borne here, must be expiated hereafter in purgatory. There is no *form* of indulgence; there are *conditions* of gaining an indulgence; but there is no certificate given to the effect that we have obtained it. If we have sincerely complied with the conditions prescribed by the pope, we gain it; but whether we have gained it neither we nor the church can know in this life without a special revelation. Every Catholic knows that to offer money for it would argue a disposition on his part that would render it impossible, while he retained that disposition, to gain an indulgence. No one can gain an indulgence while in a state of sin, and hence indulgences are not at any price profitable things to purchase. That Tetzel exaggerated the virtue of indulgences was asserted by Luther and his friends; but that he offered them for sale in the market-places, was never, we believe, even pretended until after his death—was and never has been proved. Luther and his friends complained that he was causing a scandal, and procured his arrest and imprisonment in a convent of his order, where he died two years after, without the matter, owing to the troubles of the times, even undergoing a judicial investigation. As for Luther's own testimony, in a case touching his hatred against Rome, it is of no account.

"The only sense," continues the preacher, "in which the Roman Church has ever sold licenses for crime, has been in this, of announcing (not in America, in this century) a tariff of cash-prices at which (*with* contrition) all evil consequences of certain sins, whether in this world or the world to come, would be cancelled. The price-current in Germany in the sixteenth century, ranged as follows: for polygamy, six ducats; for sacrilege and perjury, nine ducats; for murder, eight ducats. In Switzerland, at the same period, the price was for infanticide, four francs; for parricide or fraticide, one ducat."

This seems to us quite enough. The Catholic will perceive that our learned friend is not very well posted on Catholic matters. He evidently confounds sacramental absolution with indulgences, and indulgences with the dispensations which the church grants in particular cases, not from the law of God, nor the law of nature, but from her own ecclesiastical law; and supposes that the fees paid to the chancery for the necessary legal documents in the various causes that come before it, are the fees paid by the faithful for indulgences and the pardon of their sins.* A man who speaks of matters of which he knows nothing is liable to say some very absurd things. Nevertheless, the preacher says expressly, and we doubt not means to concede the point made by the tract, that indulgences are not licenses to commit sin, but he has labored to make his concession as little offensive to his Protestant brethren as possible. Still he concedes it. "I think, therefore," he says, "that the author of this tract is right in claiming that it is not just to assert that the Catholic Church grants any indulgence or permission to commit sin." No, she does no such thing, she only "intimates beforehand her willingness, if such and such crimes are committed, to make it all right with the malefactor both in this world and the world to come, for penitence—and CASH." He who should offer cash to pay for absolution would receive for answer, "Thy money perish with thee!"

6. "IS IT HONEST *to repeat over and over again that Catholics pay the priests to pardon their sins*—such a thing is unheard of anywhere in the Catholic Church—when any transaction of the kind is stigmatized as a grievous sin, and ranked along with murder, adultery, blasphemy, etc., in every catechism and work on Catholic theology?"

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* For a full proof of the forgery of the above passage in the book called *Tax-book of the Roman Chancery*, see Bishop Englaud's Letters to Dr. Fuller, Works of Bishop England, vol. iii. p. 13.

The preacher thinks it is very honest, because, if the church prohibits and punishes it as simony, it is very evident that it sometimes happens. If the offence had never been committed, the church would never have had occasion to legislate on the matter. It was argued that for a long time the crime of parricide was unknown at Rome, because there was no law prohibiting and punishing it. This is his answer, and a proof, we suppose, of his candor of which he boasts, of his readiness to die rather than knowingly repeat a false charge against the church! The real accusation against the church, which the tract denies can be honestly made, is that Catholics are required to pay, or that the priest can lawfully exact pay, for the pardon or absolution he pronounces in the sacrament of penance. It does not necessarily deny that the thing may sometimes be done, but, if so, it is unlawful, is a sin, and ranked along with murder, adultery, &c. The sin of simony, in one form or another, has in the history of the church often been committed, and those who committed it are, in general, favorites with Protestant historians, who seldom fail to brand as haughty tyrants and spiritual despots the noble and virtuous popes who struggled energetically against it, and did their best to correct or guard against the evil. But honest men will not hold the church responsible for the misdeeds of unprincipled men, which she prohibits and exerts all the power of her discipline to prevent and punish. The case is too plain to need argument. Penance, the church teaches, is a sacrament, of which absolution is a part, and to sell any sacrament or part thereof is simony, a grievous sin; and though there is no sin that may not have been committed, yet the fact of a priest, however depraved, demanding pay for sacramental pardon or absolution is not known to have ever occurred. The church prohibits it, indeed, but only in prohibiting simony, and we are not aware that she has ever passed any special law against this particular species of simony; and therefore the argument of the preacher falls to the ground, and for aught he shows, it is true to the letter that the thing is unheard of.

7. "Is it honest *to persist in saying that Catholics believe that their sins are forgiven merely by the confession of them to the priest, without a true sorrow for them, or a true purpose to quit them*—when every child finds the contrary distinctly and clearly stated in the catechism, which he is obliged to learn before he can be admitted to the sacraments? Any honest man can verify this statement by examining any Catholic catechism."

"Nothing," says the preacher, "could be more conclusive than this logic, if we could constantly presume that the belief and practice of the people always coincide exactly with the teaching of the catechism." If the coincidence were perfect, there would be no sins to confess, no need of the sacrament of penance, and no question as to the condition of ghostly absolution or pardon could ever be raised. But as the preacher finds nothing to object to under this head in the teaching or official practice of the church, we must presume that he finds the logic of the tract, whatever may be the deceptions, if any, practised upon the priest, is quite conclusive, and he certainly concedes quite enough to show that the accusation against the church which the tract repels, cannot be honestly repeated. We would remind the preacher that no one is forced against his will to go to confession, and the very fact of one's going is presumptive proof of sincere sorrow for his sins, and a resolution, weaker or stronger, God helping him, to forsake them. Why should he seek to deceive the priest, when he knows that if he seeks to do so, he would not only receive no benefit from the absolution, but would commit the grievous sin of sacrilege by profaning the sacrament?

"IS IT HONEST *to say that Catholics believe that man, by his own power, can forgive sin*—when the priest is regarded by the Catholic Church only as the agent of our Lord Jesus Christ, acting by the power delegated to him, according to these words, 'Whose sins you shall forgive, they are forgiven them, and whose sins you shall retain, they are retained?' St. John xx. 23."

The preacher has offered no reply, or, if he has, we have overlooked it, to this grave accusation; perhaps he has none to make. The journals, however, attempt a reply, the purport of which is, that, though the tract states truly the official teaching of the church, yet Catholics practically believe, as every one knows who has had intercourse with them, that it is the priest, not God, who they believe pardons sin. This, too, is in substance the reply of Mr. Bacon throughout. The tract states the doctrine of the church correctly on all the points made, but then that, it is pretended, is not the doctrine of the Catholic people, the practical doctrine of Catholics, and gives no clue to the practical workings of the Roman system—a clear confession that they really have nothing to object to in Catholic doctrine and practice, though they have much to object to in what is no doctrine or teaching or practice of the church. The reason

of this, we suppose, is, that they have no conception of the church. Now, we think it is very likely that there are many Catholics who cannot define very scholastically the distinction between efficient cause and instrumental or medial cause; but put the question to the most ignorant Catholic you can find. "Do you believe the priest as a man in confession pardons your sins?" as soon as he gets hold of what you are driving at, he will answer: "No; he pardons or absolves them as a priest." This answer means that the priest does not absolve by a virtue in him as a man, but by virtue of his priestly office, to which he is appointed by the Holy Ghost; that is, as the minister, or as the tract says, the agent of our Lord Jesus Christ. All Catholics unhappily do not conform their life to their faith; but you will find that the faith of the people is that of the church, that which the church officially teaches; and there is no room for the distinction which non-Catholic ministers and journals, try, as their last resort in self-vindication, to make between Catholicity in the formularies of the church and the Catholicity that works practically in the faith and lives of the Catholic people, whether learned or unlearned. All this talk about the practical workings of the system is moonshine, at least outside of the record, to which no Catholic is bound to reply. We are required to believe and defend only what the church teaches and requires of her children.

8. The tract concludes with the question,

"IS IT HONEST *to make these and many other similar charges against Catholics*—when they detest and abhor such false doctrines more than those do who make them, and make them too, without ever having read a Catholic book, or taken any honest means of ascertaining the doctrines which the Catholic Church really teaches? AMERICANS LOVE FAIR PLAY."

In spite of all that sectarian preachers and journals can say, the unprejudiced and fair-minded American will answer, to each question the tract puts, No! it is not honest, but gravely dishonest; for every one is bound to judge Catholics by the standards of the church, open to all the world. And these manifestly disprove the accusations.

We have attempted no defence in this article of our holy religion itself. We have only attempted to show our Protestant accusers that their efforts to prove themselves honest in their false charges against the church and her faithful children, are unsuccessful. They have not successfully impeached the tract in a single instance, nor vindicated them-

selves from a single one of its charges; nor can they do it. Many things may be said against the immaculate spouse of Christ; the daughters of the uncircumcised may call her black, may rail against her, and call her all manner of hard names; but she stands ever in her loveliness, all pure, and dear to her Lord, who loves her, and gave his life for her, and dear to the heart of every one of her loving children, and all the dearer from the foul aspersions cast upon her by the ignorant, the foolish, and the malicious.

We have not taken much notice of the professions of candor and independence of the preacher; for we have never much esteemed professions which are contradicted by deeds; nor are we easily won by fine things said of individual Catholics by one who in the same breath calumniates the holy Catholic Church. Few sermons have we read that show a more decided hostility to our religion than these of the Rev. Leonard W. Bacon, of Brooklyn, which are unredeemed from their low sectarian character by any depth of learning, extent of historical research, force of logic, richness of imagination, flow of eloquence, or sparkle of wit. We have found them very commonplace and dull; we have found it a dull affair to read and reply to them; and we fear that our readers will find our reply itself very dull, for dulness is contagious.

REASON AND RELIGION.

[From the Ave Maria for 1866-7.]

It has been fashionable for some time, not only with the declared enemies, but even with some who profess to be the warm friends of religion, to treat it and reason as if they were entirely independent of each other, and in fact as mutually antagonistic. It is assumed that reason can exist and operate in full freedom and strength without pious or religious affection, and that pious or religious affection in no sense depends on reason or intelligence. But there is no reason without religion, and no religion without reason, as it will be my purpose in this article to show.

Knowledge without religion is satanic, and worse than worthless to its possessor, for it is not a rational knowledge directed to the true end of man; and religion without knowledge is a blind sentiment losing itself in idolatry, superstition, or a savage and destructive fanaticism. Reason is essential to man's nature, that which distinguishes him from the lower creation, and renders him kindred with the angels, and, in some sense, with God himself. It is the faculty of apprehending and acting voluntarily from the principle of our existence, and of apprehending and acting for—*propter*—the end for which we exist. There is and can be no human act that is a perfectly irrational act. Piety or religion without reason or the rational activity of the soul is not, as say the theologians, *actus humanus*, and must be either wholly extraneous to man, or mere sensitive affection, what Catholics call sensible devotion, and what has in itself no moral character, and is neither praiseworthy nor blameworthy.

Herein lies the great mistake of the Evangelical or Methodistical sects. They divorce piety or religion from reason, and therefore from all intellectual apprehension of the Christian mysteries and dogmas, or from faith as an intellectual act. They reduce faith itself to a mere sentiment, and while inveterate dogmatists in their way, hold that nothing is necessary to salvation but the sensible affection or emotion. You cannot reason with them, for they set reason aside as having

nothing to do with religion. To your most reasonable objections they have a prompt and decisive answer: "I feel it here," laying a hand over the heart, "and am sure." But you may draw a false inference from your feelings and thus delude or deceive yourself. "I feel it here, and am sure." You cannot reason against feeling, and have nothing to do but to make a low bow and be silent. They do not seem to be aware that it is by the activity of the rational soul that they can be conscious of their own sensible affection, or are able to say, "I feel, and am sure." They resolve, so far as the man is concerned, all devotion into sensible devotion, and even regard all prayers made when the soul suffers from aridities, or which are not accompanied by certain sensible sweetnesses and freedom, as offensive or, at least, not acceptable to God.

This comes not solely from a bad psychology, but chiefly from a bad theology. They do not, all of them at least, do not accept the Calvinistic doctrine, *decretum horribile*, as Calvin himself says, of election and reprobation, but they all proceed in their theology on the assumption that original sin means the total corruption and moral impotence of our nature, so that our nature has not been simply averted from God and inclined to sin, as the Council of Trent teaches, but that it has itself become sin and loathsome to God, and incapable of thinking a good thought or performing a good deed. This corruption extends to the reason and will, and they correct the apostle who says, "in me," that is, "in my flesh," and say that, "in me," that is, in my reason and will, "there dwelleth no good thing." Hence, naturally, prior to conversion they think and will only evil, and after conversion it is not they that think and will good, but the grace that is in them. Hence they hold that whatever in them is not false or evil is placed there by sovereign grace, without their active concurrence, and therefore the sensible affection which they call religion or piety is produced in them by grace without any activity of their own reason and will. Faith with them is not an intellectual act,—not elicitable, indeed, without the grace of faith illustrating the understanding and converting the will towards God, yet elicitable by us, so as to be really and truly our act—but is a simple feeling of confidence that God has for Christ's sake forgiven us our sins, and translated us from the kingdom of darkness into the kingdom of his dear Son. Hence with them religion is not something done, but something undergone by us.

as is indicated by the question they ask: "Have you experienced religion?"

The Protestant reformers generally manifest the greatest distrust of reason, and Luther treats it with great indignity and coarse invective. All non-rationalistic Protestants regard reason as a false and deceptive light that leads to bewilder and dazzles to blind. It is a great mistake to suppose that the central principle of Protestantism is private judgment. This is not and never was the Protestant principle. Its central principle was and is the total depravity of human nature, or the absolute moral and spiritual inability or nullity of man since Adam's prevarication. This is the central principle of its whole system, from which radiate all its so-called "doctrines of grace," or "the great doctrines of the reformation." The Bible, interpreted by human reason, public or private, was never a Protestant doctrine or a Protestant rule of faith, and they who combat that rule, thinking thereby to refute Protestantism, its principle, are simply beating the air. The charge brought against us by Protestants was and is that we are Pelagians or semi-Pelagians, and tend to rationalism; that is, we hold that there is some good and some moral ability left in man, and that reason and will are active in justification, not purely passive. True, we hold that without grace we can do nothing, not even make the first motion; but, then, we hold that we ourselves must actively concur with grace, and that by grace we can concur with grace, and so work out our own salvation. On this point the reformation joined issue with the church, maintained, in opposition to her, the absolute impotence of nature, expressed in their doctrine of justification without works, that is, without human activity, by faith alone, or in that of justification by imputation.

That modern rationalism holds from the reformation is, no doubt, true, but from its practice in rejecting the authority of the church, not from any doctrine or principle it asserted. Its principle was total depravity by the fall, and its rule of faith was the Bible, or certain portions of the Bible, interpreted by grace, or the Holy Ghost dwelling in the individual believer. Rationalism is a one-sided and bastard development of Protestantism, and loses grace altogether. The legitimate developments of Protestantism are Quakerism and Methodism, or Evangelicalism. Quakerism consists in asserting the universality of the inner light, and its sufficiency without the written word, or that the Holy Ghost dwells in every man, whether believer or not, and is

"a light within" sufficient to guide the individual to eternal life; but it carefully distinguishes this "inner light," this "Christ within," this "indwelling Holy Ghost," from the natural light of natural reason.

Its connecting band with the reformers is in making the interpreter of the word the grace operative in the individual, and asserting the passivity of nature in the work of salvation, that is, in exclusive supernaturalism. Methodism, which is not by any means restricted to the sect called Methodists, but is common to all the Evangelical sects, though it often makes a show of asserting free will or free agency, is based on the total depravity of man by the fall, and holds that the interpreter of the written word is the Holy Ghost transiently or permanently in the soul of the regenerate. With it, as with Calvinism, reason and will are impotent, and the essence of the Christian life, which, prior to Whitefield, Calvinism did not assert, is in the feelings or sensible affections produced by the operations of grace within the believer. Methodism comes in the direct line from the reformation and is the only form of Protestantism that gives signs of life, and that retains much hold on the Protestant people. It is the development of Protestantism most hostile to Catholicity.

Many persons of liberal and even philosophic minds, who have ceased to believe any Protestant doctrine, still honor the memory of the reformers, as bold and earnest men, who asserted the rights of the mind, and emancipated reason, and restored to human nature its dignity; but nothing is further from the fact, as is evident from their assertion of the total corruption of human nature, and of the absolute moral and spiritual impotence or nullity of man. The supposed antagonism between reason and faith, or intellect and piety, was unheard of before the reformation, and has grown out of the doctrine of total depravity and that of sovereign and irresistible grace asserted by the reformers and uniformly condemned by the church. The reformation regarded reason as false and deceptive, and the will, since the fall, as a serf or slave, and allowed to neither any participation in the work of salvation. It has done all in its power to damage reason and bring it into contempt, while the church through her clergy, her pontiffs, and her councils has always vindicated it and sustained its credit. It is a great wrong done to the church by modern liberals, that of asserting Protestantism as favorable to the freedom and activity of reason, and the church as hostile to it. The church asserts the supernatural,

but without excluding the natural; the reformation denied the natural and asserted exclusive supernaturalism.

God says to man since as well as before the fall, "My son, give me thy heart." It is not compatible with the character of God to demand of his creatures what they have not the ability to give. He may demand more of them than they are naturally able to perform, but not without rendering them able by his gracious assistance. To give the heart to God requires an act of free will on our part, and therefore implies that we are not in religion resistant or purely passive, but must be active and concurrent. This negatives the reformation doctrine of the total depravity or corruption of our nature, and places religion in the free exercise of our active powers, and makes it something which we do,—do by the assistance of grace, if you will,—not something which we undergo, or which is wrought in us, by grace, without our active concurrence.

The rationalizing sects among us, who deny the fall, deny the necessity and the fact of grace, and assert the sufficiency of nature for herself, fall into a serious mistake when they suppose the doctrine of the church and that of the reformation on original sin are one and the same. The church and the reformation both assert that there is original sin, but they differ radically as to what original sin is. The reformation understands by the term, as we have seen, the total moral and spiritual inability or corruption of our entire nature, so that in faith, justification, holiness, we are either passive or resistant, and never actively concur with grace. Hence it scouts the idea of merit, and denies that heaven is given as a reward for well-doing. Human nature from first to last resists grace, and never of itself, or even by the assistance of grace, performs any active part in the work of Christian perfection. God concludes all men under sin, and by his sovereign act gives heaven to whom he will, and denies it to whom he will. All are children of wrath, and the elect are as sinful in themselves after regeneration as before, and are no less so than the reprobate.

I know very well that the Methodists talk of free will, free agency, and pretend that man has some part in the work, but I know also that they do it at the expense of logical consistency, because they hold, with the reformation, that by the fall man became totally depraved, totally corrupt, and with it deny what our theologians call infused habits. They pretend to deny irresistible and inamissible

grace, but they hold justification by faith alone, and that the perfect sanctification which they say is possible even in this life is wrought out not by us assisted by grace, but in us by the Holy Spirit without our active concurrence. Calvinism is the only logical and consistent expression of the reformation, and whoever concedes the doctrine of total depravity must, if capable of reasoning at all, accept the Calvinistic doctrine of man's moral and spiritual impotence, and therefore the Calvinistic doctrine of grace, as Whitefield maintained against Wesley to the last. The Methodist tried to form a compound of Calvinism and Catholicity, but the two systems will not mix and coalesce, and practically Methodism is only a development of Calvinism, for of all Protestant sects the Methodists are the most attached to the reformation, and the most inveterate in their hostility to the Catholic Church.

The church asserts, indeed, original sin, and that Adam's sin has passed upon all men, for as Adam represented the whole human race, all men were generically in him, and so all sinned, generically, not individually, in him; but she denies that original sin consists in the total depravity or corruption of nature, or that its effects are the absolute moral and spiritual inability or impotence of man. By it our nature lost the supernatural grace in which it was clothed in the state of innocence, and what theologians call integral nature, as immunity from sickness and death, and the submission of the body to the soul, the appetites and passions to reason. By it man lost original righteousness, his original communion with God, became alienated in his affections or averted from God, and inclined to sin, so that he needs to be turned back or converted to God; but his nature, though disordered by the fall, his reason darkened, and his will attenuated, is still good, and is able by grace to concur actively with grace; and by perseverance in grace, man is able to work out his own salvation, and to merit and receive heaven as a reward for his well-doing.

All our natural faculties, appetites, passions, and tendencies remain, since the fall, substantially, what they were before, and are still in themselves good and necessary to constitute us human beings, and when rightly exercised or directed are productive of good. Our reason has, indeed, been obscured by original sin, and our will enfeebled, but neither has been taken away or changed in its nature. Grace is needed not to supersede nature or to change its faculties

appetites, or tendencies, but to heal the wounds it received in the fall, to elevate it to the plane of its supernatural destiny, and to strengthen it to gain it. The maxim of all Catholic theologians is that grace supposes nature. The necessity of healing or integrating grace grows out of the fall, but elevating grace, or the grace that elevates our nature to the level of a supernatural destiny, was as necessary before as since the fall, and hence many theologians hold that the Word would have become incarnate even if man had not sinned,—not, of course, to redeem man from sin, but to enable him to gain that union with God for which he was originally created, and therefore the Incarnation was no afterthought, but was included in the original decree to create.

I will not say that God could not have created man for a natural destiny,—though I see not how he could, or how any rational creature could possibly find beatitude in any created good, or in any thing short of the possession of the infinite God himself, in whom alone his being can be completed or filled up,—but this much I may say, that God has made all things for himself, and that in the present decree of God man has no natural destiny, and that regeneration, or its equivalent, would have been as necessary as it is now even if man had never sinned. The reformation has taken a very narrow and untenable view of grace or the supernatural by isolating it from the natural, and presenting it as a *succedaneum* or an expedient, and laid it open to the attacks of the rationalists. As the church holds, it is an essential part of the divine system of the universe, viewed as a whole, and can no more operate without nature than nature can gain its end without it. Nature and grace are parts of one whole. Nature has been damaged, has received a false bent by the fall, but it is nature still.

The active powers of the soul are reason and will, and it is only in them that we are properly active. If we suppose them so corrupted as to be incapable of acting in religion or of concurring by the assistance of grace with grace in the work of salvation, grace can operate only on the sensibility, in which, properly speaking, we are not active but passive. We feel as we must, not as we will to feel. It is to this conclusion that Methodism or Evangelicalism, the legitimate development of the reformation, leads. It must lead to this conclusion, or else it must maintain that grace is wholly forensic, and does not touch the soul at all. But as this conclusion is inadmissible, nothing remains but to assert that

religion addresses the active powers of the soul, and that it is only by the exercise of our reason and will that we do or can comply with its demands, which corresponds to *rationabile obsequium*, or "reasonable service" of the apostle. There then is and can be no antagonism between reason and piety or religion. Such antagonism results only from the reformation theory of grace or the supernatural, which instead of presenting the natural and supernatural as two distinct parts of one whole, and both equally essential to the existence and completeness of the divine system, presents them as two contrary systems, incapable of reconciliation.

In the order of grace, as in the order of nature, as I show in my article on Saint-worship, man acts by way of concurrence with the divine action in gaining the end the Creator proposes, and is not simply acted or acted upon; and also that in all the actions of the creature the Creator concurs by his ever active and efficient presence, for the creature can do nothing and is nothing without the Creator. So is it in nature, so is it in religion, or the order of grace. We can do nothing in religion without grace to illustrate the understanding and to strengthen and incline the will, but we in it act by and with grace. This, as I have learned it, is the doctrine of the church, which equally opposes the exclusive supernaturalism of the reformation on the one hand, and the exclusive rationalism of the rationalists on the other, or, in other words, reconciles nature and grace in a principle common to both.

In placing religion, subjectively considered, in the exercise of the active powers of the soul, and representing it as something to be done, as acts to be performed by us, we are far from pretending that it is restricted to external acts, or to internal acts followed in all cases by external manifestation. The greatest and most important work possible for us is that of disciplining the soul herself, and by the aid of grace bringing her into harmony with the divine law. The internal acts of faith, hope, love, and contrition, are real acts, and acts in the fullest and highest sense of the term.

It is very fashionable for Protestants to charge the church as teaching and practising only an outward, an unspiritual and sensuous religion, while they claim for their Protestantism that it is purely spiritual, and for them that they are pre-eminently spiritual worshippers. Yet I have had more than one respectable Protestant minister ask me what is meant by making an act of faith, an act of hope, an act of love, an act of contrition, an act of thanksgiving, as direct-

ed in our prayer-books, and I well remember how puzzled I myself was to attach any distinct meaning to the direction. The reason of this is that Protestantism in all its forms is unspiritual and materialistic. It may talk much of the interior, but ordinarily its interior is our exterior. God looks at the heart, and the act he demands and rewards is the act of the will, and the will acts in itself, and its acts may be complete without any external manifestation. I may will to raise my arm, and my arm may be paralyzed or held down by a force superior to mine, so I cannot actually raise it, but the act, in so far as an act of the will, is as complete as though I did raise externally my arm. The act of faith is an interior act, for it is the assent of the understanding and the consent of the will to the word of God. The act of love is necessarily interior, of the soul itself, giving itself to God, that it may be one with him. The Catholic holds the interior world to be real and even more real than the exterior, and acts done by the soul to be real acts, without which no exterior acts are of any avail with him who seeth the heart.

There are in the church various religious orders, divided ordinarily into two classes, the contemplative, and the active, though, as a matter of fact, the greater part of them combine contemplation with some external work. The general tendency at present is to depress the contemplative and to exalt the active; yet the contemplative orders are really as active as the others, and when faithful are active even in a higher and nobler sense. Our Lord told the active Martha that the contemplative Mary had chosen "the better part." Contemplation is not a state of pure passivity or perfect quiescence, and never is the soul more intensely active than when rapt in the sublime contemplation of God, and never are its acts of faith, hope, love, union, more full and complete, or more frequent.

Is it said that these acts are confined to the bosom of the individual, and are of no service to the world? I do not believe it. The fervent and urgent prayer of the righteous availeth much, and the highest and most perfect prayer is from contemplation. God remains master of his works, of the creatures he has made. After all, it is from him, the Father of lights, that proceedeth every good and every perfect gift; and who dares say that he will not do as much in answer to those internal acts of the contemplative, as to the external acts of the active? It is not with any thoughts of

detracting from the merits of the so-called active orders, that these remarks are made, but solely with the view of showing that the contemplative are also active, and to protest against the modern tendency to regard them as useless to the world, and idle drones in society. I do not believe that the fathers of the desert were, in point of fact, less useful to society, than the orders of mercy or charity who do so much to relieve and solace suffering humanity. Those ages are most to be envied in which there is the fullest faith in a higher utility than the material. Having reduced, in a great measure, religion to a sentiment, the age counts the utility of the body above that of the soul. The so-called active orders would soon lose their power of effective action, were they to neglect prayer, meditation, or contemplation.

We cannot, indeed, live in this world as if we were already in heaven; while we are on our pilgrimage as if we had arrived at home, *in patria*; but the principle of the light of heaven is infused into the heart of every regenerated soul, and that life must be commenced on earth, and lived here as far as our unglorified state permits. The elect on earth form really one communion with the elect in heaven, and both form one communion with the living God, who is all and in all. Man has, while in this life, relations with the material world, for he is body as well as soul, and provisions for bodily wants are needed, and not to be neglected without failing in our duty. The apostle implies it when he says: "He that provideth not for his own household, is worse than an infidel, and hath denied the faith." But the best way to provide for the body is not to live and act as if we were all body and no soul. The earth is not our abiding place, is not our home, and we violate the divine order when we treat it as if it were. There is no age and no country in which the body is less well provided for, or in which there is really more bodily suffering, than one which devotes all its thought and energy to the productive accumulation of material goods. The more we pamper the body, the more does it suffer, and the Louvain professor is nearer the truth than the world believes, when he makes self-denial and sacrifice the principle of national wealth.

The divine order is the real order, and is never violated with impunity. The soul is more than the body, and the life of the body is in the life of the soul, as the church teaches; for she defines the soul to be the formative princi-

ple of the body: *Anima est forma corporis.* We best provide for the body by best providing for the soul. Hence our Lord says: "Seek first the kingdom of God, and his justice, and all these things (things needful for the body,) shall be added unto you." There is a more intimate relation in the real order between the soul in union with God, and the active principle of the material universe, than is dreamed of in our modern philosophy. And history records few great moral convulsions not attended by equally great physical convulsions. The moral has more power over the physical than the physical has over the moral. It is the way of the transgressor that is hard. "I have been young, and now am old," says the psalmist, "and I have not seen the righteous forsaken, or his seed begging bread." And: "Blessed are the meek," says our Lord, "for they shall possess the land." There is more than an accidental relation between the perturbation of the spiritual world, and the perturbation of the material universe. The earth was cursed on account of man's sin, and he shares in the penalty. This should not surprise us, for philosophy as well as revelation teaches us that the material universe rests for its principle and foundation on the spiritual, and responds, and must respond to all its pulsations. Our age reverses this, and makes the spiritual depend on the material.

There may be an exclusive or one sided asceticism that should be guarded against, and the Platonic and Manichean doctrine, that requires us to contemn the body, to lacerate the flesh and to treat the material with every possible indignity, on the ground that matter is evil, and the body intrinsically unclean, and the primal source of sin, has never been and never can be the doctrine of the church, for our Lord assumed a real human, and therefore, a material body, in the Incarnation. The cause of evil is not, as Plato taught, in the intractableness of matter, for matter, as well as spirit, is the creature of God, and all the creatures of God, as they come from his hands, are not only good, but very good. But that Christian asceticism which disciplines the soul into harmony with God, and brings the body into subjection to the soul, has its material as well as its spiritual uses. So also has that ascetic discipline, a part of the same, which mortifies and chastises the body by way of expiation, as we observe in the lives of all great saints, and without which it would seem that true heroic sanctity is rarely, if ever attained. All suffering is designed to be expiatory of the

curse that follows man's sin, and sufferings voluntarily assumed or inflicted are the most meritorious of all, because they have in them something kindred with those which our Lord voluntarily suffered for our sake. The principle, as every good thing, may be misapplied or abused, but it is true and good, and where it is not in some degree operative, sanctity or the real good of either soul or body is not secured; but people may and should turn their every-day work to this purpose.

Taking this view of the relation of spiritual good to material good, and of spiritual evil to material evil, there is a real reason in the constitution of the universe why our Lord should tell Martha that Mary had chosen the better part, and why we should regret the growing tendency to depreciate that Christian asceticism practised by the old contemplatives; practised for the sake of its material utility, it would be worth nothing; but disinterestedly, for the sake of God, or even interestedly, for the sake of our beatitude in God, who is both our supreme good and the supreme good itself, it is of the highest utility even in the material order, and would form the most effectual instrument of social and political ameliorations throughout the world.

In asserting that religion is an act rather than a sentiment, an act of the rational soul rather than an affection of our own sensitive nature, it is not implied that religion in the subject is a dry logical process, or a cold calculation of interest. Undoubtedly no act of the creature can be more logical or conformed to the reason of things, and certainly none can be more for our highest interest; but the act is not purely an intellectual act, far less an act of pure ratiocination, and its object is God, not self, nor simply our own good. Hope is indeed one of the theological virtues, and we know from the decision of the Holy See that an habitual state in which the soul is indifferent to her own good is not possible in this life. Fears of hell and hopes of heaven are proper motives of action, but only when we fear hell as the loss of God, and hope for heaven in the possession of God as our supreme good. There must be on the one side a fear of losing God, that is, of sinning, and on the other, a hope of possessing God, that is, of finding our good in him—less of disinterestedness would not bring us within the sphere of Christian virtue.

It should also be remembered that what the church censured in the *Maxims of the Saints*, by Fénelon, was not the

disinterested love of God, or the pure love of God for his own sake, without which there is no Christian perfection, or distinct acts of pure love, but the state of indifference to our own good, as an habitual state of the soul in this life—a fact sometimes forgotten. The regenerated soul can, and does, make distinct acts of pure love or charity, and of perfect contrition, which is a contrition motived by pure love, only in this life we cannot attain to that state in which hope and fear are excluded. But we must love God with our whole mind, heart, soul, and strength, and our good, as our neighbor's good, in him, and for his sake. But it is, as Montesquieu remarks, an admirable fact that Christianity, while it bids us live for the world to come, secures us the best goods of this world. "Seek first the kingdom of God, and all these things shall be added unto you;" so we may say that in loving and serving God for his own sake we secure our supreme good both here and hereafter.

Yet is there no religion when the motive of our conduct is a simple calculation of interest, because in such a motive we take ourselves exclusively as our end, and there is no love of God at all, and there would be no reason why, in this case, we serve God rather than the devil, if by serving the devil it were possible to secure our supreme good. God in such love and service counts for nothing in the respect that he is the supreme good itself, and is regarded only as the supreme good for us. Practically, we cannot in our love and service separate God as he is in himself from what he is to us, for he is our supreme good only because he is the supreme good in himself, or, as Plato would say, "the good in itself." They who attempt to do so fail, and really love and serve God not at all, and are what the Scriptures and the common speech of mankind call hypocrites—a very disreputable, but a rather numerous class of sinners, whose hope is sure to perish.

Now both reason and will may be, and are, used in the service of pure self-interest, as well as in the service of our sensual appetites and passions: and of all men the cool calculating sinner, whom neither passion nor generous impulse ever diverts from the one object of his life, is the meanest and most despicable of men. There is every day more intellect, more reasoning employed to gain purely selfish objects, wealth, place, or power, than, if rightly directed, would be needed to gain the kingdom of heaven and convert the earth into a paradise. To say nothing of great

merchants and manufacturers, whose brains are constantly exercised to the fullest possible extent, we can see it in burglars, forgers, thieves, and swindlers. These criminals often show rare powers of mind, extraordinary ingenuity, skill, and dexterity, and tax their understanding far beyond what is needed to attain to eminence in religion and morality, and their gains are really only losses. These men are slaves to their sensual nature, in point of fact, as much as those who are wedded to vicious habits which tend to deaden rather than strengthen the intellect. But in both cases the will, properly so called, is weak, and wants firmness to will the higher good, and the intellect is employed only in the service of ingenuity. In both, the higher follows the lower, and the result is sin and misery, both for the individual and for society.

Yet religion, subjectively considered, is an act, an act of the intellect and will, not a sentiment, understanding as I do by sentiment an internal affection of the sensibility or sensitive nature. But this does not deny it to be love. The Greeks recognized two loves, called in their mythology *Eros* and *Anteros*, and I suppose all cultivated nations do the same in principle. There is love as an act, and love as a sentiment. The sentimental love, which depends on the sensibility, according to modern psychology, mimics or imitates the rational love, as the sensible always mimics or imitates the intelligible, and hence is called by Plato, Clemens Alexandrinus, St. Athanasius, and some modern writers, *mimesis*, a Greek word signifying imitation, or representation, as representing or symbolizing a higher reality than itself. But the two loves are in reality widely different. In the one the person is passive, or subjected, in the other the person is free and active. Hence we are told to make an *act* of love, as I have already shown. It is an act of free will; and an act of free will is not an impulse, nor an emotion, but an act of the will from a rational motive, therefore in creatures with limited intellect like man, an act of deliberation. God has free will, and creation is an act of free will, as are all his acts *ad extra*, but in him there is no deliberation, because his being is perfect and all his attributes are infinite; he has no imperfection, therefore no need of deliberation.

But it is not necessary to suppose that the rational love, because an act of free will and from a rational motive, is therefore cold or dry, in which the heart has no share, or that

it is the product of pure intellect, without any affection of the soul. A sentimental love for God, his blessed mother, or the saints in glory, is not possible, for he is never an object of sense, and they are no longer so. God is spiritually, not sensibly apprehended, and efforts by imagination to work up in ourselves a sort of sentimental love for him or for them are vain. To do our best we can only conjure up and embrace an empty shade. The sentimental love is possible only in cases of objects that can be sensibly represented. God who is spirit, and glorified saints who are spirits, can be loved only with a spiritual or rational love. This love may or may not be accompanied by sensible emotions and delights, but whether so or not, it remains unaffected, and equally acceptable. What our spiritual writers call sensible devotion is no part of the prayer or worship, and is neither to be sought nor rejected. We are never to be elated as if more pleasing to God when we experience it, or depressed as if unacceptable to him when we experience it not. It is no assurance, as Methodism fondly imagines, that we are in favor with God when we have it, and no intimation that we are out of favor with him when we have it not. Perhaps its absence rather than its presence is the mark of divine favor, for it is through this Satan operates, and puffs up the soul with spiritual pride, checks the growth of grace, and ends by ruining the soul. The greatest saints are, perhaps, those who suffer the most from aridities in prayer.

Yet sentimental or sensible pleasures are not the only pleasures the soul can taste, nor its highest, but its lowest pleasures. The rational love of God gives a joy, a rapture to the soul that it never experiences from any sentimental love. The bliss of all love is in proportion as it rises above the sentimental, and rests in the rational, or as it becomes an act of reason, an offering of free will. The sentiments all originate in the wants of the soul, and love as a sentiment is rather the need the soul experiences of loving or being loved, than love itself. It is a craving, not a satisfaction of the soul, and hence marriages prompted by sentiment alone prove unhappy, unless followed by mutual esteem and respect, or what I call rational love. God does not bless such marriages, because they are not made in him, and imply no rational love. St. Theresa for eighteen years, it is said, found no sensible consolation in her prayers, but she persevered, loved God with her reason and will, gave

him her noblest faculties, even herself, and I am far from believing those eighteen years were years of misery. Her happiness was far greater and more joyous than she could have derived from every sensible delight. The suffering and sorrow of the saints are joy in comparison with the highest pleasures ever experienced from sensual delight. There is a rapture in loving and serving God even when he hides his face from us, and tries us in the furnace of affliction.

I conclude, therefore, by reasserting that religion or piety is a rational act, and therefore that it demands not ignorance, but intelligence, for the will cannot act without intelligence, and the greater the intelligence, other things being equal, the greater, the more enduring the piety, and the richer its rewards.

CATHOLICITY AND NATURALISM.

There was published in the *Christian Examiner* for January, 1865, an Article, the first in the number, entitled *The Order of St. Paul the Apostle, and the New Catholic Church*, which has attracted some attention, as boldly presenting rationalism or more properly naturalism as the rival of Christianity, and destined to supplant it, and which is perhaps not unworthy of a brief reply from the believers in Jesus Christ, the Son of God, and in supernatural revelation.

The article is pleasantly written, but more remarkable for literary polish, grace and finish of style, than for depth of thought or force of argument. Its title promises much, and is taking with the public at large; but it sounds a little strange to the Catholic reader, as there happens to be no such order as that of St. Paul the Apostle, and there is and can be no new Catholic Church. A church to be catholic must have existed from the beginning, and continue to exist to the end. A *new* catholic church is a contradiction in terms. If catholic, the church is for all times and places, never old, never young, but the same yesterday, to-day, and forever, like Him whose spouse she is. No Catholic, not out

of his wits, ever does or can dream of founding a new catholic church.

The *Christian Examiner*, however, refers to the Congregation, not Order, of St. Paul the Apostle, a community of missionary priests in the city of New York, and well known under the name of the Paulists; and who, according to it, have founded, or are laboring to found a new catholic church. Wherefore he so imagines, it is hard even for a Yankee to guess, unless he is so unacquainted with the teachings of Catholic doctors and theologians, as to suppose that their avowed recognition of nature and reason and acceptance of the natural order in its proper place in the economy of divine providence, is necessarily opposed to the Catholic Church. The Paulists undoubtedly believe that the Catholic religion is adapted to the individual and social needs of the American people, for they as Catholics, must believe it adapted to the individual and social needs of every people; they unquestionably wish to present it in its purity and integrity to the reason, the intelligence, the hearts, and the consciences of the American people, and with the grace of God assisting, to convert them to the Catholic faith and church; but in this they are only faithful to the injunction, "Go ye into all the earth, and teach all nations."

The *Christian Examiner* seems not a little suprised and even chagrined to find that what it had imagined must be a new catholic church is no new church at all, but, saving a few phrases which mean nothing, it is the identical old church of the fifteenth century. The Paulists, it asserts, have surrendered nothing, given up no Catholic principle or dogma, but maintain all, even the most offensive old doctrines as rigidly as the Council of Trent itself. It makes from the publications of the Rev. Father Hecker and the sermons by the Paulists, *à propos* of which the article has been written, a long list of passages which prove that they have not only retained the old dogmas unchanged, but even the old Catholic estimate of Protestantism, and have as little respect for it as had Catholics in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Yet it is very unreasonable to complain of this, for its own estimate of Protestantism, when it means any thing more than pure individualism, is not less unfavorable. "Mr. Hecker," it says, p. 10, "might have stated the facts much more forcibly, and still kept himself within the limits of truth." "The process of disintegration is going forward with immense rapidity throughout Protestant Chris-

tendom." This can hardly be surpassed in severity. Disintegration is decomposition, and decomposition does not usually commence till after the death of the body. Is Father Hecker's offence that he has not remembered the maxim, speak of the dead only good?

The Paulists, unquestionably, make no surrender of any thing Catholic, for they are Catholic priests, and probably believe what their church teaches is revealed truth, without which there is no salvation, no true and immortal life, and honest men, earnest men, men of faith can hardly be expected to give up the truth God has taught them till they have lost their reason. They love it; they prize it more than riches and honors, more than ease and pleasure, more than life itself. It is the truth that upholds the intellect, it is the truth that liberates it from ignorance and bondage. Besides, it is probable that the Paulists are aware that the truth is not their property, and that no man has a right to give away, to be liberal or generous with, what is not his own. No wise man ever yields any thing he holds to be true for the sake of peace, for he knows that without truth there is no basis for peace. No true man ever deals diplomatically with principle, and every Catholic holds that every dogma of his church is a universal principle, true eternally, and in all orders, and that therefore his church is called Catholic. The Paulists, moreover, are, as they avow, laboring earnestly to convert the American people to the Catholic Church, and they are hardly the men to begin by first converting the church to the American people.

The *Christian Examiner* has fallen into several mistakes in its biographical sketch of the Reverend Father Hecker, the Superior of the Paulist Congregation. Father Hecker was received into the church in 1844, not in 1845 as it asserts, p. 2, and he did not go "to Rome in 1857 for the purpose of obtaining the Papal release from his order [Congregation of the Most Holy Redeemer] whose austere regulations were somewhat more than distasteful to him, and whose mediæval type of Catholicism seemed to him out of date in this generation, and ill suited to the genius and needs of the American people." This is untrue in all its parts. Father Hecker never complained that "the austere regulations of his order were somewhat more than distasteful to him," and never found them distasteful at all; and as for its mediæval type of Catholicity, that is his own type, the *Christian Examiner* being judge, and precisely that to which he

wishes to convert his non-Catholic countrymen. He never solicited, he never wished a release from his order, but accepted it at the request of the Holy Father himself.

The *Christian Examiner* has quite misapprehended the views and purposes of the Paulists. They are Catholic missionary priests, nothing more, nothing less. They are innovators neither in doctrine nor discipline. They are neither church-founders nor church-reformers. They seek, undoubtedly, as has already been said, to convert the American people among whom they were born and brought up, to that same Catholic Church to which they have themselves in the full vigor of their intellects been converted. This church, their own spiritual mother, they aim to present as she always was, as she is, and as she always will be. They aim to present her free from those adjuncts or things purely local and temporary which may have been associated with her in other times and nations but which have no necessary connection with her, and were never regarded by her theologians as forming any part of herself. Indeed, all they propose is that Catholics should speak English in London and Washington, as they speak French in Paris, Spanish in Madrid, German in Munich and Vienna, Italian in Florence and Naples, and as they formerly spoke Latin in Rome, Syriac in Damascus, Coptic in Alexandria, Greek in Athens and Constantinople. They know that Catholicity leaves to each people its nationality, and respects all nationalities, though itself superior to them all, and that no people need to denationalize themselves in order to become true and fervent Catholics.

In laboring for the conversion of the American people they leave American nationality untouched. They go further, and hold and endeavor to prove as all their writings show, that the Catholic religion is what the American people need, not to give them a new civilization, but to sustain, develop, and perfect the civilization they already have, which has, in fact, been borrowed from that very civilization which has grown up under the fostering care and protecting influences of the church herself. They hold that the church harmonizes perfectly with the fundamental principles of American civilization and is needed by our countrymen as their religious support and complement. The *Christian Examiner* itself concedes that in this respect at least they are logically right.

" In his second paper from the *Civiltà Cattolica*, Mr. Hecker draws an argument for the future of the Church from the singular correspondence

that exists between American institutions and the ideas on which they rest, and the doctrines of the Church of which he is a representative. Here are his positions:—1. That Catholic doctrines are more in accord with American institutions than Protestant doctrines are. 2. That political experience in America has abundantly established the truth of this position, and has actually generated a disposition to return to the Catholic Church, on the part of the more thoughtful, enlightened, and consistent of the advocates of a democratic government.

"That the Catholic dogma is more congenial with democratic institutions than the Protestant dogma, is a fact too clear to be disputed; and if this consideration were of any vital moment, we might leave the case here on the threshold. The principle that lies at the foundation of democratic institutions is *man's capability for self-government*. This principle implies the essential rectitude of human nature, in all its spheres of faculty. It implies that man is possessed of reason and of free will; that he knows what is wise, just, orderly, beneficial; that he is at liberty to elect it, and that he has power to enact it. It implies that his natural ideas of what is right, equitable, and obligatory are correct, or may be made so by suitable study, care, and attention. All this the Catholic theology asserts; all this the Protestant theology denies. The Catholic dogma maintains that human nature preserved its essential goodness after the fall of Adam. The Protestant dogma contends that human nature, in consequence of the fall of Adam, became totally depraved. The Catholic dogma accommodates itself to human reason, assuming its capacity to receive truths presented to it; the Protestant dogma almost vilifies reason in its jealousy for faith, and allows it no power of judgment in matters of moral truth. The Catholic dogma acknowledges man's moral freedom; the Protestant doctrine affirms predestination. The Catholic ought, therefore, to be a democrat; the Protestant ought to be a monarchist. Neither can logically be any thing else.

"This logical necessity is confirmed by other peculiarities of the two systems. The Protestant Church makes a radical distinction between different orders of mankind, by classifying them as regenerate and unregenerate, elect and non-elect, children of God and children of the world. It divides by palpable barriers the sheep from the goats. The church-member is a person set apart from the general congregation, as an object of peculiar consideration in the sight of God and men,—a sacred person specially illuminated, guided, upheld by the Holy Spirit. Here, it would seem, is a basis, something more than speculative,—a basis actually laid in institutions,—for the most absolute of all governments, a theocracy,—a government of priests ruling in the name of God,—a spiritual oligarchy. The Catholic Church, on the contrary, puts all mankind in the bosom of the Church on an equality. Her sacraments and symbols are for all on the same terms; the same articles of faith satisfy the wise and the simple. All social distinctions disappear at the foot of her altar. Her priesthood is not a caste; no one of the faithful is disqualified by his

obscurity for the office of Supreme Pontiff. Side by side, the rich and the poor, the noble and the plebeian, the lord and the serf, bend in worship, and kneel on the pavement to receive the consecrated elements. Church and Congregation are one. To be a Christian is to be a Catholic, and to be a Catholic is to be one of the 'elect.' If all were Catholics, all would be Christians, and consequently all would be priests and sons of God." (pp. 16-18.)

This in its substance is a very important concession. It concedes the harmony of Catholic teaching with the principles of our American civilization. The *Christian Examiner*, however, pretends that it amounts to nothing because the people are not logical, and a thousand causes quite independent of their religious convictions go to form their political institutions, and because in point of fact Protestantism has been practically associated with liberty, and Catholicity with despotism.

"Here it would seem, is a basis—a very practical basis, too—for the most popular form of government, the government that assumes the equality of mankind, the democratic. If communities of men were only logical! If people would only take pains to square their practical with their speculative beliefs! If states would just look to it that their living genius was conformed to their inherited dogma! But, alas! they do not, and they will not. The contradiction between creed and life which preachers are always harping upon, deploring, objurgating, endeavoring vainly to annul, history delights in parading on a grand scale. No nation of modern times exhibits a logical accord between its creed and its life, for either the creed is an inherited tradition and the life an original creation, or the life an inherited tradition and the creed an original creation. The genesis of the two is not contemporaneous, nor do the two births spring from the same stock. The institutions, laws, civil and social arrangements, forms of government and administration, in the nations of modern Europe were determined by a thousand causes—material, organic, ethic, historical,—which were wholly independent of speculative opinions in philosophy and faith; and such opinions as they have were conveyed to them, for the most part, from regions lying outside of themselves,—from other climates and spheres,—and were attached to them by statecraft or priestcraft. Thought and life lack thus organic conviction. The thought belongs to one age, the life to another. The discord is not felt, because the necessity of the concord is not felt. A nation will exist hundreds of years with its soul in the Eastern hemisphere and its body in the Western, with its 'faith' in Jerusalem and its knowledge in London, with its speculative reason in Asia Minor and its practical understanding in the United States, with its fancy in the Middle Age and its fact in the present generation, and not feel disturbed by it. No doubt where the nation's being is vigorous the effort is ceaseless and

persistent, though unconscious, to establish an equilibrium between its life and its thought; but in all such cases the life takes the initiative, and the vital energies of the people absorb understanding, reason, hope, imagination, more and more, and so reconstruct its views, and insensibly substitute new modes of speculative thinking for old ones. But the new modes of thinking are not a 'scheme,' a 'system,' a 'theology.' The creed is unwritten, unspoken, unrecognized as a creed." (pp. 18–19.)

There is much truth in this extract, and happily expressed; but it explains as well why Catholicity has sometimes coexisted with arbitrary forms of government as why Protestantism has sometimes been associated with political freedom. All in Catholic nations is not, and never has been thoroughly harmonized with Catholicity, and all Protestant nations have retained from the Catholic Church in the civil order much which their Protestantism has not yet eliminated. Yet it is not true that the people, in the long run, are not logical. They are in their march through the ages strictly and invincibly logical, and sooner or later push their principles even practically to their last consequences. The whole life of every nation is but the logical development of the premises given it in the outset. When there is a logical discrepancy between the religious principles and the political principles of a people, either their religion eliminates their politics, or their politics eliminates their religion. The *Christian Examiner* itself asserts that the people are logical when it tells us that "the American people are rapidly discarding their old traditional theologies, Lutheranism, Calvinism, Socinianism," because they find them incompatible with the principles they are developing in their life. Why may not the same causes which lead them to discard theologies incompatible with their civilization, lead them in time to accept a theology which is not only compatible with it, but in intimate harmony with it, and tending by its very principles to sustain, invigorate, and perfect it?

The *Christian Examiner* is out in its historical reading, when it asserts that "the Catholic Church has always been associated with aristocratic governments, to the extent that has identified it in the common mind with oligarchies, monarchies, despotisms." If so identified, there are no facts to warrant it. The most thoroughly aristocratic, oligarchic, and despotic governments on earth have always been and are non-Catholic. The Catholic nations of Europe have always been more advanced in civilization than the non-Catholic, and consequently in real liberty, without which there is no civiliza-

tion. The great objection, the one urged with the most effect in the sixteenth century against the church, was that she is unfriendly to kingly government, and it was against Cardinal Du Perron, a Catholic, that James the First of England wrote his *Remonstrance for the Divine Right of Kings*. The sovereigns in the sixteenth century favored the reformation chiefly because it favored arbitrary pretensions, and relieved them from the restraints which the church, the only power, when the nobles were tyrants, and the people, in a political sense, had no existence, that could in any degree curb their lawless passions and restrain their despotism, imposed on them. England is a more aristocratic or oligarchic country than France. Prussia has always been more despotic than Spain or Italy, Russia than Austria, and Austria finds to-day the chief obstacle to her reorganization on a truly liberal basis in the Protestant population of Hungary. The small Protestant states of Germany tend to found liberal institutions only as Protestantism loses its hold on prince and people. In this country, by the *Christian Examiner's* own confession, liberty advances only over the ruins of Protestant theologies.

The *Christian Examiner* adds inconsiderately, that "the Swiss republics have always been Protestant." He forgets that the Swiss republics were founded by Catholics long before the Protestant reformation was born, that one-half of the Swiss cantons are still Catholic, and that the least aristocratic are precisely the Catholic cantons. "The Republic of Holland is Protestant." The *Republic* of Holland, which in its best days was only an oligarchy, no longer exists, it has been swallowed up by the *Kingdom* of Holland, less free in its constitution than Belgium, more decidedly Catholic than Holland is Protestant. It is always convenient to know and remember history before appealing to it.

Moreover, the *Christian Examiner* does not believe in Protestantism, and has no more respect for it than the Catholic. Just see, how he treats it.

"The facts that Mr. Hecker cites are indisputable; he might have stated them much more forcibly, and still kept himself within the limits of sober truth. The process of disintegration is going forward with immense rapidity throughout Protestant Christendom. Organizations are splitting asunder, institutions are falling into decay, customs are becoming uncustomary, usages are perishing from neglect, sacraments are deserted by the multitude, creeds are decomposing under the action of liberal studies and independent thought. A tendency to individualism was folded up in the early Protestant movement, and that tendency has

gone on towards its ultimate expression in Transcendentalism. All this is plain, too plain for evidence. The process has gone so far, that one of our own most advanced and most resolute thinkers, a leader whom only the boldest followed in his assault on tradition and formalism, has lately surprised his friends by sounding the retreat and calling the fresh recruits back into the old, battered intrenchments, to make themselves safe there as well as they can." (p. 10.)

This concedes that Protestantism is dead and undergoing the process of decomposition, which is more than most Catholics would venture to assert. "Naturalism is pushing it hard, and we have a firm conviction that it must go." The American people can, then, hope nothing from it in support of their free institutions. But it thinks that the same naturalism that is pushing Protestantism is pushing equally hard the Catholic Church, and is sure that the American people emancipated from Protestantism will not seek repose in Catholicity. They may cease to be Protestants, but will not become Catholics. In what then will they seek to find rest for their souls? "In transcendentalism, or spiritual Christianity." Perhaps so. But what is the transcendentalism or spiritual Christianity, which is neither Catholicity nor Protestantism? The answer is not very definite, but here is what the *Christian Examiner* says,

"Transcendentalism, or spiritual Christianity, is no longer the peculiarity of a small intellectual class, who have as much as they can do to maintain themselves against the ridicule of a great public. It is a definite system of philosophical faith, firmly planted on immovable foundations, carefully constructed in its details, popularly expounded, heartily welcomed, and earnestly professed by multitudes of men and women. It has churches and preachers, and is fast making a sacred literature. It has succeeded to a very remarkable extent in recommending its interpretations of the ancient symbols and dogmas. It has a theology, a christology, a consistent account of the Bible and the Church; it gives its definition of inspiration, revelation, and Divine influence. They who accept it are among the calmest, quietest, serenest, and happiest of people. They enjoy as much peace of mind and of heart as the Catholics do, and they enjoy it on more rational grounds, and with a surer confidence. For they fear nothing from science; they welcome knowledge; criticism, and especially criticism of the Scriptures, is all on their side; the movement of things is in their direction; they have a sweet and altogether childlike faith in the spiritual laws. They can afford to tell the truth without equivocation. They can afford to be generous to their opponents. They take no great pains to make proselytes, for the ripe fruit drops into their hands as fast they can catch it. Unrest will not

drive these people into the Catholic Church, and as the majority must pass into the Church through them, if they go thither at all, the accessions to it are not likely to be very numerous. So much for the speculative disquiet and despair from which Mr. Hecker hopes so much." (p. 13.)

This is very well in words, but still it may be asked, what is this "definite system of philosophic faith, firmly planted on immovable foundations," that "has its churches, its theology, its christology, and is fast making a sacred literature"? It is "philosophic," and therefore in the natural order. As the *Christian Examiner* makes its missionaries "industry, enterprise, intelligence," and calls them nature's missionaries, and as the author of the article in the *Christian Examiner* calls it in another publication, the *New Religion of Nature*, it may be safely concluded that it is pure naturalism, and includes nothing that is not explicable on purely natural principles. It certainly rejects all supernatural revelation, and all supernatural intervention in the affairs of men or of the world. It stands opposed to all supernaturalism, and rejects both Protestantism and Catholicity so far as they assert a supernatural revelation, supernatural intervention, and a supernatural order. Decidedly then, if any thing, it is pure naturalism, and admits nothing but natural development. This is what the American people are to fall back upon when they have ceased to be Protestants, and this will have for them far more charms than Catholicity.

No doubt, individuals may find it so—for a time, but that a whole people will is questionable. Man is a social being, and will never rest in pure individualism; which necessarily excludes all ideas of government, society, solidarity, and brings back the state of nature asserted by Hobbes, which is only a state of war, in which the right is to the strongest. Man is also in some sense naturally religious, and religion is as necessary to his soul as food to his body. How then can we expect men to be full-grown, hearty, robust men under a system that excludes all society, all social organization, all government, all religious faith, hope, or love, all forms of worship, but such as theorists with "malice aforethought" may attempt, like Auguste Comte, to institute? Man too is a rational animal, and reason is in man a perpetual aspiration to know the origin and end, the principles and causes of all things, and these unhappily for the naturalists all have their root in the supernatural, and are placed by Mr. Herbert Spencer in that

division of things which he calls the Unknowable. How then can naturalism satisfy reason, of which the American people participate as largely as any other people, and who are proverbially curious and aspiring?

It may not be always good logic to argue from the want to the supply, or to conclude the truth of the Catholic religion from its adaptation to the genius and needs of American civilization. Many persons of strong reasoning powers, sound judgment, and good sense have found Dr. Channing's conclusion that Christianity must be true, because it meets the wants of the soul, inconclusive, but it is not reasonable to suppose that men will rest contented in a system that obviously can satisfy neither their intellectual nor their moral wants. Neither of these wants of man does or can naturalism supply. Few men are contented to say two and two, two and two, without adding,—make four. Naturalism excludes from both science and faith whatever is not explicable on natural principles. It excludes therefore from both the first and final cause of all things, and stops with second causes alone. Before it and behind it all is impenetrable darkness, and it is impossible to prevent thinking, reasoning, reflecting men, who feel with Schiller, *ernst ist das Leben*, life is serious and not to be trifled away, from sending longing glances into that darkness, and praying for some ray of celestial light to illumine it, if but for a moment.

The *Christian Examiner* speaks of the rest, the content and joy of the worshippers in its naturalistic churches; but from men's sensations in the battle, in the first flush of partial success, it is not safe to conclude how they will feel when the battle is over, the struggle ended, the triumph obtained, and there remain no longer any enemies to combat, any more worlds to conquer. The combatants for naturalism have all brought into the combat the arms, the discipline, and the forces supplied by a system not their own, indeed by that very supernaturalism which they reject as degrading to human nature, and repugnant to human reason. Let them succeed, and they will find after the first joy of success is over that in their conquests they have only despoiled themselves, and their rest, if rest they have, will be that of the stock or stone.

Naturalism denies the supernatural and affirms that there has never been any supernatural revelation, any supernatural intervention in human affairs. Whence then have

originated all these religions, Jewish, Christian, Mahometan, and all those cruel, barbarous, and enslaving pagan superstitions both before and since the Christian era? The *Christian Examiner* must hold that they are all natural, the outgrowth of human nature. Then why war against them? Why expect from nature alone any thing different? If human nature has developed them, they must be, on its principles, true and good. If nature has developed them, how can it be pretended that nature does not need them, and can have her full and free development without them? If she has developed them all through the past, how can it be certain that she will not continue to develop them all through the future? If there is nothing above nature, no supernatural, nothing but nature, then nature can never get out of nature, and what nature is and can and will do can be only inferred from what she has been and done.

Is it answered that all religions are symbolical, and symbolize, each in its way, more or less of the natural order, and that when, as the worshippers in the churches of the new religion of naturalism have done, we have penetrated the symbol and got at its philosophical or scientific sense, the symbol is rejected, and can never be restored? That all religions are symbolical, and symbolize truths or facts of the natural order even is unquestionably true, but that they symbolize *only* truths or facts of that order is far more easily asserted than proved. How know you that they do not, some imperfectly, the Christian perfectly, symbolize the supernatural, and that when you have extracted what belongs to the natural, you are not still as far as ever from having obtained their higher and real significance, or given them their true and full scientific explication? Men sometimes see no more, not because there is no more to be seen, but because their sight is no longer, nor stronger. The child fancies that the horizon that bounds our vision bounds the universe, and that by ascending yonder hill on which the sky seems to rest, it could play with the rainbow,—it is a child's fancy, not a man's.

Will the *Christian Examiner* appeal to development? There is, no doubt, development, natural development even, but development only unfolds or brings out what was originally in the germ. It can create nothing, nor even go on without borrowing from the medium in which it takes place. Without the supernatural there can be no natural development. Nature did not originate herself, and could

originate only in the supernatural; nor can she even subsist and operate without the constant, efficient presence of the supernatural. The *Christian Examiner* has little to hope from future developments. Euhemerus long ago anticipated the modern positivists and nature-worshippers in their explication of the symbols, and the old Epicureans, their real ancestors, were fully up on this point at least to their scientific level. They did not in just so many words deny the gods, as that might have brought them into collision with the police, as it did not long since the late Abner Kneeland, in Massachusetts; but they gave them nothing to do, put them "asleep up above," and reduced man, —in their theories—to pure nature. They were learned and eloquent, rich, polished, genteel, and had their orators, professors, poets, and philosophers. They had for a time a large portion of the upper and educated classes of the Roman Empire, which was then the whole civilized world, with them. Yet the Stoics and Neo-platonists carried it over them, and the Catholics carried it over both Stoics and Neo-platonists, and brought the empire back to belief in the supernatural, even to belief in a crucified God, and the power and dignity of the Cross. *Argumentum ab esse ad posse valet.* What has been may be. The conversion of the American people to the church would be a less wonderful thing than the conversion of the Roman Empire.

The *Christian Examiner* undoubtedly places its hopes in the progress of science, and the intelligence of the age and country; but the progress of modern science lies all in the secondary order, in the observation of facts and the explication of the laws of nature; valuable in its order indeed, but throwing no new light on first principles, or the origin and reason of things. The intelligence of the age will soon grow dim, and well-nigh disappear in the darkness if the supernatural be rejected, and men reduced to simple exclusive naturalism. If you can once get men to confine their thoughts and wishes to the low sphere of naturalism, and to be contented with it, they will soon cease to aspire, lose sight of the ideal, become gross and material, as incurious and as unprogressive as the savage. Is that what the *Christian Examiner* would call progress, a progress in losing, not in gaining? Does it agree with Rousseau, that "the man who thinks is already a depraved animal," and that the savage state is preferable to the civilized? Placed on this narrow island called Nature, surrounded on all sides

by an impenetrable and untraversable ocean of darkness, unable and forbidden to aspire,—to know any thing above or beyond mere creatures,—what would there be to stimulate man's intellectual activity, or to awaken his reason? He would be born, grow up, propagate his species, snatch the few sensible pleasures within his reach, die, and be forgotten. Is there any thing more to be expected from naturalism?

"The American people are in search of a philosophy, rather than a faith. Now a philosophy is what the church never gave or professed to give." Can naturalism give them a philosophy? Can nature explain her own origin or end? Do you call that philosophy that stops at second causes, and never rises to the principles and reason of things? From nature you can get only nature. The observation and explication of the facts and laws of nature, without carrying them up to their first, or forward to their final cause, is only secondary science, very useful and desirable in its order, but it is not philosophy any more than it is theology. Whether the church gives a philosophy or not, it is certain that naturalism does not, and cannot give one, for it is, in fact, the denial of philosophy.

Moreover, if the American people are in search of a philosophy, it is that through philosophy they may attain to faith in the supernatural, that they may justify the traditional faith of the race, convert the unbelieving, or strengthen and confirm the weak and hesitating. That the church does not teach dogmatically a philosophy in so far as philosophy is solely the work of natural reason, is true enough; but philosophy has received its grandest and richest developments in her schools in connection with her dogmatic teaching, and all who discard wholly that teaching have utterly failed to give the world a philosophy. The greatest masters of philosophic thought, since Plato and Aristotle, have been her great theologians, as St. Augustine, St. Anselm, St. Bonaventura, St. Thomas, Thomassin, Malebranche, Fénelon, to mention no others. The greatest of all modern philosophers not in her communion is the German, Leibnitz; but Leibnitz defended the Catholic dogmas, and in their light constructed his philosophy. Amongst the rejectors of supernatural revelation, or those who confined themselves to the strictly natural order, no philosopher in ancient or modern times can be named whose philosophy the man up to the level of Christian civilization does not

reject as a tissue of absurdities or puerilities. The reason of this is plain enough. Without supernatural revelation the philosopher cannot place himself in the position to solve, or to perceive even as far as they are rationally apprehensible and solvable, the great problems of philosophy. Plato and Aristotle had supernatural revelation, as far as it was preserved in the traditions of the gentiles, and hence their merits; but those traditions retained it only in an imperfect or mutilated form, and hence their defects. The eminent philosophers among Protestants also have it in the measure in which Protestants have retained the tradition of it, and hence, however defective that tradition may be with them, they are able to touch philosophical questions from a higher plane than simple nature.

The *Christian Examiner* apparently forgets that we who believe in the supernatural revelation of God have all the nature that the adherents of naturalism have. We may have, and most likely have more than they have, more than is dreamt of by their philosophy, but we cannot possibly have less. The supernatural, even if an illusion, leaves to the believer all that there is of nature. It does not supersede nature, weaken or distort its power. They can offer the American people nothing that we have not as well as they. Nature is as open to us as to them, and nothing in the Bible or the church prevents the Christian from pushing his investigations as freely and as far into nature as they can theirs. Supernatural revelation, if real, adds to reason and nature faith, which is a logical knowledge above their reach, and enlarges their boundaries; but in no case does it or can it diminish their power, or circumscribe the sphere of their observation and induction. The church places no restrictions on science, and interferes never with scientific explications, if really scientific they are. All she does is to forbid her children, in the interest alike of natural and revealed truth, to put forth *as true and established*, our conjectures, our theories, our speculations, *if they tend to unsettle faith*, where they have not been scientifically verified and converted into real science. It is well to note this, and to bear in mind that, on any conceivable hypothesis, faith does not supersede reason, or discourage its exercise; and, in point of fact, the men who have made the greatest scientific discoveries and done the most to advance modern science to its present proud position, have all been men born and brought up in the bosom of Christian civiliza-

tion, and educated in Christian schools, colleges, or universities. If some of them have seen proper to calumniate the mother that bare them, and to rend the bosom that nourished them, it is their fault or madness as individuals, but it cannot alter the fact that they have been formed under Christian civilization and Christian influences, and could have been formed under no other. Has science been advanced in modern times by men formed under the Chinese, the Hindoo, or the Mahometan civilization? Whence comes the superiority of the Christian civilization to all others but from Christianity itself, and Christianity even as a supernatural religion?

The *Christian Examiner* claims great success for its "philosophic faith." The transcendentalists, it says, "take no pains to make proselytes. The ripe fruit drops into their hands as fast as they can catch it." Might it not more properly have said, the fruit that rots and falls from the tree before it is ripe? "They have their churches." How many? They have a feeble congregation in the city of New York, consisting, it is said, of a few hundred members, and they had one and a stronger one, in the city of Boston, before Theodore Parker died, and perhaps still have one; but where else have they one on this continent? Fanny Wright's Hall of Science has long since been broken up, and Mr. Robert Dale Owen, one of its founders, has at least abandoned naturalism. The Unitarians have several churches, but the greater part of them recoil from the anti-supernaturalism of the Article of the *Christian Examiner*, and retain, if little, still too much of traditional Christianity to accept naked naturalism.

"They who accept it are among the calmest, quietest, serenest and happiest of people." Perhaps so; and yet the *Christian Examiner* says, "one of our most advanced and most resolute thinkers, a leader whom only the boldest followed, . . . has recently surprised his friends by sounding the retreat, and calling the fresh recruits back into the old, battered entrenchments." This would seem to indicate that the *Christian Examiner* has been deceived by appearances. This leader's example may prove contagious, and large numbers may follow it. The bare horror of naturalism into which transcendentalism threatened to plunge its followers, caused, before him, large numbers, who had not advanced so far, to recoil and seek refuge elsewhere. Was it not so with Brownson, Wilson and Patterson, Coolidge and Hunt-

ington, and many others that need not be named, who have either returned to the church or sought security in Protestant sects that have retained the principal Catholic dogmas? May not these be taken as an earnest of the ultimate return to belief in the supernatural of the great mass of those who have hitherto been following the tendency to naturalism?

To this naturalism, from which serious and earnest minds are already recoiling with horror, the *Christian Examiner* professes to believe the American people will yield themselves, when they have ceased to be Protestants, as cease they will. They will not, it tells us, become Catholics. Perhaps they will not; yet at the bottom they are a serious, an earnest, and a brave people, and their very vices spring from the richness and nobility of their nature. They are wanting in none of the heroic elements of human nature, and have a more real solidarity with the church, through their Christian civilization, their common law, their republican institutions, and their moral theology than they themselves are aware of. The church, too, is in their midst, with her celestial light, a light which cannot be hid, and which sends its rays to illumine the darkness which envelops the people outside of her communion, and it is far more reasonable to suppose that they will learn to distinguish between her Catholicity, which cannot fail to attract them, and some foreign associations which repel them, and return to her, and seek rest in their Father's house, than it is to suppose that they will definitely take up with sheer naturalism, which, whatever imposing names it may bear, or brilliant costume it may be decked with, is only another name for Christianity without Christ, and religion without God. Forced to choose between Catholicity and no religion, and perceiving the harmony which the *Christian Examiner* confesses between its principles, and those of their political institutions, they may in time lose their prejudices against her, which are chiefly political, may see and examine her claims in a more impartial frame of mind, and discover that their hostility to her heretofore has arisen from their misapprehension of her real character, and their confounding whatever they have found offensive or objectionable in the lives of Catholics or the acts of Catholic nations with Catholicity itself, and be prepared to listen with open minds and open hearts to the teaching of the Catholic missionary, and finally come to find joy and gladness in believing.

"This," says the *Christian Examiner*, p. 26, in its second

article, written apparently to neutralize the first, "will be known as the age of secession; . . . . but perhaps we have not thought how far political secession comes of theological schism." Certain it is, that with the American people theological schism in the leading Protestant denominations preceded actual political secession, and men are now beginning to discover that there is a closer connection between the moral and religious convictions of a people and their political conduct than it has been latterly supposed. Many minds are beginning to suspect that the only effectual guaranty of national unity is in religious unity. The state, not any more than the church, can be based on pure individualism, according to the *Christian Examiner*, the only living principle of Protestantism, and it is not unlikely that the terrible struggle in which the United States are now engaged for national existence and unity may turn attention to religious unity, and lead reflecting men to ask themselves very seriously if they can find that unity anywhere outside of the Catholic Church. "There is a Divinity that shapes our ends, rough-hew them as we will," and God in his providence uses even the passions of men to bring about his purposes. The civil war has led the *Christian Examiner*, in one article, to assert a connection between religion and politics it had denied in another, to assert not only a connection between religion and politics, but to disclaim all solidarity with those who dream of a Christianity without the supernatural.

"There is a copula between nature and the supernatural, as much as of any thing above with what is below. If *nature* be not all, with God and spirit merged in it, the *supernatural* must be. 'Anti-supernaturalism' is out of place 'in the pulpit' on the ground of any religion, to say nothing of Christianity; and to define the Christian miracles as unnatural, or violations of nature, or as more wondrous in themselves than any thing else, or wonderful at all to God, is the art of their enemies, not the wisdom of their friends." (p. 38.)

This shows a tendency in a right direction, and proves that even the Unitarians, as a body, will not accept pure, naked, unmitigated naturalism. No error can long live where truth is at hand to take its place: and it is not improbable that the present civil war, notwithstanding the mistakes of some individual Catholics, may result in correcting not a few religious as well as political errors, and in placing the religion as well as the politics of the nation on

a solid and imperishable foundation, and thus aid the American people in fulfilling their mission and working out their glorious destiny.

But be this as it may, the *Christian Examiner*, whether it speaks with a single or a double tongue, will never succeed in persuading any considerable number of our countrymen that Christianity without Christ, and religion without God, is either the Christian religion or any religion at all. If they are driven to accept it as the best thing there is for man, they will not accept it as religion, or even as philosophy, but will call it plainly and bluntly what it is, atheism in relation to God, and anarchy in relation to society. Yet if they lose their Protestantism, without finding Catholicity, they will not stop at naturalism, as the rise and spread among them of both Mormonism and spiritism, whose successes shame those of the transcendentalists, abundantly prove. Men must and will have a religion of some sort. This world is too bleak and wintry to permit them to walk abroad in the simplicity of nature, and when they lose the supernatural robes of true religion they will make themselves aprons of the fig-leaves of superstition. When they can no longer get an answer from the powers above to their questions as to their origin and end, they will invoke the powers below, as Saul, when he could get no answer from God, resorted to the Witch of Endor. They must and will worship, and when they have lost God they will worship the devil: for they can worship only something they believe to be superior to themselves and visible nature.

The *Christian Examiner* would do well to study the old heathen mythologies, and the fearful and abominable superstitions into which the gentiles fell after their apostasy. No men are so credulous as sceptics, who, as Clement of Alexandria said of the Greeks, can believe any thing and every thing but the truth; and no people are so open to superstition as they who have no faith in God and his revelation. Abner Kneeland could not believe in God, but he could and did believe that a little girl, by looking into a stone placed in a hat, could see things at the bottom of the ocean. It need not surprise any one to find even the writer of the article in the *Christian Examiner*, though having no belief in St. Paul, or even in the evangelical history of our Lord, vaunting Andrew Jackson Davis as a true seer, and accepting the teachings of his lying spirits as the living and eternal truth. The great movement in which he believes, he tells us, was

commenced by Luther, and Emerson is its best representation as yet. Some persons have asked how it can continue on beyond Emerson without going off into vacuity: but beyond Emerson is demonism, which under the name of spiritualism is now spreading rapidly through the land. Its earliest receivers were unbelievers, men who could not believe in the gospel or in the existence of God. They could not believe the prophets and apostles, but they could believe the spirit-rappers. In this low and vulgar superstition, which in time may grow into a creed, will the American people take refuge, if they cease to be Protestants without becoming Catholics. Is the *Christian Examiner* prepared to accept it? Or is it unaware that only the church has delivered the world from the ancient superstitions, and that it is only she that has the power to save the American people from this new and growing demon-worship, as illusory as the ancient, and capable of becoming equally cruel and enslaving?

The *Christian Examiner*, though firmly convinced that the American people will cease to be Protestants, yet contends that Protestantism, in one or another of its forms, will continue to be their religion. "Nature has missionaries who travel faster than the brothers of the order of St. Paul. They are industry, enterprise, intelligence, knowledge, the awakened capacities of man."—p. 26. Was there no industry, no enterprise, no intelligence, no knowledge, no mental and physical activity before Luther? Will Protestants accept these missionaries that carry a Christianity without Christ, a religion without God; missionaries solely of the material order, as their missionaries? Is there any form of Protestantism properly so called that believes in nothing above the material order? If so, it can in no sense be called a religion. And when men are reduced to the material order alone, what will remain to awaken and exercise their higher and nobler faculties? What motive will they have to cultivate their spiritual nature, and to strive to be high, noble-minded men? You reduce them to be mere bodies without souls, and they will seek only the goods of the body. Having reduced Christianity to a mere religion of the body, how can you look honest men in the face and call it "spiritual Christianity," "transcendentalism," and cry out against the formalism, the materialism, and the sensuousness of Catholicity!

Has the writer already leaped the precipice? If so, we

will hope that the American people will not follow him. That they will see that although Protestantism served their material growth in the infancy of their nation, it cannot be the religion of its manhood. That without ceasing to respect the many noble qualities and hardy virtues of their Protestant ancestors, they will seek for the true principle of unity in the Catholic Church, and find there, a consecration of their nationality and a firm support of their free and republican institutions.

THE GREAT COMMISSION.*

[From the Catholic World for November, 1870.]

As this is a standard Protestant work on the subject, and has been before the public for nearly thirty years, we are a little surprised to learn from the title-page that its sales have only reached the ninth thousand, though it is possible if we were to read it our surprise would be somewhat lessened. Read it we have not, though we have looked into it here and there; and certainly we do not propose to review it. We are not in the habit of reviewing books we have not read; and as we did not think it worth our while to read it when we were a Protestant, we are still less disposed to do it now we are a Catholic. We have no doubt that if one had patience to wade through its pages he might fish out some curious things; but we would rather forego them than submit to the weary labor of seeking them, especially in hot weather. We are contented to stop with the title and the question it raises as to the great commission, or authority to evangelize the world.

We accept the assertion contained in the title, that our Lord constituted and commissioned his church to convey the Gospel to the world. We do not concede that this is all his church was constituted or instituted and commissioned

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**The Great Commission; or, The Christian Church Constituted and Charged to Convey the Gospel to the World.* By JOHN HARRIS, D. D. With Introductory Essay by the Rev. William R. Williams, D. D. Ninth thousand. Boston: 1870

to do; but we do admit that she was instituted, among other things, for this, and that this is included in the great commission which our Lord gave his apostles. But here comes up the question: To whom did this great commission issue; and who inherit the authority it confers? Who have received it, and have the right to act under it and appropriate the promises that accompany it?

We know well the commission, and to whom it was originally given. "And Jesus coming, spake to them [the apostles], saying: All power is given to me in heaven and in earth. Go ye, therefore, and teach all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost; teaching them to observe all things whatsoever I have commanded you; and behold I am with you all days, even to the consummation of the world." This is the commission, given by one who had ample authority, for he had all power in heaven and in earth, and it is sufficiently broad in its terms. There can be no dispute that it was given originally to the apostles; but was it given to them personally, during their natural life only? If so, the commission expired, by its necessary limitation, with their death, and there is now and has been since no "great commission," no "church constituted to convey the Gospel to the world." If there has since been no such church, no such commission, certainly our Protestant friends have no commission, no authority from God to evangelize the world; and their missionaries at home or abroad, in Protestant nations, Catholic nations, or infidel nations, are like those prophets of whom the Lord says by the mouth of Jeremy the prophet: "I did not send these prophets, yet they ran; I have not spoken to them, yet they prophesied." If the Lord hath not commissioned and sent their preachers and missionaries, they have no authority that anybody is bound or even has the right to respect. In matters of religion, nobody is bound or has the right to listen to any preacher or teacher not commissioned or authorized to teach by our Lord himself.

But Dr. Harris, the author of the book before us, cannot take the ground that the commission was to the apostles personally, and expired with their natural life. The very purpose for which he writes is to show from the Scriptures and other sources that the great commission was issued to the church, which still subsists, and is in full force now, or that the church was constituted for the very purpose of evangelizing the nations in every age of the world. It

could not then have lapsed with the natural life of the apostles. A careful analysis of the terms of the commission, as recorded by St. Matthew, will sustain the author, and prove that it was to remain in force through all time; for our Lord promised those he commissioned that he would be with them "all days, even to the consummation of the world," which proves that they whom he commissioned were in the sense intended to remain to teach or evangelize till the consummation of the world, an event still future; for evidently he could not remain with and aid and protect with his gracious presence teachers or evangelizers that had ceased to live in the world. Either, then, we must admit that the promise of Christ has failed, which is not possible, or else maintain that the commission was to the apostles in a sense in which they are still living in time; for the promise is, "Behold, I am with *you* all days, even to the consummation of the world."

As the apostles are personally no longer inhabitants of time, evidently it is only as a body or corporation of evangelizers, which survives the death of its individual members in their successors, that the apostles do or can continue to exist in time to the end of the world. The commission reads: "Go *ye*," and the promise is, "I am with *you*"—plainly proving that they who received the commission, in the sense in which they were commissioned, are precisely they who were or are to continue in time till the world is consummated, which is not possible except in the sense of a corporation of teachers or evangelizers, defined by the lawyers to be an artificial and immortal person. The commission must then have been given to the apostles and their successors in whom the corporation is perpetuated, and is to be perpetuated to the end of the world; for it is only in their successors in whom they survive that they do or can live to the consummation of the world. Dr. Harris must take this ground, or else say nothing about the "Great Commission," as given to anybody now living.

There is no question of the fact that the commission issued and is a perpetual commission to the church as a teaching body to evangelize the world. We have read enough of the volume before us to see that Dr. Harris abundantly proves this point from the Scriptures. So long as there are any nations not yet converted, the church must either prove false to her trust or be in one sense a missionary church. But the church to whom the commission is given must be

the church that continues or perpetuates the church of the apostles, or, more strictly, the identical apostolic body. Every other or any other body, whatever it may call itself, whatever its pretensions, or however successfully it may mimic it, has no authority, no commission from our Lord to evangelize at home or abroad. A man who is not commissioned by the regular authority for that purpose has no right to assume the command of the army, and no officer or soldier has any duty, or even right, to obey his orders. It is necessary, then, to identify the body claiming to have received the commission with the apostolic body, and any body that cannot establish its identity with that body must be treated as a usurper, and without authority to evangelize. The apostle St. John assures us of this: "Dearly beloved, believe not every spirit; but try the spirits, whether they be of God; because many false prophets are gone out into the world. By this is the spirit of God known: every spirit that confesseth Jesus Christ to have come in the flesh is of God; and every spirit that dissolveth Jesus, is not of God; and this is Antichrist, of whom ye have heard that he cometh, and he is now already in the world. You are of God, little children, and have overcome him; because greater is he that is in you than he that is in the world. They are of the world; therefore of the world they speak, and the world heareth them. *We are of God. He that knoweth God heareth us; he that is not of God, heareth us not. By this know we the spirit of truth and the spirit of error.*"

We have quoted the whole passage; but at this moment we use only the sixth verse, which we have italicized. The apostle gives two tests, one of doctrine, and the other of communion. The latter only is to our present purpose, though we shall refer to the other before we close. We, the apostolic body or communion; says the apostle, are of God—"He that knoweth God, heareth *us;* and he that is not of God, heareth us not. By this we know the spirit of truth and the spirit of error." Clearly, then, any body separated from the perpetual apostolic body, and who heareth it not, or refuses to receive its teachings, is governed by the spirit of error, is of the world, and has neither commission nor authority from our Lord to evangelize the nations. No body or corporation of evangelizers not identical with the apostolic body, and commissioned in its communion, therefore extending without any break, or the failure of a single link, from the apostles down to us, can have received a com-

mission from our Lord, or can evangelize by his authority. This becomes rather a serious matter, and renders it necessary to ascertain what body existing to-day, claiming the apostolic commission, if any, is the continuation of the apostolic body, and identical with it.

Into the question of corporate identity we do not propose at present to enter at any length; it is sufficient for our present purpose to say that no pretended church that is not in the apostolic communion, or that cannot trace its historical union with the apostolic body from the time of the apostles down, without break or interruption, to the present, is or can be the body commissioned. This, of course, excludes all so-called Protestant churches; for they have all been born fifteen hundred years too late for that, and, besides, are in communion with no body or corporation that dates from apostolic times. The oldest Protestant churches are not yet three centuries and a-half old, and date only from the first half of the sixteenth century. They were all founded by men who inherited neither the commission nor the promises of our Lord to his apostles, and who acted upon their own personal authority alone. The Lord did not send them, yet they ran; he did not speak to them, yet they prophesied, and could prophesy only from their own hearts. So far from having commissioned or sent them, the Lord forbids us to hearken to them. "Hearken not to the prophets that prophesy to you and deceive you; they speak a vision of their own heart, and not out of the mouth of the Lord." So much is certain and undeniable.

Protestants, therefore, in any case are without any commission or authority from God to evangelize the world. If the great commission was never given, or was given only to the apostles personally, they, as we have seen, never received it; and if it was given to the apostles as a teaching body to continue to the end of the world, they are equally without authority to evangelize the world; for none of their churches are that body, or participate in its authority, its commission, or the promises it inherits. Whether, then, our Lord did or did not constitute, institute, as we say, the church "to convey the Gospel to the world," Protestant churches are equally without mission or authority, and have no right to apply to themselves any of the passages of Scripture that speak of it.

Protestants cannot abide the test of apostolic communion proposed by St. John. Can they any better abide the doc-

trinal test? "Every spirit that confesseth Jesus Christ to have come in the flesh is of God; and every spirit that *dissolveth* Jesus, is not of God." Whether Protestants profess to believe that Jesus Christ has come in the flesh or not we need not inquire, for all Protestant churches, so far as we know them, really dissolve him, or deny in him the hypostatic union, in the unity of the divine person, of the human and divine natures. This is evident from the fact that, like Nestorius, they all refuse to call our blessed Lady the mother of God, and will only call her the mother of Christ. They stigmatize the honor we pay to her as the mother of God as Mariolatry. This can only be because they do not really believe that he who took flesh in her womb and was born of her, flesh of her flesh, was really and truly God, or that the human nature which he took from her was substantially joined to the one person of the Word, so as to be as truly and as indissolubly the nature of God as is his divine nature itself. They admit that Christ died in his human nature, for they know the divine nature cannot die, but they feel great reluctance to say that it was really and literally God who died on the cross, and in their minds hold that it was only the man the Word assumed who so died. This is really to deny Jesus Christ to have come in the flesh, and to dissolve him, to separate his humanity from his divinity, or, in other words, to deny the unity of his person, and to assume that he is dual in person as well as in nature.

Rationalists or naturalistic Protestants, if they do not regard Jesus Christ as a myth and deny that he ever really lived, dissolve him by denying his divinity and holding him to have been only a man—a great and good man, the most of them say; a messenger from God with a divine mission, others of them say; but after all a man with a simple human personality and simple human nature like other men. The supernaturalists, or the so-called orthodox Protestants, though they recognize in him a union of the human and divine natures, fail to recognize the indissoluble union of the human nature with the divine personality, and thus dissolve him, at least so far as concerns the work of regeneration and salvation. The human nature of the Word serves no purpose in the economy of grace as they hold it, except in regard to that part of his mediatorial work which consists in satisfying by his atoning sacrifice the divine justice. That sacrifice made once for all, his human nature no longer comes into play, and henceforth he acts solely in his divine

nature, as pure divinity. The Incarnation was a temporary, a transitory fact, and now either does not subsist or performs no office in the actual application of the atonement, in the regeneration, the justification, and glorification of souls. The humanity of the Word has done its work; it finished it nearly two thousand years ago, and has nothing more to do. If this is not dissolving Jesus, we know not what would be.

This conclusion is evident from the Protestant denial of the church, which grows out of the Incarnation, and is, as Moehler well maintains, in some sort its visible continuation; also the denial by Protestants of sacramental grace, or the whole so-called sacramental system, and of all medium of the new birth or of the union of the soul with Christ, as we have explained in our article on *Union with the Church*.* With Protestants the atoning sacrifice was a transitory act, completed both as to God and man in the past, not a continuous fact in the economy of grace; the new birth is not being born of God in his humanity, but of God in his divinity, and therefore not regeneration but creation; the justification, sanctification, all that pertains to regeneration and secures glorification, is done by God immediately in his irresistible divinity, without any intervention of his humanity. Hence Protestants reject the ever-living mediator of God and men, the MAN Christ Jesus. Hence they deny the intercession of the saints, and regard all honor or worship which Catholics pay to the saints as related by nature through his human nature to Christ and redeemed and sanctified by his grace, as idolatry, and to be punished as such by the civil magistrate. In all this we can see only the denial of the hypostatic union, or "the Word made flesh." There is a decided failure to recognize the indissoluble union of the two natures in one divine person. The divine person is always, eternally, the second person of the divine nature, and is therefore God, in the fullest and strictest sense of the word. This divine person, remaining as ever the second person of the divine nature, assumes human nature, which henceforth is as much and as truly his nature as the divine nature itself, and can no more be separated from his personality, or his personality from it. To assume a separation in any act or part of the mediatorial kingdom of grace is to dissolve Jesus, or to deny him to have come, in the apostolic sense, "in the flesh."

*Vol. III, p. 438.

And the spirit that does this "is Antichrist, of whom ye have heard that he cometh, and is now already in the world." "They," the apostle further informs us, who follow this spirit, this Antichrist, "are of the world; therefore of the world they speak, and the world heareth them." If we wanted further confirmation of the fact that Protestants dissolve Jesus, this would give it. Protestants are unquestionably of the world, speak from [the sense of *of*]the world, and the world heareth them. Is it not so? What is the great Protestant charge against the Catholic Church? Is it not that she does not conform to the spirit of the age—that is, of the world—but is hostile to it, and anathematizes it? Is it not that she opposes what it pleases the world to call modern civilization? What else means the savage outcry which we have heard in all lands against the *syllabus* of our holy father, Pius IX., now gloriously reigning? Protestant as well as secular journals with one voice condemn the church in the name of the world, accuse her of hostility to the age, of lagging behind it, and refusing to go on with it. They charge her with resisting the world's movements, with opposing its plans of reform and projects of revolution. They oppose her in this age and in this country in the name of democracy, as in the sixteenth century in England and Germany she was opposed in the name of monarchy. They charge Catholics with a want of worldly enterprise and activity, and Catholic nations with inferiority in commerce, industry, and national wealth.

Nowhere do we find Protestants in antagonism to the world, or if they seem now and then to antagonize the world, it is in the spirit of the world, and from the world's point of view. They are everywhere in close affiliation with its revolutionism, and join it everywhere in its war against authority, against strong and stable government, and the sacredness of marriage and the family relations which religion enjoins and has always labored to protect and defend. Protestant literature breathes the spirit of the world; it lets loose the passions, wars against all social or moral restraint as tyrannical, and demands and tends to create universal license. Even when it affects to be pious, it does not rise above the piety of the heathen, that is, above the piety which lies in the natural order.

"And the world heareth them." The world did not oppose but encouraged the reformers, and whatever opposition they encountered came, as Protestants themselves boast,

not from the world, but from the church. Kings, princes, nobles, the men who belong to this world and are devoted to its interests, everywhere favored them, and if they did not all openly side with them, it was because the old church retained too strong a hold on their people to make it in all cases safe for them to do it. It is the same still; nobody has ever heard of Protestants being opposed in the name of the world. Who has ever heard of a Protestant martyr? The world knoweth and loveth its own. It hated our Lord and crucified him between two thieves, because he was not of the world; it hates the Catholic Church, and uses all the means in its power to destroy her, to annihilate her power and influence, because, she, like our Lord, is not of the world, but seeks its subjection to the law of God. In point of fact, Protestants are the world, and the world is Protestant, and Protestants make their boast of it. Protestantism moves on with the world, changes with its changes, and maintains always and everywhere a good understanding with it, and condemns the church because she does not do the same.

In the outset, Protestants pretended to have some theological reasons for breaking from the church and fighting against her, and they no doubt deceived many simple-minded people by their theological pretences, but it was from the first the world, not theology, that constituted their strength and secured them the successes they obtained. But at present Protestants have pretty much dropped all theological or even religious pretences, and defend themselves and attack the church almost entirely on worldly grounds. The late prime minister of England opposes Catholicity in his *Lothair* as un-English, unpatriotic, and not a becoming religion for an Englishman; and in this country, the paradise of Protestants, the controversy between Catholics and Protestants has pretty much ceased to be theological, and so far as serious on the part of Protestants is purely political or social. The church is opposed on the ground that she is hostile, and Protestantism defended on the ground that it is favorable, to the civilization of the nineteenth century and "the American idea." The Protestant leaders everywhere seek to rally their forces and inflame them with wrath against the church on the pretence that she is hostile to American liberty, and would, were she to become predominant, destroy our free institutions and reduce the American people to civil and spiritual bondage. The

motive, whether founded or not, is manifestly borrowed from the world, not from religion or from Christianity, and the fact that Protestants act from it proves that they are of the world worldly, that they place politics, or the goods of this life, above religion or the goods of the life to come.

Protestants claim to be the great and leading nations of the world, to be the only progressive nations of the time, and the only nations that support civil and religious liberty. They claim the chief merit of modern scientific inventions and discoveries, as also of the marvellous application of modern science to the mechanical and productive arts. It matters not to our present purpose whether their claims are well founded or not; it suffices that they make them and bring them forward in their justification, to prove that they are of the world, as also does the fact that everybody but Catholics who are not, or profess to be not, of the world, admits all they claim, for it proves that the world heareth and believeth them. They unquestionably have the ear and the heart of the world. What they agree in asserting is reiterated by the organs of public opinion, and is generally credited. Any attempt on the part of Catholic organs to refute Protestant claims or assertions and to stem the current of public opinion passes unheeded, or, if heeded, is only sneered at or contemned as the raving of a lunatic, certainly of persons whose eyes are on the back-side of their heads, and who are hopelessly "behind the age." We may, then, repeat without fear of contradiction, that Protestants "are of the world, and the world heareth them." Indeed, this is their boast, and they are daily flinging it in the face of Catholics as a proof that the world belongs to Protestantism, not to the church.

But, if the beloved apostle St. John is to be believed, this boast is their shame as Christians, though not as Protestants, and proves that they are not animated by the spirit that confesses Jesus Christ to have come in the flesh, but follow the spirit that dissolveth Jesus, which, according to the same apostle, is Antichrist, who even in his day was already in the world. Protestants, it is clear, then, can abide neither of the two apostolic tests, and utterly fail in regard to both. They confess not the great central truth of Christianity, Jesus Christ has come in the flesh; they dissolve Jesus, separate his humanity from his divinity, deny him as the present, living, active mediator of God and men. They gather not with the apostles, are not affiliated with the apos-

tolic body, but separate from it and scatter, and, instead of being moved and directed by Christ, they are moved and directed by Antichrist. It were absurd, then, to pretend that they are the recipients of the great commission, or that they are constituted by our Lord himself "the church to convey the Gospel to the world."

Protestants have two answers to this conclusion—the one that, though their ministers have no outward or external commission, they yet have an inward call or authorization from the Holy Ghost; the other, that no commission from God is needed, for every congregation has the natural right to call any man to be their minister they please, and any one so called has the right, if he pleases, to accept the call and to assume the functions of a minister of Christ. It is a matter of mutual agreement and contract. The first answer would do well enough, if the minister had any means of proving his internal commission from the Holy Ghost. A commission from the Holy Ghost is necessary and is no doubt sufficient, but while the operation of the Holy Ghost is necessarily internal, it is neeessary that there be an outward sign of the inward graee, or else they to whom one is to minister can never know that he is commissioned or duly authorized to minister in holy things. Nor can he himself know it, and must be always in danger of mistaking his vocation, and of running without being sent, and of preaching the dreams of his own fancy, or the crude imaginations of his own heart. The outward sign must be either miracles which prove his mission or the sacrament of orders and a commission from a regular authority competent to give it. Protestant ministers can appeal to neither. The reformers proved their mission by no miracles, and the Protestant ministers of our day are no miracle-workers. The several Protestant sects have no orders, no authority to confer jurisdiction, and can give no external proof of the internal call. Hence they can bind no one, nor render it lawful for any one to listen to their preachers or missionaries. Some of these sects indeed affect airs as if they were churches founded by our Lord himself, but everybody knows or ought to know that they are only self-created societies, or simple voluntary associations, with no more of the authority of the church than a political caucus has of the authority of the state, nor even so much; for the caucus is composed of a portion of the people through whom the state derives its authority from God, and the sect is no part or portion of a

divinely constituted church. Besides, the church derives its power immediately from our Lord, not through the medium of the faithful.

The second answer only proves that those Protestants who adopt it are of the world, and understand no difference between purely worldly matters and religious and ecclesiastical matters. Yet we deny the assumption that any congregation or any persons whatever have the natural right to call any man they please to minister to them in religion; they have no right to call any one not duly ordained according to the law of God, and duly commissioned by our Lord himself. Nor has any man who knows that he is not so ordained and commissioned the right, natural or acquired, to take upon himself the work of a religious minister, or to contract with any body to be their minister; for no man has the right to contract to do what he has no power to do. In religion, which is the law of God, all authority must proceed directly from God. Religion binds alike the congregation and the minister, the people and the clergy, and therefore the people or congregation cannot invest a man with authority to minister unto them. How can a man teach with authority those from whom he derives all the authority he has? No man has a natural right to teach or to be taught error, any more than he has to believe or deny what he pleases. The authorization is necessary both for the shepherd and his flock—as a guaranty to the flock that they shall be taught the truth; and to the shepherd, that he shall be divinely aided to teach it, and no authority except that of our Lord can guaranty either, because no other can impart to the commissioned the inward ability to fulfil the obligation he incurs.

Neither of these answers can avail Protestants any thing. The Anglicans and Episcopalians pretend that their so-called church did not originate in the sixteenth century, but is the identical church that was in England from the conversion of the nation to Christianity, and that they come down by regular succession from the apostles. But this is historically untrue. Their church was changed in the sixteenth century from the Catholic Church *in* England to the national church *of* England. Since the sixteenth century it has had and has now no communion with any church that existed in England or elsewhere prior to the reformers, and it communes with no body but itself. It has had and it has no authority but what it has derived from the crown or crown and parlia-

ment, that is, from the civil power. It may have retained some of the forms of the Catholic Church in England, and its ministers may have retained their temporalities, mutilated or unmutilated by the state, and at its mercy; but it is absurd to pretend that a national church holding from the civil power is identical with the Catholic or apostolic church, holding from our Lord, through his vicar, the supreme pastor and teacher of the universal church, the successor of Peter, on whom our Lord built his church. The change was fundamental, and the Church of England, and its offspring, the Protestant Episcopal Church of the United States, with the affiliated churches in the English colonies, are as much children of the reformation in the sixteenth century as are the Lutheran or the Calvinistic churches of Germany, Switzerland, Holland, or Scotland. The instinct of the English people is Protestant; and no more intensely Protestant church has ever existed than the Church of England. The English church is not a church, it is only an establishment.

Anglican bishops, indeed, pretend to the apostolic succession of orders; but even if their pretence could be made good, it would avail them nothing, for they have received no mission, have no jurisdiction, except what they derive from the crown, which has no authority in the case. But the pretence has never been and never can be made good; and Anglican bishops and priests or ministers are simply laymen, and just as much so as are Presbyterian, Methodist, Baptist, or Congregational ministers. They are generally well-bred, gentlemanly, amiable, many of them fine classical scholars and cultivated and learned men, but that does not make them bishops or priests of the church of God. They are outside of the apostolic body, and have no lot or part in the apostolic commission to evangelize all nations.

Having no part in the great commission, and consequently no authority from God, Protestants have no ability or capacity to teach the Gospel. They can inquire, reason, discuss, form and express opinions, which after all may or may not be true, but they cannot teach; they are not doctors. In religion, in man's relations and duties to God, only truth will answer. These relations and duties do not originate in our creative power, and do not subsist by any act of our will or understanding; they are imposed by our Creator as his law, which is alike law for the will and the understanding, and demands interior obedience as well as exterior submission. Only the law of God can bind the conscience, and

hence it is the divine law, and not any other law, that must be taught, promulgated, declared, defined, and applied. It is the divine law itself, not men's opinions of what it is, that we must be taught, if truly taught; for it is only that we can be bound to obey or have the right to submit the conscience to. The Lord says, "The prophet that hath a dream, let him tell a dream; and he that hath my word, let him speak my word *with truth*. What hath the chaff to do with the wheat?" To declare the law, to speak the word, or to teach the revelation of God *with truth*, that is, truly, demands on the part of the teacher immunity from error, or, in other words, that the teacher be infallible in his teaching; and to a fallible teacher in relation to the law or word of God no man is or can be bound to listen. The fallible teacher is always liable to be deceived and to deceive, to mistake his dreams for divine revelations, and to give us the chaff instead of the wheat.

Not only must the teacher be exempt from all liability to err in his teaching, but he must be able to establish the fact, not only before we can be bound, but before we can have any right to listen to his teachings. Hence the need of the external commission. No doubt a simple external commission does not of itself give the interior ability to teach infallibly, but a commission to teach from him who hath all power in heaven and in earth is a divine guaranty of infallibility in teaching. The divine commission to one to teach us is a command to us from God to hear him, and to believe what he teaches, as really so as when the voice thundered from the heavens, "This is my beloved Son; hear ye him;" and if one divinely commissioned could err in the matters covered by his commission, it would follow that God could command us to believe error, which is impossible, since God is true, the truth itself. Hence the divine commission to teach carries with it the divine pledge of infallibility in teaching, the pledge of him who can neither deceive nor be deceived. Proof of the commission is all that is needed. It is all that miracles prove. "Rabbi, we know that thou art come a teacher from God; for no man can do these miracles which thou doest, unless God be with him." Only God himself can work a real miracle, and the miracle therefore proves that the teacher comes from God, accredits him as sent or commissioned of God, and we know therefore that whatever he teaches in the name of God must be true, for God cannot accredit a teacher that can in that which he teaches either deceive or be deceived.

We do not say that every individual member of a teaching body must be personally infallible, but there must be infallibility in the body, at least in its head, so that every individual member when teaching only what the body authorizes him to teach can teach infallibly. So much is necessary if truth is of more value in religion than falsehood—the wheat is preferable to the chaff. Either each individual teacher must be immediately accredited by our Lord himself, or be authorized by the body that is so accredited and commissioned. Yet neither is the case with Protestants. God nowhere vouches for their veracity, and nowhere, and in no respect whatever, stands pledged to render them able to teach his word infallibly. Indeed, they disclaim infallibility, and make it one of their chief charges against the Catholic Church that she claims immunity from error in matters of faith and morals. Do we not hear them from all quarters, in all tones, crying out against the recent definition of papal infallibility, or that the supreme pastor and teacher of the universal church, through the divine assistance, is infallible in defining faith and morals? Do they not accuse him of claiming an attribute of God, nay, of making himself God? Yet how can they teach, if not infallible? What more can they do than offer their opinions, or say "every man to his neighbor, I have dreamed, I have dreamed"? Whether the pope be or be not infallible in the sense the Council of the Vatican has defined, is not now the question; but it is clear he must be so if able to speak the word of God with truth. Protestants both as congregations and ministers being really and confessedly fallible, it is equally clear that they have, as we began by saying, no ability or capacity to teach. Protestant ministers being confessedly fallible, have not the divine assistance which secures them immunity from error, and are therefore virtually by their own confession blind guides, and our Lord says, "If the blind lead the blind, they shall both fall into the ditch."

Protestants, or at least a large class of them, say, "We have the Bible; the Bible is infallible; and therefore we have in the Bible infallible authority for what we believe and teach." That Protestants have, properly speaking, the Bible may be questioned, for it was not originally addressed to them, nor was it deposited with them as its divinely appointed guardians and interpreters. Legally, or by divine authority, they have not the Bible. But pass over this. How from the conceded fact that the Bible is infallible conclude

that Protestants are infallible, or have an infallible authority for what they believe and teach? Their syllogism is not good in logic, for it lacks what logicians call the middle term which unites the two extremes. The Bible being infallible has but one uniform sense, and contains but one uniform doctrine, consistent with itself throughout, and free from all self-contradiction. How can Protestants, confessedly fallible, determine infallibly this one sense or this one doctrine, so as to have infallible authority for what they believe and teach? It matters little to say you have the Bible and the Bible is infallible, unless you have some infallible means of ascertaining its true and real meaning. Those means Protestants confessedly have not, and they prove they have not by their inability to agree among themselves as to what that meaning really is. All Protestants, not avowed unbelievers in Jesus Christ as the Word made flesh, profess to derive their doctrines from the Bible, and yet, except in so far as they follow the tradition of the Catholic Church against which they protest, there is no such thing as agreement or uniformity in doctrine among them. Their whole history is a history of disagreement and variation in doctrine. For three hundred years and over they have been trying to fix in their minds the sense of the Bible, and they are still seeking, and modifying their doctrines every day. Despairing of success, they are beginning boldly to avow that uniformity of doctrine is neither practicable nor desirable. The tendency among them just now is to discard all doctrinal or dogmatic theology, to resolve faith into *fiducia* or trust, and Christianity itself into certain inward emotions, sentiments, or affections. Objective truth is counted of little value, and religion ceases to be a law for conscience, and becomes little else than a subjective emotion or affection. At the very best, what Protestants profess to believe and teach is not the real doctrine or meaning of the Bible, but their views of what that meaning really is; not the revelation God has made to man, but their views of it, which, as they are fallible, must not be taken for the revelation or word of God itself.

Besides, the Bible, as language itself, is unintelligible without tradition. The best grammars and lexicons are those that most faithfully reproduce the traditionary sense of a language. The Bible interpreted by grammar and lexicon is still the Bible interpreted by tradition. The Jewish rite of circumcision is intelligible only by the tradition that explains it. Baptism can be understood only by the tradition

of those who practise it. The word may mean aspersion, effusion, or immersion—how then, except from tradition, determine in which sense it must be taken? Take the word presbyter, πρεσβύτερος. It means in classical Greek an ancient or elder; it means with Catholics a *priest*—which is the Christian or Scriptural sense of the word? But as the word *priest* comes from *presbyter*, and is the same word under an English form, how except from tradition can even the lexicographer determine the Scriptural sense of the word *priest?* We might continue our instances, and ask similar questions in regard to every word in the Bible. Grammarians and lexicographers can only give the tradition as they receive it, and as nobody pretends that they are infallible, appeal to them can settle no point on which error is not permissible. How then without tradition, and an infallible guardian and interpreter of tradition, is it possible to arrive infallibly at the sense or teaching of the Bible? Even granting that the whole word of God is contained in the Bible, expressly or by implication, Protestants gain nothing, for they cannot understand the Bible without tradition, and tradition requires an infallible guardian and interpreter to enable them to claim, because they have an infallible Bible, they have an infallible authority for what they profess to believe and teach.

It is well, also, to bear in mind that the Holy Scriptures, though when read in the light of authentic tradition preserved by the church, they are not difficult to understand, yet are, when read without that light, well-nigh unintelligible,—are more likely to mislead and bewilder than to enlighten and edify the reader. Experience proves it, and it is worse than idle to deny it. Something of that tradition, in a mutilated form, is, no doubt, still retained by the older Protestant sects, though they are daily losing more and more of it, and they may derive more or less profit from reading the Bible; but where that tradition is wholly lost, or where it has never existed, as with the heathen, the Bible, save in the history and laws of the Jews, is pretty much a sealed book, and is by no means fitted to give much light on the Christian religion, or to draw unbelievers to Christ. So well satisfied are even Protestant sects of this that they do not, in their efforts to convey what they call the Gospel to the heathen or benighted papists, rely on the circulation of the Scriptures alone without note or comment, even in their mutilated text and perverse or imperfect translation, but accompany them wherever they can with Bible-readers and interpreters. They

send out Protestant tracts and Protestant men and women to expound and explain the written word.

The reason of this unintelligibility is that all the books of the Bible were written for believers, not for unbelievers, for those who are assumed to have been more or less instructed in the doctrines or truths of revelation, and their writers presume their readers already know and believe something of the matters on which they are writing. Whoever reads the Bible will find on its face that its writers give very little formal doctrinal instruction; they assume much has been given and is believed, and the key to the full meaning of what they wrote is to be found only in what had been previously taught and believed. The written word, except what pertains to the Mosaic law and ritual, bears on its face the evidence of being supplementary to the oral teaching already given. Hence the primary truths or mysteries of the Gospel are alluded to rather than explicitly taught. This is true of the mystery of the Trinity, which, though alluded to and necessarily implied, is nowhere in the Old Testament or the New expressly and unequivocally taught. We may say almost as much of the mystery of the Incarnation, though the whole Christian *schema*, if we may use the word, grows out of it, and depends on it. Yet it is not till we read the passages that imply either mystery in the light of the tradition of the oral teaching preserved by the church that we fully understand those passages, and see what it is they really imply. Hence those Protestants who professedly disregard all tradition of the sort reject both mysteries, even while recognizing the infallible authority of the Bible. These instances suffice to show the vanity of the Protestant pretence of the sufficiency of the Scriptures, and that they have in them an infallible authority for their Protestantism.

We are not now either defending Catholicity or refuting Protestantism. Our purpose from the beginning has been to show that Protestants have never received the "Great Commission" of which Dr. Harris speaks in his treatise and that they are in no sense "the church constituted to convey the Gospel to the world." That our Lord instituted his church for that purpose, and to bring all nations under the evangelical law, we of course believe fully, and without a shadow of a doubt; but we have proved as conclusively as any thing can be proved that Protestants are not that church, are not included in it, and therefore that none of

the commissions issued by our Lord or promises made by him to his church, and which are recorded in the Holy Scriptures, are applicable to them. They are aliens from the commonwealth of Christ, and however loudly they may call "Lord, Lord," he knows them not as his servants. They have no authority, and therefore no capacity, to teach. They are, as we have seen, of the world, and follow the world, and the world heareth them, for in them it recognizes its own.

We have no leisure to follow Protestants in their propaganda at home or abroad, among the heathen or among Catholics; we did that sufficiently in our articles on the learned and elaborate work of the Abbé Martin, on *The Future of Protestantism and Catholicity.* Suffice it to say that they incur, we fear, the terrible censure our Lord pronounced on the Scribes and Pharisees: "Wo to you, Scribes and Pharisees, hypocrites, who compass sea and land to make one proselyte, and when he is made, ye make him twofold more the child of hell than yourselves." They seem to us to be moved in their propaganda less by a love of souls or the wish to evangelize the world, than the desire to thwart the missionary efforts of the church and to prevent the spread of Catholicity; for as a rule they follow only in the track of the Catholic missionary. Their missions in all Catholic nations succeed, to a certain extent, in unmaking Catholics, or converting ignorant or indifferent Catholics into downright infidels and enemies of the Gospel. In heathen lands, they have hindered or rendered more difficult the work of Catholic missions, and also have succeeded in detaching a considerable number from their heathenism without attaching them to the Gospel, even as Protestants hold it. They succeed in drawing them away from the old superstition of their countrymen, and in plunging them into irreligion or inspiring them with a hatred of all religion. Such are the results of Protestant missions, according to the best authorities within our reach.

This is what we should naturally expect from the labors of men who run without being sent, and assume to do what they have neither the authority nor the ability to do. The spirit of Protestantism, if we may believe the beloved apostle, whom we have so often quoted in this article, is the spirit of Antichrist. It may rouse up the world, and arm it with hostility to Christ and his church, but it can have no success in elevating the soul to God, or in purifying or

preserving the morals of society, for that would be contrary to its nature. Yet the struggle to which it compels us we must accept. The church in this world is always the church militant, and her faithful children must not expect to throw off their harness while they live. But they need not fear. "Ye are of God, little children, and have overcome him; for greater is he that is in you, than he that is in the world."

STEPS OF BELIEF.*

[From the Catholic World for December, 1870.]

James Freeman Clarke, a grandson, through his mother, of the first avowed Unitarian minister in the United States, is, if not the most learned and gifted, at least among the most earnest, industrious, energetic, and influential of contemporary Unitarian ministers. He has a mind of singular comprehensiveness, and as open to the reception of error as to the reception of truth. He is an eclectic, or, rather, a syncretist, and holds it his duty to accept all opinions, whether true or false, as equally respectable. As a Unitarian, he comprehends both wings of the denomination, accepts both extremes, without troubling himself about the middle term that unites them. He is rarely impressed with the importance of logical consistency, and feels no difficulty in maintaining that, of two contradictory propositions, both are true, or both are false.

The work before us is a fair expression of the author's mind, alike of its qualities and its defects. It is an excellent summary of his intellectual life and experience. We see in it what the author has thought and endeavored to work out. It also, besides his own active life, expresses the views and sentiments of the better class of Unitarians, without rejecting the principles and utterances of those he denounces as radicals, and from whom he differs only at the expense of his logic. He has a more conservative air, but

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**Steps of Belief; or, Rational Christianity, maintained against Atheism, Free Religion, and Romanism.* By James Freeman Clarke. Boston: 1870.

no more conservative thought than he had when he founded the Church of the Disciples in Boston on the principle of the union of incompatibles, or, like Anglicanism, on the principle of comprehensiveness.* We cannot discover that, though professing a progressive religion—a religion which is not only progressive itself, but the promoter of progress in its adherents—he has made any progress himself, either forward or backward, since as a young man he edited the *Western Messenger*, at Louisville, Kentucky. He has in his views remained stationary. Yet his insensibility to his own defects, to his own ignorance of philosophy, and of theology as a science, his lack of depth, his blissful confidence in himself, and indifference to logical consistency, coupled with an easy-flowing and not ungraceful style, have rendered him popular with his denomination, and secured him a high reputation among even the Protestants of more orthodox pretensions. In the kingdom of the blind, the one-eyed is king.

As the world goes, in this age of shallowness, of *frivolezza*, as the Italians say, Dr. Clarke is no doubt, both as a preacher and writer, above the average; and, if he had started with a larger stock of truth than his rational or Unitarian Christianity could supply, he would have been one of the most eminent men of New England. Nature has not been niggard to him in her gifts, nor has he failed in giving them a high degree of culture; but he has had the misfortune to be bred in a bad school—a school that opens only a low and narrow vista to the mind, represses free thought, and dwarfs the intellect. He has never been able to cast off its shackles, or to think and act as a free man. It is easy to see, while reading his *Steps of Belief*, that he has lacked room to expand; that he feels, with all his comprehensiveness, that his system of thought is too strait for him; that his better nature is restrained, and the nobler aspirations of his soul repressed, by the hide-bound rationalism in which he is compelled to gyrate. One sees that he feels he is "cabin'd, cribb'd, confin'd," that he has no room to move or to breathe, and that he now and then struggles to break his prison-bars.

It is not easy to conceive the sense of freedom and relief one experiences in passing from rationalism or any other form of Protestantism to Catholicity. The convert to the

*See Vol. VII. pp. 179 and 197.

church is the prisoner liberated from the Bastile, a weight is thrown from his shoulders, the manacles fall from his hands, and the fetters from his feet; he feels as light and as free as the air, and he would chirp and sing as the bird. This world changes its hue to his eyes; and he runs and leaps under the blue sky of a boundless universe. His thought, his mind, his very soul, is lighted up, and revels in the freedom of universal truth. He feels that he has something whereon to stand, that he has no longer to bear up the church, but that the church can bear up him. He is conscious of an unfailing support, and no longer fears that he is in danger every step he takes of having his footing give way and of falling through. His heart bounds with a sense of unlimited freedom, and with a joy unspeakable. He experiences in his soul and through all his frame the truth of our Lord's words to the Jews: "If the Son make you free, ye shall be free indeed." Of the joy of this freedom, our friend, whom we knew and loved in his young years, knows nothing. He craves it, but finds it not. At every move he beats his head against the walls of his dark and damp dungeon, and is forced to call it freedom. His system holds him in its bonds, and compels him in spite of his aspirations to grind forever in his prison-house.

The only portions of Dr. Clarke's book that show freedom and strength are those in which he attacks materialism and atheism, and of course those in which he has tradition and the church to back him, and can use Catholic arguments, and follow out the logic of common sense. But the moment he attempts to bring in his rationalism, or Christianity rationalistically explained, he becomes confused and weak, illogical, self-contradictory, and absurd. His thought is no longer free, his mind no longer unclouded, or his reasoning conclusive. He dares not carry out his logic to its legitimate conclusion, but is forced to stop midway, and say two and two, or two and two make three, or make five, for his whole system would be ruined if he should have the audacity to say two and two make four. He is deprived by the tyranny of his system of his natural good sense and intellectual activity, and becomes untruthful and unjust, as in his step from "Romanism to Protestantism."

Dr. Clarke discusses four steps of belief: 1. The step from atheism to theism; 2. The step from theism to Christianity; 3. The step from Romanism to Protestantism; and 4. The step from the letter to the spirit. His aim is to

maintain the spirit, or an indefinite something or nothing which he calls rational Christianity, against atheism, free religion, and "Romanism," or Catholicity. If any one is curious to know what the author means by the spirit, or rational Christianity, this book will hardly give him the desired information. Perhaps the book tells us what it is not, but it by no means tells us what it is. It is not any objective truth or doctrine that can be intelligibly stated in words, for "the letter killeth," and the moment you embody a truth or a doctrine in a form of words you kill it. "Religion," he says, page 287, "wherever you find it, as far as it goes, is always one and the same thing. It is always reverence, faith, obedience, gratitude, hope, love." Brave words, but mean they any thing but certain subjective or inward acts, states, or affections of the soul? Reverence, of what or of whom? Faith, in whom or in what? Obedience, to whom or to what? Gratitude, to whom or for what? Love, of whom or of what? The learned author has no answer to these questions, and he would not be free to answer them, even if he could; for the answers to them pertain to theology, and he expressly separates theology, or the science of divine things, from religion, and discards it as unnecessary and the cause of all religious dissensions. His rational Christianity is purely subjective, and consequently is resolved into a vague sentiment, as true and as worthy when felt by a Buddhist, or when manifested toward a graven image, a stock, or a stone, a serpent, a calf, a crocodile, or a tortoise, as when manifested toward the Father Almighty, Creator of heaven and earth, or his only-begotten Son, Jesus Christ our Lord, King of kings, and Lord of lords. He himself says as much on the very page we have cited. What, then, is the distinction between religion and superstition, or between the worship of God and idolatry? and wherein is Dr. Clarke's "rational Christianity" any better than the free religion of Frothingham, Higginson, Abbot, Johnson, and others, which he wars against and demolishes with weapons borrowed from the armory of the church? To our thinking, it is not so good, because less honest and outspoken, and equally foreign from the Christianity of Christ.

But passing over this for the present, we must remark that the author begins at the wrong end, and writes as if he held that unbelief preceded belief, and that the human race began in the lowest form of atheism, and has gradually proceeded step by step to what he considers the highest and

most advanced form of Christian belief. This is neither historically nor philosophically correct. Truth is older than error, and belief always precedes unbelief, or the denial of belief. Men believed in God before they denied him, and in the principles of Christianity before they doubted or questioned them. Hence the burden of proof is on the unbeliever, not on the believer. Men were theists before they were atheists, and therefore it is for the atheist to defend his atheism, not for the theist to prove his theism. Theism, or belief in God, being normal and prior to atheism, is in possession; all the presumptions are in its favor, and the atheist must overcome these presumptions, turn them in his favor, and show valid reasons why the belief in God should be ousted from its possession, before the theist can be called upon to plead. So of revelation. It is older than rationalism, as the supernatural is logically and historically prior to naturalism. Catholicity, again, is both logically and chronologically prior to Protestantism, and Protestantism would be unintelligible without it; in the controversy, therefore, the Protestant is the plaintiff, and must make out his case. We are ready to defend the church when the Protestant shows some good and valid reasons against her for his Protestantism, but until then the laboring oar is in his hands, and we are under no obligation to produce her titles.

Not taking note of this fact, but arguing as if unbelief were normal and prior to belief, and mistaking both the facts and the law of the case, the author's arguments for immaterialism and the existence of God, though conclusive as refutations of the objections of the materialist and the atheist, are yet insufficient to originate and establish the belief either in the existence of God or the immateriality of the soul, when the presumption is against such belief. The author gives the materialist and the atheist an advantage to which neither is entitled, and assumes a burden which no believer is bound to shoulder. The law and the facts of the case are not met by a work on "The Steps of Belief," and could be met only by a work on "The Steps of Unbelief." Man began on the plane of belief, and the steps are always downward, or away from it. The author is misled by his theory of progress, which all philosophy and the whole history of the race disprove. The perfect always precedes, in reality as in thought or conception, the imperfect. The history of the race abandoned to its own guidance is the history of a constant though a more or less rapid deteriora-

tion. Adam was the most perfect of his race ; the oldest of the sacred books of the Hindus are the most perfect, the purest in doctrine, and the freest from superstition. The earliest monuments of art which time has spared are the most perfect, and the higher one ascends the stream of antiquity, the wiser, truer, and juster are its maxims. The progress of the race in all the nations that apostatized from the primitive or patriarchal religion, and in all the nations that have followed their example and apostatized from the church founded by our Lord on Peter, has been a progress in losing or in rejecting things previously believed. Progress is effected only under and by the aid of the supernatural order.

If, as Dr. Clarke, at least in his argument, assumes, the human race began in materialism and atheism, and had no supernatural instruction, they never would and never could have risen to belief either in God or in an immaterial soul. The existence of God and the immateriality of the soul can assuredly be proved with certainty by natural reason, and hence no man is excusable for denying either ; but proof does not originate the proposition proved, and no reasoning could ever originate the idea of God, because, without the idea as the first principle of reason, no reasoning would be possible. Yet from the beginning the race has believed in God and the immateriality and immortality of the soul. How came this belief? It came not from instinct, from intuition, or logical deduction or induction, but must have come from the Creator himself, who taught it to the first man, or infused it into his mind along with language. The belief is normal, though supernatural in its origin, as is man himself, and, when once the idea is presented to the mind, reason suffices to prove it against whoever denies it, and with certainty.

The arguments the author uses against materialism and atheism are such as are usually urged by theologians and philosophers, although sometimes evidently without his understanding their full reason or force. His learning is frequently at fault. Thus, he makes the universal, or nearly universal, belief in ghosts, or in the possibility of ghosts, a proof that the race has always and everywhere believed in the soul or spirit as distinct from the body. But the ghost with the ancient classic nations was not the disembodied spirit, which it was held was reabsorbed in God from whom it emanated, but the *umbra*, or shade, a pale reflex of the

body, composed of thin air, and therefore material. He says Leibnitz and Spinoza, as well as Descartes and others, approved of St. Anselm's argument in his *Proslogium* for the existence of God from the idea of the most perfect being in our minds. Spinoza was a decided and unmitigated pantheist, and Leibnitz approved the argument only on condition that it be first proved that God is possible. Leibnitz held that the *posse* precedes the *esse*, and seems never to have reflected that there is no possible without the real; for the possible is only the creative ability of the real. God is real, actual, most pure act, as say the schoolmen, and without him, or save in his creative power, nothing is possible, there is and can be no possibility of any thing. It is absurd to suppose that a possible God is provable without God as actual, since it is God *in actu* that makes any thing possible. Hegel only followed and developed Leibnitz when he placed *reine Seyn*, or purely possible being, before *das Ideen* and *das Wesen*, the possible before the actual, thus making God and the universe spring out of nothing, or the infinite *void* of the Gnostics and Buddhists; for the possible as abstracted from the actual is simply a nullity—simply nothing.

Dr. Clarke, furthermore, though he uses the ordinary arguments of the theologians to prove that God is, does not seem to understand what it is that the theist is required to prove against the atheist. We have not, indeed, intuition of God, but we have intuition of that which really is God. What is called necessary or absolute ideas, the necessary, the universal, the unchangeable, the eternal, &c., are affirmed to us intuitively, and we could not be intelligent or rational existences if they were not. But these ideas are not abstractions; for abstractions are nullities, and no objects of intuition or of intelligence. These ideas, since they are intelligible, are intuitive, real, and are and must be necessary being—*ens necessarium et reale*. Real and necessary, universal, eternal, and immutable being is intuitively affirmed in every act of our intelligence, as its basis and necessary condition. But what is not intuitively affirmed, and what needs to be proved or demonstrated against the atheist, is that being, *ens necessarium et reale*, is God, the creator of heaven and earth, and all things therein, visible and invisible. What needs to be proved is only a single point, and a point so easily proved that he may well be called a fool who says in his heart, God is not, *non est Deus*.

Then, again, Dr. Clarke does not in reality, as he supposes, take his first step of belief, and rise from atheism to theism. The arguments he adduces from the theologians are conclusive as used by the theologians themselves, but he vitiates them by his misapprehension of the divine creative act. He admits only one substance in which spirit and matter are identical and makes the God he recognizes the substance, therefore the reality, of the universe. This is pantheism, not theism, and pantheism is not, as he contends, imperfect theism but the more refined and dangerous form of atheism. The essence of pantheism is the assertion of one only substance, or the denial that God creates substances capable of acting from their own centre as second causes. He is misled by the philosophy of Cousin, and unwittingly sinks the universe in God, which is to deny him, as really as to sink him in the universe, since either alike identifies God and the universe, and admits no distinction between them. He says, "God is the immanent, not the transient, cause of the universe." This is not true in his or Spinoza's sense. God as creator is, no doubt, immanent in all his works, but as the cause creating and sustaining them, not as the subject acting in their acts. He is immanent by his creative act as the *causa causarum*. He is not the transient or, rather, transitory cause, in the sense of producing and then passing on, or leaving the production or effect to itself; for that would leave the effect to expire as soon as produced. The creative act and the conservative act are, on the part of God, one and the same identical act; that is, the act of creation is a continuous or an ever-present act, and the preservation of the universe is its continuous creation; for the suspension of the creative act producing it from nothing would be its instant annihilation. So explained, it may be said that God is the immanent, not the transient or transitory, cause of the universe. But in Dr. Clarke's sense, which is that of Spinoza, or that God remains in it as its substance and the subject of its acts, he is not immanent, for this would assert the identity of God and the universe, and exclude second causes, as they do who say God is the author of sin.

No doubt Dr. Clarke talks of creation, and proves conclusively against the developmentists that the germ which is developed must be created; but he holds not that God creates from nothing, but from himself, from his own substance or fulness, as was maintained by Cousin and the better Boston school some thirty or forty years ago. The

Boston school, whose chiefs were Dr. Walker, George Ripley, George Bancroft, and ourself, intended to escape pantheism, and thought they did, but unhappily they could not see that creation must be creation by the power of God from nothing, or be no real creation at all, and hence they maintained that God made the world out of his own fulness, or, so to speak, out of his own stuff, as the *causa materialis*. This assumed that the substance of the universe is identically the substance of God, which was really to assert, not to escape, pantheism. That Dr. Clarke says much in his book that is incompatible with pantheism, we willingly admit; but he is not always consistent with himself, and has the happy faculty of accepting, when necessary or convenient, both sides of a question, or doctrines that mutually contradict one another.

The author, assuming that he has really taken the step from atheism to theism, proceeds to take the step from theism to Christianity. He tells us Christianity is an advance on theism or deism, as theism itself is an advance on atheism; but wherein Christianity, as he sets it forth, is an advance on deism, or simple natural belief in God and the immateriality of the soul, he does not anywhere show or enable us to discover. His Christianity is, of course, what he calls "rational Christianity," and contains nothing and requires nothing, as far as we can discover, that exceeds the normal powers of human nature. He calls himself, we admit, a supernaturalist, but, at the same time, he would seem to contend that he holds no views which rise above simple naturalism. He defends what he calls the "historic Christ" against the mythists and free-religionists, and professes to accept the principal events recorded in the Gospels as historical facts; but he sees in our Lord only a man conceived and born like other men, and in his character only the normal perfections of our human nature. He says:

"In regard to Jesus Christ himself, we find two distinct and seemingly opposite views prevailing at the present time. The first is the traditional and general opinion that he was not like other men in his person, his endowments, his work, or his character; that his person was superhuman, his endowments supernatural, his work miraculous, and his character intellectually infallible and morally impeccable; that he was a miraculous creation, that he was divinely inspired and sent, that he did not sin, did not err, will never be superseded, and is the Master, Lord, King, of the human race for ever. Hence it is assumed that he was not a man only and purely, but something more.

"The other view is that which has been becoming more and more popular since the days of Theodore Parker, not only in this country, but also in England, France, and Germany. It is, that Jesus was a man like all other men, born like other men, formed by circumstances as other men are formed, partaking of the errors of his age, not supernatural, but wholly natural; working no miracles, not infallible, but falling into errors; not perfect morally; capable of being superseded and outgrown; and, in short, purely a man, like other men.

"It will be observed that these two theories, so utterly opposite, nevertheless agree in one assumption. Both assume that perfection is unnatural to man; that man is necessarily imperfect, mentally and morally; that to be sinless is unnatural; that to see truth so clearly as to be certain of it and not liable to be mistaken, is unnatural: in other words, that it is not natural for man to be good, and that a perfectly good man is necessarily a supernatural, or (what is thought the same thing) an unnatural being.

"The one class of thinkers say, 'Jesus was sinless and infallible, and worked miracles, therefore he was superhuman.' The others say, 'He was human, and therefore he could not work miracles or be perfect.' The first class, wishing to believe in the superiority of Jesus, think it necessary to believe him superhuman; the other class, not wishing to believe him superhuman, think it necessary to deny his superiority. Both classes agree that any such inward superiority as ascribed to Jesus in the New Testament implies a superhuman element. That is, again, both classes assume the essential poverty of human nature."—pp. 118–120.

The Catholic reader will not fail to perceive that Dr. Clarke by no means gives a fair or adequate statement of what he is pleased to term the traditional and general opinion of our Lord, but only what was the general opinion of Arians and the earlier Unitarians. Our reading is not very extensive, and our knowledge of the views and reasonings of others is very limited, but we doubt if any Christian or professed Christian has ever been found who says "Jesus was sinless and infallible, and worked miracles, therefore he was superhuman." No one, as far as we know, ever appealed to the miracles of our Lord as proofs of his superhuman nature or superhuman character. The miracles of our Lord do not of themselves prove him superhuman, any more than the miracles of St. Vincent Ferrer prove him to have been superhuman; but they prove that God was with him, for only God can work a miracle. "Rabbi, we know that thou art come a teacher from God; for no man can do these miracles which thou doest, unless God be with him" (St. John iii.

2). The miracles are the divine credentials or divine endorsement of the teacher. They attest the presence and assistance of God, and are God's own vouchers for the truthfulness and trustworthiness of the teacher, and therefore of whatever he teaches in the name of God. If our Lord taught that he was himself perfect God as well as perfect man, then he was so; for God can no more vouch for a lie than he can himself lie. Dr. Clarke, also, does injustice to Christians when he represents them as holding that perfection is *unnatural*. There is no class of men who call themselves Christians, not even Calvinists, that so hold. Christianity teaches us that God is our origin and end; and since God is necessarily supernatural, therefore that our beginning and our end are supernatural. The natural cannot rise above itself, and hence the fulfilment or perfection of our nature is and must be impossible without supernatural aid or assistance. But this supernatural aid or assistance is not against nature, does not repress or supersede it, but carries it on and completes, fulfils, or perfects it. But here follows a passage which proves that the author's supernatural does not rise above the natural. He has presented the views of the two parties which we have just quoted, and adds:

"But why may we not suppose that man's nature is higher than either party believes? What if man was made to be all Jesus was; what if human nature is not necessarily sinful, but otherwise; what if sin and error are unnatural, not natural?—then it may follow that Jesus did all that he is claimed to have done in the Gospels; that he is all that he is described to have been, and yet, instead of being at all unnatural, is a truer and more perfectly natural man than any other has been. Perhaps the greatness of Jesus may have been just here—that he was the man of men, the truest man, fulfiling the type of humanity. Perhaps the great lesson of his life is, that human nature is not essentially evil, but good. Perhaps his mission was to show us one perfect specimen of the human race; one ideal pattern; one such as all are hereafter to become."—p. 120.

He may well conclude:

"If this view be correct, then it may reconcile the war between the naturalists and supernaturalists.

"The naturalists can then accept the leading facts in the life of Jesus, and yet believe in him as a purely human being. The supernaturalists can believe in his perfect holiness wisdom, and power, and yet not deny his simple humanity. I propose, therefore, to adduce some facts which show that there is nothing claimed in the Gospels for Christ which is inconsistent with the assumption of his being made in all respects like his brethren."—p. 120.

It is evident from this that Dr. Clarke sees nothing really supernatural in Christianity. He resolves the supernatural into a higher form of the natural, and sees no necessity of the supernatural to perfect the natural, or to place man on the plane of his destiny, and to enable him to attain to it. He rejects the miraculous conception of our Lord as legendary and unproved; and regards him as simply the son of Joseph and Mary, conceived and born as other men, with a simple human nature and a human personality like Peter or John. He cannot pretend that there is more in Christianity than there is in Christ, and since he sees in Christ only a man, he can see in Christianity nothing superhuman. He says Christianity is not a doctrine, not something to be believed, but the life of Christ to be lived. As Jesus Christ was simply a man like other men, only a truer and a more perfect man than his brethren, it is evident that in living his life we live only a simple, natural, human life. Such being the case, we would thank him to tell us wherein Christianity, as he understands it, is a step in advance of theism or deism. His Christianity at best is only the law of nature, and affords us nothing beyond our natural strength to help us, that is, no aid beyond that which deism itself affords.

The author's third step in the progress of belief is "from Romanism to Protestantism." There is evidently here a break in the continuity of the progress the author assumes. To be consistent with himself, he should either identify Romanism with Christianity, and then give, as his third step, the step from Christianity to Protestantism; or distinguish "Romanism" from Christianity, and then his third step would be from Christianity to "Romanism," which on his theory of progress would imply that "Romanism" is a step in advance of Christianity. As it is, "Romanism" comes in abruptly, without any preparation of the reader for it. Its relation to Christianity, or to any thing that has gone before it, as well as its origin, is left wholly unexplained. Evidently, "Romanism" is a puzzle to the author, an anomaly in the theory of progress he would maintain, and he is unable to account for it. However, he stumbles at no difficulties. He says, in his opening chapter on "Romanism":

"We now begin a new series of questions. We have compared atheism with theism, and find ourselves theists. This was our first step upward. We have next compared theism outside of Christianity with Christian theism, and find the last an advance on the other; so that, in the interest of human progress, we have accepted Christian theism as an advance

on deism. But now we see before us two forms of Christianity. One is called Romanism, the other Protestantism. The first places supreme authority in the church, in the outward organization; the other, in the human soul. Which of these is an advance on the other ?"—p. 197.

The learned and philosophical author evidently holds that, as a form of Christianity, Protestantism, though not the final step, is in advance of what it pleases him to call "Romanism," meaning thereby the Catholic religion held by the immense majority of all those who, since the disciples were first called Christians at Antioch, have borne the Christian name. Of course, we do not accept his statement that Catholicity places supreme authority in the *outward* organization alone, and he himself, before he gets through, corrects the statement, and owns that Catholics assert the internal as well as the external—the spirit as well as the letter. Catholics hold that the authority of the church is derived from God, and is that of the Holy Ghost who dwells in her, and without his dwelling and operating in the outward organization she would have no more authority than a Protestant sect.

But waive this for the moment and let us see wherein Protestantism is an advance on Catholicity. Say the Catholic idea or rule of faith is the authority of the church as an external visible body, and the Protestant idea or rule of faith is the authority of "the human soul." Protestantism, then, has at best only a human authority, rests solely on the human soul and its Christianity is purely human. This, instead of being a step in advance of "Romanism," is a step even below theism or deism; for there is no form of theism that does not assert an authority superior to that of the "human soul," namely, the authority of God. At the very lowest, the authority of the church is as high as the authority of the human soul, and Protestantism is no advance on the church at most; and Catholics have human souls as well as Protestants, and the human soul is no more in a Protestant than in a Catholic. We are men as well as Protestants, and man to man are their equals. Have they reason? So have we. Have they the Bible? So have we. Can they read? So can we, as well as they. Suppose, then, that the church has no authority from God, that she has only a human authority, she has as much and as high authority as the author even claims for Protestantism. How, then, can Protestantism be a step in advance of "Romanism"?

It would be difficult to conceive a more untenable posi-

tion than this, that Protestantism is a step in advance of the Catholic Church. Progress is in gaining, not in losing, truth; and what single truth can it be pretended even that Protestantism teaches that the church does not also teach, and with at least equal distinctness and emphasis? What means of justification, virtue, holiness, perfection, has the Protestant that the Catholic has not in his soul or in his church? What the Protestant holds of religion in common with the Catholic belongs, of course, to the church, for she held and taught it fifteen hundred years before Protestantism was conceived in the morbid brain of the apostate monk of Wittenberg; and the advance from Catholicity can be only in what Protestantism has that the church or the Catholic has not, therefore in what is peculiar to Protestantism and distinguishes it from the church and her teachings. What truth has Protestantism in any or all of its multitudinous forms that the church has not always taught? Analyze Protestantism, and you will find that it has nothing peculiar, nothing that distinguishes it, nothing that it can call its own, but its negations or its denials of what the church affirms. It differs from the church only in what of the church it denies, and therefore is and can be no progress on Catholicity.

Take Dr. Clarke's own definition of Protestantism, "the supreme authority of the human soul:" it is only the denial of the supreme authority of God asserted by the church, for the soul has no more real authority under Protestantism than under Catholicity. It denies a truth the church teaches, and affirms only a falsehood in its place. To place the supreme authority in the human soul is to assert the very error the author so earnestly combats in his arguments against atheism and free religion. It is the denial of God, and therefore is really atheism; for, if God the creator is, he is supreme, the sovereign Lord and proprietor of all things, and no creature has or can have any authority in his own right. In trying to prove Protestantism an advance on Catholicity, the author only succeeds in proving, if he rightly defines it, that it is not an advance even on atheism. It is absurd to place the supreme authority in the human soul, for that would suppose either that the human soul is God, or that God is the human soul.

But take Protestantism according to another statement of the author (p. 198), namely, Protestantism places the supreme authority "in the Bible." This, again, makes Prot

estantism consist in the denial of Catholic doctrine, that is, the supreme authority of the church and unwritten tradition; for the church actually holds the Bible to be even more authoritative than does the Protestant. The reformers asserted justification by faith alone. Here, again, the distinctive Protestantism is the denial of the necessity of good works, or the concurrence of the will in regeneration and justification, for the church always taught that a man is justified by faith, though a faith perfected by charity, or in which man is active and lovingly co-operates. The church teaches that Christ has instituted sacraments, and that the Holy Ghost uses the outward visible sacraments as media of his operation in regeneration and sanctification. Protestants deny the sacraments, and all visible media of the union of the soul with Christ, the whole mediatorial system, and leave the soul as naked, as destitute, as helpless as it is under pure deism, as we have frequently shown. We might go on through all the doctrines of Protestantism and arrive at the same result. What is affirmative in them is Catholic, and only what is negative in them is Protestant. So true is this that Protestantism would have no meaning, be absolutely unintelligible, were it not for the Catholic doctrines it arraigns, distorts, or denies.

Our learned friend has been able to make out a seeming case against the church in a few instances, but only by mistaking and misrepresenting her teachings, placing the human soul above God, the interests of time above those of eternity, and civilization above religion. His blunders and self-contradictions in stating the teachings of the church would be exceedingly amusing, did they not concern so grave a matter. He insists that the church places all her confidence in the outward visible sacrament, and grows merry over her carefulness in baptism, for instance, as to the matter and form, and yet confesses that she regards the outward visible sacrament only as the medium of an inward grace. He asserts that she places the supreme authority in an outward visible organization, and forgets to inform his readers that she teaches that her authority is from God, and is limited in teaching and governing all men and nations to things which her Lord has commanded her. He forgets also that she professes to be able to do it only because he has promised to be with her all days to the consummation of the world, and that she has the simplicity to believe that the promises of God cannot fail.

Dr. Clarke seems to be animated by a bitter hostility to the church, and when speaking of her loses his usual placidity of temper. He loses command of himself, and becomes almost as enraged against her as the Jews were against our Lord when they gnashed their teeth at him. We do not comprehend his hostility and rage, which make him forego all respect for truth and decency, and sully his pages by repeating the foulest slanders ever uttered against the church, unless we suppose that he holds the body superior to the soul, while she requires him to subordinate the body to the soul, the flesh to the spirit. He cannot pretend that she is dangerous to men's souls, for he expressly denies the endless punishment of the wicked, and holds that all men will finally be saved. It is only in this life and only in relation to this life that he can believe that the church or any thing else can injure either soul or body. The sufferings, the sorrows, and the injuries of this life, which can be but momentary, and to be succeeded by an eternity of bliss, whether we have done good or have done evil, are hardly worth getting angry at or troubling one's self about.

We have no intention of following the author, and correcting his misrepresentations of Catholic teaching, and refuting his charges against the church, especially as he says expressly that he objects to Catholicity not as a religion, but as a political organization or conspiracy against freedom and for the establishment of universal despotism. Religion is the *lex suprema*, the supreme law for all men and nations, alike for individuals and governments; and he who can see in the unwearied efforts of the church to bring all men and nations into subjection to religion or the law of God, which it is, only the vulgar ambition for political ascendency or efforts to establish a universal despotism, is past being reasoned with, especially if he calls himself a Christian. Such a man has not taken as yet even the first step of belief—that from atheism to theism. But he repeats a statement often repeated, which it may not be amiss to correct. He says, after having quoted the *Syllabus* and the Paris *Univers* in support of some of his charges against the church:

"If it be thought that such doctrines cannot be held by Catholics in America, we refer to the following passage, extracted from Mr. Orestes A. Brownson's *Review*, to show the contrary. Mr. Brownson is an American, educated a Protestant, for many years the advocate of the broadest religious liberty. If such a man as this, on becoming a Catho-

lic, defends persecution, it is evident that nothing in modern civilization or modern education can neutralize the logic which carries every consistent Catholic to that conclusion. Thus spoke Mr. Brownson, some years ago, indeed; but he has never retracted his declaration:

"'The church is a kingdom and a power, and as such must have a supreme chief; and his authority is to be exercised over states as well as individuals. If the Pope directed the Roman Catholics of this country to overthrow the constitution, sell its territory, and annex it as a dependent province to the dominions of Napoleon, they would be bound to obey. It is the intention of the Pope to possess this country.'" (pp. 265, 266.)

The passage was never extracted from *Brownson's Review*, and was never written by Dr. Brownson, but is an unblushing forgery. Mr. Hepworth, Dr. Clarke's brother Unitarian minister in this city, quoted the same passage from an infamous book entitled *Pope or President*, and asserted it was from *Brownson's Quarterly Review*, but when called upon by a Catholic through the New York *Times* to prove his assertion, he confessed, after some shuffling and quibbling, that he could not do it, and that it was probably a mistake. We do not accuse either Dr. Clarke or Mr. Hepworth of forging the passage, or of being capable of such baseness; but neither is excusable for not having ascertained the facts in the case before making the charge.

Even on the low ground of civilization, Protestantism is no step in advance of Catholicity, as it were easy to show, and, indeed, as it has been shown over and over again even in this magazine, especially in the articles on *The Future of Protestantism and Catholicity*, reviewing the great work of the Abbé Martin. Protestant civilization has only a material basis, or at best rests only on the human soul, and runs off into philanthropy and a vague humanitarianism which tramples down more good by the way than it effects even in gaining its end, as we may see in both England and the United States. The author's "step from Romanism to Protestantism" is, under every point of view, a step backward and not forward; and if, as he says, Protestantism places the supreme authority "in the human soul," it is a step downward from theism to atheism. A more severe condemnation of Protestantism cannot be pronounced than to say that the highest authority it recognizes is the human soul, that is, man himself.

The fourth step the author takes is that "from the letter

to the spirit." We have already shown that this is a step in the descending, not in the ascending, scale; for it is the rejection of all objective Christianity, all dogmatic or doctrinal belief, all that can be drawn out in distinct propositions and formally stated, and the reduction of religion to purely subjective states, affections, sentiments, or emotions of the human soul. This is what the author must mean when he rejects theology, all creeds and dogmas, and tells us Christianity is not a doctrine, but a life, and a life lived not by communion with God, but by communion of men with one another—the communion of humanity or the socialism of Pierre Leroux, or, at the highest, simple humanitarianism, which is only a clumsy form of atheism, and amply refuted by the author himself.

Perhaps, in justice to the intentions of the author, we ought to say that, when he rejects all external authority and places the supreme authority in the soul, he does not mean absolutely to deny the authority of God to command us, but that God teaches and commands in the human soul, not through any external media or organs. The authority is God in the human soul, something like the "inner light" of the Quakers. But in this sense God must be in all souls alike, and teach all alike, whether Jews, pagans, Mohammedans, Catholics, or Protestants. The teachings of God are always and everywhere absolutely true, and free from all error and all liability to error, for it is impossible for God to lie. Then all religions, however they contradict one another, are true and good. Why, then, declaim against the Catholic religion, and seek its destruction? God is in the souls of Catholics as well as in the souls of Protestants, if in the souls of all men, and is equal to himself in all, and must be infallible in all. How, then, is it possible for any human soul to err? Yet, if the author is to be believed, the materialist, the atheist errs, the theist outside of Christianity errs, the "Romanist" errs, and the greater part of Protestants err; indeed, all the world are in error or fall short of the truth, except Dr. Clarke and his church of the disciples, who have got rid of the letter that killeth, and passed over to the spirit that quickeneth. Very extraordinary, since every man has in his soul God, the infallible teacher!

But all do not listen to the voice of God in the soul. Most men close their ears to it, shut their eyes to the light, follow their own lawless desires or vain imaginings, lose the

truth and fall into error. Very good. But who shall determine who those are who close their ears and shut their eyes, and who are they who keep them open? What is the criterion of truth and error? Dr. Clarke, however infallible the inner light, has none, and therefore, in order to lose no truth, his rule is to accept all errors. The inward teacher may be infallible, but it guaranties no soul from erring as to what he teaches, as the author must himself confess. Then of what avail to him or to any other one is the inward teacher?

The Catholic doctrine on this point, we think, has some advantages over Dr. Clarke's, and none of its disadvantages. He supposes that the Catholic has only an outward authority, the authority of an external organization, which may indeed command the will, but cannot convince the understanding. Even this is more than he has, for the authority on which he relies can do neither; and, moreover, he contends that by doing what the truth commands, though against our belief, we may come to understand and believe the truth. But this is not all the Catholic has. The Catholic has reason as well as other men, and he asserts the inner light or the inspirations of the Spirit as earnestly, as fully, as confidently, as did George Fox, William Penn, or Robert Barclay, as the author would have known if he had ever read any of the writings of Catholic mystics, or any of the spiritual or ascetic works in which Catholic literature abounds. The Catholic directors and masters of spiritual life assert all of the spirit that he can, and infinitely more than he does. The Catholic does in no case stop with the outward or external. He relies on the internal, the spirit, not less, but more than others do; no one is or can be more persuaded than he that the letter alone cannot suffice, and that it is the spirit that giveth life; but he tries the spirit, for there are many false prophets gone out into the world, and he has in the infallible authority of the church the standard or criterion by which to try them. If they gather not and agree not with the church, he knows they are lying spirits, and he refuses to follow or even to hear them; if the spirit gathers with the church and teaches in accordance with the external, he knows it is the Spirit of God, and he follows it, knowing that it leadeth not to error, but to all truth. It is not that we have less than our rationalistic friend, but more. He has nothing that we have not in larger measure than he, but we have much that he has not, and without which what he has is of no avail.

The great difficulty with our author, we may say in conclusion, is that he has no proper conception of the supernatural. Even at the very best, his Christianity does not rise above the deism of Lord Herbert of Cherbury or of Tom Paine. He never once hints that man's destiny, his end, or supreme good, is and cannot but be in the supernatural. He does not reflect, even if he knows, that man is created for God as well as by God, and that God, whether as first cause or as final cause, is supernatural, above nature, since he creates it, is its author, sovereign, and proprietor. The evil of any creature is in not attaining to the end for which it is made. This is the hell of the damned. They, through their own fault, miss their end, and remain forever below their destiny, with their existence unfulfilled, craving for ever a good which they have not and can never reach. As the evil, the misery of a creature is in not attaining, so its good, its heaven or beatitude, is in attaining to its end. As we are created and exist for God, as he is our end, he is our supreme good, and we can find our heaven, our beatitude, only in attaining to him and becoming one with him without being absorbed in him, as Brahminism and Buddhism falsely teach. This is what the soul craves, what it hungers and thirsts for, and must have, or be for ever miserable.

Now, as God is supernatural, it is evident that our end or our supreme good, our beatitude, is and must be supernatural, and consequently above and beyond the reach of our natural powers. We cannot by ourselves, without the help of the supernatural, any more attain to our end or fulfil our existence than we could have created ourselves. The natural is not and cannot be on the plane of the supernatural, and, therefore, man, with his natural powers alone, is not adequate to his end, or destiny. Even a revelation which should teach us what is our end, and what it is necessary to do in order to attain to it, would not suffice to enable us to attain to it, for our natural understanding and the natural force of our will are not even with the revelation equal to it. We must for that be supernaturalized, born again, regenerated, elevated to the plane of our destiny, and supernaturally sustained and assisted afterwards. Dr. Clarke and all rationalists overlook this fact, and either assume that man has no end, no destiny, and must remain for ever an inchoate or unfulfilled existence, or else that his beatitude is in the natural order, that is, in the creature, which is impossi-

ble, for the creature is finite, and the soul craves the infinite, thirsts, as Dr. Channing says, "for an unbounded good." Nothing finite can satisfy it.

But how is it possible for finite man to be placed on the plane of the infinite God? This would not be possible, nor would it be possible for man to attain to beatitude, to union with God as his final cause or supreme good, if God did not himself descend to man, and take his nature up to himself in hypostatic union with the Word. The possibility is in the Incarnation, the mystery of the Word made flesh. Born anew of Christ, the incarnate Word, in whom the human and the divine natures, though for ever distinct, are united in the unity of one divine person, we are born of God, are united to him by nature, and have him for our father in the teleological order, as we have him for our Creator in the initial order, or the order of generation. This supernaturalization, through the Incarnation, of all who are born anew, by the election of grace, of Jesus Christ our Lord, is not conceived of by our author, and is denied by what he calls "rational Christianity." The author has never penetrated in the slightest degree into this profound mystery of the Incarnation, or reflected that, by rejecting or explaining it away, he reduces Christianity to the natural order, and leaves man as helpless as he would be under naked deism. By rejecting it or failing to recognize it, he proves that he has in his conception never got beyond the initial order, and is wholly unaware of the teleological order, which is created or constituted by the Incarnation. He appears not to have learned that Christianity is purely teleological, and, therefore, necessarily supernatural, founded by our Creator to enable us to attain to the fulfilment of our existence, our end, our beatitude. and, therefore, must have been included in his eternal decree to create, and without which the creative act could never be more than inchoate. It is only when Christianity is so understood that it is rational, that it does or can satisfy the demands of human reason or meet the wants and satisfy the cravings of the human soul.

Catholicity seems to our author irrational, shallow, absurd even, but it is only because it lies deeper than he has sounded. The shallowness and absurdities are with him, in his own thought, not in the Catholic faith. It is supremely rational, because it is supremely divine. Man, even if he had not sinned, would by nature have stood below the plane of his destiny, and never could have fulfilled it with-

out the supernatural elevation of his nature. The very state from which he fell by original sin, the original righteousness in which he was constituted, was a supernatural righteousness, a supernatural state, to which he was elevated by supernatural grace. With the supernatural grace itself he lost by sin the integrity of his nature, but even with the integrity of his nature unimpaired he could not attain to his beatitude, his true beatitude, and fulfil the purpose of his existence, without the supernatural elevation by grace which we call the new birth, regeneration, or palingenesia. Dr. Clarke laughs at all this, nay, blasphemes it; yet how is a man to live a teleological life unless born into it? How is he to be either born into it or persevere in it without the act of God, or supernatural grace? The doctor is learned in many things, but the Catholic child that has been taught his catechism knows more than he does, and stands on a plane that is infinitely above his reach, unless he be converted himself and become as a little child. Here is his error. He forgets that his end is in the supernatural, and that he cannot attain to it without the light of revelation, nor without the assistance of supernatural grace.

THE CHURCH ACCREDITS HERSELF.*

[From the Catholic World for May, 1871.]

Archbishop Manning's pastoral letter to his clergy on *The Vatican Council and its Definitions*, to which are appended the two constitutions the council adopted—the one the *Constitutio de Fide Catholica*, and the other the *Constitutio Dogmatica Prima de Ecclesia*—the case of Honorius, and the Letter of the German bishops on the council, though containing little that is new to our readers, is a volume which is highly valuable in itself, and most convenient to every Catholic who would know the real

**The Vatican Council and its Definitions.* A Pastoral Letter to the Clergy. By Henry Edward, Archbishop of Westminster. New York: 1871.

character of the council and what is the purport of its definitions. Few members of the council were more assiduous in their attendance on its sessions or took a more active part in its deliberations than the illustrious Archbishop of Westminster, and no one can give a more trustworthy account of its dispositions or of its acts. We are glad, therefore, that the volume has been republished in this country, and hope it will be widely read both by Catholics and non-Catholics.

The character of the book and of the documents it contains renders any attempt by us either to review it or to explain it alike unnecessary and impertinent. The pastoral is addressed officially by the archbishop to his clergy; the constitutions or definitions adopted by the Holy Synod declare, by the assistance of the Holy Ghost, what is, and always has been, and always will be the Catholic faith on the matters defined; and we need not say that we cordially accept it as the word of God, and as the faith which all must accept *ex animo*, and without which it is impossible to please God. What the council has defined is the law of God, and binds us as if spoken to us directly by God himself in a voice from heaven. He speaks to us by his church, his organ, and her voice is in fact his voice, and what we take on her authority we take on his authority, for he assists her, vouches for her, and commands us to believe and obey her.

There are, indeed, enemies of the faith who pretend that Catholics believe solely on the authority of the church as an organic body; but this is a misapprehension. We believe what is revealed on the veracity of God alone, because it is his word, and it is impossible for his word to be false; and we believe that it is his word on the authority or testimony of the church, with whom the word is deposited, and who is its divinely commissioned keeper, guardian, witness, and interpreter. The word of God is and must be true, and there is and can be no higher ground of faith or even of knowledge than the fact that God says it. Nothing can be more consonant to reason than to believe God on his word. Certainly, it is answered, if we have his word; but how do I know that what is proposed to me as his word is his word? We take the fact that it is his word on the authority of the Catholic Church; we believe it is his word because she declares it to be his word. It is permitted no one to doubt the word of God is conceded; but how from

that fact does it follow that we are not permitted to doubt the word of the church? Or why should we believe her testimony or her declaration rather than that of any one else?

To this question the general answer is, that she has been divinely instituted, and is protected and assisted to bear true witness to the revelation which it has pleased God to make, to proclaim it, declare its sense, and condemn whatever impugns or tends to obscure it. Supposing she has been instituted and commissioned by our Lord himself, for this very purpose, her authority is sufficient for believing whatever she teaches and declares or defines to be the word of God is his word or the truth he has revealed; for the divine commission is the divine word pledged for her veracity and infallibility. This is plain enough and indubitable: but how am I to know or to be assured that she has been so instituted or commissioned, and is so assisted?

There are several answers to this question; but we would remark, before proceeding to give any answer, that the church is in possession, has from the moment of the descent of the Holy Ghost upon the apostles on the day of Pentecost claimed to be in possession of the authority in question, and has had her claim acknowledged by the whole body of the faithful, and denied by none except those who deny or impugn authority itself. Being in possession, it is for those who question her right to show that she is wrongfully in possession. They are, to use a legal term, the plaintiffs in action, and must make out their case. Every one is presumed in law to be innocent till proven guilty. The church must be presumed to be rightfully in possession till the contrary is shown. They who question her possession must, then, adduce at least *prima facie* evidence for ousting her before she can be called upon to produce her title-deeds. This has never been done, and never can be done; for, if it could be done, some of our able and learned Protestant divines would, in the course of the last three hundred years and over, have done it. There is, then, in reality no need, in order to justify the faith of Catholics, to prove by extrinsic testimony the divine institution and commission of the church to teach all men and nations all things whatsoever God has revealed and commanded to be believed.

But we have no disposition to avail ourselves just now of what some may regard as a mere legal technicality. We answer the question by saying the church is herself the

witness in the case, and accredits herself, or her existence itself proves her divine institution, commission, and assistance or guidance.

The church was founded by our Lord on the prophets and apostles, being himself the chief corner-stone. This is asserted here as a simple historical fact. Historically, the church has existed, without any break or defect of continuity, from the apostles down to our times. Its unbroken existence from that time to this cannot be questioned. It has been a fact during all that period in the world's history, and too momentous a fact to escape observation. Indeed, it has been the one great fact of history for over eighteen hundred years; the central fact around which all the facts of history have revolved, and without which they would be inexplicable and meaningless. This assumed or granted, it must be conceded that she unites as one continuous fact, in one body, the apostles and the believers of to-day. She is a continuous fact; a present fact during all the period of time that has elapsed between the apostles and us, and therefore is alike present to them and to us. Her existence being unbroken, she has never fallen into the past; never been a past fact; but has always been and is a present fact; and therefore as present with the apostles to-day as she was on the day of Pentecost, when they received the Holy Ghost; and therefore presents us not simply what they taught, but what they teach her now and here. She bridges over the abyss of time between our Lord himself and us, and makes us and the apostles, so to speak, contemporaries; so that, as it is our Lord himself we hear in the apostles, so it is the apostles themselves that we hear in her.

This continuity or unity of the church in time is a simple historical fact, and as certain as any other historical fact, and even more so, for it is a fact that has never fallen into the past and to be established only by trustworthy witnesses or documents. By it the church to-day is and must be as apostolic and as authoritative as in the days of the apostles Peter, James, and John. Individuals die, but the church dies not; individuals are changed, as are the particles of our bodies, but the church changes not. As in the human race individuals pass off, but the race remains always the same; so in the church individuals pass away, but the church remains unchanged in all its integrity; for the individuals die not all at once, and the new individuals born in their places are born into the one identical body, that does not

die, but remains ever the same. No matter, then, how many generations succeed one another in their birth and death, the body of the church is subject to no law of succession, and remains not only one and the same church, but always the one and the same present church. The church of to-day is identically the church of yesterday, the church of yesterday is identically the church of the day before, and thus step by step back to the apostles; on the other hand, the church in the time of the apostles is identically the church of their successors down through all succeeding generations of individuals to us. There has never been an interval of time when it was not, or when it lost its identity as one and the same body. The church is precisely as apostolic now as it was in the beginning, or as were the apostles themselves.

Now, if we suppose our Lord communicated the whole revelation to the apostles either by his personal teaching or by the inspiration of the Holy Ghost, then he communicated it to her, and she is an eye and ear witness to the fact of revelation in the same sense that the apostles were, and her historical identity with the apostles makes her a perpetual and contemporary witness to the fact of revelation and to what is revealed. What misleads not a few on this point is that they regard the church as a mere aggregation of individuals, born and dying with them, or succeeding to herself with the succession of each new generation of individuals. But this is no more the case with the church than with the human race itself, or with any particular nation that has an historical existence through several generations. In all historical bodies the generations overlap one another, and no generation of individuals is either aggregated to the body or segregated from it all at once. The body does not die with the receding nor is it born anew with the acceding generation. The church, indeed, is an organism, not a mere aggregation of individuals, but even if it were the conclusion would not follow; for though the individuals are successively aggregated or affiliated, they are aggregated or affiliated to her as a persistent body, and though they pass off successively, they leave the body standing, one and identical. This is the simple historical fact. The church, as an ever-present body, remains one and the same identical body amid all the successive changes of individuals, and is just as much the depositary of the revelation and an eye-witness of the facts recorded in the Gospels, as were the apostles themselves.

We say, then, the church is herself the witness, and a competent and credible witness, to her own divine commission to teach and declare the word of God which he has revealed, and no better, no more competent or credible witness is needed or, in fact, conceivable. She is competent because she is the identical apostolic body, the contemporary and the eye-witness through the successive ages of the facts to which she testifies. She is a credible witness, because even as a human body it would be hardly possible for her either to mistake or to misrepresent the facts to which she testifies, since they are always present before her eyes, since, however her individual members may change, she herself knows no change with lapse of time, and no succession. She could not forget the faith, change it, or corrupt it, because there is at all times in her communion an innumerable body of living witnesses to its unity, purity, and integrity, who would detect the change or alteration and expose it. It is not with her as it would be with a book having a limited circulation. Copies of the book could easily be altered or interpolated without detection; but the living testimony of the church, spread over the whole world and teaching all nations, cannot be interpolated or corrupted. It is on the fidelity of the church, her vigilant guardianship, and uniform testimony that we depend for our confidence in the genuineness and authenticity of our copies of the sacred writings, and it is worthy of note that in proportion as men throw off the authority of the church, and reject her traditions, they lose that confidence, and fail to agree among themselves what books, if any, are inspired; so that without the testimony of the church the Holy Scriptures themselves cease to be an authority in matters of faith.

In human tribunals the supreme court is presumed to know the law which constitutes it, and it defines its own jurisdiction and powers. It declares the law of which it is the depositary and guardian, and though the judges have only their human wisdom, learning, and sagacity, it is remarkable how few mistakes through a long series of ages they commit as to what is or is not the law they are appointed to administer, and nearly all the mistakes they do commit are due to the changes the legislature makes in the law or in the constitution of the court. Why should the church be less competent to judge of the law under which she is constituted, and to define her jurisdiction and powers? And since her constitution, as well as the law she ad-

ministers, changes not, why should she be less exempt, even as a human court, from mistakes in interpreting and declaring the law, than the supreme court of England or the United States? What higher authority can there be to judge of her own constitution and the law given her to administer than the church herself?

The church received her constitution in the commission given to the apostolic body with whom she is one and identical, and the law or revealed word in the reception of it by the apostles. Being one identical body with them, she has received what they received, and knows what they knew, is taught what they were taught, understands it in the same sense that they did, and has the same authority to interpret and declare it as they had. If they were commissioned to teach all nations to observe all things whatsoever our Lord commanded them, she is commissioned in their commission to do the same. If he promised them his efficacious presence and assistance to the consummation of the world, he made the promise to her; if he made Peter the prince of the apostles, the father and teacher of all Christians, and gave him plenary authority to feed, rule, and govern the universal church, he made the successor of Peter the visible head of the church, and gave him the same authority. The church, being the apostolic body persisting through all times, knows what the apostles received, knows therefore both her own constitution and the law deposited with her, and is as competent to judge of them as the apostles were, and has full authority to interpret and declare both, and it is to her, as to the supreme court of a nation, to judge what they are, and to define her constitution, jurisdiction, and powers.

The objection which many make to this conclusion arises from their confounding the authority of the church to interpret and define the law—and, as a part of the law, her own constitution, jurisdiction, and powers or functions—with the authority to make the law: a mistake like that of confounding the supreme court of the United States with congress. The church, like the court or supreme executive, may make her own rules and orders—what are called the orders and rules of court, for the purpose of carrying out the intent of the law—but she no more makes the law than does the civil court make the law under which it is constituted, and which it administers. God alone is the lawgiver or lawmaker, and his revealed word is the law—the law for

the human reason and will, and which binds all men in thought, word, and deed. We want no church, as the supreme judge of the law, to tell us this, for it is a dictamen of reason itself. It is the revealed word of God, which again is only his will, the will of the supreme Lawgiver—that is the law under which the church is constituted, and which she guards, interprets, and declares, whenever a question of law arises. She does not make the law; she keeps, interprets, declares, and defends or vindicates it. Even with only human wisdom, she can no more make the law, or declare that to be law which is not, than the supreme civil court can declare that to be civil law which is not civil law. The objection, therefore, is not well taken.

The law, it is agreed on all hands—that is, the revelation, whether written or unwritten—was deposited with the apostles, then it was deposited, as we have seen, with the church identical with the apostolic body. Now, she knows, as the apostles knew, what she received, the law committed to her charge, and, as she is constituted by the law she has received, she knows, and cannot but know, her own constitution and powers, also what promises, if any, she has received from her divine lawgiver and founder. The promises of God cannot fail; and if he has promised her his assistance as an immunity from error she knows it, and knows that her judgments of law, or in matters of faith, are through that assistance infallible. Of all these questions she is the divinely constituted judge. She is the judge of the law constituting her, of her own appointment and commission, and of her rights, powers, and jurisdiction, no less than of the law or revelation committed to her charge, for all this is included in the law. If she defines that in her commission is included the promise of the divine assistance to protect her from error in interpreting and declaring the law—that is, the faith, the revealed word of God—then of all this she judges infallibly, and she is the infallible authority, not for believing what God has revealed—for that is believed on the veracity of God alone—but for believing that what she teaches as his revealed word is his revealed word, and therefore the law we are to obey in thought, word, deed, as the supreme court is the authority for defining its own constitution and powers, and what is or is not the law of the state. Say we not, then, truly that the church is her own witness and accredits herself? Say we not truly, also, that she is the faithful and infallible witness to the fact of rev-

elation, and teacher and judge of what God has or has not revealed? The fact, then, that the church defines that she is the divinely appointed guardian and infallible teacher and judge of revelation, is all we need to know in order to know that it is God we believe in believing her.

None of the sects can apply this argument to themselves; for no one of them can pretend to be the identical apostolic body, or to span the distance of time from the apostles to us, so as to be at once their contemporary and ours. They all have either originated too late or have died too soon for that. Not one of them can pretend to have originated in the apostolic communion, and to have existed as a continuous body down to us. There were sectaries in the lifetime of the apostles, but they were not in the apostolic communion, but separated from it; and there is, as far as we know no sect in existence that originated in apostolic times. Some of the Gnostic sects sprang up at a very early day, but they have all disappeared, though many of their errors are revived in our day. The Nestorian and Jacobite sects still subsist in the East, but they were born too late to be of apostolic origin, and our modern Unitarians are not the old Arians continued in one unbroken body. The Lutheran and Calvinistic sects are of yesterday, and they and their numerous offshoots are out of the question. The poor Anglicans talk of apostolic succession indeed, but they separated or were cut off from the apostolic body in the sixteenth century, and with all the pretensions of a few of them, are only a Protestant sect, born of the reformation, as the greater part of them strenuously contend. There is something in people's instincts; and it is worthy of note that no people who have cast off the authority of the Holy See have ever ventured to assume as their official name the title of APOSTOLIC. Even the schismatic Greeks, while they claim to be orthodox, do not officially call their church apostolic; and the American Anglicans assume only the name of Protestant Episcopal. *Protestant apostolic* would strike the whole world as incongruous, and very much as a contradiction in terms.

Let the argument be worth little or much, the only body claiming to be the church of Christ that has or has had an uninterrupted historical existence from the apostles to us, is the body that is in communion with the See of Rome, and recognizes the successor of Peter in that see as the vicar of Christ, the teacher of the nations, supreme pastor of the

faithful, with plenary authority from our Lord himself to feed, rule, and govern the universal church. The fact is too plain on the very face of history for any one who knows history at all to deny it. Nor, in fact, does any one deny it. All in reality, concede it; and the pretence is that to be in communion with that see is not necessary in order to be in communion with Christ, or with the universal church.

But this is a question of law or of its interpretation, and can itself be determined only by the supreme court instituted to keep, interpret, and declare the law. The court of last resort has already decided the question. It is *res adjudicata*, and no longer an open question. The court has decided that *extra ecclesiam nulla salus*, or, that out of communion with the church there is no communion with Christ; and that out of communion with the Holy See there is no communion with the universal church, for there is no such church. Do you appeal from the decision of the court? To what tribunal? To a higher tribunal? But there is no higher tribunal than the court of last resort. None of the sects are higher than the church, or competent to set aside or overrule her decisions. Do you appeal to the Bible? But this were only appealing from the law as expounded by the church or the supreme court to the law as expounded by yourself or your sect. Such an appeal cannot be entertained, for it is an appeal, not from an inferior court to a superior, but from the highest court to the lowest. The law expounded by the individual or the sect is below, not above, the law expounded and declared by the church. The sect has confessedly no authority, and the law expounded and applied by the sect is no more than the law expounded and applied by the private individual; and no private individual is allowed to expound and apply the law for himself, but must take it as expounded and applied by the court, and the judgment as to what the law is of the court of last resort is final, and from it, as every lawyer knows, there lies no appeal. To be able to set aside or overrule the judgment of the church, it is necessary, then, to have a court of superior jurisdiction, competent to revise her judgments and to confirm or overrule them. But, unhappily for those who are dissatisfied with her judgments, there is and can be no such court to which they can appeal.

There might be some plausibility in the pretended appeal from the church to the Bible, if the church had not the

Bible, or if she avowedly rejected its divine authority; but as the case stands, such an appeal is irregular, illegal, and absurd. The church has and always has had the Bible ever since it was written. It was, as we have seen, originally deposited with her, and it is only from her that those outside of her communion have obtained it or their knowledge of it. She has always held and taught it to be the divinely inspired and authoritative written word of God, which none of her children are allowed to deny or question. There is no opposition possible between her teaching and the Bible, for the Bible is included in her teaching, and consequently no appeal from her teaching to the Bible. It would be only an appeal from herself to herself. The only appeal conceivable in the case is from her understanding of the sacred Scriptures or the revealed word of God to—your own; but as you at best have confessedly no authority to expound, interpret, or declare the law, your understanding of the written word can in no case override or set aside hers.

The reformers, when they pretended to appeal from the church to the Bible, mistook the question and proceeded on a false assumption. There never was any question between the church and the Bible; the only question there was or could be was between her understanding of the Bible and theirs, or, as we have said, between the Bible as expounded by the church and the Bible as expounded by private individuals. This the reformers did not or would not see, and this their followers do not or will not see to this day. Now, count the authority of the church for as little as possible, her understanding cannot be below that of private individuals, and the understanding of private individuals can never override it, or be a sufficient reason for setting it aside. The reformers had recognized the church as the supreme authority in matters of faith, and the question was not on admitting her authority as something hitherto unrecognized, but on rejecting an authority they had hitherto acknowledged as divine. They could not legally reject it except on a higher authority, or by the judgment of a superior court. But there was no superior court, no higher authority, and they could oppose to her not the authority of the Bible, as they pretended, but at best only their private opinion or views of what it teaches, which in no case could count for more than her judgment, and therefore could not overrule it or authorize its rejection.

It is all very well to deny the divine commission and

authority of the church to expound the word and declare the law of God; but a denial, to serve any purpose, or to be worth any thing, must have a reason, and a higher reason than has the affirmation denied. One can deny only by an authority sufficient to warrant an affirmation. It needs as much reason to deny as to affirm. The authority of the church can really be denied only by opposing to her a truth that disproves it. A simple negation is nothing, and proves or disproves nothing. Yet the reformers opposed to the church only a simple negation. They opposed to her no authority, no affirmative truth, and consequently gave no reason for denying or unchurching her. Indeed, no individual or sect ever opposes either to the church or to her teaching any thing but simple negation, and no one ever makes an affirmation or affirms any truth or positive doctrine which she does not herself affirm or hold and teach. Every known heresy, from that of the Docetæ down to the latest development of Protestantism, simply denies what the church teaches, and affirms nothing which she does not herself affirm, as Catholics have shown over and over again. These denials, based as they are on no principle or affirmative truth, are gratuitous, and count for nothing against the church or her teaching. Who would count the denial by a madman that the sun shines in a clear sky at noonday?

The simple fact is that whoever denies the church or her judgments does it without any authority or reason but his own private opinion or caprice, and that is simply no authority or reason at all. It is not possible to allege any authority against her or her teaching. Men may cavil at the truth, may by their sophistries and subtleties obscure the truth or involve themselves in a dense mental fog, so that they are unable to see any thing distinctly, or to tell where they are or in what direction they are moving. They may thus imagine that they have some reason for their denials, and even persuade others that such is the fact; but whenever the fog is cleared away, and they have *easted* themselves, they cannot, if they have ordinary intelligence, fail to discover that the truth which in their own minds they opposed to her or her teaching is a truth which she herself holds and teaches as an integral part of her doctrine, or as included in the depositum of faith she has received. Do you say there is truth outside of the church; truth in all religions; in all superstitions, even? Be it so; but there is no truth outside of her in any religion or superstition that

she denies or does not recognize and hold, and hold in its unity and catholicity. There may be facts in natural history, in physics, chemistry, in all the special sciences, as in the several handicrafts, that she does not teach; but there is no principle of science of any sort that she does not hold and apply whenever an occasion for its application occurs. None of the special sciences have their principles in themselves, or do or can demonstrate the principles on which they depend, and from which they derive their scientific character. They all depend for their scientific character on a higher science, the science of sciences, which the church and the church alone teaches. The principles of ethics, and therefore of politics as a branch of ethics, all lie in the theological order, and without theology there is and can be no science of ethics or politics; and hence we see that both, with those who reject theology, are purely empirical, without any scientific basis. An atheist may be moral in his conduct, but if there were no God there could be no morality; so may an atheist be a geometrician, but if there were no God there could be no geometry. Deny God, and what becomes of lines that may be infinitely projected, or of space shading off into immensity, on which so much in the science of geometry depends? Nay, deny God, and what would become even of finite space? Yet without the conception of space, which is in truth only the power of God to externize his acts, geometry would be impossible. All the special sciences are secondary, and are really science only when carried up to their first principles and explained by them. What more absurd, then, than the attempt of scientists to prove by science there is no God, or to oppose science to the theology of the church, without which no science is possible?

We need but look at the present state of men's minds to see how the world gets on without the church. Never were men more active or indefatigable in their researches: they send their piercing glances into all subjects, sacred and profane; they investigate the heavens and the earth, the present and the past, and leave no nook or corner of nature unexplored, and yet there is not a principle of ethics, politics, or science that is not denied or called in question. In the moral and political world nothing is fixed or settled, and moral and intellectual science, as well as statesmanship, disappears. Doubt and uncertainty hang over all questions, and the distinctions between right and wrong, just and un-

just, as well as between good and evil, are obscured and well-nigh obliterated. The utmost confusion reigns in the whole world of thought, and "men," as a distinguished prelate said to us the other day, "are trying the experiment of governing the world without conscience." All this proves what we maintain, that they who deny the church, or reject her teaching, have no truth to oppose to her, no reason for their denial, and no principle on which they base their rejection of her authority. Their rejection of the church and her teaching is purely gratuitous, and therefore, if not sinful, is at least baseless.

This much is certain, that it is either the church or nothing. There is no other alternative. Nothing is more absurd than for those who reject the church and her teaching to pretend to be Christian teachers or believers. They cannot believe the revelation God has made on the veracity of God alone, for they have no witness, not even an unassisted human witness, of the fact of revelation, of what God has believed, or that he has or has not revealed any thing, since they have no witness who was the contemporary of our Lord and his apostles—they were none of them born then—and they have no institution that dates from apostolic times, and that has continued without break down to the present. In fact, what they profess to believe, in so far as they believe it at all, they believe on the authority of the church, or of that very tradition which they reject and deny to be authority. They agree among themselves in their doctrinal belief only when and where they agree with the church; whenever and wherever they break from Catholic tradition, preserved and handed down by her, they disagree and fight with one another, are all at sea, and have neither chart nor compass. Do they tell us that they agree in the essentials of the Christian faith? Yet it is only so far as they follow Catholic tradition that they know or can agree among themselves as to what are or are not essentials. There is a wide difference between what Dr. Pusey holds to be essential and what is held to be essential by Dr. Bellows. Nearly the only point in which the two agree is in rejecting the infallible authority of the successor of Peter; and, in rejecting that authority, neither has any authority for believing what he believes, or for denying what he denies. Deny the church, and you have no authority for asserting divine revelation at all, as your rationalists and radicals conclusively prove.

But, happily, the other alternative saves us from all these logical inconsistencies. The church meets every demand, removes every embarrassment, and affords us the precise authority we need for faith, for she is in every age and every land a living witness to the fact of revelation, and an ever-present judge competent to declare what God reveals, and to teach us what we have, and what we have not, the veracity of God for believing. She can assure us of the divine inspiration and authority of the Holy Scriptures, which without her tradition is not provable; for she has received them through the apostles from our Lord himself. She can enable us to read them aright, and can unfold to us by her teaching their real sense; for the Holy Ghost has deposited with her the whole revelation of God, whether written or unwritten. Outside of her, men, if they have the book called the Bible, can make little or nothing of it, can come to no agreement as to its sense, except so far as they inconsistently and surreptitiously avail themselves of her interpretation of it. They have no key to its sense. But she has the key to its meaning in her possession and knowledge of all that God reveals, or in the divine instruction she has received in the beginning. The whole word of God, and the word of God as a whole, is included in the depositum she has received, and therefore she is able at all times and in all places to give the true sense of the whole, and of the relation to the whole of each and every part. In her tradition the Bible is a book of divine instruction, of living truth, of inestimable value, and entitled to the profoundest reverence, which we know it is not in the hands of those who wrest it from her tradition, and have no clue to its meaning but grammar and lexicon.

The notion that a man who knows nothing of the Christian faith, and is a stranger to the whole order of Christian thought and life, can take up the Bible, even when correctly translated into his mother-tongue, and from reading and studying it arrive at an adequate knowledge, or any real knowledge at all, of Christian truth or the revelation which God has made to man, is preposterous, and contradicted by every day's experience. Just in proportion as men depart from the tradition of faith preserved by the church, the Bible becomes an unintelligible book, ceases to be of any use to the mind, and, if reverenced at all, becomes, except in a few plain moral precepts, a source of error much more frequently than of truth. One of the most precious gifts

of God to man becomes instead of a benefit a real injury to the individual and to society. Our school-boards may, then, easily understand why we Catholics object to the reading of the Bible in schools where the church cannot be present to enlighten the pupil's mind as to its real and true sense. It is the court that keeps the statute-books, and interprets and applies the law, whether the *lex scripta* or the *lex non scripta*.

The church, existing in all ages and in all nations as one identical body, is a living witness in all times and places, as we have said, of the fact that God has revealed what she believes and teaches, and is through his assistance a competent and sufficient authority for that fact, and to interpret and declare the revealed law, as much so, to say the least, as the supreme court of a nation is to declare what is the law of the state. The objection made by rationalists and others to believing on the authority of the church, or to recognizing her authority to declare the faith, is founded on the false assumption that the church makes the faith, and can make any thing of faith she pleases, whether God has revealed it or not. We have already answered this objection. The church bears witness to the fact of revelation, and declares what is or is not the faith God has revealed, as the supreme court declares what is or is not the law of the state; but she can declare nothing to be of faith that is not of faith, or that God has not revealed and commanded all men to believe, for through the divine assistance she is infallible, and therefore cannot err in matters of faith, or in any matters pertaining in any respect to faith and morals. Since she cannot err in declaring what God has revealed and commanded, we are assured that what she declares to be revealed is revealed, or to be commanded is commanded, and therefore we know that whatever we are required to believe as of faith, or to do as commanded of God, we have the authority of God himself for believing and doing, the highest possible reason for faith, since God is truth itself, and can neither deceive nor be deceived; and the highest possible law, for God is the supreme lawgiver. It is they who reject the church or deny her authority that have only an arbitrary and capricious human authority, and who abdicate their reason and their freedom, and make themselves slaves, and slaves of human passion, arrogance, and ignorance. The Catholic is the only man who has true mental freedom, or a reason for his faith. His faith makes him free. It is the truth that liberates; and therefore our Lord says, "If the Son shall make you

free, ye shall be free indeed." Who can be freer than he who is held to believe and obey only God? They whom the truth does not make free may fancy they are free, but they are not; they are in bondage, and abject slaves.

The church in affirming herself is not making herself the judge in her own cause, is not one of the litigants, as some pretend, for the cause in which she judges is not hers, but that of God himself. She is the court instituted by the supreme lawgiver to keep, interpret, and declare his law, and therefore to judge between him and the subjects his law binds. She, in determining a case of faith or morals, no more judges in her own cause than the supreme court of a nation does in defining its own jurisdiction, and in determining a case arising under the law of which it is constituted by the national authority the judge. She has, of course, the right, as has every civil court, to punish contempt, whether of her orders or her jurisdiction, for he who contemns her contemns him who has instituted her; but the questions to be decided are questions of law, which she does not make, and is therefore no more a party to the cause litigated, and no more interested or less impartial, than is a civil court in a civil action. Indeed, we see not, if it pleases Almighty God to make a revelation, and to set up his kingdom on earth with that revelation for its law, how he can provide for its due administration without such a body as the church affirms herself to be, nor how it would be possible to institute a higher or more satisfactory method of determining what the law of his kingdom is, than by the decision of a court instituted and assisted by him for that very purpose. In our judgment, no better way is practicable, and no other way of attaining to the end desired is possible. We repeat, therefore, that the church meets every demand of the case, and removes every real difficulty in ascertaining what is the faith God has revealed, as well as what is opposed to it, or tends to obscure or impair it.

It is agreed on all hands, by all who hold that our heavenly Father has made us a revelation and instituted a church, that the church of Rome, founded by Saints Peter and Paul, was in the beginning catholic and apostolic. If she was so in the beginning, she is so now; for she has not changed, and claims no authority which she has not claimed and exercised, as the occasion arose, from the first. She is the same identical body as she has been from the beginning. All the sectarian and schismatical bodies that oppose or re-

fuse to submit to her authority acknowledged her authority prior to rejecting it, and were in communion with her. The change is not hers, but theirs. They have changed and gone out from her, because they were not of her, but she has remained ever the same. Take the schismatic Greeks. They originally were one body with her, and held the successor of Peter in the Roman See as primate or head of the whole visible church. They got angry or were perverted, and rejected the authority of the Roman Pontiff, and have never even to this day ventured to call themselves officially the Catholic or the Apostolic church. The men who founded the reformed churches so-called—the Anglican among the rest—were brought up in the communion of the Catholic Church, and acknowledged the supremacy of the Roman Pontiff, and the church of Rome as the mother and mistress of all the churches. The separation was caused by their change, not by hers. She held and taught at the time of the separation what she had always held and taught, and claimed no authority which she had not claimed from the first. Evidently, then, it was they and not she that changed and denied what they had previously believed. She lost individuals and nations from her communion, but she lost not her identity, or any portion of her rights and authority, as the one and only church of Christ, for she holds from God, not from the faithful. She has continued to be what she was at first, while they have gone from one change to another, have fallen into a confusion of tongues, as their prototypes did at Babel; and Luther and Calvin could hardly recognize their followers in those who go by their name to-day.

In the very existence of the church through so many changes in the world around her, the rise and fall of states and empires, assailed as she has been on every hand, and by all sorts of enemies, is a standing miracle, and a sufficient proof of her divinity. She was assailed by the Jews, who crucified her Lord and stirred up, wherever they went, the hostility of the people against his holy apostles and missionaries; she was assailed by the relentless persecution of the Roman Empire, the strongest organization the world has ever seen, and the greatest political power of which history gives any hint—an empire which wielded the whole power of organized paganism; she was driven to the catacombs, and obliged to offer up the holy sacrifice under the earth, for there was no place for her altars on its surface. Yet she survived the empire; emerged from the catacombs and planted

the cross on the Capitol of the pagan world. She had then to encounter a hardly less formidable enemy in the Arian heresy, sustained by the civil power; then came her struggle with the barbarian invaders and conquerors from the fifth to the tenth century—the revolt of the East, or the Greek schism; the great schism of the West; the Northern revolt, or the so-called reformation of the sixteenth century; and the hostility since of the greatest and most powerful states of the modern world; yet she stands erect where she did nearly twenty centuries ago, maintaining herself against all opposition; against the power, wealth, learning, and refinement of this world; against Jew, pagan, barbarian, heretic, and schismatic, and preserving her identity and her faith unchanged through all the vicissitudes of the world in the midst of which she is placed. She never could have done it if she had been sustained only by human virtue, human wisdom, and human sagacity; she could not have survived unchanged if she had not been under the divine protection, and upheld by the arm of Almighty God. The fact that she has lived on and preserved her identity, especially if we add to the opposition from without the scandals that have occurred within, is conclusive proof that under her human form she lives a divine and supernatural life; therefore that she is the church of God, and is what she affirms herself to be.

Believing the church to be what she affirms herself to be; believing the Roman Pontiff to be the successor of Peter, the vicar of Christ on earth, the father and teacher of all Christians, we have no fear that she will not survive the persecution which now rages against her, and that the pope will not see his enemies prostrate at his feet. Through all history, we have seen that the successes of her enemies have been short-lived, and the terrible losses they have occasioned have been theirs, not hers. It will always be so. Kings, emperors, potentates, states, and empires may destroy themselves by opposing her, but her they cannot harm. See we not how the wrongs done to the Holy Father by Italian robbers, obeying the dictates of the secret societies, some of which, like the *Madre Natura*, date almost from apostolic times, are quickening the faith and fervor of Catholics throughout the world? Not for centuries has the Holy Father been so strong in the love and devotion of his faithful children as to-day. Never is the church stronger or nearer a victory than when abandoned by all the powers of this world, and thrown back on the support of her divine Spouse alone.

THE PROTESTANT RULE OF FAITH.*

[From the Catholic World for January, 1872.]

Dr. Hodge is an Old School Presbyterian, and a sturdy opponent of what among Protestants is called the "New England theology." He is a man of learning and ability, and one of the most distinguished theologians in the Presbyterian church. If he has failed to reduce Protestantism to a system, complete, uniform, and coherent in all its parts, it is not his fault, but undeniably the fault of Protestantism itself, which is not all of a piece, which consists of fragments only of truth, with no genetic relation one to another, or connecting links, and which no mortal man can mould into a systematic whole. What man can do with so untoward a subject Dr. Hodge has done, if we may judge from the volume before us, and, as far as our knowledge goes, his work is the least unsuccessful attempt to construct a complete and consistent system of Protestant theology that has as yet been made.

Neither our space nor our leisure permits us to review the entire volume, or to discuss the author's system in its several bearings; a better opportunity to do that will be presented when we have the completed work before us, of which only the first volume has as yet been published. We shall confine ourselves for the present to a single question, namely, the Protestant rule of faith. The author devotes the entire Chapter V. of his Introduction to the statement and refutation, as he understands it, of the Catholic, or, as he says, the Romanist rule of faith; but as his objections to that rule and his supposed refutation of it presuppose the truth of Protestantism, and are of no account if the Protestant rule of faith is invalid or inadequate, we need not stop to defend it, but are free to pass at once to the examination of the Protestant rule which he opposes to it. If that can be asserted and maintained as a rule of faith, or authority for determining what is the faith God has revealed and com-

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manded us to believe, the Catholic rule is indefensible, or at least unnecessary.

The author is not very clear and definite in his statement of the Protestant rule of faith. He says, "All Protestants agree in teaching that 'the Word of God as contained in the Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments is the only infallible rule of faith and practice';" but from his assertion of the right of private judgment and several of his objections to the Catholic rule, we may, without danger of error, take the Protestant rule of faith to be the Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments, or the Bible interpreted by private judgment—that is, interpreted without any public or catholic authority—as the Protestant rule or standard of faith. But this is rather the denial than the assertion of a rule, because it presents no rule or standard to which private judgment must conform in order to be any thing but naked opinion. The Bible, even conceding its divine inspiration and sufficiency, cannot be the rule or standard for private judgment, if it is to be interpreted by private judgment, for that would require private judgment to judge what the faith is, before it has any rule by which to judge what it is. The Protestant doctrine confounds the rule of faith with the place of faith, and private judgment with individual judgment. In private judgment, the individual judges by no objective rule or standard, and his judgment is purely subjective, and is worth nothing even for himself; but an individual judgment is not necessarily private, for it may be by a rule or standard common to all men, what we call a public or catholic rule. A judgment dictated by reason, or the reason which is common to all men and the same in all, is not a private but a public judgment, and binds all men to whose knowledge it comes as much as it does the individual who renders it. Men may sin against reason as well as against faith. Men are bound to exercise their reason, the reason common to all men, in all questions submitted to reason or within its province, and are bound to do so in interpreting the Bible so far as its interpretation comes within the province of reason, and may abide by its decisions, unless overruled by a higher authority—as the lawyer has the right to abide by his own judgment of the meaning of a statute, or as to what the law is, till the court decides against him; but private judgment is a private opinion, and binds nobody.

Dr. Hodge holds that the Scriptures contain not all the

revelation Christ and his apostles made, but all that is now extant. But, even if so, his doctrine only makes them the *place* of faith; it tells where the faith is, but not what it is. They may be the fountain, but they cannot be the rule or standard, of faith. The rule is precisely that which is necessary to enable us to draw the faith from the Scriptures, and determine that it is the faith God has revealed and commanded us to believe as his word. The Protestant rule as given, then, is no rule of faith at all, and it is impossible to elicit by it an act of faith. The author is too hasty, then, in setting aside the Catholic rule on the authority of his Protestant rule, which, in order to be a rule, demands a catholic rule of judgment, as he himself virtually concedes. (p. 127.)

Dr. Hodge makes it a grave objection to the church that she does not allow private judgment as a rule of faith; yet it is only as against the church or Catholics that he himself allows it. When his aim is to destroy Catholic faith or to detach Catholics from their fidelity to the church, he asserts the unrestricted right of private judgment; but, when he wishes to build up faith or to establish Protestantism as a positive doctrine, he restricts it, and confines it to the regenerate. It is not every one who is free to interpret the faith or the Scriptures according to his own private judgment; but only those who have been regenerated, and are enlightened and led by the Holy Ghost. But even this does not help him, for he has no public or catholic rule by which to determine who are or who are not regenerated, and the individual himself has only his own private judgment by which to test the spirits, and to determine whether the spirit by which he is led is the spirit of truth or the spirit of error. The blessed Apostle John tells us not to believe every spirit, but to try the spirits, for there are many false prophets gone out into the world. Now, what is wanted is an objective test or touchstone of truth by which to try the spirits. This cannot be the subjective leadings of the spirit, for they are precisely what is to be tested in order to determine that they are from God, and not from the enemy of souls taking the guise of an angel of light in order to deceive. The learned professor, then, even with the restriction of private judgment to the regenerate, and the assumption of the interior assistance and guidance of the Spirit, though contradicting himself, gets no rule of faith, and has at best only the place of faith.

The learned author is aware that the Bible interpreted by private judgment is no rule, at least no adequate rule, of faith, and so he seeks to supply its deficiency by tradition. He says, "Protestants admit there has been a stream of traditionary teaching flowing through the Christian church from the day of Pentecost to the present time. This tradition is so far a rule of faith that nothing contrary to it can be true. Christians do not stand isolated, holding each his own creed. They constitute one body, having one creed. Protestants admit that there is a common faith of the church, which no man is *at liberty to reject, or can reject and be a Christian.*" (pp. 113, 114.) This would seem to make the Protestant rule not the Bible interpreted by private judgment and private illumination, but the Bible interpreted by the traditionary teaching of the church or the common faith of the Christian body. This, if it meant any thing, would be fatal to Protestantism. The author says, "Christians constitute one body with a common creed. Rejecting this creed, or any of its parts, is the rejection of the fellowship of Christians, incompatible with the communion of saints or membership in the body of Christ." It is undeniable that the Catholic Church included at the epoch of the reformation the whole Christian body, except those cut off from that body as heretics and schismatics; and it is equally undeniable that the reformers or first Protestants did reject what was then the creed of this body, or at least important parts of it, and, therefore, did reject what our Princeton professor says "no man is at liberty to reject, and which no man can reject and be a Christian." The reformers, then, were not, and Protestants who hold from them are not and cannot be, Christians.

But the author would avoid this conclusion by making the tradition he concedes mean nothing, or at least nothing tangible. When Protestants speak of the common consent of Christians, he says "they understand by Christians the true people of God," that is, "the truly regenerate, holy men, the temples of the Holy Ghost." They understand not a public external organic body, but an invisible and inorganic body of believers, confined to no one external communion, that is, men who belong to what Catholic theologians call "the soul of the church." Yet even these prior to Protestantism were, if not the whole body of Catholics, in the Catholic Church, and held firmly, and more firmly than others, the very creed, or the very parts of it, which

Protestants reject as Roman or papal corruption. Even conceding this restriction, the author would hardly be able to avoid the conclusion that Protestants do reject the common creed of the true people of God, for these true people of God, whoever they might be, were included in the visible Catholic Church, and held its faith. But let this pass. How is the Protestant to ascertain who these people are? Or how ascertain what is their creed or common faith, if he does not determine it by the creed publicly professed by the external or visible church in which they are concealed?

Here is a grave difficulty, and much graver than our Protestant professor would seem to regard it. The Scriptures interpreted by unregenerate men, he holds, are no rule or criterion of faith; it is only the private judgment of the regenerate, of those who are led by the Spirit, that is to be heeded, and the common faith of all such, the true people of God, is obligatory, and the faith which no one can reject in whole or in part and be a Christian. But we cannot avail ourselves of their traditionary teaching or common consent as a rule of faith, or for the interpretation of Scripture, unless we know who they are. But, as they are not an outward visible public body, but an invisible, inorganic, and, so to speak, a private body, we cannot know who they are without some rule or criterion by which we can distinguish them from the ungodly, or from those who, according to St. Augustine, are *in* the church, but not *of* the church. Hence the difficulty. We must have, prior to the application of the Protestant rule, another rule, a catholic rule, by which to determine and apply it. We cannot use the Protestant rule unless we know what it is, and we cannot know what it is without a prior rule for determining who are the true people of God, the elect, and what is their common creed, or traditionary teaching from the day of Pentecost down to our times. But our learned professor has neglected to give us this antecedent rule, without which the one he gives us is no rule at all. He gives no mark or sign by which we can recognize the invisible people of God, and we do not think he can; for we do not believe anybody knows or will know who they are till the last judgment, when the secrets of all hearts will be laid open.

It will not do here to refer us to the Bible for the rule by which to ascertain them; for we must know them and their common faith in order to obtain our guide to the sense of the Bible. We cannot take the sense of the Bible to de-

termine them, and then take them to determine the sense of the Bible. It will not do, again, to say they are they who are led by the Spirit, for it is precisely those who are led by the Spirit that we wish to ascertain; nor will it do to appeal to religious experience, for it is only the religious experience of the true people of God that can avail, and that would be referring us to the people of God to tell us who are the people of God. It would be to reason like the poor Anglican, who makes orthodoxy the test of the church, and the church the test of orthodoxy. "Jack, where is the hoe?" "Wid de harrow, Massa." "Where is the harrow?" "Wid de hoe, Massa." The Protestant, in any case, gives no more satisfactory answer; for, with all his pretensions, he can only tell us that the true faith is the faith held and followed by the true people of God, and the true people of God are they who hold and follow the true faith.

The author, as we have seen, says: "When Protestants plead the common consent of Christians—the common faith of the Christian body—they mean by Christians the true people of God. Romanists, on the other hand," he continues, "mean the company of those who profess the true faith, and who are subject to the Pope of Rome. There is the greatest difference between the authority due to the common faith of truly regenerate, holy men, the temples of the Holy Ghost, and that due to what a society of nominal Christians profess to believe, the great majority of whom may be worldly, immoral, and irreligious." But where did the professor learn that the authority of the teaching depends on the personal virtue of the teacher? How does he know that they who recognize the authority of the pope are only nominal Christians? or that the pope is not led and assisted by the Spirit in his office of teacher of the universal church? Nay, how does he know, or how can he prove to us or anybody else, that there are any of the true people of God among Protestants at all? He must prove his rule of faith before proceeding to apply it.

Dr. Hodge continues, on the same page (115): "The common consent for which Protestants plead concerns only essential doctrines; that is, doctrines which enter into the very nature of Christianity as a religion, and which are necessary to its *subjective* existence in the heart, or which, if they do not enter essentially into the religious experience of believers, are so connected with vital doctrines and precepts as not to admit a separation from them."

Here is the same difficulty again. What is the Protestant rule for distinguishing among revealed doctrines those which are essential and those which are not essential? Will the author tell us the essentials are those doctrines which all Protestants agree in teaching, and that those in which they do not agree in teaching are non-essentials? But who are Protestants? All those who agree in teaching the essentials? Where is the hoe? With the harrow. Where is the harrow? With the hoe. This would be only to adopt the principle of poor Jack's replies to the questions of his master.

But no. The essentials are "those doctrines which enter into the very nature of Christianity as a religion, and which are necessary to its *subjective* existence in the heart." But how determine what these are, unless we know the very nature of Christianity? And how can we know or determine what is the very nature of Christianity, unless we have a rule or standard of faith? But the essentials are those doctrines which "are necessary to its subjective existence in the heart." What doctrines are these? Have Protestants any objective rule for determining them? The professor gives none except the Scriptures, which do not suffice, because, as we have seen, the Scriptures are the place, not the rule of faith, and what we are seeking is the rule or authority for determining what is the faith they contain. Among Protestants there is a very great diversity of views as to what is necessary to the subjective existence of religion in the heart. Schleiermacher, in his *Discourses on Religion, addressed to the Cultivated among its Despisers*, maintains that only the sense of dependence is necessary to the subjective existence of religion; Twesten, as cited by the author, maintains the same, and that in a subjective sense all religions are equally true, though not equally pure; some Protestants place the essence of religion in reverence; Dr. Channing seemed to place it in philanthropy, or in a sense of the dignity of man; others in "self-culture," in "self-worship"; and a distinguished Protestant minister maintained to us, some years ago, that a pantheist, like Spinoza, or an atheist, like Shelley, might not only be truly religious, but a good Christian. There are thousands and thousands in all Protestant denominations who, virtually at least, regard the subjective existence of religion in the heart as nearly, if not totally, independent of all objective doctrines or faith. Such is at least the tendency of modern Evangelicalism, Bush-

nellism, Beecherism, from which even our author himself is not always free. He makes, indeed, a brave fight for dogmatic theology or objective faith, but his concessions to Whitefieldian and Wesleyan notions of religious experience place him on the declivity to pure religious subjectivism. All these have the Scriptures, and profess to take them for their rule of faith and practice; but it is evident from what we have said that the Scriptures are not a sufficient rule by which to determine what are essentials and what are not. What rule, then, have Protestants by which to make the distinction?

Dr. Hodge says, in refutation of the Catholic rule, which, by the way, he does not correctly state: "Our Lord, in promising the Spirit to guide his people into the knowledge of truths necessary to their salvation, did *not* promise to preserve them from error in subordinate matters, or to give them a supernatural knowledge of the organization of the church, the number of the sacraments, or the power of bishops." (Pp. 115, 116.) Then, on these matters, the organization of the church, the number of the sacraments, and the power of bishops, Protestants have no promise of exemption from error, and hence it is quite possible that they err in rejecting the Catholic doctrine of the church, of the hierarchy and the sacraments. But the professor's limitation of the promise of our Lord is not warranted by his own professed rule. The promise, as recorded by the evangelists is unlimited: "But the Paraclete, the Holy Ghost, whom the Father will send in my name, he will teach you *all* things, and bring *all* things to your mind *whatsoever* I shall have said to you." (St. John xiv. 26.) This is explicit enough. But, again, "But he, the Spirit of truth, when he shall come, will teach you *all* truth." (*Ib.* xvi. 13.) Therefore, our Lord said to his apostles, "Go ye, and teach all nations . . . . to observe all things *whatsoever* I have commanded you, and behold, I am with you all days, even unto the consummation of the world." (St. Matt. xxviii. 19, 20.) This is a promise of guidance of the Spirit into all truth, and of exemption from error, in any thing which our Lord has said or commanded.

If we were defending the Catholic rule, we should remind the author that this promise was made to the *ecclesia docens*, and only through that to the *ecclesia credens*; but, as we are not defending the Catholic rule, we suffer him to apply it to what he calls the true people of God. Yet, if he accepts

the plain declaration of our Lord himself as recorded in the Gospels, he has no authority for distinguishing between essentials and non-essentials in the revelation of God, and none at all for restricting the promise of spiritual guidance and assistance to a promise of preservation from error only in certain fundamental truths of revelation. The author must either give us the rule or authority on which he makes the distinction and limitation, or concede that he makes it by no rule, and, therefore, on no authority.

Dr. Hodge tells us (p. 151) that "all Protestants agree in teaching that the word of God, as contained in the Old and New Testaments, is the infallible rule of faith." He should have said *some* Protestants; for many who claim to be Protestants do not agree in teaching that. Will the professor say that those who do not so agree are not Protestants? By what authority? By the authority of the Bible, interpreted by private judgment? But they have the Bible and private judgment as well as he, or those who agree with him. Will he appeal to tradition? But tradition taken as a whole condemns him as well as those who differ from him. Then he must discriminate in tradition between what is to be followed and what is to be rejected. But this discrimination demands a rule of judgment. But what rule can the author allege? Private judgment? But that is no rule, for private judgment is by its very definition a judgment without any rule or standard of judgment, and, besides, those who differ from him have private judgment, and theirs is worth as much as his. Will the author answer again—The tradition or common consent of the true people of God? But who are they? Here, then, we are back in the old difficulty. Protestantism moves always in a vicious circle; proving its rule by its faith, and its faith by its rule. We see no way by which it can get out of this circle. It is not only as a Catholic we have felt this difficulty; we felt it as a Protestant, when we had the misfortune to be a Presbyterian, like our learned friend the Princeton professor.

We are sure the fault is not the professor's, for he doubtless sees that he moves only in a vicious circle as clearly as we do, and no doubt would come out of it and move forward in a straight line, if he could. The fault is in Protestantism itself, which is essentially illogical, and does not conform to the divine order or the truth of things. The reformers themselves started without seeing whither they were going, and without seeing that the Catholic system, parts of

which they rejected, was a systematic whole, and that, if one part was retained, the whole must be retained, and, if one part was rejected, the whole must be rejected. This is what Moehler has so admirably shown in his *Symbolik*. But the reformers did not wish to reject the whole; they wished to reject only a part, and in the beginning only a small part. They wished to remain Catholics, *minus* one or two dogmas, and, after the condemnation of Luther by Leo X., *minus* the pope and the Roman curia. But they were driven onward further than they intended, and further than they foresaw or were prepared for. They constructed no rule of faith beforehand, and adopted one only as the exigencies of the controversy with Catholics made one necessary; still, except on certain points, they continued using the old Catholic rule. Hence their Protestantism was patched up with shreds of the old religion, eked out by such new cloth as they were able to supply to meet the pressure of the occasion. It was formed not all at once, nor all of one piece. It was formed little by little in the struggle to maintain themselves against their Catholic adversaries, and to retain as much of what had always been the faith of Christendom as was possible in the position they assumed. In forming it, they were much more intent on demolishing what our professor calls "Romanism" than on laying a solid foundation for a Protestant superstructure.

The simple fact is, the Protestant movement could find no solid foundation except in pure rationalism, or, rather, in pure individualism, in which every man is his own church, his own rule of faith, his own law, and his own God—a conclusion from which Luther and Calvin would have recoiled with horror, as recoils Dr. Hodge to-day. The reformers did not see, for they were, as all Protestants are, sad logicians in matters of religion, whither their movement tended, nor dream that one day they would be called on to show that their religion rests on a solid foundation, or a bottom of its own, irrespective of any relation to the Catholic Church, and when they must prove that it is something besides a mere protest against the church of Rome. They thought they could throw off Rome and a few dogmas, and still remain true Christian believers. In this they were deceived; for they were too little for Christianity and too much for its full denial. They retained certain positive Christian doctrines, but they had no authority for them except the Catholic authority which they madly rejected. Hence, when we

press them for the authority on which they assert these doctrines, they fall into the vicious circle in which we find them for ever gyrating, and from which not even Dr. Hodge can relieve them.

The author says (p. 104), "Romanists agree with Protestants in teaching the plenary inspiration and consequent infallible authority of the sacred writings." But this is a mistake. Catholics do not agree with Protestants, but some Protestants—by no means all Protestants—agree with the church in maintaining the Catholic doctrine of the "plenary inspiration and consequent infallible authority of the sacred writings." It is simply a Catholic doctrine retained by the reformers from the church, which taught it nearly fourteen hundred years before Protestantism was born. The able and learned professor, we are sorry to observe, forgets that the church is some centuries older than the oldest Protestant sect, that the founders of Protestantism had all been reared in her communion, and separated from her. Protestants have undeniably no historical connection with our Lord and his apostles, save through the Catholic Church, or the church in communion with the See of Rome. Whatever doctrines Protestants hold that the church always held and taught are hers, not theirs; and it is a grave mistake to pretend that they are Protestant doctrines. Protestantism consists essentially and solely in those things which distinguish it from Catholicity, or in what is peculiar to it and constitutes its *differentia*—in what it denies that the church asserts, and it asserts that she denies. If they have stolen some of her doctrines, that does not make them any the less hers by right, nor give them the right to appropriate them as their own. There is not a single doctrine which Protestants profess to hold—which she teaches, and always has taught—to which they, as Protestants, have any title, or which they can prove to be revealed truth independently of her testimony and authority. It is disregarding this truth that gives to Protestantism the appearance of being a religion.

We return to the word of God as contained in the Old and New Testaments. Before the author can assert the Scriptures as the infallible rule of faith, he must settle, first, the canon; second, the plenary inspiration of the Scriptures; third, the completeness or sufficiency of the Scriptures; and, fourth, the true sense of the Scriptures. Now, not one of these points is it possible for a Protestant to settle independently of the witness and authority of the

Catholic Church, and Dr. Hodge confirms our assertion by his manifest failure to settle any one of them on Protestant grounds. They are all questions of faith, and not one of them can be settled prior to or without the rule of faith; and yet on Protestant grounds they must all be settled before the rule of faith can be ascertained and applied.

Protestants exclude from the canon of the Old Testament several books called by some the deutero-canonical books, which are included in it by the Catholic Church, and even the schismatic churches of the East, and they are far from being agreed among themselves as to what books are or are not canonical. Some would exclude the Book of Ruth and the Canticle. As to the New Testament, Luther had doubts, if our reading or memory be not at fault, of the Epistle to the Hebrews, and that of St. Jude, and rejected the Epistle of St. James, which he called an epistle of straw, probably because it flatly contradicts his doctrine of justification by faith alone; others have doubted the canonicity of these, and, in addition, of the Apocalypse, the second Epistle of St. Peter, the second and third of St. John, and that of St. Paul to Philemon; others still reject the Gospel according to St. John, and indeed the whole New Testament, except the Synoptics—and these, while they admit them as authentic, they deny to be inspired. The Princeton professor may deny these to be Protestants, but they have as good a right to exclude from the canon such books as they judge proper as had Luther and Calvin; and there is no rule by which he can make out that he is a Protestant that will not equally serve to prove that they are Protestants. The only rule available is Catholic tradition, and that condemns him as well as them.

The professor does not rely on the authority of the synagogue, though he adduces it, to settle the canon of the Old Testament, for that would be anti-Protestant; but attempts to settle it by the authority of the New Testament. Such books as he finds a text quoted from by our Lord or his apostles he assumes to be canonical and inspired; but such as he does not find thus quoted from, he rejects from the canon. But this is not conclusive, for the author concedes that our Lord and his apostles said many things that are not recorded in the New Testament, and how does he know that in those many unrecorded discourses the books which he rejects as uncanonical, and which Catholics hold to be canonical, were not quoted? Then, by what authority does he

pretend that a citation of a text from a book proves the book to be canonical or the whole book to be inspired? St. Paul, at Athens, cites Arrian, and in his Epistle to the Hebrews he manifestly adopts a phrase and a sentiment from Plato's *Republic:* must we therefore conclude that the writings of Arrian and Plato's *Republic* are canonical, and Arrian and Plato to be included in the list of divinely inspired writers? Has the professor any assertion of our Lord or of any writer in the New Testament that a Jewish or any other book cited by him or by his apostles is canonical and divinely inspired? Certainly not. St. Paul says in his second Epistle to Timothy, "All Scripture divinely inspired is profitable," &c., but he does not say what Scriptures are or are not divinely inspired.

Then, again, as to the New Testament, the author concedes that, during the first century and later, the canon of the New Testament was uncertain. It, then, was not settled by our Lord or his apostles themselves. On what authority, then, was it settled? Manifestly only on the authority of the church, that is, of popes and councils. But our Princeton professor denies the authority of popes and councils; denies the infallibility of the church; nay, he denies that the church, Catholic or Protestant, has any teaching authority, fallible or infallible. The canon neither of the New Testament nor of the Old is settled, then, by any infallible rule or authority. How, then, can the professor maintain that Protestants have, in the Scriptures, an infallible rule of faith? No fallible rule suffices for infallible faith.

As Protestants are unable, without the authority of the church or tradition, to settle the canon, so are they unable, without the same authority, to determine what books are or are not divinely inspired. The author contends that it suffices to prove that the writers were messengers from God, and commissioned to speak or write in his name. But that cannot be proved unless they accredited themselves as such by their miracles, and not even then, unless the miracles are attested to us by a competent and credible witness of them. Who or what, for Protestants, is that witness? The Record! But the record may have been forged or interpolated, and must, before it can be adduced as evidence, be authenticated. How can the Protestant authenticate it, except by showing that it has been carefully and vigilantly guarded from the first till now by an official keeper with whom it was deposited? Deny the church as the deposit-

ary of the record, as the Protestant does, and there is no certain means of authenticating the record, and then none of authenticating the miracles; then none of establishing the fact of the divine commission of the sacred writers, and consequently none of proving the divine inspiration of the sacred writings, since inspiration is a supernatural fact.

But did it ever occur to our learned professor that he has, in order to prove the inspiration of the Scriptures, not only to take the authority of the church for so much, but to prove, before he can allege the authority of the Scriptures, all the Catholic has to prove, in order to prove the divine authority and infallibility of the church? He must prove that our Lord and his apostles spoke and wrote by divine authority, and that is all the Catholic has to prove. In either case, the authority, whether of the church or of the Bible, turns on the fact of the divine commission, which the Protestant must prove in the very outset as well as the Catholic, and which he cannot prove if he rejects the testimony of the church as the contemporary and living witness of the facts. The church, having been founded by and grown out of that commission, and continuing without interruption from the apostles down to us, is herself the living witness of the facts which prove the commission. She authenticates the record; but the Protestant has, in addition to authenticating the record which proves the commission, to establish the genuineness, integrity, and authenticity of the sacred writings before he can infer their divine inspiration and infallible authority, or use them as a rule of faith, and not even then unless their writers expressly declare them to be inspired, for it is possible for divinely commissioned men to write at times on matters not covered by their commission.

But we are not yet through with the Protestant's difficulties, if he is to proceed independently of Catholic tradition. Supposing him to have proved all this, he still has to prove the completeness or sufficiency of the Scriptures. Dr. Hodge does not pretend that the Scriptures contain all the revelations made by our Lord to his apostles, but only what is now extant. "It is not denied," he says (pp. 182, 183), "that there may have been, and probably were, books written by inspired men which are no longer in existence. Much less is it denied that Christ and his apostles delivered many discourses which were not recorded, and which, could they now be known, would be of equal authority with the

books now regarded as canonical." But how does he know that these discourses or the instructions they contained are now lost, or that they are not preserved and as well-known and authenticated in the traditions of the church as the canonical books themselves? Furthermore, how does he know that it is not precisely in these discourses which were not recorded that is to be found the key to the sense of those which were recorded? The church has always so held and taught; indeed, the author himself concedes that, at the first, the whole revealed word, whether written or unwritten, went by the name of the tradition, and the written tradition was not distinguished from the unwritten. He says:

"In the early church, the word [tradition] was used in this wide sense. Appeal was constantly made to the traditions, that is, the instructions the churches had received. It was only certain churches at first that received any of the written instructions of the apostles. And it was not till the end of the first century that the writings of the evangelists and apostles were collected and formed into a canon or rule of faith. And when the books of the New Testament had been collected, the fathers spoke of them as containing the 'traditions,' that is, the instructions derived from Christ and his apostles.....In that age of the church, the distinction between the written and unwritten word had not yet been distinctly made. But as controversies arose and disputants on both sides of all questions appealed to 'tradition,' that is, to what they had been taught; and when it was found that these traditions differed, one church saying their teachers always taught them one thing, and another that theirs had taught them its opposite, it was felt that there should be some authoritative standard. Hence the wisest and best of the fathers [who were they?] insisted on abiding by the written word, and receiving nothing as authoritative not contained therein. In this, however, it must be confessed, they [the wisest and the best of the fathers] were not always consistent. Whenever prescription, usage, or conviction founded on unwritten evidence was available against an adversary, they did not hesitate to make use of it. During *all the early centuries*, therefore, the distinction between Scripture and tradition was not so sharply drawn as it has been since the controversies between Romanists and Protestants, and especially since the decisions of the Council of Trent:" (pp. 108, 109.)

There are several inaccuracies in this passage. In the early ages of the church, when controversies arose and contradictory traditions were alleged, appeal was not made to the written word, but to the churches founded by St. Peter, or by his immediate authority, that is to Antioch, Alexandria, or Rome, or to a council, provincial, plenary, or œcu-

menical, as can hardly be unknown to so learned a theological scholar as Dr. Hodge.* But two facts are conceded in the passage: first, that the church for a hundred years or more had only unwritten tradition or the oral instructions of its pastors as its rule of faith; and, second, that the written and the unwritten traditions of the word were deemed of equal authority by the wisest and best of the fathers, and were not as to their authority distinguished, at least not sharply distinguished, before the rise of Protestantism. The professor, then, must prove that the whole church was wrong prior to Luther in recognizing the authority of the unwritten traditions before he can assert that the Scriptures contain all of the revealed word extant, or maintain the completeness or sufficiency of the Scriptures as the rule of faith. How will he do it, after conceding that they do not contain the whole revelation that was made, nor even the whole extant in the opinion of the church or the great body of Christians prior to the rise of Protestantism? Does the written word anywhere declare its own completeness or sufficiency, and that the portions not recorded are of no importance?

But the difficulties of Protestantism do not end even here. The Bible is no rule of faith except in its true sense, or as rightly interpreted according to the meaning of the Holy Ghost. The author says (p. 183): "The Bible is a plain book. It is intelligible by the people. And they have the right and are bound to read and interpret it for themselves, so that their faith may rest on the testimony of the Scriptures, and not on that of the church. Such is the doctrine of Protestants on this subject."

But is it true? If so, how happens it that among Protestants we can hardly find two, when left to themselves, without any parental or pastoral instruction, who agree in

* If the written word had been regarded as the sufficient and only rule of faith, there could have been no occasion to appeal to apostolic churches or to councils to ascertain the evangelical or apostolical traditions. It would have been simpler to appeal to the written word itself. The reason of the council, as its purpose, was to collect by the testimony of the pastors of the several churches what was the tradition that was handed over to each by its apostolic founder, and which it had preserved. By ascertaining thus by the testimony of each the traditions common to them all, the controversy was settled. The frequency of councils in the early ages proves that during those ages, at least, Christians did not adopt the Protestant rule of faith, and that they were by no means Protestants. The pretence of the reformers that they were restoring primitive Christianity, primitive faith and usage, is to be taken as a pretence only.

their interpretation of the written word, or as to the doctrines to be deduced from it? Yet the author himself can hardly believe what he asserts to be the Protestant doctrine on the subject is true. "It is not denied," he adds (pp. 183, 184), "that the Scriptures contain many things that are hard to be understood; that they require diligent study; that all men need the guidance of the Holy Spirit to a right knowledge and true faith. But it is maintained that in all things necessary to salvation they are sufficiently plain to be understood even by the unlearned." What! even by those who are unable to understand a word of the language in which the Scriptures were written, and must depend on the fidelity of translations made by fallible men, and vouched for by no infallible authority? By those who do not know how to read at all in any language? Then how does the professor know what things are or are not necessary to salvation? That the things necessary to the right apprehension of the mysteries of the faith are not contained in those very parts of Scripture which are hard to be understood, or that the proper explanation of those parts is not necessary to the proper understanding of the other parts, which he judges to be intelligible even to the unlearned? The author here must either borrow from the Catholic rule, which condemns his Protestantism, or else admit that he has no satisfactory answer to give to these and kindred questions.

But all these questions are quite unnecessary, for the author obligingly refutes his own rule of faith, and acknowledges that the Scriptures interpreted by private judgment or by human reason itself are not sufficient to give a "right knowledge of the true faith." Neither learning nor diligent study, nor the perspicuity of Scripture, suffices; for "all men," he says, "need the guidance of the Holy Spirit in order to a right knowledge of the true faith." This is conclusive against the Protestant rule, and confesses that no man can arrive at the knowledge of the true faith without the supernatural assistance of the Holy Spirit. Let us hear no more, then, of the Scriptures interpreted by private judgment, or of the ability or the right of every individual to read and interpret the Scriptures for himself and to form from them his own creed.

It is worthy of remark here that our Protestant professor is obliged throughout to adopt the principle of the Catholic rule of faith, only he applies it differently. The Catholic asserts the infallibility of the pope in matters of faith and

morals by virtue of the assistance or guidance of the Holy Spirit; the Protestant professor claims the same infallibility, by virtue of the same supernatural assistance, for each one of the people of God taken individually. But the pope is a public personage, all the world knows or may know who he is, and can recur to him, and, supposing him to be assisted as claimed, all the world may know from him the true faith; but in the Protestant sense there is no public means of knowing who the people of God are, and, consequently, no public means of knowing what the Spirit teaches, or whom he guides or assists to a knowledge of the true faith, since he guides or assists only private individuals, not a public personage or a public body. It can be no public rule of faith, and, as we have shown, none for the individual himself, for he has no objective and independent rule for determining whether the spirit that leads him is the spirit of truth or the spirit of error. The professor has refuted his own doctrine in his refutation of the Quaker rule of faith. The interior illumination, he asserts, is private, and can be brought to no public or catholic test. Not the church, both because the church the Protestant recognizes is invisible, and recognizable by no external marks or notes, and because the church, according to him, has no teaching authority or faculty. Not to the Scriptures, because it is the test of the right understanding of them that is required, and to take them as the test of this is to reason in a vicious circle.

Protestants, historically considered, arrived at their rule through Protestantism, not at Protestantism through the application of their rule, and the fact is, they cannot logically assert their rule till they have proved or obtained *aliunde* their Protestantism. They are obliged to prove their Protestantism in order to prove their rule, and they must prove their rule in order to prove their Protestantism. This is a grave inconvenience. But, assuming without proof that the Scriptures are the sufficient and only rule of faith, they conclude, against undeniable facts, that the Bible is a plain book, and intelligible to the people, even to the unlearned, and it should be if intended by its divine author to be the sufficient and only rule of faith. They find their conclusion untenable, and modify their statement, and say that their conclusion is true as to all things necessary to salvation. But, finding no agreement among Protestants themselves who take the Bible as their sufficient and only rule of faith as to what things are necessary to salvation, they divide.

One class declares more or less distinctly that no objective faith is necessary to salvation, and another class, in which is included our author, asserts, while maintaining the right of private judgment, the private illumination of the Holy Ghost as the rule for interpreting the Scriptures, apparently not perceiving that they are in flagrant contradiction with themselves.

The professor objects (p. 127) to tradition as the rule of faith that it is not adapted to that purpose: "A rule of faith to the people must be something they can apply; a standard by which they can judge. But the unwritten tradition is not contained in any one volume accessible to the people and intelligible by them." This were a valid objection, if the people had to seek through all history to find and verify the tradition; but is no objection at all, if we suppose an infallible teacher, always present, who preserves and applies the tradition for the people. But does the Protestant escape his own objection by rejecting all unwritten tradition, and making the Bible alone the rule of faith, which is at least as unintelligible to the people as is unwritten tradition explained and applied by duly authorized preachers of the word?

That the Bible ought, on Protestant principles, to be a plain book, interpreting itself to every person of ordinary sense, or who has enough sense to be a moral agent, we concede, and Protestants should actually derive their doctrines from it. But nobody knows better than our author that neither is a fact. He knows that the Protestant people, however much they may read and praise the Bible, do not form their own opinions from it, but from their pastors or teachers, or the community in which they are brought up. He knows, also, that the people could never of themselves derive even the doctrines which he holds to be essential and necessary to salvation from reading the Bible alone. Unitarians and Universalists deny that the Bible teaches them, and the people, as a matter of fact, take them from the tradition of their sect, and at best only find confirmation of them in the Scriptures; and yet such are the exigencies of Protestantism that the ablest and most learned Protestant professors are obliged, in the face of these facts, to say with Chillingworth, "The Bible, the Bible alone, is the religion of Protestants."

But Protestants should bear in mind that Catholics have the Bible as well as they—had it ages before Protestantism

was ever heard of, and that it was from Catholics that they obtained it—strictly speaking, from the church *stole* it. How, then, can it be their religion any more than it is the religion of Catholics? Catholics, if they have not admitted it to contain the whole revealed word, have always held it, before Protestantism and since, to be divinely inspired, and, as far as it goes, the infallible word of God. They have always held that all Christians are bound to believe whatever it teaches, and forbidden to believe any thing that contradicts it. This is all that Protestantism can really say. The church contends that in no respect does her doctrine conflict with the written word, and is in most respects, if not in all, positively sustained by it. Suppose her as fallible as Protestants confess themselves to be, what can Protestants have in the Bible that Catholics have not? or what have they from any source that can override the Catholic understanding of the Scriptures, or authorize them to say that it is a misunderstanding? Catholics may have more than Protestants, but in no case have they or can they have less. By what rule or standard, then, do Protestants judge the Catholic understanding of the Scriptures to be false and the Protestant understanding to be true? Private judgment is no rule, and, if it were, Catholics have private judgment as well as Protestants; they have, too, reason, Biblical, historical, and all other sorts of learning, as well as they, and, at least, in as eminent a degree. By what rule or standard of judgment, then, is Protestantism to be pronounced more Biblical than is Catholicity?

The professor says: "The people have the right of private judgment, and are bound to read and interpret the Bible for themselves." In matters left to private judgment, in regard to which there is no public or catholic rule, be it so. But, when the people have a public or catholic rule, they are bound to judge by it, and the right of private judgment ceases. Protestants either have such a rule or they have not. If they have, they are bound to judge by it, and have no right of private judgment in the case. If they have not, then they have no rule or standard by which to judge, no rule of faith, and that ends the matter. We beg the professor to understand that all this Protestant rationalistic talk about private judgment is mere moonshine. He may allow it against what he calls "Romanism," but he by no means allows it against what he holds to be the word of God. As for the people being bound to read or interpret the Bible for themselves, it is sufficient to ask what would

become of the professor's own vocation if it were so? Were the people who lived before the New Testament was written, or its several books collected into a volume as the rule of faith, bound to read and understand it for themselves? Are those bound to read or interpret the Bible for themselves who know not even how to read? These are reckoned to be at least nineteen-twentieths of mankind; shall they receive no religious instructions till they have learned to read? What shall we say of those who—and they are the bulk of mankind—obliged to toil incessantly to sustain their bodily existence, have no time to learn to read, much less to study diligently the sacred Scriptures, even if they could read? What are we to say of children who are too young to read and understand the Bible for themselves, and yet are old enough to sin? Can these all be saved without the knowledge of the truth? or are they excluded by an inexorable decree and no fault of their own from salvation? The fact is, Protestants, whatever the fuss they may make about the Scriptures and private judgment, adopt, in practice, as their rule of faith, the Bible interpreted by the learned, or those they hold to be learned, the rule Dr. Döllinger would force the church to adopt. Catholics are not more dependent on the church than Protestants are on their pastors. But as their doctors cannot agree among themselves, they have no resource but to divide with their doctors, and divide they do, each division following its favorite doctor, and founding with him a new sect, which allows no private judgment against itself. Even Unitarians, who believe hardly any thing, tolerate private judgment only when it makes for them, and are as intolerant of those who deny any thing they hold to be essential as an Old or New School Presbyterian. The worst of it is that, while Protestants yield a slavish submission to their ministers, they deny that their ministers have any authority from God either to teach or to govern them, and, like the old carnal Jews, boast that they are free and in bondage to no man. The most degrading and debasing slavery into which mortals can be plunged is that of Protestants to their favorite ministers, unless it be that of the heathen to their idols or false gods.

But we are exceeding our limits. We have said enough, we think, to show that Protestants have no independent rule of faith—independent of the Catholic Church, we mean. In so far as they hold Christian truth or positive faith at all, they hold it on the authority of the Catholic rule, which they reject; and when deprived of what they stole from us,

and to which they have no right, they have nothing to prevent them from running into pure rationalism on the one hand, or into mysticism and transcendentalism on the other. The germs of both were in the original Protestant movement, and may be easily detected even in our Princeton professor. Into one or the other he must run, if he ever gets out of the vicious circle in which Protestantism, pretending to be Christian, necessarily gyrates, unless the grace of God relieves him and enables him to return to the bosom of the Catholic Church, where alone he will find true freedom and truth in its unity and integrity.

PROTESTANTISM ANTICHRISTIAN.*

[From Brownson's Quarterly Review for October, 1873.]

These are both American reprints of English works by a well-known and highly-esteemed author, whose name we do not give, because he has not seen proper to attach it to these publications. The works are both directed against the Anglican church, of which the author was formerly a minister. Whether it is in good taste or not for an author to assail with wit and ridicule his former associates, we shall not undertake to decide; but this much we can say, the author is profound as well as witty, and the pungency of his satire is more than overmatched by the strength and solidity of his reasoning. He is an able as well as a pleasing writer, and may be read for the grace and polish of his style and for the classical purity of his English, as well as for his argument.

It is not difficult to turn Anglicans and their church pretensions into ridicule, and we confess that we have hardly ever been able to treat either seriously. As to the high church party, the lamented Cardinal Wiseman has left nothing to be said. He has left them not an inch of ground to stand on, and has blown their church pretensions to the winds. As for low churchmen, or the Evangelicals—the

*1 *My Clerical Friends, and their Relation to Modern Thought.* New York: 1873.

2.—*Church Defence.* Report of a Conference on the Present Dangers of the [Anglican] Church. New York: 1873.

Exeter Hall people—they hold from Calvin, and have no church pretensions at all. They are to be placed in the same category with Presbyterians, Dutch Reformed, Congregationalists, and Methodists, who place the essence of religion in emotion, and count dogma of no great importance, perhaps of none. They are unmistakably Protestant, and alternate between fanaticism and indifference.

We can readily understand why converts from Anglicanism should give it a large place in their thoughts and make its pretensions the chief object of their attack; yet to us, Presbyterianism and Methodism are far more important, as they are far more influential than Anglicanism. Anglicanism is comparatively insignificant, and is to-day by no means our most formidable or dangerous enemy even in England. Much more is to be apprehended from Scotch Presbyterians, and English Wesleyans, and other Dissenters, than from the Anglican Establishment. Most of the converts to the church in Great Britain, Ireland, and the colonies, as well as in the United States, are from the ranks of Anglicans or Episcopalians. Even those in our country who are gathered from non-Episcopal sects, are for the most part gathered into the church through conversion first to Episcopalianism. Its influence in our country is more friendly than hostile to us, and tends to render the dominant sects more malleable. We see, then, no special reason why nearly all our controversial works in English should be directed against Anglicanism, which is far from dominating the mind of the English-speaking world.

Even the controversy with Protestantism in any form, as distinguished from downright infidelity, that is, naturalism and atheism, is not of much use in our day; for if we show Protestants that their Protestantism is untenable as a religion, they will not embrace the church, at least not in large numbers, but will fall back on indifferentism, on no-religion, or maintain that no-religion is true religion. Do we not see the positivists erecting their atheism into a religion? A religion without God, as a Christianity without Christ, has nothing of the absurd for the advanced minds of this age. Yet to assume that Protestantism, affecting to be a religion, even a form of Christianity, is dead, would be a grave mistake: as it would, also, be a grave mistake to suppose that the whole Protestant world has lapsed into a state of religious indifferentism. It has fallen to a great extent into what we may call doctrinal or dogmatic indifference: but

it is by no means indifferent to what it calls religion, as is evident from the meeting-houses it erects, the large salaries it pays to popular preachers, the number of journals it supports, the extensive literature it produces, and the large sums it collects and pays for supporting Bible societies, tract societies, and home and foreign missions. Certainly it shows little lack of interest in what it calls religion, or even of ability to make considerable sacrifices for it.

The evil is not there ; it is in the indifference to truth, or the loss of faith in objective truth. The age has resolved truth, whether in the natural order or the supernatural order, into an inward emotion or sentiment, and made its religion purely subjective. It is easy to understand why controversy with Protestants is comparatively unavailing. Arguments presuppose reason, and can avail nothing with one who has abdicated the exercise of reason, and fallen back on interior feeling or sentiment. The Protestant, by rejecting dogma and placing religion in emotion, excludes all intellectuality from his religion, and becomes as incapable of appreciating reasons in matters of religion as the dog, the ox, or the horse. Our difficulty, as Catholics with Protestants, is that they reject reason, and that, by making their religion purely subjective, they place it and themselves beyond the reach of reason. They cannot be convinced or convicted, in their own apprehension, by arguments, however cogent or conclusive, where religion is in question. Whether so or not in other matters, in religion they cease to belong to the order of rational creatures, and are neither men nor Christians.

The children of the reformation have been driven to the rejection of reason and of the objectivity of truth by the necessities of their position. All truth is homogeneous. The truth cognizable by reason and the truth cognizable only by divine revelation are only parts of one and the same truth. To reject either part is to reject, in principle, both parts, and to lose the whole. The reformers supposed at first that they could maintain dogmatic religion by means of the Bible, without any divinely authorized interpreter or teacher, for they were not aware at first how much their interpretation of Scripture depended on the tradition of the church in which they had all been educated. When shown this by Catholics, and shown still further that the Bible interpreted by tradition supported the claims of the papacy and the church from which they had separated, they

were forced, in order to be consistent with themselves, either to return to the church or to reject the traditional interpretation of the written word, and to rely henceforth solely, in their interpretation of the sacred text, on grammar and lexicon. But, interpreted solely by grammar and lexicon, it was soon discovered that no uniform and consistent dogmatic system could with any tolerable degree of certainty, be educed from the Holy Scriptures. There is no denying the fact. The variations of Protestantism, even during the lives of the reformers, the multiplication of Protestant sects, all appealing alike to the sacred text, and the experience of three hundred and more years, render it indubitable. Hard pressed by their Catholic opponents, Protestants were driven to the sad alternative of either condemning their separation from the church and returning to her communion, or of giving up dogmatic religion as unessential and falling back on interior feeling or sentiment.

But the rejection of dogmatic religion, and the resolving of religion into a subjective sentiment, feeling, or emotion, necessarily carry with them all objective truth, or, what is the same thing, all objective reason. Reason, like truth, is one and catholic. The principles of reason are universal, and the principles of all orders, natural, revealed, or palingenesiac. The universe asserted by reason, and the universe asserted by revelation and held by faith, are not two separate universes resting on two distinct and unrelated principles; but simply two parts of one and the same universe, resting on the same catholic principles, and forming, as we have said, one whole. The revealed order has its basis in the rational order, and the rational order its complement or fulfilment in the revealed order. The supernatural supposes the natural, according to that maxim of the theologians, *gratia supponit naturam*, and the natural demands the supernatural to complete or perfect it. We do not of course pretend that the revealed order, the order of grace, can be logically inferred from the rational order, but we do say its necessity to fulfil or perfect the part cognizable by reason can be so inferred. If not, what does Father Perrone mean in his *Tractatus de Vera Religione adversus Incredulos*, by proceeding, after having proved the possibility of supernatural revelation, to prove its necessity, as do all our theologians? If the order of reason were sufficient for itself, or were complete in itself, how could we prove by it or from it the necessity of a revelation, or of any thing beyond it?

Our more modern theologians, obliged on the one hand to defend reason against the exaggerated supernaturalism of former dogmatic Protestants, and on the other the supernatural against the exaggerations of the rationalists, may sometimes neglect to mark the connecting link between reason and revelation, and leave the impression that what are simply two parts of one whole are two separate and parallel orders, lying, if we may so say, one above the other, without any real nexus in the divine creative act uniting them in one dialectic whole; yet the real and objective relation of the two parts as dialectic parts of an indissoluble whole, as we showed in our article on *Synthetic Theology*,* must always be understood, whether the theologians neglect or not to express it. The creative act of God is one act, and it is the act of the Logos, of supreme Logic, of logic in itself, and therefore the universe, whether natural or supernatural, initial or teleological, must be supremely dialectical. There are and can be no anomalies, no inconsistencies, in it, nothing arbitrary, nothing that has not its reason in the original design and decree of the Creator, though we may not even by the aid of revelation be able in all cases to see it, for the works of God are too vast and too deep for our comprehension.

Now, by denying the objectivity of religion, or rejecting dogma, we deprive reason of its complement, impair its strength, and obscure its light. It ceases to be able to hold with a firm grasp the truth that lies in its own order, as is evinced by the immense intellectual superiority of Catholics over Protestants. Compare an Irish or Spanish peasant with an English or Protestant German peasant, the learned Benedictines of St. Maur, or the Bollandists, with your most erudite Protestant scholars and critics, or the great mediæval doctors with your most lauded Protestant theologians. The difference in mental lucidity, acuteness, and strength is so great as to render all comparison almost ridiculous. Reason, moreover, demands objective principles, and whoever recognizes these, or the objectivity of rational truth, must go further, for reason demands as its complement the Catholic dogmas of revelation, or the Christian mysteries. It seeks unity and catholicity, and these it can find only in the church and her catechism. Consequently, Protestants in religion are forced by the exigencies of their position to reject rea-

*Vol. III., p. 536.

son, or, what is the same thing, its objectivity, as they are forced to reject the objectivity of revelation, or dogmatic religion.

Hence we find that the advanced Protestants distrust the objective dictates of reason as much as they do the objective teachings of religion. Sentiment is above reason, for religion is addressed to the heart, not the understanding. There is for men no catholic truth. What a man feels is true, that is true for him, and he may rest contented with it. Even the Protestant laggards or old fogies who adhere to the early Protestant confessions and formulas, adhere to them as opinions not as dogmas of faith. They, as well as the more advanced Protestants, speak of the differences among the sects, and between them and Catholics, as differences of opinion. This is the established phraseology of the journals, the best exponents, not indeed of the truth, but of the spirit, views, and tendencies of their times and country. Differences of opinion exist only where men have not the truth, or only on matters where authoritative teaching is silent, and the truth neither is nor can be known. Opinion cannot then be of primary importance. Nothing is more unreasonable than to hold that men will be saved for adhering to one set of opinions, or damned for adhering to another set of opinions. A man's opinions have no necessary connection with his religious character. It matters not, then, what are or are not a man's religious opinions, and hence the journals canonize men, even before they are buried, without reference to their religions beliefs, without regard to the fact that they belonged to this sect or to that, or to none. They have canonized Horace Greeley, a Unitarian Universalist, Chief-Justice Chase, an Episcopalian, President Lincoln, a *nothingarian*, J. Stuart Mill, whose writings prove him to have been devoid of all religion, virtually saying with the fool in his heart, *Non est Deus*, God is not. This proves that what is called, in the slang of the day, the spirit of the age, is indifferent to men's beliefs or no-beliefs.

The age boasts of its liberality, but its boasted liberality is the result of its indifferentism to dogmatic theology, and its lack of firm belief in any positive or affirmative truth at all. The sects have ceased to cut each other's throats, for the differences between them are not worth quarrelling about, since they are all animated by one and the same spirit, and are moving in one and the same direction. Yet

wherever the age is in earnest it is as intolerant as any preceding age. There may be individuals who honestly detest intolerance in every way or shape, but these are chiefly to be found among Catholics, who take seriously the popular doctrine of religious liberty, and go out of their way to disclaim all solidarity with the past history of their church, and to protest against the spirit, if not the very letter, of the *syllabus*. The church teaches the truth, and all truth is intolerant, and refuses to tolerate even the semblance of error. The popularity or the unpopularity of a principle or doctrine has nothing to do with its truth or with one's obligation to stand by it. Where Catholics are in a minority, as with us, worldly prudence may seem to counsel the advocacy of what is called, but falsely so called, the freedom of conscience, that is, the right of every man to form or to choose for himself his own religion and abide by it; but a higher prudence, divine prudence, counsels adherence to catholic principle, to that which is true always and everywhere. Neither the principles nor the doctrines of the church change or undergo any modification with the changes or variations of time or place. No man has the right before God, however he may before the state, to hold any religion but the one only true Catholic religion, and no one can adhere to any other but at his own peril.

Yet with all their boasted liberality, Protestants assert only the liberty to deny the truth, and if their intolerance to Catholicity has changed its form, it has not diminished in its intensity. Their hatred of the church has in no degree abated. Protestant nations do not now persecute Catholics, as they did in the beginning, not from fear of the intervention of foreign Catholic governments, for strictly speaking, there are no longer any Catholic governments on earth; yet their dread of the church and hostility to every thing Catholic are as great as ever, and precisely because the term *catholic* is directly opposed to their denial of objective truth, and their resolution of religion into a subjective sentiment or emotion varying with place and time, and from individual to individual. They feel this; they feel that Catholicity is the assertion of catholic truth, and therefore that the church differs from them, not simply in degree, as more or less, but in kind, and directly contradicts their whole order of thought. Hence the intolerance of Protestants to Catholicity is not inspired by love of truth or by zeal for the word of God, but by their want of faith, and

wish to feel themselves free from all obligation to believe and hold fast the truth, to follow either reason or revelation, contented with their own opinions, whatever they may be, and satisfied to live and die in their religious indifferentism, or simple religious subjectivism. This they cannot do so long as confronted with the Catholic Church. They must destroy her or not be able to enjoy with a quiet conscience their own beliefs or no-beliefs.

The hostility to the church does not arise from her special doctrines or dogmas, or from any intellectual conviction that they are false or unreasonable, but from the fact that she teaches that truth is objective, independent of the believer, and is obligatory, and no one has or can have the right before God to resist it. Protestants hate the church for two reasons: 1, because she claims to teach infallibly by the divine assistance, and 2, because she maintains that truth is catholic and binds both reason and conscience. The claim of the church to teach by divine authority through the pope and councils was the principal object of hostility in the beginning. This was an absolute necessity of the position assumed by the reformers. But, we have seen, as time went on, it became necessary, in order to sustain their position against the pressure of the Catholic argument, to deny not only the authority of the church, but also the authority of truth itself, and then to hold themselves under no obligation to regard it, and free to resist it whenever they chose. The presence and influence of the church are opposed to this interior freedom from truth, which unbelievers call freedom of mind, and Protestants religious liberty, and both make war on her, and war to the knife, because she does not and cannot favor it. They, unbelievers and Protestants, form an alliance against her, and seek, by all the arts and devices in their power, her total destruction from the face of the earth; for both instinctively feel that either she or they must perish.

It is worthy of remark that in the war which Protestants and infidels have hitherto waged against the church or are now waging with such fury against her, neither has nor pretends to have any truth or principle to oppose to her. They do not fight for the truth, nor for any affirmative or catholic principle that she denies or neglects, but for what they call the rights of the mind, which, translated into plain English, means the emancipation of the human mind from the authority of truth, and therefore from God who is truth, or, in simpler

terms still, the liberty to treat truth and falsehood as of equal value, as equally indifferent, or to deny all real distinction between them, and therefore between right and wrong. Neither reason nor revelation can tolerate this sort of liberty—intellectual and moral license rather; and the very existence and presence of the church condemns it. Hence the irreconcilable antagonism between the church and the sects. Yet is there a notable difference between the temper and motives of the two parties. The church is always calm and collected, for she knows that she has the truth: she indulges in no passion, resorts to no violence, to no cruelty or harshness against her enemies, for she knows that they are only harming themselves, not her; and hence she is moved in her resistance to their blind rage only by that divine charity which seeks to save souls, not to destroy them. She is moved by love for her enemies, and seeks at all times, by all the means in her power, to do them good,—good for time and for eternity. Her temper towards them is that of infinite tenderness and compassion. But the temper of her enemies towards her is that of hatred, and hatred without cause; they are moved, not by charity, by love of souls, for, if they believe in salvation at all, they believe that souls can be saved in the church at least as well as out of it, and hence, the dupes of their own hateful passions, there is no extreme of violence or cruelty to which, where they have the power, they will not go, if they judge it necessary or useful to their cause. The persecution of Catholics in England under Elizabeth, the bastard daughter of Henry, the wife-slayer, was not a whit less cruel than that under the pagan Cæsars.

We count for nothing the boasted liberality of the age. What is so called, where it actually exists, is the result of religious indifference, and there is as little of it as ever there was among Protestants where they are in earnest, and they feel the sort of liberty they contend for is at stake. During the last years of the last century and the first years of the present century, the world was affected by a panic created by the old French revolution, and Protestants who had not reached the last stage of Protestant development, and believing the power of the church for ever broken, were willing to take off the chains with which they had hitherto, wherever able, kept Catholics bound, and for a moment relaxed the rigor of the persecution they had hitherto sustained. They believed the church was still strong enough to add something to the strength of the civil authorities against the

revolution, yet not strong enough ever to become dangerous to Protestantism. As the Protestant and Catholic governments had united in the war against Jacobinism, and were likely to regard henceforth each other's interest, there was to human eyes every prospect that the Catholic governments would exert their power to prevent the church from becoming aggressive in relation to Protestantism. The Catholic powers, especially France, Austria, and the Italian and German sovereign princes, did their best to restrain the church, and prevent her from all movements likely to excite the susceptibilities of their Protestant allies, and to keep her within bounds.

The Pope was restored, regained his temporal possessions of which Napoleon I. had despoiled him, and to all appearance the church regained her freedom and independence; yet there are few more humiliating passages in her history than that from 1815 to 1846. Protestant liberality had effected more against Catholics than centuries of Protestant persecution. The pope was restored, the church was re-established, but under the surveillance of the "protecting powers," or the European pentarchy, Russia, Prussia, Great Britain, France, and Austria—two Catholic powers and three non-Catholic powers—which not only oppressed the church, restrained her free action, and embarrassed her with their advice, but created in the minds of the European populations the impression that she was in league with the sovereigns, pledged to uphold them and to use her spiritual authority to sustain them against the aspirations of their subjects in case they sustained her in her temporalities. There was, of course, no such league; but it was widely asserted and believed, or pretended to be believed; and Protestantism, which never hesitates to speak with a double tongue, as the panic subsided, saw its advantage in it, and though leagued with the sovereigns, formed, especially English and American Protestantism, another alliance with the disaffected subjects of the Catholic governments—the republican party, or so-called party of progress—to injure the church by clamoring against her, and denouncing her, for the first time in history, as the patron and upholder of civil despotism; and, what is worse, a considerable number of prominent Catholics, still suffering from the fright caused by the Jacobin revolution, seemed to countenance and confirm the charge as honorable to the church.

The charge was not only false, but it was cruel, for all the

time the church was the victim of the league of sovereigns, her protectors, who held her in the most galling slavery, and consulted only the use they could make of her. Gregory XVI. felt it, and was, when he had received some fresh insult from them, accustomed to say that there ought to be added to the Litany, "From our protectors, O Lord, deliver us." This galling protectorate continued until the election and coronation of our present glorious pontiff, Pius IX., in June, 1846. He freed himself from the protectorate, and by his acts proved that the charge against the church, of being in league with the sovereigns, or pledged to do their dirty work, was absolutely false, and that she was pledged only to her divine Master, and to do his work and no other. The sovereigns stood aghast, and found themselves face to face with the revolution, which instantly broke out in France, in the Italian states, even in the papal principality itself, in Austria, Prussia, and the smaller German kingdoms and sovereign principalities. It swept like a deluge over a large part of continental Europe, and would have taught the sovereigns, were they capable of learning, that they have need of the church rather than she of them, and that to be of any service to them, or to the cause of good government and social order, she must be free and independent in her action, free to follow the law of her divine constitution, and labor for the temporal and eternal good of the people no less than for their rulers. The rulers are for the people, not the people for the rulers. The church favors neither despotism nor revolution, but order and liberty.

The act of the supreme pontiff, in asserting his own independence and that of the church, caused him to be abandoned by the sovereigns; but no matter: it is better to be their prisoner in the Vatican, than to be their slave or their tool. The sovereigns are now trying to govern without the church, and we are beginning already to foresee with what result. But let this pass. One would naturally suppose that the old charge against the church of being leagued with despots would be suffered now to drop, and that all fear of the pope would be dissipated. Stripped of all his temporal possessions, abandoned by all the sovereigns of this world, who openly act on the principle that might makes right, and held a prisoner in his palace, what is there in the pope for the enemies of Catholicity to dread? What, in fact, is wanting to render the victory of Protestantism complete? Why

need it any longer distrust or make war on Catholics? Yet we do not see that Protestants anywhere abate their hostility, or become one whit less afraid of them. We see the proofs of it in the anti-Catholic legislation and measures of Prussia, of Switzerland, of protestantized Italy, revolutionary Spain, and the miserable republics south of us on this continent, where the influence of our own republic has been most hostile to religion and the peace and order of society.

All these things prove, first, that the Protestant party do not, as they pretend, oppose the church for purely political reasons, for she has no political power or connection; and, second, that they really here and everywhere oppose her because she is catholic in her teaching, asserts truth as binding on the intellect and the conscience, in direct contradiction to their doctrine of the indifference of truth and falsehood, or that every man has the natural right to be of any religion, if not Catholic, or of no religion, as he pleases. The governments support them, because their principle frees them from all moral restraints in the exercise of power, or obligation to consult the precepts of the law of God, whether promulgated by natural reason or by revelation. It is worthy of remark that the governments have been the first revolutionists in the modern world by their rejection of the *jus gentium*, or law of nations, preserved and proclaimed in universal tradition, and substituting for it international law founded in convention, which has no binding force on the national conscience. They encouraged, aided, and abetted the reformers in their rebellion against the spiritual authority, the only firm basis of secular authority, and set their subjects the example of rebellion, which they might follow, under pretext of political and social reforms, with even less scruple against themselves. Their subjects have done so, and against them the governments have no moral authority, for they themselves have denied and as far as in their power broken down all moral authority, and left themselves only physical force with which to protect themselves; and it is only through some remains of the Catholic tradition of law and order among the people, that they have any physical force even. Let the army fraternize with the rebels, as we have seen it do more than once, and where is even the physical force of the governments?

These results are not merely logical conclusions, but logical conclusions historically verified. We perfectly agree with most Protestant authors who treat the question, that

the reformers did not foresee the consequences of their revolt against the papacy. They did not understand the strictly dialectic character of Christianity, and that no link in the chain could be broken without breaking the chain; nor did they understand that revolt against the external spiritual authority involved in its historical developments revolt against all authority, both spiritual and secular, both external and internal. They did not understand the maxim, *ex nihilo nihil fit*, or that a denial that simply denies, without opposing an affirmative truth or principle to the matter denied, can terminate only in universal negation. But such has been, as we have seen, the termination of the Protestant revolt. It opposed no truth or affirmative principle to the papacy, and had nothing to fall back upon, when the papacy or the church was cast off. This could not be avoided, for the church teaches all truth.

The reformers imagined that they had opposed a truth to the authority of the church when they asserted the authority of the Bible; but in doing this they only changed the form of their denial. Their assertion of the authority of the Bible was purely negative, simply the denial of the authority of the church to interpret it or declare and apply its sense. It meant nothing more nor less; for the church asserted and always had asserted the authority of the Bible interpreted and applied by the divinely instituted court in the case. The Bible, Protestant experience has proved, without the church as that court, is as unauthoritative as are the statutes of a kingdom or republic, left to the private judgment of the citizen or subject, without the civil court to interpret and apply them to the case in hand. They, then, did not oppose to the church as the principle of their denial any truth or authority, any thing but pure denial. Historically as well as logically, Protestantism, in spite of every refuge or subterfuge, has reached its inevitable termination—the negation of all authority, external or internal, spiritual or secular, and therefore of all faith, of all objective truth, and of all religion; for the very nature of religion is to bind the conscience, or the obligation of man to obey God.

There are, no doubt, Protestants in large numbers who hold the principal Christian mysteries as taught by the church and handed down by tradition; but they, as we have said, hold them, not as catholic truth, but as opinions, which do not bind the intellect or conscience, and which

they are free to hold or reject as suits their pleasure, their convenience, or their caprice. In the popular language of the day, they are called simply *religious opinions*, not dogmas, and rarely articles of faith. Some may hold them to be essential doctrines of Christianity, but Christianity itself is held to be an opinion, or an interior sentiment, not a law which no one has the right to dispute, and which every one is bound to obey. It is only one among many religions, none of which are wholly false or wholly true. Some years ago we published an essay entitled, *The Church against No-Church*, in which, starting with the assumption that to be saved it is necessary to be a Christian, and to be a Christian it is necessary to believe something, we proved by a closely-linked argument that one must believe and obey the Catholic Church or not be saved. The Protestant journals replied that the argument was inconclusive, because it did not prove but took for granted the main point, namely, that in order to be saved it is necessary to be a Christian. We were so answered by both Unitarian and Episcopalian organs.

Now, how are we to sustain a controversy with Protestants who deny alike the authority of reason and of revelation, and refuse to be bound by either; and hold it answer enough to reply to any argument urged against them: "That is your opinion, but we think differently?" They have no principles recognized alike by them and us, from which we can reason, for they recognize only their private opinions and their subjective feelings or sentiments. Obviously we cannot reason with them as Christians, nor treat Protestantism as a form, though an erroneous form, of Christianity. They have nothing of Christianity but the name, to which they have not the least right.

The practice of Catholic controversialists of regarding Protestantism as embodying some Christian principles, and even some of the Christian mysteries, though unavailing because held out of Christian unity, we think is no longer admissible. Protestantism in its developments is more than a heresy; it is apostasy from the Christian religion, and in principle its total denial. If Catholicity is Christian, Protestantism is antichristian. It is not an erroneous representation of Christianity; it is not Christian at all, and is the negation of Christianity and of all religion, for it denies the authority of reason itself. We know no claim that genuine Protestants have to be treated as Christians, except the

fact that possibly they may have been baptized in infancy, and though baptism gives an indelible mark or character, we may well doubt that it avails any thing to those who, on coming to years of discretion, not only fail to elicit the act of faith, but positively deny that the sacrament of baptism communicates the grace of regeneration, as Protestantism requires them to do. It seems to us that this positive denial is equivalent to a positive act of infidelity.

There are, we like to believe, among Protestants, many individuals who are far superior to their Protestantism, who have not yet learned to distrust reason, who hold that truth is obligatory, that religion is the law of conscience, who are honest, upright, kind-hearted, and benevolent according to their light, and who mean to be true Christian believers. These can be reasoned with and be more or less affected by argument; but they are not genuine Protestants. They may not very well understand the doctrines retained from the church by the early reformers, but they believe them to be revealed truths, which it would be sinful in them to deny, not mere opinions which one is free to hold or not hold according to his pleasure. These serve to keep up a show of religion in the several Protestant sects, but they are not governed by the Protestant spirit, and if carried away by the Protestant movement, they are not its leaders. They are the laggards in the onward march of Protestantism. You find some of them in Geneva who in earnest condemn the measures adopted by the council against Bishop Mermillod and the Catholic clergy; some like Herr von Gerlach, in Prussia, who resist with all the means in their power the legislation demanded by the government against the church and her faithful pastors; and a small number even in this country who openly oppose the iniquity of taxing Catholics for the support of schools to which their consciences forbid them to send their children. It is not these, as men, as individuals, that we denounce, for many of them we honor and esteem, but the Protestantism with which they are associated.

That Protestants, that so-called orthodox Protestants at least, profess to hold, and claim as belonging to their Protestantism, many things that are also held by Catholics, nobody denies; but these things are no part of Protestantism, for the church held and taught them ages before Protestantism was born. They are part and parcel of the one Catholic faith, and belong to Catholics only. Protestants

can rightfully claim as Protestant only those things wherein they differ from the church, which the church denies, and which they assert; that is, what is peculiarly or distinctively Protestant. We cannot allow them to claim as theirs what is and always has been ours; we willingly accord them their own, but not one whit more. All which they profess to hold in common with us is ours, not theirs. Adopting this rule, which is just and unimpeachable, nothing in fact is theirs but their denials, and as all their denials are, as we have seen, made on no catholic principle or truth, they are pure negations, and hence Protestantism is purely negative, and consequently is no religion, for all religion is affirmative.

Nor is this all. We have seen that the Protestant denials, in both their logical and historical developments, lead to the denial of all dogmatic religion, of all objective truth, and reduce the truths of reason and of revelation to mere personal opinions, and therefore involve the denial of those very doctrines which Protestants profess to hold in common with us. The immense majority of Protestants will give up these doctrines, or consent to hold them simply as opinions with no objective authority, sooner than desert the Protestant movement or reject the denials which are the essence of Protestantism, if we may speak of the essence of a negation, which has no being either in itself or elsewhere. A few of the laggards may be occasionally captured, but most of them will quicken their pace and close up with the main body. Individual conversions, indeed, are made which in the aggregate are considerable, but which are little more than the dust in the balance compared with the whole number of Protestants, and are by far outnumbered by the Catholics who lapse, here and elsewhere, into Protestantism or infidelity.

It is obvious, then, that to carry on a controversy with Protestants, as if they were Christians simply erring as to some portions of the Christian faith, can effect nothing. They cannot be convinced by argument, for they hold firmly nothing which can serve as the basis of an argument. It seems to us much more important to strip them of all Christian pretensions, to deprive them of their prestige and the power of seduction which their Christian profession gives them, by showing them up in their utter nakedness as downright infidels, than to labor to make them accept the Catholic doctrines they avowedly reject. Infidels they are, and

it is of no little importance to let it be seen that no man can be a Protestant and be at the same time a Christian or follower of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ. We owe this to uninstructed or imperfectly instructed, and especially to our worldly-minded, Catholics, who are exposed to Protestant influences and seductions, and who would recoil with horror from open and undisguised infidelity or denial of the Lord who has bought us, and yet be tempted to fraternize with Protestants who pretend that they are Christians, and hold the essentials of the Christian faith, if they find that Catholics themselves concede that Protestants are Christians, though heterodox Christians. We owe it also to those who, in the ranks of Protestants, feel themselves bound to be Christians, and would fain be Christians. Both classes should be made to understand, what is true, that Protestantism is not Christianity, is not religion, but is, when pushed to its last consequence, the denial of revelation, the denial of reason, the denial of God, the author of reason, and only a disguised atheism, or subtle form of universal negation or nihilism. Every honest Protestant should, as far as possible, be made to understand this, so that he may understand the risk he runs if he remains in the ranks of Protestants; and every Catholic should be made to understand it, so that he may see clearly that, if he yields to the seductions of Protestantism, he severs himself completely and entirely from Christ our Lord, and insures his eternal perdition.

We know nothing more reprehensible than the namby-pambyism babbled by sentimental Catholics about the good faith of "our separated brethren." There may be persons in good faith amongst Protestants, but, if so, they do not lack opportunities of showing it, and of coming out from the Babylon in which they have been reared. Men cannot be saved without Christ, for there is no other name given under heaven whereby they can be saved. Without faith it is impossible to please God, and he that cometh to God must believe that he is, and is the remunerator of them that seek him; and how can those be saved by Christ who adhere to the party that rejects him and makes war on him; and how can they have faith or believe in God who commune with those who resolve all faith, all belief, all truth indeed, into a mere opinion, or an inward sentiment, varying with each individual? If Catholicity is Christian, if reason is authoritative in its own province, nothing is more certain than that Protestantism is in no sense Christian, and that persons liv-

ing and dying Protestants cannot be saved. It is a stultification of common sense to maintain the contrary, and besides, it practically neutralizes all our efforts to convert Protestants, and to bring them to a living and saving faith in Christ.

We know what theologians say of invincible ignorance, and we do not contradict them. Invincible ignorance excuses from sin in that whereof one is invincibly ignorant; but it gives no faith, no virtue; and without faith, without positive virtue, no man can be saved. The man who holds implicitly the Catholic faith, but errs through invincible ignorance with regard to some of its *consectaria*, and even dogmas, may be saved; but how can a man be said to hold implicitly the Catholic faith, who holds nothing, or rejects every principle, that implies it? It is not safe to apply to Protestants, who really deny every thing Catholic, a rule that is very just when applied to sincere but ignorant Catholics, or Catholics that err through inculpable ignorance. Protestantism does not stand on the footing of ordinary heterodoxy; it is no more Christian than was Greek and Roman paganism.

No doubt, this will be complained of as illiberal, as quite too severe; but the only question we have to ask is: Is it true? Is it the law? If it is the law of God, it is true; if it is what the church teaches, we have nothing to do with the question of its liberality or illiberality, of its severity or its leniency. All we have to guard against is against asserting it in a harsh or illiberal spirit, in a severe and cruel temper, or with any uncharitableness towards those who expose themselves to the terrible consequences of rejecting Christ and his law, or who refuse to suffer him to reign over them. We may love and pray for them, but to seek to alter the divine constitution of his kingdom is to incur ourselves the guilt of rebellion. There is but one right way; and while it is our duty to walk in it, it is also our duty to do our best to show it to those who are out of it, and induce them to come into it. It were a sin against charity to leave them to think that they can be saved out of it, or by any other way. It would alter nothing in the law, which is independent alike of them and of us, were we to do so. A man may be as liberal as he pleases with what is his own, but to give away what is another's is an injustice. God is just and merciful, and he loves all the works of his hands, for never would he have made any thing, if he had hated it. Christ so loved even sinners that he gave his life for them, and it is a want

of faith in him to doubt the wisdom or justice, the goodness or mercy of his law. The church cannot save those who reject her, but she weeps as a loving mother over those who are out of the way, and go to sure destruction. Charity is higher and broader than blind sentimentality. It loves all men, but it loves them in God.

It may be gathered from what we have thus far said, that we deny Protestants, as such, to be even heterodox Christians, as were the old Arians, the Nestorians, the monophysites, and monothelites, and others who, though they erred grievously on specific doctrines, and most important doctrines too, did not break with the entire Christian order. It may also be gathered that we hold it a grave mistake to reason with them, as if they still retained any Christian principles or doctrines, save as mere opinions, which bind neither the intellect nor the conscience. We must regard them as men who acknowledge no objective truth, no catholic principle whatever, nothing which they hold themselves bound to abide by, that is common to them and us. There is no common principle on which we can reason with them. They have discarded reason, discarded intellect, and taken refuge in mere feeling, and reduced themselves in religion as near the level of irrational animals as possible. They have in religious matters suppressed their proper human characteristics, and placed themselves beyond the reach of Catholic arguments, or of being convinced by the reasoning of Catholics. Hence we regard all arguments, books, tracts, reviews, or journals, monthlies, weeklies, or dailies, addressed to the reason of Protestants with the expectation of inclining the great body of them towards the church as so much labor lost.

Yet, controversial publications which refute Protestantism and explain and defend Catholicity, are both useful and necessary. They are useful not to the great body of Protestants, but to those individuals among them who retain some sense of religion and confidence in reason. They are in a certain sense even necessary to Catholics, who in this reading age live more or less among Protestants, to put them on their guard against the seductions of Protestantism, and to furnish them with weapons of defence against those who by their sophistries, misrepresentations, and calumnies seek to rob them of their faith, and destroy their souls. A large portion of our Catholic laity are insufficiently instructed in the principles and reasons of their religion, and need a fuller in-

struction in order to detect and resist the wiles of their Protestant enemies, who lie in wait for their souls, than the clergy, with their present insufficient numbers, and overworked as they are, especially in our country, are able to give them without the aid of the press. The popular literature of our own and all other countries is more or less anti-Catholic. "The slime of the serpent is over it all." It instils the deadly poison of Protestantism, or hostility to the church of God through every pore of the reader. The fatal miasma floats in the whole literary atmosphere, is drawn in with every literary breath, corrupting the very life-blood of religion in the mind and soul. It needs the fullest instruction not only in Catholic dogmas and practices, but in the great underlying principles which show that the church is inherent in the divine order of creation and represents it, and that whatever is incompatible with her teaching is incompatible with the divine order, nay, with the divine Being himself. They need it in order to detect and avoid the poisonous breath of the world. The church is not one religious body among many, but is the only religious body; as without God there is nothing, so without the church, or outside of her, there is no religion, no spiritual life. All the pretended religions outside of her are shams, at best have no basis, stand on nothing, and are nothing, and can give no life or support to the soul, but leave it out of the divine order to drop into hell. Catholics need to know this, and to be armed with principles and arguments that enable them to prove it against all gainsayers, or, at least, to enable them to defend themselves, and to be always on their guard against Protestant contamination and sophistry.

Books of controversy, or written against Protestantism showing its deadly effect on the soul, on the heart, on the intellect, on morals and manners, on politics and society itself, are needed for Catholics, and cannot be produced in too great numbers. Reviews, journals, are also needed to expose the mystery of Iniquity, or the doings of Protestantism, that Man of Sin, and to create and maintain an intelligent, sound, and healthy public opinion in the Catholic community. Our women are doing what they can, and if not always as well as we could wish, they deserve our gratitude for their good intentions and their efforts in a right direction; but our educated laymen are doing comparatively nothing. They seem to be too much engrossed in the business world, in the world of politics, in making or in spend-

ing their fortunes, to have time or thought for the interests of their religion. If they had the proper spirit, and were animated by an ardent zeal for religion, they might, working in submission to, and under the direction of the pastors of the church, do incalculable good. It is a shame to them that they should leave their proper work to be done by women, or not be done at all.

As for the main body of Protestants, they are beyond the reach of controversy and of controversial works, and by such works we hold it quite useless to expect to influence their conversion or to soften their prejudices against the church. They are not to be affected by books, tracts, or journals. We do not know that their conversion is possible; for those converts we receive from the Protestant ranks are no fair specimens of those who remain unconverted. They may have gone as far astray in their opinions and in their moral practice; for some of them we know were great sinners, and we must beware of supposing only the pure-minded, the honest and upright, and in their way pious, devout, and conscientious are converted; but as a rule, the converts had not lost all sense of right and wrong, and did retain some moral principles and some fear of a future reckoning. It is not the fact that the main body of Protestants are sinners, and great sinners, that prevents us from being hopeful of their conversion, but the fact that they have shaped their principles to their inclinations, passions, and practice, so that there ceases to be any contrariety between their judgment and their desires, their theory and their practice. There were great crimes and great criminals before the reformation as there still are, even among Catholics, but the criminals knew and felt that they were criminals, and did not attempt to justify their crimes by adapting their principles to them. Hence, if in those ages or since we are shocked by great crimes committed by Catholics, we are consoled and edified by grand penitences, and, as Montalembert well remarks, by grand expiations. But the peculiarity of our modern world, formed by Protestantism, is, that instead of aiming to conform its practice to its principles, it is studious to conform its principles, or the law, to its practice. Its success in this direction is what it calls progress, which, it must be conceded, has been very great.

Now, we do not know that these can be reached at all, and it may be that they have committed that sin against the Holy Ghost, which shall be forgiven neither in this world

nor in that which is to come; but if reached by human means at all, it must be by the Catholic missionary, who goes to them clothed with the authority of his divine Master, meets them face to face, and preaches the word to them as sinners, precisely as the pastor preaches to hardened and unrepentant sinners of his own flock. He must not do them the honor of refuting their errors or denials, but must assume that they acknowledge the law, that they acknowledge him as an ambassador from God; he must give them no time to interpose their theories or sophistries as a shield, no opportunity to chop logic with him, but press home the truth upon them, and startle their conscience from its slumbers, convict them of sin, startle them with "a fearful looking for of judgment to come," and make them cry out: "Men brethren, what shall we do to be saved?" Let him take no thought for their negations, for they have a conscience, though it has long slept, and they all have in the interior of their souls a witness for the truth of what he preaches, though they have long smothered his voice. When the missionary, assisted by the grace of God, has wakened conscience from its slumbers, and made the voice of reason audible, he may then easily brush away the cobweb theories, negations, sophistries, and falsehoods of Protestantism, and instruct the neophyte in the glorious and life-giving truths of the Gospel.

What we mean by this is that until the conscience is awakened, and reason, which has been silenced, as it was amid pagan abominations, is able to make its voice heard in the depths of the soul, and the man has become alarmed for his safety, no discussion of doctrine can move him. The preacher must precede the polemic. We do not say that this will always prove effectual, but we know that to begin by controversy will not. Hence our reliance, the grace of God supposed and assisting, is on the missionary not on the controversialist, for the recovery of the main body of Protestants. In our writings we aim to aid our fellow Catholics, but neither to conciliate nor to convert our Protestant countrymen. They are beyond our reach, and our arguments would not convince them, for they have nothing awake and active in their minds or hearts that responds to them. The ordinary pastor cannot reach them, for he is taken up with the routine of his pastorate. We need missionaries and missionary orders for that, as under the old law they needed, in addition to the hierarchy, special prophets

and schools of the prophets. The missionary orders supply, under the new law, the place filled by the prophets—special inspiration excepted—under the old law. The more we have of them, and the more numerous the missions they give, the better. Protestants stand as much in need of them as the people of China, Japan, Corea, Tonquin, or Oceanica.

EVANGELICAL ALLIANCE.

[From Brownson's Quarterly Review for January, 1874.]

We have been requested from various quarters to devote an article to the late conference, in this city, of delegates, American and foreign, of the so-called Evangelical Alliance, but we do not regard its proceedings as important enough to be worth any special notice. We have before us very full reports of the sayings and doings of the delegates, all very distinguished men in the Protestant world: but, though we have looked into them here and there, we have had neither the curiosity nor the patience to read them. They can tell us nothing that we were ignorant of, or that is of the slightest importance in the real and living controversy of the age. The Protestantism represented by these delegates is, as a power in society, a thing of the past, and has no significance for the present. When the Council of the Vatican was convoked and assembled at Rome, all the world was moved; it was looked upon as a world-wide event, and its doings were watched with the most jealous eyes, by states and empires, kings and kaisers, princes and nobles, statesmen and politicians, heretics and schismatics: proving thereby that the church is not only living in the present, but living as the mightiest power on earth. The meeting of the Protestant conference, which some had the hardihood to call an œcumenical council, did not cause so much as a ripple, outside of the journals, on the surface even of the Protestant world. What better proof that the Protestantism of the conference has ceased to be a power, can be asked or given? It is dead. Why, then, trouble ourselves about it? "Let the dead bury their dead."

The conference was composed of delegates from various allied sects. The Evangelical Alliance is only an *alliance*, not an organic unity. Unity is not made up of parts, each with its own autonomy, and were all existing sects to unite their forces and act in concert, they would come no nearer being the one Catholic Church than if they remained as separate in their action as they are in their organizations. Nay, were they by mutual concession and arrangement to become united in one organic body, that one organic body would be only a humanly constituted body, with only a human origin and authority, and in no sense the body of Christ, or the one holy Catholic Church of the creed. It could not teach or govern in the name of God, or bind the conscience, and therefore would be either a powerless body and soon dissolve into its original elements, or be a spiritual despotism as intolerable as the Calvinism established in Geneva, or in the Puritan colonies of New England. Such a body might be the body of Antichrist, but in no sense the body of Christ the Lord, as St. Paul calls the church.

The unity of the church, as well as the church herself, grows out of the Incarnation, and the church is one, because Christ, whose body she is, is one and indivisible. Unity begins in him, the one Mediator of God and men; he is the source in which the church originates, he is essential to her very existence, and she can never be made up by an aggregation of parts. Hence the terrible nature of schism, which is severance from the body of Christ, and therefore from Christ himself, and the setting up of the authority of man, or of human pride, against the authority of God. The mother error of the reformation was in assuming that the church has no organic connection with the Incarnation, and that it is a body organized by men according to the views or principles which they obtain from the Holy Scriptures interpreted by private judgment, or, as the reformers said, by private illumination. The reformers did not understand that the church, as Moehler maintains and Father Perrone concedes, is in some sense the visible continuation of the Incarnation; they supposed they could lop off what appeared to them excrescences on her body, or abnormal accretions, and still retain her in greater purity, beauty, strength, and efficiency; but in cutting away what seemed to them abnormal accretions, they cut to the quick, and severed the church herself from her source of life, and made her for themselves a dead body, or a body living only the life derived from her

members, or the associated individuals calling themselves the church, and which is no true life, nay, no life at all. In no Protestant sect is it held that individuals derive their life from Christ through the church as its medium, but in all it is held that the church derives whatever life she has from her members united to Christ outside of her, and without her agency. All Protestants then, in principle, reject the church as the medium by which the soul comes to Christ. Those free religionists who reject all ecclesiasticism, as they call it, and all sacerdotalism, are the only legitimate descendants of the reformers, and their attacks on the Alliance the Alliance is impotent to parry.

The Protestantism represented by the Alliance is "neither fish, flesh, nor fowl, nor yet good red herring." It is a miserable hodgepodge, and can only disgust a man of a logical stomach, and we own we have no respect for it. It is neither frankly infidel nor frankly Christian, but strives to be a little of both. It has no principle of its own, but borrows infidel principles when it would fight against the church, and church principles when it would fight against infidelity. Against the one it asserts principles it denies when opposing the other. How can we respect or fear it? It is useless to talk. The Protestantism of the Alliance has no bottom, stands on nothing, and we think it time wasted to attempt to refute it. It only shows the power of Satan to blind the intellect, to pervert the reasoning powers, and to corrupt the heart.

The Alliance claims to be Christian, and its aim seems to be to wage a relentless war against Catholicity on the right and rationalism on the left: but unhappily for it, it has no base for its operations against either, and is unable to conduct its war on any scientific principles, taken either from reason or revelation. When it attacks rationalism it exposes itself to the merciless attacks of Catholics in flank; and when it turns against Catholics it exposes itself to the equally merciless attacks of the rationalists in the rear. The meeting of the rationalists which followed, in the Cooper Institute, the week after the conference, thoroughly routed its forces on that side, and avenged their would-be murderous onslaught on Catholics. But to drop all metaphor, the Alliance can oppose only Catholic principles to rationalists, and rationalistic principles to Catholics, and neither set of principles is its own, or such as it has any right, with its profession, to urge, or is able to urge with any effect.

The only real controversy of this age is between Christianity and infidelity, as it was in the apostolic age, when the Jews had apostatized, or rejected the Gospel; and all attempts to maintain Christianity, except as a private opinion outside of the Catholic Church, have proved, as they ever must prove, total and even disgraceful failures. Christianity as a private opinion or even as a public opinion is no religion, and falls into the category of speculative opinions which even infidels may hold without giving up their infidelity. Obviously, then, the issue is between the church and infidelity. They who oppose the church favor infidelity, and only they who defend the church do or can consistently oppose the infidel or rationalist. They who attempt to oppose both forget that there is no middle term between them.

We have no doubt that among the Protestants represented by the Alliance there are many very respectable individuals, who really imagine that they are Christians, united to Christ by faith, and if faith were simply an opinion, or merely a subjective belief, we should recognize them as Christians, as holding the faith indeed, but as holding it, through ignorance of the truth or false education, in error. We recognize the Nestorians, the monophysites, monothelites, and even the old Arians and Pelagians, as heterodox indeed, but do not deny them the Christian name. They are heretics, not infidels. They held certain specific heresies, dangerous, fatal even, to the whole Christian faith, if logically carried out; but none of them erected heresy into a principle, and made it, as does Protestantism, the basis of their entire system of Christian doctrine. Protestantism is not so much a heresy, as the principle of all heresy; not so much a schism as the principle of all schism. Even when it asserts Catholic or Christian dogmas, it asserts them neither on Catholic principles nor in a Catholic sense; and yet it is only on Catholic principles, and in a Catholic sense and in their Catholic relations and interdependence, that they stand opposed to rationalism, or downright infidelity. This is wherefore we refuse to recognize Protestantism as even so much as a form of heterodoxy, to concede it any distinctively Christian character, or to treat even Protestants, as such, as possessing any Christian worth, however successfully they may in practice and intention imitate the Christian virtues. They have not charity, for as St. Augustine says, charity cannot be kept out of unity. They have at best only philanthropy.

Disguise the matter as we will, Protestantism adopts private judgment as its principle, and private judgment is the principle of all heresy. It can give only opinion, neither faith nor certainty. It is no use to bring in here the authority of the Holy Scriptures, for the authority of the Holy Scriptures, vouched for and interpreted by private judgment, cannot rise above private judgment, since, as the logicians say, the conclusion follows the weaker premise. The conclusion drawn from premises one of which is divine and the other human, is only human, as all theologians teach, not *de fide*. It is of just as little use to allege the private illumination, or the operations of the Holy Spirit, for the Protestant has only his private persuasion that they are the operations or the illumination of the Holy Spirit; he has no catholic standard by which to try the spirits or to determine whether he follows the spirit of truth or the spirit of error. St. John, the beloved disciple of Jesus, bids us not to believe every spirit, but to try the spirits, whether they be of God or not, for many false prophets have gone out into the world. But Protestants have nothing by which to try them. Not the Scriptures, for it is precisely the sense of Scripture that is in question; not the apostolic communion, for Protestantism, in rejecting the apostolic see, rejects that communion, and thereby proves, if the blessed apostle is to be believed, that its spirit is the spirit of error, and not from God. (John iv. 1–6.)

This brings us back to the assertion that Protestantism assumes private judgment as its principle, and therefore that Protestants have, by virtue of their Protestantism, no faith, but human opinions only, which is not faith in any sense of the word. Understand now why we have said Protestantism, or the Protestantism of the Evangelical Alliance, has no base for its operations against either the church or rationalism. Not against rationalism, which denies the supernatural and admits no authority above man and his faculties; for, when stripped of its verbiage and false pretensions, Protestantism is based on the same principle, that of private judgment or private reason, and neither has any thing but opinion. The pretensions these Alliance Protestants make to belief in the supernatural as opposed to rationalism are unfounded, for the principle of private judgment excludes the supernatural and whatever transcends the individual reason. The Evangelical Alliance says "two and two," and there stops; the rationalist simply adds, "make four." The

Alliance lays down the principles or premises, the rationalists simply draw the logical conclusion. Hence, so far as logic is concerned, the rationalists have decidedly the best of the argument. The supernatural of the Alliance Protestants is abnormal in Protestantism; it has no root in it, and depends on authority which Protestantism rejects. Hence there is a constant tendency in the Protestant world to eliminate it. This tendency increases as time goes on, and will hardly be checked for a moment by the prescriptions of the learned doctors of the Alliance.

Still less is Protestantism able to maintain a successful struggle with Catholicity, or "Romanism," as it politely designates the church of Christ. To the church they can oppose only their opinions, and opinion is no sufficient base for operations against Catholic faith. Opinion is never science, nor certainty. You say, Mr. Protestant, that in your opinion or private judgment the Catholic Church is the church of Antichrist. Well, that is your opinion, but our opinion is that she is the church of God, and why is not our opinion worth as much as yours? So far we are equal, and you have no advantage over us. You say the church is contrary to the Holy Scriptures; but that is only your private judgment: our opinion is the reverse, and the church asserts that the Scriptures sustain her claim to be the one holy Catholic Church. She appeals to them as well as to other historical documents, and has done so for eighteen hundred years, as witnesses for her, and her interpretation at the very lowest is as good as yours. Evidently then, no argument based on opinion or private judgment can conclude any thing against the church. To convict the church of making false claims you must oppose to her a certain truth that invalidates them, not an uncertain opinion. The Protestant, in order to conclude any thing against her, must base his argument on a certain, indubitable, and catholic principle which involves her condemnation: but he has no such principle, and can oppose to her only his pretended right of private judgment, to which no civil court on earth would listen for a moment or attach the least possible weight. No man is permitted to interpret the law for himself.

The church claims to teach and govern all men and nations by divine commission, did so claim for fifteen centuries before the so-called reformation was born, and had her claim admitted by all civilized nations and the greatest, wisest, purest, and holiest men, that ever lived. Simply to deny

that she so teaches and governs, may be your condemnation as a rebel against God, but is and can be no invalidation of her claim, for you even disavow infallibility, are therefore fallible and may err. To invalidate that claim, your private opinion or inward persuasion does not suffice: you must do more; you must prove with absolute certainty, either that no commission of the sort was ever issued, or if it was, that it was issued to another, not to her. You can prove neither. That it was issued you have the express words of our Lord, after his resurrection; and that it was given to her and not to another is sufficiently proved by the fact that no other has ever even claimed it. Indeed, all the sects concede that the church of Rome, or the church in communion with the see of Rome, was once the true apostolic church and held the true faith; but they pretend that she, at some period—they cannot agree among themselves within a thousand years or more at what period—became corrupt, apostatized, and forfeited her commission. Well, what proof of all this have they? Why, they *think so*, and can find no justification of themselves, if it be not so. It is the Protestant tradition, resting never on any better authority than private judgment, false theology, and historical ignorance, misrepresentation, false statements, and calumny. As the church interprets Scripture and history, she has never apostatized or become corrupt, and her interpretation, on the Protestant ground of private judgment, is at least as authoritative as yours, and is conclusive against it till you disprove by a catholic reason, which you have not, her claim to the divine commission to teach and govern.

Indeed, Protestants have never been able to make any headway against the church by arguments drawn either from Scripture or reason, or from both combined; and in fact they have never relied on them. Protestantism owes whatever success it has to its appeals to the enmity of the world to the Gospel of Christ; to the pride of the human heart, which revolts at subjection to a master; to the secular powers, nearly always hostile to the spiritual supremacy of the Roman pontiffs; and to physical force employed to enforce the most iniquitous and infamous penal laws against Catholics who refused to turn against and curse their spiritual mother, ever devised by man or Satan. It never could have gained a foothold in any country had it not been able first to win over the civil magistrate by fostering his unchristian tendencies and pandering to his unchristian appetites and passions.

What it is able to do by Scripture and reason we can see in the utter barrenness of Protestant missions among the heathen, to which the pretended success in the Sandwich Islands forms no real exception.

Here, in our country, the people are held to be the state, and the Protestant majority control the government; yet the consciousness of their inability to maintain themselves against Catholics, were they once to lose that control, is seen in the frantic efforts of the Protestant leaders to keep Catholics from obtaining the share of political power to which they are entitled by their equal rights as citizens. They feel, instinctively, that were they once deprived of their political ascendency, though allowed ample freedom to profess and practise their Protestant religion, if religion it may be called, they would have no power to sustain themselves and would soon sink into insignificance. It is not denied that Protestants have succeeded in detaching many Catholics in old Catholic nations from the church, but it has been only because the governments of those nations were virtually Protestant, refused the church her rights, and restricted her freedom, as the state does even here in the matter of education. It taxes Catholics to support schools which the church condemns, and bribes Catholic parents to send their children to anti-Catholic schools, with the money it unjustly takes from Catholics themselves. Yet Catholicity, without any external aid, most bitterly opposed by the secular authority and the passions of the people, in spite of Jew and gentile, converted the Roman Empire and established itself as the religion of the whole world. It is to-day steadily advancing, in spite of the most severe and relentless persecution by acute but barbarous secular chiefs, in converting contemporary heathen nations to the one holy Catholic Church, and what is more to our purpose, is steadily and even rapidly advancing here and proving its immense superiority to Protestantism.

There are, as St. Augustine says, two cities, the city of God and the city of the world, that stand one over against the other. These two cities are organized on different principles and for different ends. Between them there is an irrepressible antagonism, as there is between the spirit and the flesh. Peace between them is impossible except by the submission and subordination of the city of the world to the city of God. We doubt not that the reformers in the outset sought, consciously or unconsciously, to effect a sort of com-

promise between them. Protestantism, no doubt, originated in an effort to combine the service of the one with the service of the other, or in plain words, to reconcile the service of God with the service of Satan. The so-called orthodox Protestants sought to become citizens of the city of the world without ceasing to be citizens of the city of God. They thus became too much for the one, and too little for the other. It is impossible, said our Lord, to serve two masters, "Ye cannot serve God and Mammon." The reformers did not believe it, and attempted to prove the contrary by experiment, with the result to be expected. Protestants profess to belong to the city of God, but in reality they belong only to the city of the world, and practically serve only Mammon, not God. We need only to study the developments of Protestantism to be assured that such is the fact.

We need not tell our readers that we are discussing Protestantism, not passing judgment on individual Protestants. We have no doubt that among Protestants there are some, even many individuals who are not intentionally Mammon-worshippers, but who mean to be and really believe they are worshippers in spirit and truth of God alone. Such individuals there were among the gentiles before the coming of our Lord, and such it need not be doubted there are even now among the Turks and other Mahometans. Indeed, to our mind Mahometanism is hardly further removed from Christianity than is Protestantism. Of the final destiny of these honest and well-intentioned individuals, whether Protestants or Mahometans, and whose lives might shame many a Catholic, we say nothing, for we know nothing, and are not their judge. We speak of Protestantism, and the predominant spirit of the Protestant world, and that spirit is of the city of the world, not of the city of God.

Protestants generally regard with horror or pity those heroic Christians who give up all, houses and lands, father and mother, the sweet domestic affections, even their own wills, and retire from the world and live a life of painful penance and mortification, of perpetual sacrifice for Christ's sake. They look upon monasticism, or the complete renunciation of the world and all its pleasures, for a life of prayer, holy contemplation, and deeds of charity, as at best an insane folly, and denounce the church for permitting it. Their first and most furious attacks are upon the religious consecrated to the service of God in the monastic life, and their houses and establishments. Then follows their perse-

cution of the clergy, and chiefly because bound to celibacy. They see in these a contempt of the world and its proffered pleasures. They are mad against them because they despise the world and the things after which they and the heathen seek. What, again, is their appeal to private judgment but an attempt to set up a rival authority to that of the city of God? They oppose the church because she, as they say, denies by her principle of authority the rights of the mind, free thought, and makes man spiritually a slave: that is, denies the principle on which is founded the city of the world, and they assert private judgment because it supports the world in its enmity against Christ the Lord. Yet the mind has no rights against God, it has only the right from him to be governed by his law. The emancipation of the mind Protestantism boasts of having effected, means only the emancipation of the intellect from the divine sovereignty, which is only denying that God creates the intellect, for the Creator has necessarily the sovereign dominion of whatever he creates. The state, as separated from the church, represents the world, and the standing charge of Protestants against the church is that she denies civil and political liberty by asserting the supremacy of the city of God over the world, or the supremacy of the divine law over all human enactments. This is the pretence of the German Kaiser, and therefore he seeks to bind the church hand and foot, to compel her to obey the city of the world which he represents, or to drive her from his new-fangled empire; it is also the pretence of the European republicans, socialists, revolutionists, and communists, and therefore they make war to the knife against her. Now what in all these respects does Protestantism do but appeal to the principles, passions, or prejudices of the world, which is at enmity with Christ, and seek to enlist them against the church, the city of God? Who then can say Protestantism is not of the world, and simply opposes the world to the church?

We have studied with no ordinary care and with what poor ability we possess, the various reasons alleged by Protestants for rejecting the Catholic Church, and we have found none that, when analyzed, do not prove to be drawn exclusively from the city of the world, that are not based on pride or the assumed independence of the human intellect, or that do not assume the supremacy or independence of the secular order, and the paramount value of the goods of time and sense. Indeed, analyze all that Protestantism has of its

own, and you will find that it is really nothing but the world, and the flesh, and the devil, which every Christian renounces in baptism. It has nothing else to oppose to the church. In so far as it opposes the church it is the city of the world, of which Satan is prince. It can have nothing else, for the church is Catholic, and holds, teaches, and insists on every principle of the city of God, or the kingdom of Christ, even Protestants themselves being judges. There is no positive doctrine of revelation that Protestants even pretend to hold that the church does not believe and teach, and did not believe and teach fifteen centuries before the reformation. Do the Protestants represented by the Alliance assert the divine inspiration of the books of the Old and New Testaments? The church asserts and always has asserted the same, and that of several books in the Old Testament, in addition. Moreover, it is owing to her reverence for the written word of God, her care and diligence in guarding the sacred text, and placing it within the reach of the faithful, that it has been preserved and come down to us in its integrity. Protestants themselves are indebted to the church for the Bible and for whatever real knowledge they have of it. They have only mutilated it, suppressed several of its books, and cast doubts on the genuineness and authenticity of others which they retain in their canon. Do they assert the sufficiency of the Holy Scriptures as the rule of faith? Here they depart from the church, but they do so on the authority of the city of the world, on the authority of their private judgment; for the Holy Scriptures nowhere declare their own sufficiency. Besides, the Protestant assertion is a mere negation, and intended to be the mere negation of the Catholic doctrine of divine and apostolic tradition preserved and handed down to us by the church.

Do these Protestants assert the doctrine of justification by faith in Jesus Christ, and through his merits alone? So far they oppose nothing to the church, for that is and always has been her doctrine. Do they assert, what is distinctively Protestant, justification by faith alone, without works? This opposes, indeed, the teachings of the church, but it rests on human authority alone, therefore is drawn from the city of the world, and is designed to persuade men that they may do the works of the flesh, the world, and the devil without endangering their salvation; for if they have faith, they believe God will not impute their evil deeds to them, but forgive them for Christ's sake, and impute his righteousness

to them, and account them just, though actually sinning every breath they draw. They are logically free to live as they list. There is no warrant for this in the city of God. The allegation so frequently made that Catholic nations are inferior to Protestant nations, in thrift, worldly prosperity, and power, if intended as an argument against the church, is an assumption of the supremacy of the city of the world, and supposes that Christ, the Messiah, came as a temporal, not as a spiritual prince, and identifies Protestantism with carnal Judaism, and gentilism.

But we need not pursue the analysis any further. Nothing is more evident than that Protestantism has nothing to oppose to the church but the world, the flesh, and the devil, and hence we say that the Protestantism of the Alliance has no base for its operations against either rationalism or the church. If it opposes rationalism, it condemns its own separation from the church: if it opposes the church, it condemns its opposition to rationalism. The *via media* which so-called orthodox Protestantism seeks to find is illusory. There are and can be but two parties, properly designated the church and the world, or the kingdom of God and the kingdom of this world, whose prince is Satan. Protestantism, seek to disguise it as you will, is of the world, worldly, and opposed to the kingdom of God. It is of the earth, earthly, low, mean, and grovelling. Its wisdom is not from above, but from below—sensual, devilish. We care not how many temples it erects, how lavish it may be of its substance to support a false and idolatrous worship; under its influence the nations are lapsing into all the vices and abominations of heathenism. We care not that it appears unto men a whited sepulchre, beautiful on the outside, for within it is full of dead men's bones, rottenness, and filth.

They who are not on the side of the church, the immaculate spouse of Christ, are on the side of Satan, and fighting under the banner of the enemy of God, of Christ, and of immortal souls. Such is the fact, however we may seek to disguise it, or shut our eyes to it. Some indeed pretend that men may be natural men, standing on the plane of pure nature, but it is a delusion. Man is under a supernatural Providence, with a supernatural destiny, and when his nature is not elevated by grace above itself to the plane of his supernatural destiny, it is dragged by Satan below the level of his nature. Whoso is not Christ's is Satan's. We, if not by regeneration children of God, are by nature children

of wrath, in captivity to the devil, as the holy Council of Trent, as we understand it, defines. Hence those who fight not under the banner of Christ, and we may add, of his vicar on earth, are fighting against him. Such, we have shown, are all real Protestants.

We know that there are not a few Catholics, that have Protestant relatives and dear friends, who will accuse this conclusion of severity, and regard it as repugnant to the sublime charity of the Gospel. We cannot help it. It is true, and that is enough for us. The charity that is not based on truth is not charity, but simply a false liberality, which grows out of forgetfulness of the heinousness of heresy and schism, and the destructiveness of infidelity. Be as tender and affectionate to the persons of Protestants as you please, but do not forget that Protestantism, in any or all of its manifold forms, is a revolt against God, is of the world, gives the lie to God, and seeks to substitute the synagogue of Satan for the kingdom of Christ. If Catholics had been true to their church, there would have been no Protestantism, and if they were now impressed with the sinfulness of error, and not enervated by the false liberality and mawkish sentimentalism of the age, the dead body of Protestantism, now poisoning the atmosphere and breeding a moral pestilence, would be instantly buried from sight. All heresies have originated with men bred in the church, and Catholics are responsible, in no small degree, for the heresy and infidelity which are destroying so many precious souls purchased by the life-blood of our God, and making the earth the image of hell. Let liberal Catholics look to it, endeavor by their repentance in sackcloth and ashes to repair the scandals they have given. If the Evangelical Alliance has still any influence, let these wishy-washy Catholics, who have only Catholicity enough to be damned as Catholics, and not as infidels, know that they themselves are in fault. It is time that Catholics should look Protestantism in the face, and comprehend its real nature and character, and studiously avoid all sympathy with it. The whole strength of Protestantism lies in the weakness of Catholics and their want of unwavering fidelity to their own religion. Indeed, Catholics have yielded too much to the world, are yielding too much to it now, and, without suspecting it, suffer themselves to be half seduced by Protestant influences from their Catholic allegiance; and God is severely chastising them—in mercy, we hope, not in wrath, or that in wrath he will remember mercy, and spare the remnant of his people.

GUETTÉE'S PAPACY SCHISMATIC.*

[From the Catholic World for 1867.]

ARTICLE I.

This volume purports to be the translation of a late French work entitled, *La Papauté Schismatique; ou Rome dans ses Rapports avec l'Église Orientale.* Why the translator or editor has changed the title we know not, unless it has been done to disguise the real character of the work, and induce Catholics to buy it under the impression that it is written by a learned divine of their own communion.

Whether equal liberty has been taken with the text throughout we are unable to say, for we have not had the patience to compare the translation with the original, except in a very few instances; but there is in the whole get up of the English work a lack of honesty and frank dealing. On the title-page we are promised an Introduction by the Protestant Episcopal Bishop of Western New York, but in the book itself we find only the "Editor's Preface" of a few pages. Even this preface lacks frankness, and seems intended to deceive. "The author of this work," writes the editor, "is not a Protestant. He is a French divine reared in the communion of Rome, and devoted to her cause in purpose of heart and life." This gives the impression that the author is still a member, and a devoted member, of the communion of Rome, which is not the case. "But his great learning having led him to conclusions contrary to those of the Jesuits, he fell under the ban;" that is, we suppose, was interdicted. This carries on the same deception, making believe that he was interdicted because he rejected some of the conclusions of the Jesuits, while he remained substantially orthodox and obedient to the church, a

**The Papacy: Its Historic Origin and Primitive Relations with the Eastern Churches.* By the Abbé Guettée, D. D. Translated from the French, and prefaced by an original biographical notice of the author, with an Introduction by A. Cleveland Coxe, Bishop of Western New York. New York: 1867.

thing which could not have happened, unless he had impugned the Catholic faith, the authority, or discipline of the church in communion with the apostolic See of Rome.

We read on: "Proscribed by the papacy, ... he accepts at last the logical consequences of his position, ... receiving the communion in both kinds at the hand of the Greeks in the church of the Russian Embassy at Paris." Why not have said simply: The author of this work was reared in the communion of Rome, but, falling under censure for opinions emitted in his writings, he left that communion, or was cut off from it, and has now been received into the Russian Church, or the communion of the non-united Greeks, and has written this book to prove that the communion that has received him is not, and the one in which he was reared is, schismatic? That would have told the simple truth; but we forget, the editor is a poet, and accustomed to deal in fiction.

The editor, who has a rare genius for embellishing the truth, tells us that "the biographical notice prefixed to the work . . . . gives assurance of the author's ability to treat the subject of the papacy with the most intimate knowledge of its practical character." It does no such thing, but, on the contrary, proves that he never was devoted in purpose and life to the communion of Rome, and that even from his boyhood he assumed an attitude of real though covert hostility to the papacy. His first work was a history of the church in France, the plan of which was conceived and formed while he was in the seminary, and that work is hardly less unfavorable to the papacy than the one before us. Its spirit is anti-Roman, anti-papal, full of venom against the popes, and he appears to have carried on his war against the papacy under the guise of Gallicanism, till even his Gallican bishop could tolerate him no longer, and forbade him to say mass.

His biographer gives a fuller insight into his character, perhaps, than he intended. "From a very early age," he says, "his mind seems to have revolted against the wearisome routine" of instruction prescribed for seminarians, "and, in its ardent desire for knowledge and its rapid acquisition, worked out of the prescribed limits. . . and read and studied in secret." That is, in plain English, he was impatient of direction in his studies, revolted against making the necessary preparation to read and study with advantage, rejected the prescribed course of studies, and followed

his own taste or inclination in broaching questions that he lacked the previous knowledge and mental and spiritual discipline to broach with safety. There are questions in great variety and of great importance which it is very necessary to study, but only in their place, and after that very routine of studies prescribed by the seminary has been successfully pursued. Most of the errors into which men fall arise from the attempt to solve questions without the necessary preparatory knowledge and discipline. The studies and discipline of the college and the seminary may seem to impatient and inexperienced youth wearisome and unnecessary, but they are prescribed by wisdom and experience, and he who has never submitted to them or had their advantage feels the want of them through his whole life, to whatever degree of eminence he may have risen without them. It is a great loss to any one not to have borne the yoke in his youth.

It is clear from M. Guettée's biography that he never studied the papal question as a friend to the papacy, and therefore he is no better able to treat it than if he had been brought up in Anglicanism or in the bosom of the Greek schism. He is not a man who has once firmly believed in the primacy of the Holy See, and by his study and great learning found himself reluctantly forced to reject it; but is one who, having fallen under the papal censure, tries to vindicate himself by proving that the pope who condemned him has no jurisdiction, and never received from God any authority to judge him. He is no unsuspected witness, is no impartial judge, for he judges in his own cause. His condemnation preceded his change of communion.

The editor speaks of the great learning of the author, and says "he writes with science and precision, and with the pen of a man of genius." It may be so, but we have not discovered it. His book we have found very dull, and it has required all the effort we are capable of to read it through. To our understanding it is lacking in both science and precision. It is a book of details which are attached to no principles, and its arguments rest wholly on loose and inaccurate statements or bold assumptions. A work more deficient in real logic, or more glaringly sophistical, it has seldom been our hard fortune to meet with. As for learning, we certainly are not learned ourselves, but the author has told us nothing that we did not know before, and nothing more than may be found in any one of our Catholic treatises on the authority of the see of Peter and the Roman pontiff.

All his objections to the papacy worth noticing may be found with their answers in *The Primacy of the Apostolic See Vindicated*, by the lamented Francis Patrick Kenrick, late archbishop of Baltimore, a work of modest pretensions, but of a real merit difficult to exaggerate.

Though M. Guettée's book is far from bewildering us by its learning or overwhelming us by its logic, we yet find it no easy matter to compress an adequate reply to it within any reasonable compass. It is not a scientific work. The author lays down no principles which he labors to establish and develop, but dwells on details, detached statements, assertions, and criticisms, which cannot be replied to separately without extending the reply some two or three times the length of the work itself, for an objection can be made in far fewer words than it takes to refute it. The author writes without method, and seems never to have dreamed of classifying his proofs, and arranging all he has to say under appropriate heads. Indeed, he has no principles, and he adduces no proofs; he only comments on the proofs of the papacy urged by our theologians, and endeavors to prove that they do not mean what we say they do, or that they may be understood in a different sense. Hence, taking these up one after another, he is constantly saying the same things over and over again, with most tiresome repetition, which require an equally tiresome repetition in reply. Had the author taken the time, if he had the ability, to reduce his objections to order, and to their real value, a few pages would have sufficed both to state and to refute them. As it is, we can only do the best we can within the limited space at our command.

The author professes to write from the point of view of a non-united Greek, who has little quarrel with Rome, save on the single question of the papacy. He concedes in some sense the primacy of Peter, and that the bishop of Rome is the first bishop of the church, nay, that by ecclesiastical right he has the primacy of jurisdiction, though not universal jurisdiction; but denies that the Roman pontiff has the sovereignty of the universal church by *divine right*. He says his study of the subject has brought him to these conclusions: "1. The bishop of Rome did not for eight centuries possess the authority of divine right that he has since sought to exercise; 2. The pretension of the bishop of Rome to the sovereignty of divine right over the whole church was the real cause of the division," or schism between the East and the West. (p. 31.)

These very propositions in the original, to say nothing of the translation, show great lack of precision in the writer. He would have better expressed his own meaning if he had said: The bishop of Rome did not for eight centuries hold by divine right the authority he has since claimed, and the pretension of the bishop of Rome to the sovereignty of the whole church by divine right has been the real cause of the schism. We shall soon object to this word *sovereignty*, but for the moment let it pass.

These two propositions the author undertakes to prove, and he attempts to prove them by showing or asserting that the proofs which our theologians allege from the Holy Scriptures, the fathers, and the councils, do not prove the primacy claimed by the bishop of Rome. This, if done, would be to the purpose if the question turned on admitting the claims of the Roman pontiff, but by no means when the question turns on rejecting these claims and ousting the pope from his possession. The author must go further. It is not enough to show that our evidences of title are insufficient; he must disprove the title itself, either by proving that no such title ever issued, or that it vests in an adverse claimant. This, as we shall see, he utterly fails to do. He sets up, properly speaking, no adverse claimant, and fails to prove that no such title ever issued.

It suffices us, in reply, to plead possession. The pope is, and long has been, in possession by the acknowledgment of both East and West, and it is for the author to show reasons why he should be ousted, and, if those reasons do not necessarily invalidate his possessions, the pope is not obliged to show his titles. All he need reply is, *Olim possideo.*

That the pope is in possession of all he claims is evident not only from the fact that he has from the earliest times exercised the primacy of jurisdiction claimed for him, but from the Council of Florence held in 1439. "We define," say the fathers of the council, "that the holy apostolic see and the Roman pontiff hold the primacy in all the world, and that the Roman pontiff is the successor of blessed Peter, prince of the apostles and true vicar of Christ, and head of the whole church, the father and teacher of all Christians, and that to him is given in blessed Peter, by our Lord Jesus Christ, full power to feed, direct, and govern the universal church; *et ipsi B. Petro pascendi, regendi, et gubernandi plenam potestatem traditam esse.*"

This definition was made by the universal church, for it was subscribed by the bishops of both the East and the West, and among the bishops of the East that accepted it were the patriarchs of Constantinople and Alexandria, and the metropolitans of Russia, with those of Nicæa, Trebizond, Lacedæmon, and Mitylenæ. We know very well that the non-united Greeks reject this council, although the Eastern Church was more fully represented in it than the Western Church was in that at Nicæa, the first of Constantinople, Ephesus, or Chalcedon; but it is for the non-united Greeks to prove that, in rejecting it and refusing obedience to its decrees, they are not schismatic. At any rate, the council is sufficient to prove that the pope is in possession by the judgment of both East and West, and to throw the burden of proof on those who deny the papal authority and assert that the papacy is schismatic.

Before producing his proofs, the author examines the Holy Scriptures to ascertain "whether the pretensions of the bishop of Rome to a universal sovereignty of the church have, as is alleged, any ground in the word of God." (p. 31.) The translation here is inexact; it should be: "Whether the pretensions, etc., to *the* universal sovereignty of the church have, as is alleged, *their* foundation in the word of God." The author himself would have expressed himself better if he had written "the sovereignty of the universal church," instead of "universal sovereignty of the church." But the author mistakes the real question he has to consider. The real question for him is not whether the primacy we assert for the Roman pontiff has its ground in the written word, but whether any thing in the written word denies or contradicts it. The primacy may exist as a fact, and yet no record of it be made in the Scriptures. The constitution of the church is older than any portion of the New Testament, and it is very conceivable that, as the church must know her own constitution, it was not thought necessary to give an account of it in the written word. The church holds the written word, but does not hold from it or under it, but from the direct and immediate appointment of Jesus Christ himself, and is inconceivable without her constitution.

The author makes another mistake, in using the word *sovereignty* instead of *primacy*. Roman theologians assert the primacy, but not, in the ecclesiastical order, the *sovereignty* of the Roman pontiff. Sovereignty is a political,

not an ecclesiastical term; it is, moreover, exclusive, and it is not pretended that there is no authority in the church by divine right but that of the Roman pontiff. It is not pretended that bishops are simply his vicars or deputies. In feudal times there may have been writers who regarded him as suzerain, but we know of none that held him to be sovereign. He is indeed by some writers, chiefly French, called *sovereign* pontiff, but only in the sense of *supreme* pontiff, *pontifex maximus*, or *summus pontifex*, to indicate that he is the highest but not the exclusive authority in the church. The Council of Florence, on which we plant ourselves, defines him to be primate, not sovereign, and ascribes to him plenary authority to feed, direct, and govern the whole church, but does not exclude other and subordinate pontiffs, who, though they receive their sees from him, yet within them govern by a divine right no less immediate than his. The real and only sovereign of the church, in the proper sense of the term, is Jesus Christ himself. The pope is his vicar, and as much bound by his law as the humblest Christian. He is not above the law, nor is he its source, but its chief minister and supreme judge, and his legislative power is restricted to such rescripts, edicts, or canons as he judges necessary to its proper administration. The sovereign makes the law, and the difference, therefore, between the power of the sovereign and that claimed for the Roman pontiff is very obvious and very great. Could the author, then, prove from the written word that the pope or the Holy See is not the universal sovereign of the church, he would prove nothing to his purpose. Yet this, as we shall see, is all he does prove.

The author pretends, p. 32, that the papal authority, sovereignty he means, is condemned by the word of God. The assertion, understanding the papal authority as defined by the Council of Florence, is to his purpose, if he proves it. What, then, are his proofs? The Roman theologians, that is, Catholic theologians, say the church is founded on Peter, and cite in proof the words of our Lord (St. Matt. xvi. 18): "I say unto thee that thou art Peter, and upon this rock will I build my church, and the gates of hell shall not prevail against it." But this does not prove that Peter is the rock on which the church is founded. The church is not founded on Peter, or, if on Peter, in no other sense than it is on him and the other apostles. The rock on which the church is built is Jesus Christ, who is the

only foundation of the church. St. Paul says (1 Cor. iii. 11): "Other foundation can no man lay than that which is laid, which is Jesus Christ himself."

That Jesus Christ is the sole foundation of the church in the primary and absolute sense, nobody denies or questions, and we have asserted it in asserting that he is the real and only sovereign of the church; but this does not exclude Peter from being its foundation in a secondary and vicarial sense, the only sense asserted by the most thorough-going papists, as is evident from what St. Paul writes to the Ephesians, (ii. 20,) as cited by the author: "You are built on the foundation of the apostles and prophets, Jesus Christ being himself the chief corner-stone." The principal, primary, absolute foundation is Christ, but the prophets and apostles are also the foundation on which the church, the mystic temple, is built. The author says, same page: "The prophets and apostles form the first layers of this mystic edifice. The faithful are raised on these *foundations*, and form the edifice itself; finally, Jesus Christ is the principal stone, the corner-stone, which gives solidity to the monument." This is very true, and we maintain, as well as he, that there is "no other foundation" in the primary sense, "no other principal corner-stone than Jesus Christ;" but he himself asserts, as does St. Paul, other "foundation" in a secondary sense. So, though our Lord is the principal or first foundation in the sense in which God is the first cause of all creatures and their acts, yet nothing hinders Peter from being a secondary foundation, as creatures may be and are what philosophers term second causes.

But in this secondary sense, "all the apostles are the foundation, and the church is no more founded on Peter than on the rest of the apostles." Not founded on Peter to the exclusion of the other apostles certainly, but not founded on Peter as the prince of the apostles, or chief of the apostolic college, does not appear, and it is never pretended that Peter excludes the other apostles. Our Lord gave, indeed, to Peter alone the keys of the kingdom of heaven, thereby constituting him his steward or the chief of his household; but he gave to all authority to teach all nations all things whatsoever he had commanded them, the same power of binding and loosing that he had given to Peter, and promised to be with them as well as with him all days to the consummation of the world. There is in this nothing that excludes or denies the primacy claimed

for Peter, or that implies that our Lord, as the author says, merely "gave to Peter an important ministry in his church."

The author labors to refute the argument drawn in favor of the primacy of Peter from the command of our Lord to Peter to "confirm his brethren," and the thrice repeated command to "feed his sheep;" but as we are not now seeking to prove the primacy, but simply repelling the arguments adduced against it, we pass it over. He attempts to construct an argument against the primacy of Peter from the words of our Lord to his disciples, (St. Matthew xxiii. 8): "Be ye not called Rabbi; for one is your Master, and all you are brethren. And call none your father on earth; for one is your Father, who is in heaven. Neither be ye called masters; for one is your master, Christ. He that is greatest among you shall be your servant." "Christ, therefore," p. 48, "forbade the apostles to take, in relation to one another, the titles of master, doctor, or even father, or pope, which is the same thing." Why, then, does the author take the title of *Abbé*, which means father, or suffer his editor to give him the title of *Doctor* of Divinity? His non-united Greek friends also come in for his censure; for they call their simple priests *papas* or popes, that is, fathers; nay, if he construes the words of our Lord strictly, he must deny all ecclesiastical authority, and, indeed, all human government, and even forbid the son to call his sire father. This would prove a little too much for him as well as for us.

The key to the meaning of our Lord is not difficult to discover. He commands his disciples not to call any one master, teacher, or father, that is, not to recognize as binding on them any authority that does not come from God, and to remember that they are all brethren, and must obey God rather than men. God alone is sovereign, and we are bound to obey him, and no one else; for, in obeying our prelates whom the Holy Ghost has set over us, it is he and he only whom we obey. He commands his disciples to suffer no man to call them masters; for their authority to teach or govern comes not from them, but from their Master who is in heaven, and therefore they are not to lord it over their brethren, but to govern only so as to serve them. "Let him that is greatest among you be your servant." Power is not for him who governs, but for them who are governed, and he is greatest who best serves his brethren. The pope, in reference to the admonition of our Lord, and from the

humility with which all power given to men should be held and exercised, calls himself "servant of servants." The words so understood—and they *may* be so understood—convey no prohibition of the authority claimed for the Roman pontiff as the vicar of Christ, and father and teacher of all Christians, by divine authority, not by his own personal right.

Here is all the author adduces from the Scriptures, that amounts to any thing, to prove "that the papal authority" is "condemned by the word of God," and nothing in all this condemns it in the sense defined by the Council of Florence, which is all we have to show.

From the Scriptures the author passes to tradition, and first to "the views of the papal authority taken by the fathers of the first three centuries." He does not deny that our Lord treated Peter with great personal consideration, and thinks Peter may be regarded in relation to the other apostles as *primus inter pares*, the first among equals, but without jurisdiction; and he says, p. 48, "We can affirm that no father of the church has seen in the primacy of Peter any title to jurisdiction or absolute authority in the church." But the first father he finds who, as he pretends, absolutely denies the primacy Catholics claim for Peter, and consequently for his successor, is St. Cyprian, who seems to us very positively to affirm it.

The author has a theory, which he pretends is supported by St. Cyprian, and which explains all the facts in the early ages which have been supposed by Roman theologians to be favorable to their doctrine of the papacy. He does not bring it out very clearly or systematically, and we can collect it only from scattered assertions. He denies that Peter had any authority not shared equally by the other apostles; or that the bishop of Rome had or has by divine right any pre-eminence above any other bishop; or that the church of Rome has any authority not possessed equally by the other churches that had apostles for their founders. He concedes that Peter and Paul founded the church of Rome, but denies that St. Peter was ever its bishop or bishop of any other particular see. How, then, explain the many passages of the fathers of the first three centuries, which undeniably assert Peter as "the prince of the apostles," "the chief of the apostolic college," the superiority and authority of "the see of Peter," "the chair of Peter," and recognize the jurisdiction actually exercised in all parts of the church by

the bishop of Rome? No man can read the early fathers, and deny that the church of Rome was regarded as the church that "presides," as St. Ignatius calls it, as the root and matrix, as St. Cyprian says, of the church, as holding the pre-eminence over all other churches, with whose bishop it was necessary that all others should agree or be in communion. The author does not deny it; but Peter meant "the faith of Peter," "the chair of Peter meant the entire episcopate," which was one and held by all the bishops *in solido*, and the pre-eminence ascribed to the church of Rome was in consequence of her exterior importance as the see of the capital of the empire. This is the author's theory, and he pretends that he finds it in the Treatise on the Unity of the Church, by St. Cyprian.

"In fact," he says, p. 79, "he (St. Cyprian) positively denies the primacy of St. Peter himself; he makes the apostle merely the type of unity which resided in the apostolic college as a whole, and by succession in the whole episcopal body, which he calls the See of Peter." "After mentioning the powers promised to St. Peter, St. Cyprian remarks that Jesus Christ promised them to him alone, though they were *given* to *all*. 'In order to show forth unity,' he says, 'the Lord has wished that unity might draw its origin from one only.' 'The other apostles certainly were just what Peter was, having the same honor and power as he.' 'All are shepherds, and the flock nourished by all the apostles together is one, in order that the church of Christ may appear in its unity.'"

But to this explanation of St. Cyprian there is a slight objection; for we are not able to see from this how the unity of the apostolic college or of the church of Christ is shown forth, manifested, or made to appear, that is, rendered visible, which is the sense of St. Cyprian, or how it can be said to draw the origin of unity from one when it only draws its origin from many conjointly. St. Cyprian says our Lord *ut unitatem manifestaret, unam cathedram constituit, unitatis ejusdem originem ab uno incipientem sua auctoritate disposuit;* that is, that our Lord established by his authority one chair, made the origin of unity begin from one, that the unity of the body might be manifested or shown forth. St. Cyprian evidently teaches that the unity of the church derives, as the author holds, from the unity of the episcopate, and the unity of the episcopate from the unity of the apostolic college; but that the unity of the apostolic college

or apostolate may be manifested, and hence the unity of the church be shown forth, or rendered visible, our Lord made its origin begin from one, that is, Peter. All the apostles, indeed, had what Peter had, that is, the apostolate, partook of the same gift, honor, and power; but the beginning proceeded from unity, and the primacy was given to Peter, that the church of Christ and the chair, the apostolate, by succession the episcopal body, if you will, may be shown to be one. All are pastors, and the flock, which is fed by all the apostles in unanimity, is shown to be one, that the unity of the church of Christ may be demonstrated. *Hoc erant utique et cæteri apostoli quod fuit Petrus, pari consortio præditi et honoris et potestatis, sed exordium ab unitate proficiscitur; et primatus Petro datur, ut una Christi ecclesia et cathedra una monstretur. Et pastores sunt omnes, et grex unus ostenditur, qui ab apostolis omnibus unanimi consensione pascatur, ut ecclesia Christi, una monstretur.**

St. Cyprian endeavors to show not simply that the church is one and the episcopate also one, but that our Lord has so arranged it that the unity of each may be made to appear and both be seen to be one. The unity of the apostles, of the pastors, or of the church, regarded as a collective body, is invisible. How, then, if it does not arise from one, or if it has no visible centre and beginning in the visible order, is it to be made to appear? St. Cyprian evidently holds that the unity of the apostolic body establishes the unity of the episcopal body, since he holds the bishops to be the successors of the apostles; and the unity of the episcopal body establishes the unity of the flock, which in union with the body each pastor feeds, and therefore the unity of the entire

*Opp. Cypriani, Migne's Edition, De Unitate Ecclesiæ, pp. 498–500. The words *primatus Petro datur*, are wanting in some manuscripts, and are rejected by Baluze and some others as an interpolation, and Archbishop Kenrick does not cite them in his Primacy, when they would have been much to his purpose. It is thought that they were originally a marginal note, and have crept into the text through some ignorant copyist; but it is just as easy to suppose that they were omitted from the text by some careless copyist, and placed in the margin by way of correction, and afterward restored to their proper place in the text. When several years ago we examined the question with what ability we possess, we came to the conclusion that they are genuine, or, at least, that there is no sufficient reason for regarding them as spurious. They express what is obviously the sense of St. Cyprian, and seem to us to be necessary to carry on and complete his argument. Nevertheless, we have made none of our reasoning against M. Guettée rest on their genuineness.

church of Christ. But he just as evidently holds that the apostolic unity in order to exist must begin from a central point, or have its centre and source whence it proceeds, and radiates, so to speak, through the whole apostolic body, making of the apostolate not an aggregation, but a body really one, with its own central source of life and authority; an organic and not simply an organized body, for an organized body has no real unity. Hence, he makes the unity start and radiate from one, as it must if unity at all. This one, this central point, he holds, is, by the ordination of the Lord, Peter. Of this there can be no doubt.

As we understand St. Cyprian, whose treatise on the Unity of the Church is, perhaps, the profoundest and most philosophical ever written on that subject, the church is an organism with Jesus Christ himself for its invisible and ultimate centre and source of life. But as the church is to deal with the world and operate in time and space, it must be visible as well as invisible. Then the invisible must be visibly expressed or represented. But this cannot be done unless there is a visible expression or representation in the exterior organic body of this interior and invisible centre and source of unity, life, and authority, which our Lord himself is. To establish this exterior or visible representation, our Lord institutes the apostolic college, and through that the episcopal body, through whom the whole flock becomes in union with their pastors, who are, in union with the apostles, one organic body; but only on condition of the unity of the apostolic college, which unity must start from one, from a visible centre and source of unity. Hence, our Lord chose Peter as the central point of union for the apostolic college, and Peter's chair, the *cathedra una*, as the visible centre of union for the episcopal body, and through them of the whole church, so that the whole church in the apostolate, in the episcopate, and in the flock, is shown to be one, represented with the unity and authority it has in Jesus Christ.

The trouble here with the author's theory is, not that it makes Peter the sign and type of the unity or authority of the apostolic college, and the chair of Peter the type and figure, as he says, of the unity and authority of the episcopate, but that it does not do so; for it recognizes no visible apostolic or episcopal unity, since it recognizes no visible centre or source from which it originates; and hence neither the apostolate nor the episcopate, save as Jesus Christ, is a

unity, but an aggregation, as we have said, a collection, or at least, a sort of round robin. By denying the primacy or centre and beginning of unity to Peter and Peter's chair individually, it denies what St. Cyprian maintains was instituted to manifest or show forth unity. It denies both the manifestation of unity and external unity itself, both of which are strenuously insisted on by St. Cyprian, who, indeed, says expressly in his letter to St. Cornelius, the Roman pontiff, that "the Church of Rome," that is, "the chair of Peter," is the centre whence sacerdotal unity arose.

The author says, p. 67, that "St. Cyprian was right in calling the Church of Rome the chair of Peter, the *principal* church, whence sacerdotal unity emanated. But for all that, did he pretend that the bishop enjoyed authority by divine right? He believed it so little that, in his *De Unitate Ecclesiæ*, he understands by the chair of Peter the entire episcopate, regards St. Peter as the equal of the other apostles, denies his primacy, and makes him the simple type of the unity of the apostolic college." The Church of Rome "was the source of sacerdotal unity in this sense, that Peter was the sign and type of the unity of the apostolic college." St. Cyprian makes St. Peter, p. 79, "merely the type of the unity that resided in the apostolic college as a whole, and, by succession, in the episcopal body, which he calls 'the see of Peter.'" "The see of Peter, in St. Cyprian's idea, is the authority of the apostolic body, and, by succession, of the episcopal body. All the bishops had the same honor and the same authority in all that relates to their order, as all the apostles had the same honor and authority as Peter." (pp. 79, 80.)

Peter, then, is the sign and type of apostolic and episcopal unity, and "the chair of Peter," or "the see of Peter," is the sign and type of apostolic authority. But supposing this to be so, and Peter to have been in no respect distinguished from the other apostles, or to have held no peculiar position in the apostolic body, how came he to be regarded as the sign and type of apostolic unity, and his chair as the sign and type of apostolic authority? There is a logic in language as well as in the human mind of which it is the expression, and there is a reason for every symbolical locution that gains currency. If the fathers and the church had not held Peter to be the prince of the apostles and his see the centre and source of apostolic authority, would they or could they have made his see or chair the symbol of apos-

tolic authority, or Peter himself the symbol, "the sign and type," of apostolic unity? Why the see of Peter rather than that of Andrew, James, or John? or Peter rather than any other apostle? The fact, then, that St. Peter and his see or chair were taken as symbolic, the sign and type, the one of apostolic unity, and the other of apostolic authority, is a very conclusive proof that the primacy was given to him and his see by our Lord, and by succession to the holy apostolic see and the Roman pontiff, as the fathers of Florence define and Roman theologians hold.

Again, how could Peter be a sign and type of apostolic unity or his see the sign and type of apostolic authority, if he, Peter, had no relation, and his see none, to that authority not held equally by all the apostles and their sees? In the church of God there are and can be no shams, no make-believes, no false signs or types, no unrealities, no calling things which are not as if they were. Signs which signify nothing are not signs, and types which represent nothing are simply no types at all. The real apostolic unity and authority are internal, invisible in Jesus Christ himself, who, in the primary and absolute sense, as we have seen, is the rock on which the church is founded, the sole basis of its solidity and permanence, the sole ground of its existence and fountain of its life, unity, and authority. Peter and Peter's see, if the sign and type of this invisible unity, must represent it or show it forth in the visible order. But how can Peter represent that unity, unless he is in the visible order its real centre and source, in which it begins and from which it emanates? Or how can the see or chair of Peter be the sign and type of the invisible apostolic authority, unless it really be its source and centre in the visible order? The external can represent the internal, the visible the invisible, only in so far as it copies or imitates it. In calling Peter the sign and type of apostolic unity, the author then concedes that Peter represents our Lord, and that he is, as the Council of Florence defines, "the true vicar of Christ;" and in making Peter's see the sign and type of apostolic authority, he makes it the real centre in the visible order of that authority, and consequently concedes the very points which he rejects, and undertakes to prove from St. Cyprian are only the unfounded pretensions of the bishop of Rome.

That the primacy here unwittingly conceded by the author is not that absolute and isolated sovereignty which the author accuses Catholic theologians of asserting for Peter

and for the bishop of Rome as his successor, we readily admit, but we have already shown that such a sovereignty is not claimed. The pope is not the sovereign, but the vicar or chief minister of the sovereign. He governs the church in apostolic unity, not as isolated from the episcopal body, but as its real head or supreme chief. His authority is said to be *loquens ex cathedra*, speaking from the seat of apostolic and episcopal unity and authority. He is the chief or supreme pastor, not the only pastor, nor pastor at all regarded as separate from the church. He is the visible head of the church united by a living union with the body; for it is as necessary to the head to be in living union with the body, as it is to the body to be in living union with the head. Neither can live and perform its functions without the other; but the directing, controlling, or governing power is in the head. St. Ambrose says, "Where Peter is, there is the church;" but he does not say Peter is the church, nor does the pope say, "L'Église, c'est moi," I am the church. Succeeding to Peter as chief of the apostolic college, he is the chief or head of the church. The author's theory makes the church in the visible order as a whole, acephalous, headless, and therefore brainless.

The author bases his assertion that St. Cyprian denies the primacy of Peter on the fact that he says, "All the other apostles had what he had, the same honor and the same power." This is with Mr. Guettée a capital point. His doctrine, so far as doctrine he has, is that the church has no visible chief; that all the apostles had equal honor and authority; that all bishops as successors of the apostles are equal; that one bishop has by divine right no pre-eminence above another; and that, if one is more influential than another, he owes it to his personal character or to the external importance of his see. And this he contends is the doctrine of St. Cyprian. But, if he had understood St. Cyprian's argument, he would have never done that great saint such flagrant injustice. St. Cyprian's argument is, as is evident from the passage we have cited at length, that, although all the apostles received the same gift, the same honor, and the same power, yet, for the sake of manifesting unity, our Lord constituted one chair from which unity should begin, and gave the primacy to Peter, that the unity of the apostolic or episcopal body and of the whole church of Christ might be shown. The author himself contends that the apostolate, and by succession the episcopate, is one and indivisible, and

held by the apostles or bishops *in solido*. Then, if all the other apostles had the apostolate, they must have had precisely what Peter had, and if the other bishops have the episcopate at all, they must have precisely what the Roman pontiff has, yet without having another apostolate or another episcopate than that which they all equally receive and hold in its invisible unity, or any thing in addition thereto. He may, nevertheless, be the head or chief of the episcopal body and the centre in which episcopal unity and authority in the visible order originate, and from which they radiate through the body, and from the bishops to their respective flocks, and bind them and the whole church together in one, which, as we understand it, is the precise doctrine of St. Cyprian, and certainly is the doctrine of the Roman and Catholic Church.

The author, even if a learned man, does not appear to be much of a philosopher or much of a theologian. There are depths in St. Cyprian's philosophy and theology which he seems unable to sound, and heights which are certainly above his flight. He is, we should judge, utterly unaware of the real constitution of the church, the profound significance of the Gospel, the vast reach of the Christian system, its relation to the universal system of creation, or the reasons in the very nature of things there are for its existence, and for the existence and constitution of the church. All the works of the Creator are strictly logical, and together form but one dialectic whole, are but the expression of one divine thought. Nothing can appear more petty or worthless than the author's shallow cavils to a man who has a little real theological science.

The author cites the controversy on the baptism of heretics, in proof that St. Cyprian denied the jurisdiction of the bishop of Rome, or his authority to govern as supreme pontiff the whole church, but unsuccessfully. St. Cyprian found the custom established in Carthage, as it was also in certain churches in Asia, to rebaptize persons who had been baptized by heretics, and he insisted on observing the custom. He complained, therefore, of St. Stephen, the Roman pontiff, who wrote to him to conform to the ancient and general custom of the church. Whether he conformed or not is uncertain, but there is no evidence that he denied the authority of the Roman pontiff, and he certainly did not break communion with him, though he may have regarded his exercise of his authority in that particular case as oppressive

and tyrannical. It would seem from the letter of St. Firmilianus to St. Cyprian, if genuine, of which there is some doubt, as there is of several letters ascribed to St. Cyprian, and from the address of St. Cyprian to the last council he held on the subject, which M. Guettée cites at some length, that the question was regarded as one of discipline, or as coming within the category of those matters on which diversity of usage in different churches and countries is allowable or can be tolerated, and on which uniformity has never been exacted. He insisted not that all the world should conform to the custom he observed, but defended, as our bishops would to-day, what he believed to be the customary rights of his church or province. That he was wrong we know, for the universal church has sustained the Roman pontiff.

We do not think the author has been very happy in placing St. Cyprian on the stand against the primacy of the holy apostolic see and the Roman pontiff. The saint is a much better witness for us than for him.

The author, unable to deny the preponderating influence of the Roman pontiff and his see in the government of the church, and the importance everywhere attached to being in communion with the bishop of Rome, seeks to evade the force of the fact by attributing it not to the belief in the primacy of the church of Rome, but to the superior importance of the city of Rome as the capital of the empire, as if the Catholic Church were merely a Roman church, and not founded for the whole world. We indeed hear something of this when Constantinople, the New Rome, became the rival of Old Rome, and its bishop, on account of the civil and political importance of the city, set up to be œcumenical bishop, and claimed the first place after the bishop of Rome; but we hear nothing of it during the first three centuries, and the author adduces nothing to justify his assumption. All the fathers, alike in the East and the West, attribute the primacy held by the church of Rome not to the importance of the city of Rome in the empire, but to the fact that she is "the church that presides," is "the principal" or governing "church," is "the see of Peter, holds the chair of Peter, prince of the apostles," is "the root and matrix of the Catholic Church," and that Peter "lives" and "speaks" in its bishops. Now, whatever our learned author may say, we think these great fathers, some of whom were only one remove from the apostles themselves, and

nearly all of whom gained the crown of martyrdom, knew the facts in the case as well as he knows them, and that there is every probability that they meant what they said and wrote.

"We see," says the author, p. 48, "that as early as the third century the bishops of Rome, because St. Peter had been one of the founders of that see, claimed to exercise a certain authority over the rest of the church, giving themselves sometimes the title of 'bishop of bishops'; but we also see that the whole church protested against these ambitious pretensions, and held them of no account." That the bishop of Rome was accused by those whom the exercise of his authority offended of assuming the title of bishop of bishops, by way of a sneer, may be very true, but that he ever gave himself that title, there is, so far as we are aware, no trustworthy evidence.

"The church protested against these ambitious pretensions." Where is that protest recorded? That bishops were then as now jealous of their real or supposed rights, and ever well disposed to resist any encroachment upon them, is by no means improbable; and this, if the bishops generally held that the Roman pontiff had no more authority by divine right over the church than any other bishop, must have made it exceedingly difficult for him to grasp the primacy of jurisdiction over them. Their power to resist, in case they believed they could resist with a good conscience, must have been, being, as they were in the fourth century, eighteen hundred to one, somewhat greater than his to encroach. That the bishops or simple priests whom the Roman pontiff admonished or censured protested sometimes, not against his authority, but against what they regarded as its unjust, arbitrary, or tyrannical exercise, is no doubt true, and the same thing happens still, even with those who have no doubt of the papal authority; but that the whole church protested is not proven; and in all the instances in which protests were offered on the part of individual bishops that came before an ecclesiastical council, the universal church uniformly sustained the Roman pontiff. When St. Victor excommunicated the Quartodecimans, some bishops remonstrated with him as being too severe, and others opposed his act, but the council of Nicæa sustained it. Even before that council, the author of the Philosophumena, whose work must have been composed in the early part of the third century, treats the Quartodecimans as heretics, although, except

as to the time of keeping Easter, their faith was irreproachable. So on the question of the baptism of heretics, the whole church, instead of protesting against the decision of St. Stephen, approved it, and follows it to this day. It will not do to say the whole church treated the acts of these popes "as of no account."

The writers of the letters attributed to Sts. Cyprian and Firmilianus are good evidence that the popes claimed and exercised jurisdiction over the whole church in the controversy on the baptism of heretics, and Tertullian affords no mean proof of the same fact at a yet earlier date. In a work written after he had fallen into some of the heresies of the Montanists, he writes, as cited by our author, p. 78, "I learn that a new edict has been given, a peremptory edict. The sovereign pontiff, that is, the bishop of bishops, has said: 'I remit the sins of impurity and fornication.' O edict! not less can be done than to ticket it—Good Work! But where shall such an edict be posted? Surely, I think, upon the doors of the houses of prostitution." This passage undoubtedly proves that Tertullian himself, fallen into heresy, did not relish the papal decision that condemned him, and perhaps that he was disposed to deny the authority of the Roman pontiff; but if it had been generally held that the Roman pontiff was no more in the church than any other bishop, and therefore that his decision could have no authority out of his diocese or province, would his decision have so deeply moved him, and called forth such an outburst of wrath? If the claim to the primacy of authority in the whole church, and therefore to jurisdiction over all bishops, was not generally recognized and held, what occasion was there for so much indignation? What point would there have been in the sneer, or force in the irony, of calling him the sovereign pontiff, or the bishop of bishops? Tertullian's language, which was evidently intended to exaggerate the authority claimed by the Roman pontiff, plainly enough implies that he was generally held to have authority to make decisions in doctrine and discipline for the whole church, and that a censure from him was something of far more importance than that from any other bishop or patriarch.

The author cites to the same effect as Tertullian the work published at Paris a few years ago under the name of Origen, entitled Philosophumena, "justly attributed," he says, "to St. Hyppolytus, Bishop of Ostia, or to the learned priest Caius." The authorship of the work is unknown, and no

documents have yet been discovered that enable the learned to determine with any degree of certainty by whom it was or could have been written. The work, however, bears internal evidence of having been written by some one belonging to the East, and who lived during the pontificates of St. Victor, St. Zephyrinus, St. Callistus, St. Urban, and perhaps St. Pontian, bishops of Rome, that is to say, from 180 to 235, certainly not later. The work, when published by M. Miller at Paris, in 1851, attracted the attention of English and German Protestants by its gross charges against the two venerated Roman pontiffs and martyrs, St. Zephyrinus and St. Callistus—charges which for the most part refute themselves. But though Protestants have not been able to make much of it against the papacy, Catholics have found in it new and unexpected proofs of the authority extending over the church in all parts of the world, exercised by the popes of that early period. "In his invectives," says the Abbé Cruice, "the adversary of Callistus acknowledges his great power, and furnishes new and unexpected proofs of the supremacy of the holy see." The Abbé Cruice, who, we think, we have heard recently died Bishop of Marseilles, published at Paris, in 1851, an interesting History of the Church of Rome under the pontificates of St. Victor, St. Zephyrinus, and St. Callistus, in which he has incorporated these proofs with great judgment and effect. As we are not now considering the affirmative proofs of the primacy of the Holy See, but the arguments intended to prove the papacy schismatic, we can only refer the reader to this learned work and to the Philosophumena itself. We will only remark that the unknown author is far more bitter against the popes than his contemporary Tertullian, and leaves more unequivocal evidence to the extent of the papal power. No one can read the Philosophumena without perceiving in the complaints and incidental remarks of the author that the hierarchy at the end of the second century was as regularly organized as now, and precisely in the same manner, with the Roman pontiff at its summit.

The author, p. 82, says Tertullian, who in several passages refers to the church of Rome as a witness to the apostolic tradition, "does not esteem her witness testimony superior to that of others." Perhaps so, for in the cases referred to Tertullian had no occasion to discriminate between one apostolic church and another. He is using against heretics the

argument from prescription. Their doctrines are adverse to the apostolic tradition, and therefore false. If any one would know what is the apostolic tradition, he may learn it from any of the churches founded by apostles "where their sees still remain, where their epistles are still read, where their voice still resounds, and their face, as it were, is still seen. Is it Achaia that is near thee? thou hast Corinth; if thou art not far from Macedonia, thou hast the Philippians; if thou canst go to Asia, thou hast Ephesus; if thou dwellest near Italy, thou hast Rome, whose authority is near us," that is, near us in Africa. It is true Tertullian pronounces a eulogium on the church of Rome that he does not on the others, but no great stress need be laid on that. Any one of the apostolic churches was sufficient for determining the apostolic tradition, and there was no reason why he should mention the primacy of the see of Peter if he held it, and it would have weakened his argument if he had appealed to that primacy, doubtless then as now rejected by heretics.

But this leads us to a remark which it may be well to bear in mind. All the churches founded by the apostles were during the whole of the first three centuries in existence, and preserved the apostolic doctrine or tradition, and it could be learned from Alexandria, Antioch, Jerusalem, Ephesus, &c., without the necessity, at least on ordinary occasions, of recurring to the supreme authority of Rome. The author quotes several of the fathers who call the see of Antioch Peter's see; he might have gone further, and shown that each of the four great patriarchal sees, Rome, Alexandria, Antioch, and Jerusalem, were so-called, and because they were held to have been founded by Peter. This is the reason why they received the dignity and authority of patriarchal churches. Peter was held to survive and govern in each one of them, but more especially in Rome, where he gave his life for his faith, and where stands his tomb. It is Peter who governs one and indivisible in them all, and consequently, to get Peter's authority, it was not, except in the last resort, necessary to apply to his successor in the see of Rome. It is this fact, misapprehended by the author, that has made him assert that the see of Peter, or the chair of Peter, means the universal episcopate which all the bishops, as St. Cyprian says, hold *in solido*. Every bishop in communion with Peter's see, no doubt, was regarded as *solidaire* with the whole episcopal and apostolic body, as we have al-

ready explained; but we have not found the "see of Peter," or "chair of Peter" applied to any particular churches, except those tradition asserted were founded by Peter, and only those sees had originally patriarchal jurisdiction, and this fact is in itself no slight proof that the primacy was held to be vested in Peter as we have already explained, and the author has given us the opportunity of proving from St. Cyprian.

This fact that Peter was held to govern in the four great patriarchal sees, though supremely only in the church of Rome, explains why it is that in the early ages we find not more frequent instances of the exercise of jurisdiction beyond his own patriarchate of the West by the Roman pontiff. The bishops of these Petrine churches were not originally called patriarchs, but they exercised the patriarchal power long before receiving the name, and probably from times immediately succeeding the apostles. So long as these patriarchs remained in communion with the bishop of Rome, their head and chief, most of the questions of discipline, and many of those of faith, could be, and were, settled by the patriarch, or local authority, without resort to the Roman pontiff. But when these sees fell off from unity into heresy or schism, Peter remained only in the Roman see, and all causes that had previously been disposed of by the patriarchs of the East had to be carried at once to Rome, before the supreme court.

Rome, Alexandria, and Antioch were the three chief cities of the empire, and the capitals, the first of the empire itself, and the others of its two largest and most important prefectures. This fact may seem to favor the author's theory that the ecclesiastical superiority is derived from the civil superiority; but had this been so, Jerusalem would hardly have been selected as the seat of the third patriarchate of the East. The geographical position and civil and political importance of these cities may have influenced the apostle in selecting them to be the chief seats of the ecclesiastical government he under Christ was founding, but could not have been the ground of their superior ecclesiastical jurisdiction, because the church was not organized as a national religion, or with a view to the Roman Empire alone, and the apostles themselves carried the gospel beyond the furthest limits of that empire, into regions never penetrated by the Roman eagles. The church was catholic, and was to subsist in all ages and teach all nations, as well as all truth. Our Lord

said, "My kingdom is not of this world; it does not hold from the kingdoms of this world, and is independent of them, both in its constitution and in its powers. These remain always and everywhere the same, whatever the revolutions or the rise and fall of states and empires. The authority of the church is immediately from God; her grandeur and glory are spiritual, and not derived from the greatness, grandeur, wealth, or power of earthly cities. St. Augustine makes the city of Rome the type of the city of the world, which he contrasts with the church or city of God. The idea that the rank or the authority of the bishop derived from the civil rank and importance of the city in which he held his see was a Constantinopolitan idea not heard of till the fifth century, and, as we shall see in its place, one of the chief causes of the schism between the East and the West.

The author denies that St. Peter was ever, in the proper sense of the word, bishop of Rome, or of any particular see. If he is right, how could the unity of the church have a visible starting-point or centre? or how could it be said to begin from Peter or the chair of Peter, as his own witness, St. Cyprian, asserts? If Peter had no particular see, established his see, or set up his chair, his *cathedra*, nowhere in particular, the whole argument of St. Cyprian as to the origin and manifestation of unity is baseless, and goes for nothing. Besides, it is contradicted by universal tradition. The testimony that Peter had his chair at Rome is ample, and leaves nothing to be desired. But this is not the point. It is for the author to prove that he was not bishop of Rome; for he has undertaken to prove the papacy is schismatic, and at every step he takes, the burden of proof is on him. Where are his proofs?

The author says St. Linus was the bishop of Rome when Peter first arrived in that city. A church which has a bishop is already a church founded and constituted. Yet the author allows and cites authorities that prove that Peter was the founder, or at least one of the founders, of the Roman church! That St. Linus was the first bishop of Rome after St. Peter there is no doubt; that he was the first bishop, or bishop of Rome, before the arrival of St. Peter in the city, there is no evidence, but any amount of testimony to the contrary. We say there is no evidence. The lists given by the fathers sometimes enumerate him as first and sometimes as second, as they do or do not include the apostle; but all

make him the successor of St. Peter. The fathers, in giving the lists of other apostolic sees, are not uniform, and sometimes they include and sometimes they exclude the apostle, and reckon only from his death. Eusebius says, as cited by the author, p. 144, "After the martyrdom of Paul and Peter, Linus was the first that received the episcopate at Rome." Tertullian, as also cited by the author, p. 145, says that "Peter sat on the chair of Rome;" but he contends that Tertullian "does not mean that he was bishop, but that he taught there," that is, St. Peter was a professor of theology at Rome! This might do if Tertullian had been treating of the Sorbonne, or of the French university, but will not answer here. In ecclesiastical language, *chair*, *cathedra*, means simply the seat of the bishop, and figuratively the episcopal authority. To say Peter sat in the chair, or *cathedra* of Rome is saying simply he was bishop of Rome. The presumption is, that Tertullian meant what he said, understood according to the usages of the language he used. Besides, if chair *may* sometimes be used figuratively for teaching, it is the author's business to prove that it *must* mean so in this particular case. This he does not and cannot do.

The author pretends that the tradition which makes Peter seven years bishop of Antioch and twenty-five years bishop of Rome is obviously false; for any one can see by counting that there was not time enough for it between the day of Pentecost and the martyrdom of Peter. We do not pretend to be very good at counting, but as we count, seven years bishop of Antioch and twenty-five years bishop of Rome make in all thirty-two years. The day of Pentecost, according to the usual reckoning, was in A. D. 33, and St. Peter suffered martyrdom at Rome under Nero, A. D. 66, or at the earliest 65. Tillemont says 66, which leaves thirty-three, at least thirty-two years; and we see no reason to suppose that the organization of the church at Jerusalem and committing it to the care of James, its first bishop, and the setting up of his chair at Antioch, might not all have been done before the close of the year of the crucifixion. But even an error in the chronology would not prove that Peter was not bishop of Rome.

The pretence that it was incompatible with the dignity of an apostle to be the bishop of a particular see has nothing to sustain it. It is not necessary to suppose Peter, by establishing his see at Rome, was obliged to confine his whole at-

tention and labor to that particular church, or that he remained constantly at Rome. Indeed, it is very possible, and thought by many to be very probable, that he committed the care of that church during his absences to St. Linus as his vicar, and there are several authorities to that effect. Some of them join St. Anacletus, St. Cletus, or, as the Greeks say, Anencletus, and St. Clement, successively bishops of Rome, with St. Linus in the government of the Roman Church under Peter during his lifetime; but, however this may have been, tradition is constant that St. Linus was the immediate successor of Peter, which at least implies that Peter was regarded as having held the see as well as having assisted in founding it; for otherwise St. Linus could not have been regarded as his successor, and no reason could be assigned why he was called the successor of Peter rather than of Paul, who also assisted in founding it, and is honored even to-day by the Roman Church as one of its founders.

We have taken up the author's theory point by point, and we find him utterly failing to establish it in whole or in part. His allegations are set forth with great confidence, but the authorities he cites do not sustain them, and are either not to his purpose or, like St. Cyprian, point blank against him. He may have demolished the man of straw which he himself had set up, but he leaves standing the papacy as held by the Catholic Church and defined by the Council of Florence. He has asserted in very strong terms the ignorance, the chicanery, the sophistry, and the dishonesty of the Roman theologians, and leaves no doubt in the minds of intelligent readers that he greatly excels them in the qualities and practices he ascribes to them; but he adduces nothing beyond his own assertions and misrepresentations against their fairness and candor, and their intelligence and learning. His sneers at them are pointed only by his own ignorance or malice, and present him in a most unfavorable light. His cant, so abundant against them, is very stale and simply disgusting. From first to last he proves that he lacks, we will not say the humility of the Christian, but the modesty and reserve of real learning and science, and that he is moved not by love of truth, but by a spirit of hatred and revenge.

Here we might well close, for the author has been refuted from St. Cyprian himself, by proving by his own witness the primacy of jurisdiction by divine right was possessed

even in the third century, while he has left all the arguments and authorities adduced by the Roman theologians from Scripture and tradition to prove affirmatively the papal authority by divine right, or by the positive appointment of Jesus Christ in their full force. But the reasons which induced us in the first place to begin the examination of the author's lucubrations induce us to go through with them. The work has been translated and published here under Protestant auspices, set up as an important work against the papal authority and the Church of Rome, "the root and matrix of the Catholic Church," as says St. Cyprian, and, were it left unnoticed or unreplied to, many people might take it to be really what it is represented to be, and conclude that we cannot answer it because we have not done it.

Besides, the controversy between large classes of Protestants and Catholics is narrowed down to two questions, the honor we render to Mary the mother of God, and the authority we attribute to the Holy See and the Roman pontiff. M. Guettée, having been reared in our communion and gone out from us because he was not of us, and having in this work done his best to prove the papacy schismatic, and that its assertion has been the cause of the schism between the East and the West, affords us as good an occasion as we can expect to discuss the latter question, and to consider the arguments, facts, and authorities alleged in their defence by those who refuse their obedience to St. Peter in his successor. The work is rambling, and made up of details most wearisome to read, and difficult to bring into a shape in which its real value can be brought to the test, but it is a fair specimen in spirit and arrangement of the works written against the Roman and Catholic Church, and contains in some form all that schismatics allege first and last against her. We may as well make it our text-book for the discussion as any other.

ARTICLE II.

M. Guettée, it will be remembered, undertakes to establish two propositions—first, "The bishop of Rome did not for eight centuries possess the authority of divine right which he has since sought to exercise; and second, The pretension of the bishop of Rome to the sovereignty of divine right over the whole church was the real cause of the division," or schism between the East and the West. To the first

proposition, we have replied, the bishop of Rome is in possession, and it is for the author to prove that he is not rightfully in possession. This he can do only by proving either, first, that no such title by divine right was ever issued; or, second, that it vests in an adverse claimant. He sets up no adverse claimant, but attempts to make it appear that no such title as is claimed was ever issued. This he attempts to do by showing that the proofs of title usually relied on by Catholic writers are negatived by the Holy Scriptures and the testimony of the fathers and councils of the first eight centuries. We have seen that he has signally failed so far as the Holy Scriptures and the fathers of the first three centuries are concerned; nay, that instead of proving his proposition, he has by his own witnesses refuted it, and proved that the title did issue, and did vest in St. Peter, and consequently now vests in the bishop of Rome as Peter's successor.

This alone is enough for us, and renders any further discussion of the first proposition unnecessary. After the testimony of St. Cyprian, who is his own witness, the author really has nothing more to say. He has lost his case. But, ignorant of this, he proceeds in the fourth division of his work to interrogate the fathers and councils of the fourth and fifth centuries, but even less successfully, as we now proceed to show. We only beg the reader to bear in mind that we are not adducing our proofs of the papacy by divine right, but are simply examining the proofs the author adduces against it. We do not put forth the strength of our cause, which is not necessary in the present argument; we are only showing the weakness of the case the author makes against us.

The author attempts to devise an argument against the papal authority from the sixth canon of the Council of Nicæa. This canon, as he cites it, reads: "Let the ancient custom be preserved that exists in Egypt, Lybia, and Pentapolis, that the bishop of Alexandria have authority in all these countries, since that has also passed into a custom for the bishop of Rome. Let the churches at Antioch and in the other provinces preserve also their privileges." It must not be supposed that the author cites the canon with any degree of exactness, or faithfully renders it; but let that pass. From this canon two consequences, he contends, necessarily follow: first, That "the council declared that the authority of the bishop of Rome extended over a limited district, like that of the bishop of Alexandria; and second, That this authority was only based on usage." (p. 95.)

But the authority of the bishop of Rome was not in question before the council, for that nobody disputed. "The object of the canon," the author himself says, pp. 93, 94, "was to defend the authority of the bishop of Alexandria against the partisans of Meletius, bishop of Lycopolis, who refused to recognize it in episcopal ordinations, . . . therefore was merely to confirm the ancient customs respecting these ordinations, and, in general, the privileges consecrated by ancient usages. Now, according to an ancient custom Rome enjoyed certain prerogatives that no one contested. The council makes use of this fact in order to confirm the similar prerogatives of Alexandria, Antioch, and other churches."

The question before the council, and which it met by this canon, evidently was not the primacy of the see of Rome—although it would seem from the form in which the papal legate, Paschasinus, quoted it, without contradiction, in the Council of Chalcedon, that the Council of Nicæa took care to reserve that primacy—but certain customary rights, privileges, and dignities which the bishops of Alexandria, Antioch, and some other churches held in common with the bishop of Rome. As the ancient custom was preserved in the Roman church, the council says, so let it be in Alexandria, Antioch, and other churches. The council refers to the custom in Rome as a reason for confirming the similar custom which had obtained elsewhere, and which had been violated by Meletius of Lycopolis in Egypt, and by his partisans.

To understand this, we must recollect that prior to the fall of the great patriarchates of Alexandria and the East, the administration of ecclesiastical affairs was less centralized than at present. Now nearly all, if not all, bishops depend immediately on the Holy See, but in the early ages they depended on it only mediately. The bishops of a province or of a patriarchate depended immediately on their exarch, metropolitan, or patriarch, and only mediately through him on the bishop of Rome. The appointment or election of the patriarch, and of the exarch or metropolitan of a church independent of any patriarch, as were the churches of Asia Minor, Pontus, and Thrace, needed the papal confirmation, but not their suffragans or the bishops subject to their immediate jurisdiction. The patriarch or metropolitan confirmed their election, ordained or deposed them by his own authority, subject of course to appeal to Rome. Lycopolis, by ancient cus-

tom or canons of the fathers, depended on the bishop of Alexandria, who was its bishop's immediate superior. For some reason, Meletius, bishop of Lycopolis, had been deposed by the bishop of Alexandria, and deprived of his functions; but he refused to submit, ordained bishops by his own authority, contrary to the ancient custom, and created a schism. It was to meet this case, and others like it, that the council decreed the sixth canon.

The authority confirmed by that canon was the authority of patriarchs, as they were subsequently called, and of metropolitans by usage independent of any patriarchal jurisdiction, and therefore the authority of the bishop of Rome which it recognized as derived from usage, could have been only his authority as metropolitan of the Suburbicarian churches, called the Roman territory, or as patriarch of the West. That this authority was limited, and dependent on ancient usage or custom, nobody disputes; but this is distinct from his authority as supreme pontiff or governor of the whole church. There are instances enough on record of metropolitan churches, like Aquileia, and those of Illyrium and Bulgaria, disputing their immediate dependence on the bishop of Rome, that never dreamed of calling in question his authority as supreme pontiff, or governor of the whole church. The schismatic Armenians do not deny and never have denied the supreme authority in the whole church of the bishop of Rome; they only assert that the pope gave to their apostle, Gregory the Illuminator, and to his successors, the independent government of the church in Armenia. St. Cyprian depended on the bishop of Rome, and acknowledged the papal authority, but it is questionable if he depended on him as patriarch of the West. We suspect Carthage was independent of patriarchal jurisdiction, and that St. Cyprian had no superior but the pope. However this may have been, the fact that churches did not depend immediately on the bishop of Rome did not in any sense deny or impair his universal authority as supreme pontiff. So the argument against the papacy from the sixth canon of the Council of Nicæa, like the author's other arguments, proves nothing to his purpose.

M. Guettée, in his blind hatred of Rome, after having alleged the authority of the Council of Nicæa in his own favor, undertakes to prove that it was no council of the church at all, but merely a council of the empire. He labors hard to prove that it was convoked by the Emperor Constantine by

virtue of his imperial authority alone, that the emperor presided in its sessions, and confirmed and promulgated its acts. Does he not see that if it was so, the council had no ecclesiastical authority, and therefore that its acts have no bearing on the question before us? If any thing is certain, it is that the church, as a polity, is independent of the state, and that civil rulers or magistrates, as such, have no authority in her government. Civil rulers have often usurped authority over the church and oppressed her: they did so at Constantinople, as Gregory III. complains; they attempted to do so all through the middle ages in the West, and they do so now to a most fearful extent in the Russian Empire, as in all European Protestant states; but the authority they exercise is usurped, and is repugnant to the very nature and constitution of the church. Our Lord said, "My kingdom is not of this world." The non-united Greeks as well as Catholics hold that there is and can be no œcumenical council without the bishop of Rome to convoke it, preside over it, and to confirm and promulgate its acts; and hence they confess their inability to hold an œcumenical council, and therefore really acknowledge that they are not the Catholic Church in its integrity, though they claim to hold the orthodox faith. They admit the Roman church is the primatial see, and that the presidency of a general council belongs to the bishop of Rome by the right and dignity of his see. If he did not preside in the Council of Nicæa in person or by his legates or representatives, and approve formally or virtually its acts, it could not, by their own doctrine have the authority of a general council. The confirmation and promulgation of its canons by the emperor might make them laws or edicts of the empire, but could not make them canons of the church.

It would be no difficult matter to prove that the author is as much out in his facts as in his inferences. The universal church has recognized the Council of Nicæa as a legitimate council, and there are ample authorities to prove that its convocation and indiction were at the request or with the assent of the Roman pontiff, that he presided over it by his legates, Osius, bishop of Cordova, and Vitus and Vincentius, two Roman presbyters; that he virtually, if not formally, confirmed and published its acts; and that whatever the emperor did was merely executory; but the question is foreign to our present argument, and we have no space to indulge in extraneous or irrelevant discussions. If we were endeavoring to prove the papacy, we should adduce the proofs; but

our line of argument requires us only to refute the reasons the author alleges for asserting that the papacy is schismatic. If the Council of Nicæa was simply an imperial council, we have nothing to do with it; if it was a true general council of the church, it makes nothing for the author, for the sixth canon, the only one relied on, has, as the author cites it, no reference to the jurisdiction of the holy apostolic see of Rome.

M. Guettée pretends that the third canon of the second general council, the first of Constantinople, contains a denial of the papal authority by divine right. The canon, as he cites it, which is only the concluding part of it, says: "Let the bishop of Constantinople have the primacy of honor (*priores honoris partes*) after the bishop of Rome, *because Constantinople is the new Rome.*" Hence he concludes that as the primacy conferred on the bishop of Constantinople was only a primacy of honor, the bishop of Rome had only a primacy of honor; and as the primacy of honor was conferred on the bishop of Constantinople because that city was the new Rome, so the primacy of the bishop of Rome was conferred because he was the bishop of old Rome, or the capital of the empire. The reasoning, which is Guettéean, if we may coin a word, is admirable, and we shall soon see what St. Leo the Great thinks of it. But the canon does not affect the authority, rank, or dignity of the bishop of Rome; it simply gives the bishop of Constantinople the precedence of the bishop of Alexandria, who had hitherto held the first rank after the bishop of Rome. It conferred on him no power, and took nothing from the authority of any one else. It was simply a matter of politeness. Besides, the canon remained without effect.

From the second general council the author rushes, pp. 96, 97, to the fourth, the Council of Chalcedon, held under the pontificate of St. Leo Magnus, in 451, and lights upon the twenty-eighth canon of that council, which, as he gives it, reads: "In all things following the decrees of the holy fathers, and recognizing the canon just read (the third of the second council) by the one hundred and fifty bishops well beloved of God, we decree and establish the same thing touching the most holy church of Constantinople, the new Rome. Most justly did the fathers grant privileges to the see of ancient Rome, because she was the reigning (capital) city. Moved by the same motive the one hundred and fifty bishops well beloved of God grant equal privileges to the

most holy see of the new Rome, thinking, very properly, that the city that has the honor to be the seat of the empire and the senate should enjoy in ecclesiastical things the same privileges as Rome, the ancient queen city, since the former, although of later origin, has been raised and honored as much as the former. In consequence of this decree the council subjected the dioceses of Pontus, Asia (Asia Minor), and Thrace to the jurisdiction of Constantinople."

Of course the author cites the canon with his usual inexactness, and makes it appear even more illogical and absurd than it really was. The alleged canon professes to decree and establish the same thing decreed and established by the one hundred and fifty bishops who composed the second council, in their third canon, which, as we have seen, was simply that the bishop of Constantinople should have the primacy of honor after the bishop of Rome, that is the second rank in the church. The canon, therefore, does not deprive the Roman pontiff of his rank, dignity, and authority as primate of the whole church, and therefore did not, as it could not, raise the see of Constantinople to an equal rank and dignity with the see of Rome. This was never pretended, and is not pretended by the author himself. The council never could, without stultifying itself, have intended any thing of the sort, for it gave to the bishop of Rome the title of "universal bishop," and it says expressly: "We consider the primacy of all and the chief honor, according to the canons, should be preserved to the most beloved of God, the archbishop of Rome."* The non-united Greeks and the author himself concede that the church of Rome was and is the first church in rank and dignity.

Whatever value, then, is to be attached to this twenty-eighth canon it did not and was not designed to affect in any respect the rank, dignity, or authority of the Roman pontiff. What was attempted by it was to erect the non-apostolic see of Constantinople or Byzantium into a patriarchal see, with jurisdiction over the metropolitans of Pontus, Asia Minor, Thrace, and such as should be ordained in barbarous countries, that is, in countries lying beyond the limits of the empire, and to give its bishops the first rank after the patriarch of the West. It sought to reduce the bishop of Alexandria from the second to the third, and the bishop of Antioch from the third to the fourth rank, but it did not touch the power

*Act xvi. Labbe, IV. col. 817.

or authority of either. It violated the rights and privileges of the metropolitans of Pontus, Asia Minor, and Thrace, by subjecting them to a patriarchal jurisdiction from which, by ancient usage, confirmed by the sixth canon of the Council of Nicæa they were exempt.

The author relies on this canon because it asserts that the privileges of the see of Rome were granted by the fathers, and granted *because* Rome was the capital city of the empire. This sustains his position, that the importance the fathers attached to the see of Rome was not because it was the see of Peter, but because it was the see of the capital—a position we showed, in our previous article, to be untenable—and also that the authority exercised by the Roman pontiff over the whole church, which he cannot deny, was not by divine right, but by ecclesiastical right. But even if this last were so, since there is confessedly no act of the universal church revoking the grant, the power would be legitimate, and the author and his friends the non-united Greeks would be bound by a law of the church to obey the Roman pontiff, and clearly schismatics in refusing to obey him. But we have seen from St. Cyprian, the author's own witness, that the primacy was conferred by our Lord himself on the Roman pontiff as the successor of Peter to constitute him the visible centre and source of unity and authority. Besides, a canon, beyond what it decrees or defines, is not authoritative, and it is lawful to dispute the logic of a general council, and even the historical facts it alleges, at least so far as they can be separated from the definition or decree itself. The purpose of the canon of Chalcedon was not to define or decree that the privileges of the see of Rome were granted by the fathers, and because it was the see of the capital of the empire, but to elevate the see of Constantinople to the rank and authority of a patriarchal see, immediately after the see of Rome, and simply assigns this as a reason for doing so; and a very poor reason it was, too, at least in the judgment of St. Leo the Great, as we shall soon see.

But there is something more to be said in regard to this twenty-eighth canon of the Council of Chalcedon. The council is generally accepted as the fourth general council, but only by virtue of the papal confirmation, and only so far as the pope confirmed its acts. In many respects the council was a scandalous assembly, almost wholly controlled by the emperor and the Byzantine lawyers or magistrates, who have no authority in the church of God. The part taken by the

emperor and civil magistrates wholly vitiated it as a council of the church, and all the authority its acts had or could have for the church was derived from their confirmation by St. Leo the Great. But bad as the council was, the twenty-eighth canon never received its sanction. It was introduced by the civil magistrates, and when only one hundred and fifty bishops, all orientals, out of the six hundred composing the council, were present, and no more subscribed it. It was resisted by the legates of the Roman pontiff and protested against; the patriarchal churches of Alexandria and Antioch were unrepresented. Dioscurus, bishop of the former, was excluded for his crimes, and Macarius of Antioch had just been deposed by the emperor and council for heresy and expelled; a large number of prelates had withdrawn, and only the rump of the council remained. It is idle to pretend that the canon in question was the act even of the council, far less of the universal church.

Now, either Leo the Roman pontiff had authority to confirm the acts of the Council of Chalcedon, and by his authority as supreme pastor of the church to heal their defects and make them binding on the universal church, or he had not. If he had, the controversy is ended, for that is precisely what Mr. Guettée denies; if he had not, as Mr. Guettée contends, then the acts of Chalcedon have in themselves no authority for the church, since through the tyranny of the emperor Marcian and the civil magistrates it was not a free council, and, though legally convoked and presided over, was not capable of binding the church. The author may take which horn of the dilemma he chooses, for the pope refused to confirm the twenty-eighth canon, and declared it null and void from the beginning.

The fathers of the council, or a portion of them, in the name of the council, addressed a letter to the Roman pontiff in which they recognize him as the constituted interpreter of the words and faith of Peter for all, explain what they have done, the motives from which they have acted, and pray him "to honor their judgment by his *decrees*"—that is, confirm their acts. St. Leo confirmed those of their acts that pertained to the definition of faith, but refused to confirm the twenty-eighth canon, which he annulled and declared void, as enacted without authority, and against the canons.

Mr. Guettée says, pp. 97, 98, that the council did not ask the Roman pontiff to confirm the canon in question, "but

by his own decrees to honor the judgment which had been rendered. If the confirmation of the bishop of Rome had been necessary, would the decree of Chalcedon have been a judgment, a promulgated decision, before that confirmation?" An authoritatively "promulgated decision" certainly not; but the author forgets that the canon had not been promulgated, and never became "a promulgated decision." As to its being a judgment, a final or complete judgment it was not, and the council, by calling it *nostrum judicium*, do not pretend that it was. They present it to the Roman pontiff only as an inchoate judgment, to be completed by his confirmation. They tell the pope that his legates have protested against it, probably because they wished to preserve to him its initiation, and that in adopting it they "had deferred to the emperor, to the senate, and the whole imperial city, thinking only to finish the work which his holiness, who always delights to diffuse his favors, had begun." The plain English of which is, We have enacted the canon out of deference to the civil authority and the wishes of the imperial city, subject to your approval. *Rogamus igitur, honora et tuis sententiis nostrum judicium.* "We pray you, therefore, to honor our judgment by your decrees."* If this does not mean asking the pope to confirm their act or judgment, we know not what would so mean. It is certain that St. Leo himself, who is one of the author's anti-papal authorities, so understood it, as is evident from his replies to the emperor, the empress, and Anatolius, bishop of Constantinople, the assertion of M. Guettée to the contrary notwithstanding.

The Emperor Marcian wrote expressly to St. Leo, begging him to confirm by his apostolic authority the acts of the council, and especially the twenty-eighth canon, because without his confirmation they would have no authority. The Empress Pulcheria wrote him to the same effect, and finally Anatolius did the same. To the emperor the Roman pontiff replied, and set forth the reasons why he could not confirm the canon in question. He makes short work with M. Guettée's doctrine, broached in the second council, and extended in the twenty-eighth canon of Chalcedon, that the rank and authority of the see derive from the rank, authority, or importance of the city in which it is established. He denies that the fact that Constantinople was the second capi-

* Op. S. Leon., tom. i. col. 960–962. Migne's edition.

tal of the empire, or the new Rome, was any reason for elevating its bishop to the patriarchal rank and authority. "Let, as we desire, the city of Constantinople have its glory, and, protected by the right hand of God, may it long enjoy the reign of your clemency; but different is the reason of secular things from the reason of divine things, and no edifice will be stable unless it is built on that rock (St. Matthew xvi. 18) which the Lord has laid for a foundation. Who covets what is not his due shall lose what is his own. Let it suffice this man (Anatolius), that by the aid of your piety and my assent and favor, he has obtained the episcopate of so great a city. Let him not disdain the imperial city because he cannot make it an apostolic see; and let him by no means hope to enlarge his power at the expense of others."

It is very clear from this that St. Leo did by no means concede that the bishop of Constantinople was entitled to be clothed with patriarchal power and take precedence of the patriarch of Alexandria, because he had his see in what had become the second capital of the empire. *Alia ratio est rerum secularium, alia divinarum; nec præter illam petram quam Dominus in fundamento posuit, stabilis erit ulla constructio*; that is, only what is built on Peter, the rock, will stand, and in vain do you build on the greatness, splendor, and dignity of earthly cities.* If M. Guettée had remembered this, he would never have turned from the chair of Peter, or allowed himself to be seduced by the nationalism of the Greek sophists, and the miguided ambition of the bishop of Constantinople. Alas! he left his father's house, and, famished in the far country to which he has wandered, he is forced to feed on husks with the swine he tends. What can that man think of the church of God who holds that the dignity and authority or its prelates have only a secular origin?

St. Leo unequivocally refuses, in his reply to the solicitations of the emperor, to confirm the twenty-eighth canon. "And why," asks the author, p. 98, "did he refuse his assent? Because the decree of Chalcedon took from the bishop of Alexandria the second rank, and the third from the bishop of Antioch, and was in so far forth contrary to the sixth canon of Nicæa, and because the same decree prejudiced the rights of several primates or metropolitans," that is, of Pontus, Asia Minor, and Thrace. This we think was rea-

*Ibidem, ad Marcianum Augustum, epist. civ.

son enough, and proves that the Roman pontiff was not only the chief custodian of the faith, but also of the canons. "The bishop of Constantinople," says St. Leo, as cited by the author, "in spite of the glory of his church, cannot make it apostolic; he has no right to aggrandize it at the expense of churches whose privileges, established by the canons of the holy fathers, and settled by the decrees of the venerable Council of Nicæa, cannot be unsettled by perversity nor violated by innovation." St. Leo in the whole controversy appears as the defender of the canons against innovation, and of the catholicity of the church against Greek nationalism.

The author continues, same page, "In his letter to the Empress Pulcheria, St. Leo declares that he has 'annulled the decree of Chalcedon by the authority of St. Peter.' These words seem at first sight to mean that he claimed for himself a sovereign [supreme] authority in the church in the name of St. Peter." Undoubtedly, not only at first sight, but at every sight. The pope uses the strongest terms to be found in the Latin language, and terms which can be used only by one having the supreme authority, *irritus* and *cassare*. He refuses to ratify it, declares it null, and says, "per auctoritatem Beati Petri apostoli," he makes it void. He could make no greater assumption of authority. "But," adds the author, upon a more careful and unbiased examination of his letter and other writings, "we are convinced that St. Leo only spoke as the bishop of an apostolic see, and that in this character he claimed the right, in the name of the apostles who founded his church, and of the Western countries which he represented, to resist any attempt of the Eastern Church to decide alone matters of general interest to the whole church," pp. 98, 99. If he is convinced, we are not. If such was St. Leo's meaning, why did he not say so? Why did he annul when he only meant that the canon was null, because decreed by Orientals alone; or why did he not assign that reason for annulling it, and not the reason that it was repugnant to the canons of the holy fathers and the decrees of the Council of Nicæa?

"The proof that he regarded matters in this light," (p. 99,) "is that he does not claim for himself any *personal* authority of divine origin, descended to him from St. Peter, but that, on the contrary, he presents himself as the defender of the canons, and looks upon the rights and reciprocal duties of the churches as having been established by the fathers and fixed by the Council of Nicæa. He does not pretend

that his church has any exceptional rights, emanating from another source." This proof is inconclusive. St. Leo had no occasion to claim personal authority for himself, for whatever authority he had was official, not personal, and inhered in him as the successor of Peter in the apostolic see of Rome, and in this capacity he most assuredly did claim to have authority, when he declared to the Empress Pulcheria, as we have seen, that, "by authority of Peter, he annulled and made void and of none effect," the decree of Chalcedon. What the author says he did not do, is precisely what he did do. He does not annul and make void the decree by authority vested in him by the canons, or which he holds by ecclesiastical right, but "by the authority of Peter." He, moreover, was not defending the rights and prerogatives of his own see, nor his authority as metropolitan, patriarch, or supreme pontiff, for this was not called into question; the council most fully recognized it, and in his letter defining the faith against Eutyches, it professed to hear the voice of Peter. He was defending the canons, not for himself, nor for churches subjected to him as patriarch of the West, but for Alexandria, Antioch, and the metropolitans of Pontus, Asia Minor, and Thrace, which the twenty-eighth canon of Chalcedon sought to subject to the bishop of Constantinople; and he therefore had no occasion to dwell on the exceptional rights, or rights not derived from the canons, but from God through Peter, of the Roman Church. It sufficed him to exercise them, which he did do effectually.

"By ecclesiastical right he is the first bishop of the church," the author continues; "besides, he occupies the apostolic see of the West; in these characters he *must* interfere and prevent the ambition of one particular church from impairing rights that the canons have accorded to other bishops too feeble to resist." Wherefore must he do so? In these characters he might offer his advice, he might even refuse his assent to acts he disapproved; but he could not authoritatively interfere in any matters outside of his own particular diocese, or his own patriarchate, far less to annul and make void acts which did not concern him in either of these characters. He had no right to interfere in the way he did, except as supreme pontiff and head of the whole church, and Roman theologians have never claimed for the Roman pontiff greater power than St. Leo exercised in the case of the Council of Chalcedon.

"After reading all that St. Leo has written against the

canon of the council of Chalcedon, it cannot be doubtful what he meant." We agree to that, nor is it doubtful what he did. He annulled and made void by authority of Peter an act of a general council, and null and void it remained.

"He does not claim for himself the autocracy which Roman theologians make the groundwork of the papal authority." Very likely not, for nobody claims it for the Roman pontiff, as we showed in our former article. He is the supreme pastor, not the autocrat, of the church. "In his letter to the fathers of the council of Chalcedon he *only* styles himself 'guardian of the Catholic faith and of the constitutions of the fathers,' and not chief and master of the church by divine right." Does he deny that he is chief and master by divine right? Certainly not, and no one can read his letters without feeling that in every word and syllable he speaks as a superior, in the language and tone of supreme authority. His reply to Anatolius is such as could be written only by a superior not only in rank, but in authority, and while replete with the affection of a father, it is marked by the majestic severity of supreme power.

The refusal of St. Leo to confirm the twenth-eighth canon gave rise to the report that he had refused to confirm the acts of the council, and the Eutychians, against whom its definitions of faith were directed, began to raise their heads and boldly assert that they were not condemned, that the definitions of the council against them counted for nothing, since the Roman pontiff had refused to confirm them, as he refused to confirm the doings of the Ephesian Latrocinium. The imperial court became alarmed, and the emperor wrote to St. Leo for an explicit statement of what he had done. St. Leo answers that he has confirmed all the decrees of Chalcedon defining the faith, but that he has not confirmed the decree erecting the church of Constantinople into a patriarchal church. This fact does not seem to favor the author's theory that the Roman pontiff was held to have only a primacy of honor, nor that St. Leo did not claim universal jurisdiction.

It will have been observed that the Council of Chalcedon undertakes to support, very illogically indeed, the twenty-eighth canon on the authority of the third canon of the first Council of Constantinople, which gave the bishop of Constantinople simply the primacy of honor after the bishop of Rome. But St. Leo, in the letter to the empress just cited,

denies the authority of that canon, on the ground that it had never been communicated to Rome, and therefore could have no effect.

We have dwelt at great length on the sixth canon of Nicæa, the third canon of Constantinople, and twenty-eighth of Chalcedon, because they are the author's three strongholds, and we have wished to show that they do not in the least aid him—do in no sense contradict the papal authority, but, as far as they go, tend to confirm it. The author claims St. Leo as a witness against the Catholic doctrine of the papal supremacy, and we have thought it well to show that he has in him about such a witness as he had in St. Cyprian, or as he would have in our holy father, Pius IX., now gloriously reigning. Leo Magnus is our ideal of a pope, or visible head of the universal church, and we cannot sufficiently admire the hardihood or the stupidity that would claim him as a witness against the primacy he adorned, and the papal authority which he so gracefully and so majestically wielded, and with such grand effects for the church and the empire. No nobler man, no truer saint, no greater pontiff ever sat in the chair of Peter, and no higher or more magnificent character is to be found in all history. *Sancte Leo Magne, ora pro nobis.*

The author says, p. 102: "The canons of the first œcumenical councils throw incontestably a strong light upon the prerogatives of the bishop of Rome. They are the complement to each other. The twenty-eighth canon contains nothing less than the doctrine we defend, even though the opposition of the West in the person of the bishop of Rome should strip it of its œcumenical character, as certain theologians maintain." M. Guettée finds but two canons that in any respect favor his doctrine, the third of the second general council, and the twenty-eighth of the fourth, neither of which was ever accepted by the universal church, and both of which have remained from the first without Catholic authority. A doctrine sustained or favored only by irregularity and violent innovation needs no refutation. "St. Leo," the author continues, "did not protest against it, (the twenty-eighth canon of Chalcedon,) as opposed to the divine and universal authority of the see of Rome, *for which he claimed only an ecclesiastical primacy*, but simply because it infringed upon the sixth canon of the council of Nicæa." That he claimed only an ecclesiastical primacy for his see is not true, for he claimed to annul the canon *by authority of*

Peter. Nor did he object to it only because it infringed the sixth canon of Nicæa, but because it contained a grave innovation in the constitution of the church, and attempted to found the authority of bishops on a temporal instead of a spiritual and apostolic basis. It proposed to change entirely the basis of the pontifical authority, which had hitherto rested on Peter, and to make it rest on the empire. The church of Constantinople was not an apostolic see, and only the bishop of an apostolic see could be clothed with patriarchal authority. This seems to us to be the great objection of St. Leo. Therefore, he writes to the emperor, as already cited: "Let not the bishop of Constantinople disdain the imperial city, which he cannot make an apostolic see." Hitherto only apostolic sees and indeed only sees founded by Peter, had been clothed with the authority of patriarchal sees; and to give to a non-apostolic and non-Petrine church authority over other metropolitan churches was to strike at apostolic authority itself, and especially at that of Peter. The whole organization of the church was from the first based on Peter as the immediate representative of Christ and prince of the apostles. The twenty-eighth canon of Chalcedon was therefore aimed at Peter, and in the name and by the authority of Peter, whom he fully represented, St. Leo annulled it, and declared it void, and the author, without knowing well what he concedes, says: "St. Leo was right."

"One fact is certain, that they (the Roman pontiffs) did not convoke the first four œcumenical councils, that they did not preside over them and that they did not confirm them." This is certain only of the second general council, or first of Constantinople. But suppose it, what follows? Simply that they were not councils of the church at all—which will be very pleasant news to Unitarians and rationalists, who wish a Christianity without Christ—and can have the authority of general councils only by the *ex post facto* sanction of the universal church; but, as the two canons on which the author bases his anti-papal theory have never received that sanction, they have no authority, and never have had any. Hence, the author's theory, on any ground he chooses, has nothing in the church to sustain it. We shall, therefore, pass over what he adduces to prove the part taken by the civil authority in the councils, with the simple remark that the acts of several of them depend entirely on the confirmation of the Roman pontiff and the *ex post facto* sanction of the church for their authority.

M. Guettée's proofs are not seldom proofs of the contrary of what he alleges. "It is undeniable fact," he says, p. 118, "that the dogmatic letter addressed by St. Leo to the fathers of the council was there examined, and approved for this reason: that it agreed with the doctrine of Celestine [his predecessor] and Cyril, confirmed by the council of Ephesus." That the letter was read in the council, and that the council adopted its definitions of faith, is true; but that it was approved for the reason alleged does not appear from the proofs the author adduces. He continues, pp. 118, 119: "At the close of the reading, the bishops exclaimed: 'Such is the faith of the fathers; this is the faith of the apostles. We all believe thus. Anathema to those who do not thus believe. Peter has spoken by Leo. Thus taught the apostles. Leo teaches according to piety and truth, and thus has Cyril taught.'" Any one not bent on proving the papacy schismatic would gather from this that the bishops approved of the letter because they recognized in it the doctrine of the apostles and the tradition of the fathers.

The author imagines that he gets an argument against the papacy from St. Leo's refusal to accept the title of *universal bishop* offered him by the Council of Chalcedon, as we learn from Pope St. Gregory the Great. He also thinks the argument is strengthened by the fact that St. Gregory himself disclaimed it; and he therefore claims both of these great pontiffs and great saints as witnesses against the pretensions of the bishops of Rome. If they had believed in their jurisdiction by divine right over the whole church, would they have refused the title of universal bishop?

John the Faster, Bishop of Constantinople, on some occasion summoned a particular council, and signed its acts, which he transmitted to Pope Pelagius II. as universal patriarch, for which, as St. Gregory says, Pelagius, "in virtue of the authority of the apostle St. Peter, nullified the acts of the synod." Gregory succeeded Pelagius, and immediately on his accession to the pontificate wrote to the patriarchs of Alexandria, Antioch, and Jerusalem, condemning the title, and warning them and the whole church of the danger it threatened; and also he wrote to John the Faster himself, admonishing him of the impropriety of the title, not only as savoring of pride and vanity, but as involving a most serious error against faith, and beseeching him to lay it aside, lest he be obliged to cut him off from the communion of the church, and depose him from his bishopric.

He does not at all disclaim his own authority as supreme pastor and governor of the universal church, but quietly assumes it. Thus, he writes to the Emperor Maurice, as cited by the author: "All who know the gospel know that the care of the whole church was confided by our Lord himself to Peter, the first (St. Gregory says *prince*) of all the apostles. Indeed, he said to him, 'Peter, lovest thou me? Feed my sheep.' Again he said to him: 'Satan has desired to sift thee as wheat; but I have prayed for thee, that thy faith fail not; and when thou art converted, strengthen thy brethren.' It was also said to him: 'Thou art Peter, and upon this rock will I build my church, and the gates of hell shall not prevail against it; and I will give thee the keys of the kingdom of heaven, and whatsoever thou shalt bind on earth shall be bound in heaven, and whatsoever thou shalt loose on earth shall be loosed in heaven.' He thus received the keys of the celestial kingdom; the power to bind and loose was given him; the care of all the church and the primacy [*principatus*—principality, or primacy of jurisdiction] were committed to him, and yet he did not call himself *universal apostle*. But that holy man John (bishop of Constantinople), my brother in the priesthood [cosacerdos], would fain assume the title of *universal bishop*! O tempora! O mores!" (pp. 212, 213.)

"It is certain," St. Gregory continues, "that this title was offered to the Roman pontiff by the venerable council of Chalcedon, to honor Blessed Peter, prince of the apostles. But none of us has consented to use this particular title, [title of singularity,] lest by conferring a special matter on one alone, all priests would be deprived of the honor which is their due. How, then, while we are not ambitious of the glory of a title which has been offered us, does another, to whom no one has offered it, have the presumption to take it?" (pp. 214, 215.)

In his letter to Eulogius of Alexandria and Anastasius of Antioch, St. Gregory is more explicit still, "As your holiness, whom I particularly venerate, well knows, this title of *universal*, was offered by the Council of Chalcedon to the bishop [pontiff] of the apostolic see, which by God's grace I serve. But none of my predecessors would use this impious word, because in reality, if a patriarch be called *universal*, it takes from all others the title of patriarch." The author, after quoting a passage from another letter to Eulogius, adds: "Thus did Pope Gregory condemn even in the per-

son of the bishops of Rome the title of pope and universal." But in this he is mistaken, as his own quotation shows. Eulogius answers that he will not give the title of universal patriarch to the bishop of Constantinople, but that he gives that of universal pope to the Roman pontiff. "No," says St. Gregory, "if your holiness calls me universal pope, you deny yourself what I should then be altogether." The author interpolates in his quotation the copulative *and*, which is not in St. Gregory's text. It is not to the title of *pope* that St. Gregory objects, which was and is applied to simple presbyters, but the title *universal*, which he will not permit to be applied to any man, because it excludes others from all participation in the hierarchy, or even the priesthood. If you call a man a universal presbyter, you deny that any others are presbyters; if you call any one universal bishop, you exclude all others from the episcopate; if you call any one universal patriarch, you deny the patriarchate to all others; and if you call the bishop of Rome universal pope, since as such he possesses the priesthood, and both the apostolate and the episcopate in their plenitude, you exclude all others from sharing the priesthood, the episcopate, or the apostolate, even the pope himself from the church, and deny the solidarity of apostles, bishops, and presbyters, asserted, as we have seen, by St. Cyprian.

Eulogius was priest, bishop, and patriarch, and as such was the brother of the Roman pontiff. This brotherhood remained all the same, whether the Roman pontiff had or not supreme jurisdiction over the whole church. When Eulogius called St. Gregory, not, as the author says, pope *and* universal, but universal pope, he denied this brotherhood, and deprived himself of his own priestly, episcopal, and apostolic character. Hence, St. Gregory, after saying to him and other bishops, "I know what I am, and what you are; by your place or office, you are my brothers, by your virtues, my fathers," he adds, in reference to the title of universal which Eulogius had given him, "I beseech your holiness to do so no more in future, for you take from yourself what you give in excess to another. I do not ask to increase in dignities, but in virtues. I do not esteem that an honor by which my brethren are deprived of theirs. For my honor is the honor of the universal church, my honor is the unshaken firmness of my brethren. Then am I truly honored when to no one is denied the honor that is his due. For, if your holiness calls me universal pope, you deny that

you are yourself what I should be confessed to be universally. Sed absit hoc. Recedant verba quæ vanitatem inflant, et charitatem vulnerant."*

We may call the bishop of Rome pope of the universal church, but not universal pope, nor universal bishop, because he only possesses in its plenitude what is possessed in a degree by every member of the hierarchy, and even now, as always, the pope addresses the bishops in communion with him as "Venerable Brethren." The argument against the claim of the bishop of Rome to jurisdiction in the universal church, which the author attempts to build on the refusal of the title of universal bishop by St. Leo, and that of universal pope, *papa universalis*, by St. Gregory, is refuted by St. Gregory himself, as cited in the volume before us, pp. 212, 213. The holy pontiff and doctor, after asserting that our Lord had given to Peter the primacy of jurisdiction, and confided to him the care of the universal church, adds that Peter "did not call himself *universal apostle*." Peter was not the only apostle, and the others could not be excluded from the apostleship. He was prince of the apostles, their chief, the centre of apostolic unity and authority, as St. Cyprian explains, and had the care and jurisdiction (*principatus*) of the universal church, as Gregory asserts, but inclusive, not exclusive of the other apostles. Peter held in relation to the other apostles and the whole church all the supremacy claimed by Catholics for the bishop of Rome. If, then, the refusal of the title of universal apostle by St. Peter did not negative his supreme authority, why should the refusal of the title of universal bishop or universal pope by the bishops of Rome negative their supremacy, or their primacy of jurisdiction in the whole church? Peter held that primacy, and yet was not universal apostle, and why not, then, the bishop of Rome, without being universal bishop or universal pope?

The author is unhappy in his witnesses, and they are all too decidedly Roman to testify otherwise than against him. He cites other eminent fathers of the fourth and fifth centuries, but he raises no new questions, and makes no points in his favor not already met and disposed of; and we may, therefore, pass over what he adduces, since, as we continue to remind our readers, we are not adducing our proofs of

* Op. S. Gregorii Magni, lib. viii. epist. xxx. Migues' edition, tom. iii. col. 933.

the papal authority, but refuting his arguments or pretended arguments against it.

In his fifth division, chapter, or section, the author examines "the authority of the bishop of Rome in the sixth, seventh, and eighth centuries." We have anticipated him in regard to St. Gregory the Great, the most prominent papal figure in these centuries, and shown that this great pontiff and doctor, who justly ranks along with St. Leo, offers no testimony in support of the author's vain attempt to prove the papacy schismatic. We have read this section of his book with care, but we find that, while he shows very clearly that the Roman pontiff, to save the faith and the constitution and canons of the church from the attacks of the heretics and schismatics of the East, was obliged to intervene with his supreme authority in the affairs of the Eastern churches more frequently than in earlier ages, he brings forward nothing different from what has already been refuted to prove that they did not possess the authority which they exercised by divine right. We may say, then, that the author has totally failed to establish his first conclusion, that "the bishop of Rome did not for eight centuries possess the sovereignty of divine right which he has since sought to exercise." The facts he adduces prove that during those centuries the popes did exercise all the authority they have as supreme pontiffs since exercised, and that they professed to exercise it by divine right, and without any contradiction by the universal church. No doubt the author has adduced instances in which general councils have recognized it, and made it the basis of their action; but this does not prove that the papal authority was conferred by the church, and was held only by ecclesiastical right. No doubt the civil authority on more than one occasion recognized it and made it the law of the empire, but this does not prove that it was held as a grant of the emperor, but the reverse rather. The author, then, has not refuted the argument from possession, turned the presumption against the papacy, or proved that he and his friends the non-united Greeks are not decidedly schismatics in resisting the Council of Florence, in which both the East and West were represented and united.

The author, having failed to establish his first conclusion, notwithstanding his misquotations, mistranslations, and misrepresentations of facts, which are numerous and barefaced enough to excite the envy of his editor, the Protestant Episcopal Bishop of Western New York, cannot prove his

second conclusion, namely: The pretension of the bishops of Rome to the sovereignty of divine right over the whole church was the cause of the division. This depends on the first, and falls with it; for it is necessary to deny the divine authority of the pope to govern the whole church before his assumption and exercise of that authority can be held to be a usurpation, and the cause of the divisions which result from resistance to it. Resistance otherwise is illegal, unauthorized, and conclusive evidence of schism, or, rather, is undeniably itself schism. The resistance on the part of the Eastern bishops and prelates to the Roman pontiff in the exercise of his legitimate authority was schism, as much so as an armed insurrection against the political sovereign is rebellion, and the rebels cannot allege that the sovereign in the exercise of his legitimate authority is the cause of their rebellion, and hold him responsible for it.

The author, forgetting that the pope is in possession, and that throughout the presumption is in favor of his authority, argues as if the presumption was on the other side, and the *onus probandi* was on us. He, therefore, concludes that every exercise of papal jurisdiction beyond the patriarchate of the West is a usurpation, and resistance to it justifiable, unless we are able to prove the contrary. We deny it, and maintain that it is for him to prove that jurisdiction is usurped, and not held by divine right. The laboring oar is in his hands. It is always for those who resist authority to justify their resistance. The author can justify his resistance to papal authority only by producing some law of God or some canon of the universal church that restricts the jurisdiction of the Roman pontiff to the Western patriarchate, and forbids him to exercise jurisdiction over the whole church. A law or edict to that effect of the empire or canon of the Eastern churches alone, could it be produced, would not avail him; it must be a decision of the universal church, even according to his own doctrine. He alleges no such act or canon, and can allege none, for all the acts or canons of the universal church bearing on the question, unhappily for him, are the other way.

The author adduces the third canon of the second general council, and the twenty-eighth of the fourth, but these canons, having never been assented to by the West, are without the authority of the universal church. And, besides, they do not distinctly deny the supreme authority of the bishop of Rome, and only profess to confer the first rank and authority after the Roman pontiff on the bishop

of Constantinople. It is a strong presumption against the author that he does not even allege any law or canon of the universal church which the popes have violated, and his charge against them is that of presenting themselves as defenders of the canons against innovation, as in the refusal of St. Leo to accept the twenty-eighth canon of Chalcedon.

But the author, with his usual facility, refutes himself, and shows that it was not the pretension of the bishops of Rome, but the pretensions of the bishop of Constantinople and of the secular government that caused the division. We have seen that the third canon of the second general council, and the twenty-eighth of the fourth, which was annulled by St. Leo, were in violation of the canons, but were prompted by the ambition of the bishop of Constantinople and the secular authority. "We can perceive," says the author, p. 100, "in the struggles between the bishops of Rome and Constantinople, respecting the twenty-eighth canon of the council of Chalcedon, the *origin* of the dissensions which afterward led to an entire rupture." And why did these dissensions lead to an entire rupture? Certainly because the same parties continued to maintain the same claims in relation to each other. The ground of the dissension remained always the same. The question, then, is, which party in the beginning was in the right, and which was in the wrong? "In principle," says the author on the same page, "St. Leo was right;" that is, right in defending the canons of the holy fathers and the decrees of the venerable Council of Nicæa against their violation and subversion by the innovations of Constantinople and Chalcedon. St. Leo, the author himself says, presented himself as the defender of antiquity and the canons of Nicæa; he must, then, have been right not only in principle, but in fact. The real cause of the division was not the pretension of the bishops of Rome to an authority which they did not possess, but their refusal to assent to the violent and shameless usurpations of Constantinople. The attitude of the popes and the ground on which they resisted from first to last were distinctly taken by St. Leo in his letter to the emperor, Marcian, already cited: "Privilegia ecclesiarum, sanctorum Patrum canonibus instituta et venerabilis Nicænæ synodi fixa decretis, nulla possunt improbitate convelli, nulla mutari novitate."*

* Ad Marcianum Augustum, epist. 105,

But St. Leo "could not deny," says the author, "that one general council had the same rights as another that had preceded it." But, even if so, none of the innovations proposed by the East and opposed by the bishops of Rome have ever had the authority of a general council. There is and can be, even according to the author and his schismatic Greek friends, no general council without the bishop of Rome; and the canons on which the author relies were from the first resisted by the Roman pontiff, and, therefore, could not override or abrogate the decrees of the Council of Nicæa.

The whole controversy originated in the attempt to raise the see of Constantinople, which was not an apostolic, a patriarchal, or even a metropolitan see, to the rank and authority of the first see in the church after that of the see of Rome, contrary to the sixth canon of Nicæa, to the constitution of the church, to ancient usage, and to the prejudice of the bishops of Alexandria and Antioch, and the metropolitans of Pontus, Asia (Minor), and Thrace. On what ground does the author seek to defend this attempt, always resisted by the Roman pontiffs and the whole West? Simply on the ground that the rank and authority of a see are derived from the splendor and importance of the city in the empire. He assigns and pretends to assign no other ground. "The Nicæan council," he says, "in consecrating the usage by which the bishop of Rome was regarded as the first in honor in the church, had in view not so much the apostolic origin of his see as the splendor which he acquired from the importance of the city of Rome. . . . . Why, then, should not the bishop of Constantinople have been received as second in rank, Constantinople having become the second capital of the empire; since the bishop of Rome was first in rank, only because of its position as the first capital?" (pp. 100, 101.)

The argument is worthless, because its premises are false. In the first place, the question is one of authority as well as of rank. In the second place, the Council of Nicæa did not consecrate the usage by which the primacy, whether of honor or jurisdiction, was ascribed to the bishop of Rome, but confirmed the usage by which the bishop of Alexandria, the bishop of Antioch, and other metropolitans held a certain rank, and enjoyed certain privileges, and gave as their reason that a like usage or custom obtained with the bishop of Rome. In the third place, the council says not one word

about the splendor acquired by the Roman pontiff from the importance of the city of Rome; and we have proved that, whatever his rank and authority, he derived it from the fact that his see was held to be the see of Peter, and he the successor of Peter, the prince of the apostles. Finally, the author has no ground for his assertion, except the third canon of the second general council and the twenty-eighth of the fourth, the latter authoritatively annulled and the former declared to be without effect by St. Leo, and neither ever receiving the sanction or assent of the universal church. The ground on which the bishop of Constantinople based his ambitious pretensions, that of being bishop of the second capital of the empire, is wholly untenable. "Alia ratio est rerum secularium, alia divinarum," says St. Leo. "We laughed," says Pope St. Gelasius as cited by the author, p. 198, "at what they (the Eastern bishops) claim for Acacius (bishop of Constantinople) because he was bishop of the imperial city. . . . The power of the secular empire is one thing, the distribution of ecclesiastical dignities is quite a different thing. However small a city may be, it does not diminish the greatness of the prince who dwells there; but it is quite as true that the presence of the emperor does not change the order of religion; and such a city should rather profit by its advantages to preserve the freedom of religion, by keeping peaceably within its proper limits."

From first to last, one is struck, in reading the history of the controversy, not only with the superior calmness and dignity of the Roman pontiffs, but with their profound wisdom and catholic sense. They defend throughout the catholicity of the church against Greek nationalism, and the independence of the kingdom of Christ on earth against its subjection to the secular empire, which was attempted and finally succeeded at Constantinople, and is the case in Russia, Great Britain, and all modern schismatical and heretical states and empires. The author sees and appreciates nothing of this; he comprehends nothing of the church as the mystic body of Christ, the continuous representation of the Incarnation; his ideas are external, political, unspiritual, and, as far as appears from his book, pagan rather than Christian. The church he recognizes, as far as he recognizes any, is national, not catholic, and holds from the imperial authority, not from Christ, and has no completeness in itself.

It was precisely in nationalism, in regarding the church

as organized for the Roman Empire, not for the whole world, and in recognizing the authority of the civil power in theological and ecclesiastical matters, as the author himself unwittingly shows, that the Greek schism originated. The bishop of Constantinople, having in the hierarchy no apostolic, patriarchal, or metropolitan rank or authority beyond that which is held by every suffragan bishop, was obliged, in order to defend his ambitious aspirations to the second rank in the church, to give the hierarchy a secular origin, and to fall back on the imperial authority to support him. The idea was pagan, not Christian, and was but too acceptable to the Byzantine Cæsars. In pagan Rome the emperor was at once imperator and pontifex maximus, and held in his own person the supreme authority in both civil and religious matters. He preserved the tradition of this in Christian Rome, and continually struggled to be under Christianity what he had been under paganism. In the West the imperial pretensions were in the main successfully resisted, though not without long and bitter struggles, which have not even yet completely ended; but in the East, owing to the ambition and frequent heresy of the bishop of Constantinople, rarely faithful to the church after Constantinople became an imperial capital, and until the great patriarchates of Alexandria, Antioch, and Jerusalem, weakened by the Arian, Nestorian, monophysite, and monothelite heresies, and betrayed by the heretics, had fallen, through the pride, treachery, and imbecility of the Byzantine court, under the power of the Mohamedans, those bitter enemies of the cross, the emperor was enabled to grasp the pontifical power, to bring the administration of religion under his despotic control, to make and unmake, murder or exile bishops at his will or the caprices of the ladies of his court. Hence the Greek schism.

And this is what M. Guettée defends; and because the Roman pontiffs did all in their power to resist such open profanation and secularizing of the church, he has the impudence to contend that it was the usurpations of Rome that caused the schism, and he has found a Protestant Episcopal Bishop in Western New York ignorant enough or shameless enough to uphold him, and to assure us that he is a Catholic in the true sense of the word!

Notwithstanding the author defends the usurpations of the imperial authority and the ambitious pretensions of the courtly bishops of Constantinople, and maintains that all

the general councils held in the East were convoked and presided over by the emperors, he does not blush to object to the Council of Florence on the ground that the reunion effected in that council was brought about by the ambition of a few Eastern prelates and the undue pressure of the emperor of Constantinople. If the intervention of the Emperor did not in his judgment vitiate the third canon of the first Council of Constantinople, or the twenty-eighth canon of Chalcedon, or the fifth or sixth general council, what right has he to pretend that a far less intervention on the Emperor's part vitiated the canons of the Council of Florence? On the principles he has defended throughout, the emperor may convoke, preside over a council, dictate and confirm its acts, without detriment to its authority as a general council. He is by his own principles then, bound to accept the canons of Florence as the voice of the universal church, for they were adopted by the East and West united, and are and have been constantly adhered to by the West and the Eastern churches proper, and resisted only by heretics and schismatics, who have no voice in the church.

We need proceed no further. We have said enough to refute the author in principle, and are tired of him, as must be our readers. We said in the beginning that he had told us nothing in his book that we did not know before; but we are obliged to confess that the examination of authorities into which it has forced us has made us feel as we never felt before how truly the church is founded on Peter, brought home to us the deep debt of gratitude the world owes to the Roman pontiffs, and enabled us to see more clearly than we ever had done the utter groundlessness, the glaring iniquity, and the open paganism of the Greek schism. The author has made us, we almost fear, an ultra-papist, and certainly has strengthened our attachment, already strong, to the Holy Apostolic See. He has served to us the office of the drunken Helotæ to the Spartan youth. It is in relation to its purpose the weakest and absurdest book we have ever read, and has not, so far as the author is concerned, a Christian thought from beginning to end. If this book fairly represents the Christian intelligence and sentiments of the non-united Greeks, it is hard to see wherein they are to be preferred to the Turks, or why Christendom should seek their deliverance from the Mohammedan yoke.

If M. Guettée's readers will weigh well the arguments

for the papacy he reproduces for the sake of refuting them, and his quotations from the fathers and the Roman pontiffs for the sake of blunting their force, they will find that, in spite of misquotations, mistranslations, and misrepresentations, the book carries with it its own antidote. It can do real harm only to those who cannot weigh testimony, who never think, and are utterly unable to reason

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THE CONSTITUTION OF THE CHURCH.

[From Brownson's Quarterly Review for July, 1875.]

Mr. Gladstone has added a new word to the English language, *Vaticanism*, but it may not, after all, prove a permanent addition, for it meets no Catholic want, and serves only a temporary want of Protestant polemics. Yet the Vatican, with all deference to his Eminence, the Cardinal Archbishop of Westminster, has introduced one very important innovation, not in doctrine indeed, but in the mode of presenting it. The Holy Council of the Vatican is, we believe, the first œcumenical council that has treated the primacy of Peter as the first part of *De Ecclesia*, or the foundation before treating the body of the edifice. All previous councils, and all the theologians we are acquainted with, had treated the primacy as the second part of the tract, *De Ecclesia*. Thomists, Augustinians, Jesuits, Gallicans, Ultramontanes, the highest-toned papists, as well as the lowest-toned, those who recognized the primacy at all, had uniformly treated the body of the church before treating its head. Even the theologians designated to prepare the "Schema de Ecclesia" for the consideration of the council, undoubted papists and infallibilists as they were, did the same.

This persistence in what has always struck us as an unscientific method, cannot easily be explained otherwise than by the reluctance of any theologian to assume, on his own responsibility, to deviate from it, or the tenacity with which the Catholic mind adheres to established usage; and it is no slight proof of the presence and controlling influence of the Holy Ghost in the council, that the fathers were able to

change the method of treating this article of the faith against the uniform practice of councils and theologians, and to adopt what is really the scientific method of treatment. Undoubtedly, the need of defining the powers and prerogatives of the primacy, before they would be compelled to suspend their sessions, or to separate, perhaps never to assemble again in this world, was the occasion used by the Holy Ghost to induce them to adopt the innovation, and treat the head before proceeding to treat the body.

This seems at first sight a small matter, but it is in our judgment important; and the change is in some measure necessary to guard against the error that the church can exist as the church of Christ without the pope: which we hold to be impossible. The church is founded on Peter, and without Peter it has no foundation. A church without a foundation is founded on nothing and is nothing—a castle in the air. Till you have Peter, you have no church. We cannot understand, therefore, how we can treat scientifically the church before treating the primacy, without which there is no church. We beg here to introduce a brief disquisition on the *Constitution of the Church*, written before we removed from Boston in 1855, though not published till January, 1856. We omit the portion of the essay* written after our removal to this city, when the *Review* in a measure changed its character, and sought to co-operate with those of our friends who made it their specialty to labor directly for the conversion of non-Catholic Americans. There was something generous and patriotic, and yet more of enthusiasm in the movement which the *Review* sought to aid, but it came to nothing, and the *Review* caused its own ruin. It went so far at last, that many of its early friends hardly recognized it as Catholic, and non-Catholics began to look for our return to their ranks, as if they had any thing to offer us that we had not sufficiently tried before our conversion.

Yet, however we may have been misled by a mistaken policy, against which we inwardly revolted, we held fast, through the grace of God, to our faith, and held, as we still hold, the church to be essentially papal in her constitution. We do not view with indifference the conversion of our non-Catholic countrymen, in whose conversion and incorporation into the Catholic body is the only hope, not only of

*The omitted portion here inserted consists of the last pages.—Ed.

their salvation, but of our civil society, becoming most fearfully corrupt, indeed, rotten to the core. But to their conversion there are many obstacles which, in the ordinary course of divine providence, can be only slowly overcome, and with great labor and difficulty, prayer and self-sacrifice, which surpass the zeal and charity of the mass even of our Catholic population, who have hardly learned as yet that this is their country. We can, as laymen, only pray for their conversion, and, as far as we are permitted, present them Catholic truth in its integrity. The article from which we make our extracts was written *à propos* of a work on church authority by the eminent convert, the late Rev. Robert I. Wilberforce.

An Inquiry into the Principles of Church Authority; or, Reasons for recalling my Subscription to the Royal Supremacy. By the Rev. R. I. WILBERFORCE, M. A. Baltimore: 1855.

THE church is not, as many suppose, a mere aggregation or association of individuals or congregations; she is an organism, living and operating from her own central life, derived from the indwelling Holy Ghost; and it is the failure of non-Catholics to recognize and appreciate this fact, that renders it so difficult for us to make them understand the importance of the unity of the church, and the destructive nature of heresy and schism. The world outside the church has lost, or never had, the true conception of unity in multiplicity, and seems unable to comprehend how that which is multiple can also be one, or how that which is one can also be multiple. All modern philosophy, if pushed to its last consequences, is either atheistic or pantheistic, and loses either unity on the one hand, or multiplicity on the other. In Germany, the tendency to pantheism predominates, and multiplicity is sacrificed to unity. The universe is identified with its Maker, and the reality of second causes is denied. In Great Britain and our own country, the prevailing tendency is to atheism. The British and American mind loses the conception of unity, or confounds it with the conception of totality, or the aggregate. The God it asserts, is not the living God, but an induction from particulars, the last generalization of observable phenomena. With it, multiplicity precedes unity, and the universe is

prior to its Creator. Its unity is the sum total, composite in its nature, therefore divisible, and therefore no true unity at all. Hence English and American non-Catholics fail to conceive of the substantial unity of the church, and regard her as formed or constituted by an aggregation or association of individuals and particular congregations. They place the members before the body, make the branches older than the trunk, and assume that the branches bear the vine, not the vine the branches. The individual believer, on their theory, precedes the church, and imparts his life to her, so that she derives her life from Christ through believers, instead of believers deriving theirs from Christ through her.

This is the common Protestant doctrine, and is the only doctrine on which they can protest against the church, and yet claim to be in union with Christ. Protestants make no account of the unity of the church, and really assign her no essential office in the salvation of souls. They see no grave evil in heresy and schism, and do not understand why it is that salvation is not attainable out of the communion of the church as well as in it. Even some Catholics, more or less affected by the atheistic philosophy of the age and country, and but imperfectly understanding the constitution of the church, find themselves in some measure unable to perceive the reason or justice of the dogma of exclusive salvation. They accept the dogma, because it is a dogma of the church, and they know that, to be Catholics, they must believe whatever she believes and teaches; but they do not well understand why it need be so; and they see no intrinsic reason why there should be any harm in admitting that a man who walks by such light as he has, and is sincere in his belief, can be saved out of the Catholic communion as well as in it. Indeed, we even find not a few Catholics who in reality feel that the dogma is harsh, and hardly reconcilable with the justice of God, and who do their best to soften and explain it away. Hence, the frequent admonitions of our Holy Father, Pius IX., to the pastors of the church, to insist, in their instructions to the faithful, on the absolute necessity of the Catholic faith to salvation, and on the dogma that there is no salvation out of the church.

The error is occasioned by overlooking, or not considering the fact, that the church is an organism, that lives a life of her own, from her own centre, and assimilates to herself

individuals and congregations by a law analogous to that by which the body assimilates the food which is eaten, and converts it into living flesh. The church in the spiritual order, is what humanity is in the natural order. She is in fact regenerated humanity, living the life of grace, as unregenerated humanity lives merely the life of nature. Or we may say, she is the new creation, holding from God as author of grace, as the primitive creation or natural order holds from him as author of nature. The two creations are analogous, and each, so to speak, has its type in the other. Grace corresponds to nature, and nature corresponds to grace. The conditions of life in the order of grace must then be, to some extent at least, analogous to the conditions of life in the order of nature, for the earthly is made after the pattern of the heavenly, and mirrors, reflects, or imitates it. In the primitive creation, in the natural order, the individual can be born and live only by communion with God through natural humanity; so in the new creation he can be born, or regenerated, and live only by communion with God through regenerated humanity. The conditions of birth in the new creation, if birth at all, must be analogous, as far as spiritual things can be analogous to natural things, to the conditions of birth in the primitive creation: and hence St. Paul teaches that the relation of husband and wife, in the sacrament of marriage, is a figure of the relation of Christ and the church. The church is called the bride, the spouse of Christ, and is the mother of his children, the joyful mother of all the faithful. If there is any propriety of aptness in the figure, the church performs the maternal office in the spiritual conception and birth of the believer. The believer is begotten by the Holy Ghost, and born of her, and nourished at her breast, and we always call her our mother, and love and honor her as such. The church can, then, no more derive her life from the faithful, than in the natural order the mother can derive her natural life from her children. As the mother precedes the birth of her child, so must the church precede the birth of the believer.

If it be asked, since the church in one sense is the congregation of the faithful, Where was the church, or what was the church organism prior to the gathering of believers? we might answer by asking, Where or what was natural humanity prior to individual men and women? If humanity is inconceivable without individuals, individuals are equally inconceivable without humanity. But we will not insist on

that answer. The church derives from Christ, through the Incarnation, typified in the fact that Eve was taken from the side of Adam, and formed from him, bone of his bone and flesh of his flesh. Regarded as prior to the visible congregation of believers, the church was in the Blessed Virgin, from whom our Lord assumed his flesh. Hence the Blessed Virgin, a mother and yet a virgin, is termed the mother of God, and the spouse of the Holy Ghost. She is the second Eve, as Christ is the second Adam; the mother, as he is the father, of regenerated humanity. In a certain sense, we may even say that she is the church, and hence the saints apply to her those texts and epithets which they apply to the church herself. She is in more than a figurative sense our spiritual mother. She is the mother of grace, through whom flows the Christian life, and through whom we receive from God his gifts and graces. As the mother of our Redeemer, she is intimately connected with the work of our redemption, and participates in our regeneration. Hence the reasonableness and justice of that high honor and deep veneration which we Catholics render her, the filial love we bear her, and the prominent place she holds in our devotions, so scandalous to no-church Protestants, and which they foolishly, not to say blasphemously, affect to brand as "Mariolatry." Poor men! How little do they understand of the mystery of the Incarnation, and of the part of our Lady, through the grace and election of God, in the conception, birth, and progress of the Christian life!

Now, if there be any truth in the view we take, and which is certainly scriptural, the church is the maternal source of life to the believer, and as such must be herself a living unity, living her own central life from the indwelling Holy Ghost, supernaturally immanent in her as the new creation, as God is, so to speak, naturally immanent in the primitive creation, and imparting life to the faithful instead of receiving it from them. Hence it follows that to break the unity of the church would be to destroy her, and to be separated from her communion would be spiritual death, because separated from the source and current of spiritual life. Hence the fatal nature of schism, and the terrible consequences of excommunication. Each implies the spiritual death of the soul, and even its eternal death, as much as separation from humanity implies our natural death,—not as a mere penalty arbitrarily annexed, but as a natural and necessary consequence, because it places its subject out of all

communication with God in the new creation or supernatural order, and cuts him off from the very source and current of supernatural life.

All life springs from unity, which is always logically prior to multiplicity. The universe originates in the creative act of unity, and returns to unity as its final cause. If we suppose the church to have life at all, to be a living and not a dead church, we must, if we have a grain of philosophy, regard her as an organism, and, therefore, regard her unity as essential to her very being and existence. All life not only proceeds from unity, but is love. Hatred is death, for it separates, disunites. Life is love, and love is life. We have our being in God; in him we live and move and are; and God, the Sacred Scriptures tell us, is love. The nature of all love in creatures is, as the saints maintain, to unify, to become one with its object. The essence of the Christian life all agree is love,—charity,—and its nature is to unite all who live it with one another and with God. It tends always to unity. But this it could not do if it did not spring from unity, for there cannot be unity in the effect without unity in the cause,—unity in the final cause, without unity in the first cause. There is, then, nothing arbitrary or contrary to the general laws of divine Providence in making union with the church a necessary condition of spiritual life, or in making separation from her communion spiritual death. Having instituted his church as the maternal source of Christian life, it would be repugnant to his own divine being, which is love, to save out of her communion, since this would be to treat hatred as if it were love, death as if it were life, or to repute life where no life is.

The church, though like all living organisms, invisible as to the principle of her life, is an outward visible body. The doctors distinguish, indeed, between the soul of the church and the body, as in man we distinguish between the body and soul; but the invisible and the visible do not constitute two distinct organisms, any more than the body and soul in man constitute two distinct persons. Man, though composed of soul and body, is one *man*, in whom there is a union of the spiritual and material natures in one person. The church derives, as we have said, from the Incarnation, and includes both the divine and the human, and is, as it were, an extension of the Incarnation. Yet, it includes the human as it is, not as soul alone, but as soul and body; and as the soul is the *forma corporis*, she can be no living

church without the union of body and soul. As we can commune with the soul in man only through the body, so in the church we can commune with the soul, the *anima ecclesiæ*, only through her body,—with the invisible, only through the visible church; for though the body may bear things which do not pertain to the soul, the soul and body constitute simply one church and are inseparable,—otherwise the church would be subject to dissolution, and might fail, as we know she cannot.

The unity of the church as invisible demands her unity as visible, the unity of the soul requires the unity of the body; for we cannot conceive the soul as the *forma* of several distinct and separate bodies, or regard the church as a monster. If the church is indissolubly soul and body, visible and invisible, and if she be the maternal source of Christian life, which is love, and springs from and tends to unity, she must represent in her visible organization the invisible unity, and be alike one in body and soul. All agree that the church is catholic; but if catholic, she must be one, for what is not one cannot be catholic. Multiplicity is as repugnant to catholicity as to unity. There can be no composite catholicity. To attempt to get at the conception of catholicity by the indefinite aggregation of particulars, is as absurd as to attempt to reach the infinite by the indefinite aggregation of measurable quantities, or eternity by the indefinite aggregation of moments. The larger the number aggregated, the further are we removed from catholicity or the universal, for the more limited, relatively at least, is each particular. Hence the church, if catholic, as all who profess the apostles' creed acknowledge, she must be one. Her catholicity asserts necessarily her unity, and her visible catholicity her visible unity. She is then a visible as well as an invisible organism.

This established, the reason becomes evident why the constitution of the church is papal, not simply presbyterian or episcopal, and why the church of Rome must be regarded as the mother and mistress of all the churches. The church as visible must have a visible centre of unity, a central visible life from which all in the visible order takes its rise. But without the pope and the Roman see, made one in spiritual marriage, this visible centre, this visible central life is not conceivable. Without the papal constitution, there would be nothing in the visible order to represent the invisible unity; which would be tantamount to saying that there

is no visible church at all. But this again would, on the principles we have established, be saying that there is for us no medium of access to the invisible church, and therefore there is and can be no spiritual regeneration or new birth. We should be as to the spiritual life, practically, as if Christ had not been incarnated, and there were no church.

It follows from this that the papacy is fundamental, essential to the very conception of the church in the visible order; and without it, the visible church could neither be nor be conceived. We think highly of Mr. Wilberforce, but we do not find this thought in his otherwise most admirable treatise. It may not have entered into his plan to recognize and develop it, but he seems not to have entertained it, at least in the full sense in which we wish it to be taken. He seems to start from the life of the believer, and speaks of the church as a "confederacy of churches." He recognizes the papacy, but would seem to regard it rather as secondary than primary, as a product of the collective life of the church, than as the original and central unity in which the whole ecclesiastical organization takes its rise. He may not have intended all this, and it may be, that this is only a method he has adopted in addressing his Anglican readers, in order to render his views the more intelligible to them, and his arguments the more convincing to their understandings. Such, in fact, we suppose to be the case, for we are far from entertaining any distrust of the theological soundness of the illustrious convert, for whom we have the kindest feelings, and the highest respect. But taking this view absolutely, without reference to the author, we cannot accept it; because it makes the child precede the parent, and supposes unity may be evolved from multiplicity, which is metaphysically impossible. Unity is before multiplicity, creates it, and is never created by it. The parent precedes the child; the priest, as spiritual father, precedes the simple believer, and the pope precedes the bishop, and is not only the complement but the foundation of the hierarchy, the basis as well as the summit of the ecclesiastical organization. "Thou art Peter," said our Lord, "and upon this rock will I build my church," and therefore St. Ambrose may well say, *ubi Petrus, ibi ecclesia*,—where Peter is, there is the church. Prior to Peter is Christ incarnate and his blessed Mother, and nothing else in our conception of the church. As Christ is prior to Peter, so is Peter prior to the congregation of the faithful under the new law. The pope holds,

as successor of Peter, immediately from Christ, in whom is the original priesthood, and all teaching and governing authority. He is not evolved from the internal operations of the church, nor created or commissioned by the episcopacy, but is the central unity whence the whole hierarchy takes its rise. He is the vicar of Christ, and represents him in the visible order, and is, in regard to the visible, in the place of Christ himself. Christ may use bishops, priests, or the faithful in designating or electing the successor of Peter, as he may use the people as his instrument in constituting the state and carrying on the affairs of civil government; but he holds his commission immediately from the invisible head of the church, not from them. It is not the see that makes the bishop, for the see is not strictly a see without the bishop. The see is the bride, the spouse of the bishop, and he wears a ring symbolical of his marriage with his see. But there is no bride without a bridegroom, no wife without a husband, and St. Paul tells us the woman was not first, but the man; which our women's rights men, whose doctrine is a legitimate deduction from Protestant principles, are apt to forget. Rome did not make Peter pope, but Peter made Rome the apostolic see, which without him to create it, it never could have been, and without Peter in the apostolic see there could have been no other see. The pope is Peter, Peter still living; therefore without the pope there could have been no see, and if no see, then again, no bishop. As in the invisible order all originates in Christ incarnate, so in the visible order all originates in the pope married to the holy see. We call the successor of Peter father. The very word pope, *papa*, means father, and we are not to suppose that this term has been applied to him without a reason, or a good and sufficient reason. The term must have some appropriateness, and imply that he is really, in the visible order, the spiritual father of the faithful. Then we must regard him as primary, as before all else in that order. Without so regarding him we should have to change the language of all Christendom; we could discover no analogy or correspondence between the visible and the invisible, no aptness in the figures and illustrations used by the Scriptures and spiritual writers, and could not even conceive the unity or the catholicity of the visible church.

The Anglican theory, which under some points of view Mr. Wilberforce so ably and philosophically refutes, stands directly opposed to this view of the constitution of the

church. The Anglican sometimes, when in good humor, is not unwilling to cede the bishop of Rome a certain primacy which he calls a primacy of order, as distinguished from a primacy of jurisdiction, but he stoutly denies that the papacy is integral in the constitution of the church, or essential to her existence. He supposes the church to be prior to the papacy, that she can exist and perform all her essential functions as the church of God, without the pope. Having got angry with the pope in the sixteenth century, he rejected him, and now finds himself unable to assert either the unity or the catholicity of the church. The only church he can now conceive is an aggregation of believers or of particular congregations. The faithful must precede the hierarchy, and the episcopacy hold from the laity. Rejecting the papacy, but still retaining the episcopacy, he is obliged to fall back upon the absurd theory openly avowed by some Anglicans, of diocesan churches, and to maintain that each diocese is independent, a church in all its integrity, complete in itself, and having need of nothing out of itself,—substantially the theory maintained by the Independents. But who creates and circumscribes the diocese? who institutes or installs the diocesan? The lay authority, is the only answer the Anglican can give, and consequently he must maintain that the bishop holds his appointment, his mission, from the lay society, or that each bishop, in what happens to be his diocese, is a self-constituted pope, not called of God, as was Aaron, but taking his ministry upon himself, and running without being sent. He can have on this theory no legitimate ecclesiastical authority, no unity, no catholicity; for these diocesan churches are not subordinated to one and the same ecclesiastical regimen, and have with one another at best, only relations of comity and friendly correspondence.

This diocesan theory has grown out of the erroneous notion, which obtained in England even prior to the so-called reformation, that the papacy is not essential to the being of the church. The tendency of the secular courts, courtiers, and jurisconsults, from Frederick II. of Germany and Philip the Fair of France, down to our times, has been to regard the church as episcopal rather than papal, and the papacy as accidental rather than essential in her constitution. In the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries the secular authorities, emperors, kings, and princes, though nominally Catholic, forgetful of the subordination of the temporal to the spiritual, wielding the physical force, and having at their

disposition the chief temporal advantages, gained an undue ascendency in ecclesiastical matters, and unhappily, over the minds of not a few churchmen. We need not be surprised, therefore, to find large numbers misapprehending the constitution of the church, and imagining that she might exist, and be a true church, without the papal authority. It was the prevalence of this notion that prepared the way, and accounts for the sudden rise and rapid spread of Protestantism in the early part of the sixteenth century. No doubt among the coadjutors of Luther there were men who rejected the church herself, and did not even believe in Christ; but the larger part who joined or submitted to the Protestant movement, wished to retain the church and the Christian faith, and never would have become Protestants if they had believed it impossible to throw off the authority of the pope without throwing off that of Christ. Especially was this true in England; and we have no doubt that a very considerable number of the English people verily persuaded themselves, or were persuaded by the royalists and anti-papists, that the schism commenced by Henry and completed by his daughter Elizabeth, was in reality no schism at all, but a simple reformation of abuses, which time and the ambition of the popes had accumulated, and the restoration of the church to her primitive purity and simplicity. Even to-day we find Anglicans who apparently maintain this in good faith, and who really persuade themselves that they are members of the one holy Catholic church, and in union with Christ.

We see here the grave importance of having the people not only rightly, but thoroughly instructed as to the essential nature and constitution of the church. We are not ignorant of the corruptions of the human heart, or of the rebellious nature of passion; but we cannot help thinking that if the people had better understood the great fact that the church is essentially papal, the world would never have been afflicted with the Protestant reformation. In the later middle ages, a strong anti-papal spirit extensively obtained, and, owing to the ascendency of the secular order, everywhere encroaching on the rights and prerogatives of the spiritual, the people or the laity were inadequately instructed as to the real position of the papacy in the gracious economy of divine Providence. They knew that they were required to obey the pope as visible head of the church, but they did not fully understand the strict truth of the maxim,

where Peter is, there is the church. Before Luther brought the discussion of theological questions before the public, and appealed from the schools, and even the church herself to the mob, the people had comparatively little understanding of them. They had ordinarily the simplicity of faith, which suffices for salvation, but very little knowledge of its reasons and relations. This answered every purpose when the civil authorities were submissive to the Holy Father, and performed their duty as protectors of the church; but when these authorities made war on the pope himself, when they wished to revive the Cæsarism of pagan Rome, and make the chief of the state at once *imperator* and *summus pontifex*, the laity were, save when animated by a lively faith and an ardent piety, ill prepared to stand by the pope, and to offer them a vigorous and manly resistance. Their defective understanding of the essential constitution of the church, laid them open to the arts and subtilties of the evil-minded, and rendered it comparatively easy to impose upon their simplicity, and to detach them from their fidelity. The difficulty did not lie altogether with the simple peasantry, it lay in the defective understanding of the constitution of the church by the lay society generally. Dating from Frederick II. of Germany, the lay society was, speaking in general terms, anti-papal, and held the doctrine of which the Anglican theory is but a logical and historical development. We think this was in a great measure owing to the little real theological instruction imparted to this society. More full or more accurate theological instruction to the laity,—the state of society in those ages considered,—however desirable it might have been, was most likely impracticable; and we must not regard it as a fault of the church, or of those churchmen who were animated with her spirit, and conformed to her wishes, that it was not given.

The church is obliged to take the world as she finds it, and to do the best she can with it under the circumstances and with the materials it furnishes to her hand. She, herself, always wishes her children not only to know the simple dogmas of faith, but to understand well all that pertains to sound doctrine. She has no great fondness for what our friends of *The Rambler* call, "The system of safeguards." She does not count temptations and trials an evil, and never seeks to protect the faithful by keeping them in ignorance. She does not teach them that in order to preserve their

virtue they must retire from the world, but labors always by her instructions and sacraments to prepare them to live in the world without being of it, or contaminated with its errors and vices. "I pray not that thou shouldst take them out of the world, but that thou shouldst keep them from evil." The system, which she is supposed to approve, of keeping people in the faith by excluding all knowledge of what is opposed to it, by repressing thought, and insisting on blind obedience, is not her system; and if, as is alleged, it is sometimes countenanced in Catholic countries, we must attribute it not to her, but to the secular order which obtains in them, in spite of all she is able to do. All absolute civil governments, all despotisms and despots, are jealous of freedom of thought, and especially freedom of education. Even in our own country, we find a large party wedded, without knowing it, to social despotism, that are doing their best to destroy freedom of education. They are laboring to place education under the exclusive control of the state, and to prohibit all instruction and all methods of instruction not sanctioned by the civil authorities. The church has always had more or less of civil despotism to struggle with, for though she found it comparatively easy to convert individuals, she has never succeeded in any nation in fully converting society and the civil order. The safeguard system originates not in the church, but in unconverted society; in a state which, while professing the Catholic faith, remains pagan as to its principles and modes of action; and it accords far better with the narrow jealousies and short-sighted views of the civil despot, than with the free, open, ingenuous, and trustful spirit of Catholicity. The church loves the light, for she is from above, not from below; she fosters intelligence; she promotes education, and provides it wherever the state leaves her free to do so; she labors to have all her children well and thoroughly instructed in all that pertains to spiritual, moral, political, and social life, and wishes everywhere a free, manly, and enlightened laity. She demands in them, it is true, the docility of the child, but in understanding she demands that they be no longer children, but men,—strong, energetic men, in whom intelligence is not repressed or enfeebled, but rectified, elevated, and invigorated by the infused habits of grace.

Whatever may be said in regard to the ages immediately preceding the Protestant outbreak, this much is certain; the church wishes her children to be thoroughly instructed, and

the fullest and most exact theological instruction practicable is now a necessity, and the faithful must have it. Never, since the times of the persecuting pagan emperors, has the church had less than now to hope from kings and queens, as nursing fathers and nursing mothers, and never has she been more completely thrown back upon her own resources, as a spiritual kingdom set up by our Lord on the earth. Never, since she emerged from the catacombs and planted the Cross on the Capital of the world, have her children been more mixed up in the commerce of the world with the enemies of their religion, or more exposed to the fatal influences of error and indifferency. Simplicity of faith is now nowhere enough; we must have the knowledge of understanding. It is not enough to know the chief dogmas of our faith, and the ordinary practical duties of our state in life. It is necessary to know the dogmas, and their relation to the practical duties, to one another, and to natural reason. It is not enough now that this knowledge, formerly imparted in the schools to theological students, be possessed by the clergy alone. In these days of insubordination and self-will, when it is so difficult to secure proper respect to pastors and teachers, it must be possessed in as great a degree as practicable by the laity also. Not otherwise shall we be able to meet the wants of our times, bring back a docile and obedient spirit, and guard the faithful against the dangers to their faith and piety multiplied by common-schools, newspapers, and popular literature. The laity, in all outside the sacraments, are now in great measure thrown upon themselves, and their safety, aside from the sacraments, depends to a great extent on their understanding of their faith and its reasons and relations, and in being able at all times to defend it intelligently and manfully.

There may be those who regret the change that has taken place, and feel that we have fallen upon evil times. We canfess that we are not of their number. We think the church will gain more than she will lose by the change, for always does she lose more than she gains from the protection of princes. Princes, with a few exceptions, have always made her pay dear for their favor, and enslaved as much as they have protected her. We think, upon the whole, that she will derive great advantages from being thrown back upon her own resources, as the kingdom of God on earth. We must rely now on virtue, rather than innocence; on the knowledge of what is true, rather than on

ignorance of what is false. Innocence, regarded as a negative quality, is good, no doubt; but virtue, which is something positive, is better. Ignorance is favorable neither to simplicity of faith, nor to fervor of devotion. All faith and real devotion is an affection of the rational nature, and, therefore, intrinsically reasonable. Our religion presupposes man to be created with a rational nature, and always addresses him as a reasonable and reasoning being. The heart she demands is the enlightened heart,—the union of understanding and will. The church can live, and move at her ease, only in an atmosphere of intelligence, and, as far as she has her freedom, she creates that atmosphere around her. She is obliged, as we have said, to take the world as she finds it, and do the best she can with it. She works with such materials as the world furnishes her. Where the political and social order,—what we call *civility*, or the civil order,—is adverse to her, she has to labor under a great disadvantage, for she cannot at once change that order, and conform it to her own mind. She addresses men as individuals, and does and must treat them as free agents. Where individuals are ignorant and enslaved, and the state will not suffer them to be enlightened and emancipated, she must take them as they are, and deal with them for what they are; although they are not what she wishes them, or what she would soon make them, if suffered to address their understandings, and to exert her silent but powerful influence on their hearts. *

We must not forget that the church has never found in the old world a civil order entirely to her mind, and has never been able to show what she could do where the political and social order interposed no obstacles to her progress. Heretofore, she has had to struggle with a hostile civilization. In the old Græco-Roman civilization, so admirable under some aspects, so detestable under others, she has had to contend with social despotism,—the absolutism of the state, which absorbs the individual, and makes man, as man, count for nothing. In the barbarianism of the North, she has had to contend with turbulent passions and an exaggerated individualism, developing itself either in anarchy, or in odious aristocracies, necessarily accompanied by degraded serfs, or a miserable and oppressed peasantry. For the first

* This is all that was republished of this article in July, 1875. The rest is from the original article in January, 1856.—Ed.

time in her history, she meets in this country a civil order in some measure fitted in advance for her reception, in which she is able practically to address men as men,—nothing less, and nothing more. We do not say that the political and social sentiments of all Americans are in perfect harmony with Catholic principles, for it is a lamentable fact that Americans are not up to the level of their social and civil order, and are at the moment injuriously affected by reminiscences of cultivated Græco-Roman paganism, on the one hand, and by reminiscences of the uncultivated paganism of the northern barbarians on the other. But true Americanism—the political and civil order—the American civility—*civiltà*—is in strict accordance with Catholic principles. In founding the American state, our fathers were so directed and overruled by Providence, that they retained from the old civilization of Europe only those principles which harmonized with Catholicity; and added to them only those principles which the popes had for ages been urging in vain upon European statesmen. We hope, on some future occasion, to show this in detail, and to prove conclusively, that whatever of superior excellence we boast in our institutions, we owe directly or indirectly to the Catholic church. It must suffice us, however, for the present, to say, that if the church had had the constituting of our civil order, we are unable to see how she could have framed it more to her mind. Here neither the state nor the individual is absolute. The state does not absorb the individual, nor the individual the state. We have liberty by authority, and authority by liberty. The man does not, as under Græco-Romanism, lose himself in the citizen; nor the citizen, as under northern barbarianism, lose himself in the man. Here the individual is both a man and a citizen, and his civil duties and personal rights are harmonized as they are under the natural law, which the church presupposes, accepts, and confirms. Hence, the natural would seem here to be fitted in advance, through the disposition of Providence, to correspond to the supernatural, reason to grace, civil society to the church. Nothing remains here to be effected but the conversion of individuals, in order to make us throughout an eminently Catholic nation, with a true and lofty Catholic civilization.

Hence, we are disposed to agree with those of our friends who not only look for the conversion of the American people, absolutely necessary to place them in harmony with

the principles of their institutions, but for a new and higher development of Catholic civilization itself. We see no reason why it should not be so. The church can have in this country a free and intelligent laity, such as the world has hitherto never seen. Here she has an open field and fair play. Here are no jealous or despotic monarchies,—no privileged aristocracies,—no oppressed classes, doomed to ignorance and servitude,—no time-honored monopolies, which cannot be removed,—no vested rights working wrongs to individuals, in her way, and impeding the freedom of her action. Here she can address all as equals—as free men, each with a centre of his own, and counting one. Here she can treat individuals as units,—not as mere ciphers,—for such they are in the political order, and rely on them as free and intelligent beings, capable of acting with understanding, and of being governed, not as slaves, but as free men, by appeals to their reason and judgment, which she cannot consistently do in the case of men whom the civil society enslaves and brutalizes, and in whom the habits of rational freedom and manly independence have never been formed. This cannot but prove an immense gain, in securing to the clergy an intelligent and active laity, capable of taking part with them in all those benevolent works, —corporal and spiritual works of mercy, which are within the competency of laymen.

Here the church is destined to give a practical refutation of that popular charge against her, which every Catholic knows to be a foul calumny, that she loves ignorance, and values only blind obedience. She regards ignorance as her greatest enemy, and all her doctors teach that ignorance in all cases is either sin itself, or the penalty of sin. She values no blind obedience, and wishes all her children to understand what and wherefore they believe, what and wherefore they obey. She never refuses to give them, even when indocile and disobedient, as we see in the cases of the misguided courts of Spain and Sardinia, the reasons of the obedience she exacts. If any one doubts it, or wishes in this respect to have evidence of her condescension and patience, let him read the letters of the popes to refractory prelates and sovereigns. What she wishes is not blind credulity, but an enlightened and free intellectual assent, not a servile submission, but a free and cheerful voluntary obedience, yielded from conviction and free will. She throws herself into the crowd, and courts the fullest investigation.

of her claims, makes her appeal to reason, which she respects in each and all, and proclaims to the whole world that she has not come to supersede reason, but to teach men to make a right use of it,—not to annihilate the rights of nature, but to accept, elevate, and protect them.

An essential injustice is done in our days to the church by laying to her account whatever of despotism, servility, and ignorance happens to be found in Catholic countries, and by holding up to the world those countries, with approbation or condemnation, as models of Catholic civilization. They are never to be taken as such models, whether our object be to condemn or to defend the church. She has done much, more than we have space to tell, to mitigate or counteract the evils of the old European civilization, and to prepare the way for a better social order, which, had it not been for the Protestant outbreak in the sixteenth century, might long ere this have been effected; but she has never been able as yet to realize, even in the states which have remained Catholic, a civilization in all respects answerable to her principles or wishes. The elements of the old pagan order in some of its forms, have always remained more or less active. Individuals have been converted, and placed in the way of salvation, which after all is the great thing; but society has remained pagan to a far greater extent than is apparent to superficial observers, and in many places is to-day fearfully pagan, almost as much so as in the times of Tiberius, Nero, or Heliogabalus. European society, whether under its Græco-Roman, or its northern barbarian form, has never been thoroughly converted, as is evident from the ill success of the Crusades; the alliance in the sixteenth century of Francis I., of France, the eldest son of the church, with the Grand Turk, the sworn enemy of Christendom; the storming and sack of Rome by the troops of Charles V., the sworn protector and defender of the church, especially of the Holy See; the present union of Catholic France and heretical England, avowedly for the purpose of maintaining the independence and integrity of the Ottoman empire, the proverbial oppressor of Christians, and a blight upon the fairest regions of the globe; and that rarely has there been, and nowhere is there now, a secular government that does not follow pagan rather than Christian maxims.

We do not deny that there may be despotism, servility, and ignorance to some extent in Catholic countries, though

to a far less extent than in Protestant and in schismatic countries; but they are due to the civil and social state, neither formed nor approved by the church; not to the church, which has always struggled against them, but to the old pagan society which has traversed the ages with, but in hostility to, the society founded by Catholicity,—to the society represented and sustained by Cæsar, and which becomes exclusive under Protestantism. Under the point of view of civilization, Europe, for eighteen hundred years, has been divided into two hostile camps, and its history has been a struggle between the old civilization and the new, between paganism and Christianity, Cæsarism and the papacy, despotism and liberty, passion and reason, ignorance and intelligence; or to borrow an illustration from Persian mythology, between Ahriman, the principle of evil, and Ormuzd, the principle of good. The struggle has been continued on both sides with alternate victories and defeats. The church has never gained a complete triumph for her civilization. The Philistines have always remained in the land, and have more than once held the children of Israel captive. It is not likely that the triumph of Catholic civilization will ever be complete, for the church is never in this world the church triumphant; but if the victory is ever completely won, we doubt not, it will be on the plains of this western world.

Indeed, we think that the most important victory the church has ever won for Catholic civilization has already been won here. There really remains nothing to be done here but to convert the individual, in order to have a society as thoroughly Catholic, as we can expect with human nature, as it is since the prevarication of Adam. It would be well if those, who, under the name of Americans, are making war on Catholicity and foolishly alleging that it is hostile to our institutions, and those of our Catholic friends who are so ready to despair of the country, would pay attention to this important fact. The work to be done here in order to have a truly Catholic civilization, is far less than is needed in any other non-Catholic country. Our people have nearly run through Protestantism, and are in a state in which they will readily accept the church, if they only find that she requires no change in our institutions, and that they owe, as they do, to her and the teaching of her doctors, the principles which they most highly prize in them. Nothing, in case our people are converted, will need

altering in the framework of our society, in order to adapt it to the church, nor in the church, in order to adapt her to our civil institutions. What Catholics bring with them from the old world, derived not from the church, or from Catholic principles and life, but from the paganism which still lingers in European society, its Cæsarism, its distinctions of ranks and classes, privileged aristocracies, and a down-trodden populace, they will, no doubt, have to modify or abandon, as constituting a hindrance rather than a help to the conversion of the country. But every thing of this sort, about which some of our friends trouble themselves quite too much, will gradually disappear, under the free action of their religion in this new field, and the constant influence of the American principles, in perfect harmony with Catholic principles, which constitute the life and vigor of our civilization.

The point we most strenuously insist on, as the reader cannot fail to perceive, is, that the defective instruction in the later middle ages, which we have indicated as a source of so much evil, is due not to the church, to the ascendency of Catholic principles, but to the civil order, to the social state, and the ascendencies of pagan principles adopted and acted on by Cæsar. We are not so ignorant of history, as to pretend that the laity in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries were not educated. They were educated, and often to an extent we little dream of educating them to now. But the lay culture of those centuries was imbued with an anti-papal spirit, and fitted men to take part in a pagan rather than in a Christian society. The great writers in defence of those principles of liberty, natural right, justice, and equity, which form the basis of true Americanism, were in the middle ages, not laymen, but churchmen and monks; men who were stanch papists, and in every contest took the side of Peter against Cæsar. We do not recollect a single layman of literary renown, from Dante down to the seventeenth century, whose influence was not exerted in favor of Cæsarism, that is to say, the despotism of the state. Not one of them seems to have had any knowledge of liberty in our American sense; and however loudly they may talk about it, it is always either the freedom of the nation from foreign bondage, or the emancipation of the temporal from its natural subjection to the spiritual. They are always either simply patriots or Cæsarists, virtually political atheists, adopting the maxim of the Roman jurist,

Quod placuit principi, legis habet vigorem. They were formed under the influence of the courts of princes, not in the schools of the church. There may have been in the cultivated lay society some talk of the privileges or liberties of classes, estates, or corporations, but none, as far as we have been able to discover, except by monks and ecclesiastics, of the rights of men as simply men, much, if any, prior to our own American struggle for national independence. You will not find those rights recognized anywhere in pagan antiquity. They are essentially a Catholic conception, and are asserted in the maxim of our theologians, denied by all so-called Evangelicals, *gratia supponit naturam*, grace supposes nature. The founders of our republic have borrowed not from pagan antiquity, nor from the lay literature of the middle ages, but from the social and civil order introduced by Catholicity, and have really done nothing but embody with consummate practical wisdom and sagacity, those great principles which are everywhere inculcated in the pages of St. Augustine, St. Thomas, Bellarmine, Suarez, and other doctors of the church, as the fundamental principles of natural justice, equity, and of all wise and just civil polity. The church regards the Christian state as a republic, instituted for the common weal, and if she crowns the monarch, it is as the president, or the chief magistrate, bound by the tenor of his office to exercise his powers for the common good of the community. To her it is, indeed, a matter of indifference whether this chief magistrate is called president, king, or emperor; but by whichever name he is called, she teaches that he derives his power from God through the people, and holds it as a trust for their good, and forfeits it by gross and continued abuse. It is only your Gallican churchmen, courtiers rather than churchmen, who maintain that the prince reigns by an indefeasible personal or family right, and inculcate the Anglican doctrine of "the divine right of kings, and passive obedience;" a doctrine fit only for despots and slaves, and which provoked in its reaction the terrible revolutions, that in these last sixty or seventy years have reduced all Europe well nigh to a state of anarchy. It is not the education of the clergy we have complained of, but of the laity, or lay society, and it was the want of a more full and exact theological education of the laity, that prepared the way for the Anglican theory of the church.

The Anglican theory, in its principle, lurks still in now

and then a Catholic mind, and it is not seldom that we find nominal Catholics who have very incorrect notions as to the essential constitution of the church. There are, indeed, not a few who have very little filial affection for the Holy Father, and who look upon the papacy as our weak point. They find the pope to be the chief object of attack with non-Catholics, and that in their religion, which, with their theological and historical reading, they are least prepared to defend. They may not wish precisely to get rid of the papacy, but they studiously keep it as far in the background as possible, and sympathize most readily with those churchmen who go furthest in restricting its powers and prerogatives. They, in fact, see no intrinsic necessity of the papacy, and no reason why the church might not answer every purpose for which she was instituted, as well, if episcopal, or simply presbyterian, as by being papal. It is from the ranks of these that your red republicans, socialists, and advocates of state education obtain their recruits, and they are they who in a contest between the two powers, such as we see now in Spain and Sardinia, side with the temporal against the spiritual. These are, in fact, the church's worst enemies, and do more to impede her work of civilization than open schismatics, or avowed heretics. They are always in her way, a let and a hindrance to every good word and work. They embarrass the intelligent and zealous churchman, and create innumerable difficulties for the Holy Father in his relations with temporal sovereigns. They diffuse around them a cold and worldly atmosphere, damp the courage and zeal of the faithful, render faith to the extent of their influence weak and sickly, and perpetuate the political and social evils, which, but for them, the church would soon redress. A man's worst enemies are they of his own household. The church has constantly experienced that her worst enemies are they who are in her communion, without being of it.

It is to counteract, as far as in our power, the influence of these incipient episcopalians, or presbyterians, in the Catholic communion, that we have insisted on the papal constitution of the church, and endeavored, to the best of our ability, to show that the papacy is essential to her very being and existence as the Christian church. We do not forget that the church is episcopal as well as papal, but we remember, and wish to remind others, that the episcopacy without the papacy is null. We trust we are as little dis-

posed to diminish the rights and powers of bishops, as we are the powers and prerogatives of the pope. Bishops are our prelates, placed over us by the Holy Ghost, and as such we love, honor, venerate, and obey them; but they are placed over us by the Holy Ghost through the medium of the Holy See, and we do not forget that an appeal lies from them, individually, to the pope, or that they even congregated do not, without him, constitute the church, and are incompetent to define her faith. There is no council without the pope, as even Napoleon I. was obliged to acknowledge, and no act of bishops is a law for the Catholic conscience, without his approbation. They can neither teach nor govern without him; and although the teaching of the *Ecclesia dispersa*, or each bishop teaching singly in his own diocese, is to be taken as Catholic faith, it is so only because each communes with the pope, and through him with the others. The teaching of any number of bishops separated from his communion, is of no authority for the Catholic.

It is not the rights and powers of bishops we impugn in the remotest degree whatever, but the powers and prerogatives of the pope that we assert. Bishops receive, we well know, a character in their consecration which does not depend on the pope, and they have rights and powers which he does not confer; but as in the case of the faithful, he is the guardian, the interpreter, and the judge of those rights and powers, and the right to exercise them depends on him, for without him bishops have no mission or jurisdiction. They hold their canonical rights and powers in subordination to the interests of religion, and he, when he judges the interests of religion require it, can, without any fault of theirs, set them aside, as we have seen in the case of the concordat concluded with the First Consul in the beginning of the present century. The episcopacy is essential, but it does not create or limit the papacy, and in the visible order takes, and must take its rise in it.

We do not suppose that Mr. Wilberforce in this disagrees with us, and we have found much consolation and encouragement in the fact, that the distinguished English converts generally, so far as we know, without any exception, turn to the Holy Father with true filial love and confidence. They seem to be free from those distrustful feelings, and those narrow views in regard to the papacy, which were for a long time a characteristic of English Catholics. Men who have embraced Catholicity from conviction, from an earnest

desire to obey God and save their own souls, who have broken up all old connections, and left all to follow Christ, are not likely to wish to mutilate that papal power, the want of which they had so keenly felt, or to shrink through fear of Cæsar or his satellites, from asserting it in its plenitude. However we may differ from some of them on the development theory, we are gratified to find that we do, and can agree with them on the papacy, and alike feel that our Lord founded his church on Peter. We believe it is of the very last importance in a practical point of view, that the people should understand that, where Peter is, there is the church, and nowhere else; that the church is inconceivable without unity, that the unity of the visible church is inconceivable without the papacy; and therefore that he who separates himself from the pope, separates from unity, from the church, from the Christian religion, from Christ himself. It is this conclusion we have wished to establish, not only against those who are non-Catholics, but also against those who, though within the fold, do not seem to us to have a sufficiently high appreciation of the position of the papacy, and who forget to show that deep filial love for the successor of Peter, and that readiness to defend his rights and prerogatives as the vicar of Christ on earth, which in our judgment are required for the spread of Catholicity, the welfare of souls, and the prosperity of Catholic civilization. In this we trust we have the sympathy of all who place their religion before their politics, and believe that if God be for us, it is no matter who or what may be against us.

THE CHURCH AND HER ATTRIBUTES.

[From the Catholic World for March, 1868.]

THE heterodox of all shades recognize, in some form or in some sense, what they call the church of Christ, and hold it in some way necessary, or at least useful, to salvation. The Anglicans profess to believe in a church founded by Christ himself, of which they claim to be a pure or purified branch; the Presbyterians profess to believe that there is a church, out of which there is no salvation; the Methodists and Baptists call their organizations churches, and hold them to be parts or branches of one universal or catholic church; and even Socinians, Unitarians, and Universalists, who deny the Incarnation, speak of the church, though precisely what they mean by it is not easy to say. So far as we know, there is no sect, school, or party, not included among those whom our theologians call infidels or apostates, that does not profess a belief, of some sort, in the holy catholic and apostolic church of the creed.

In a controversy between us and the heterodox, the question is not, *An sit ecclesia?* but, *Quid sit ecclesia?* The controversy hinges, not on the existence of the church, but on what the church is, and only rarely on which is the true church; for when all have once come to agree as to what the church is, there will be little dispute as to which she is. We start, then, with the assumption that there is something to be called the church of Christ, and proceed at once to point out what she is.

The church of Christ, taken in its most comprehensive sense, in all states, places, and times, is, says Billuart: *Congregatio fidelium in vero Dei cultu adunatorum sub Christo capite*—"the congregation of the faithful, united under Christ the head, in the true worship of God." Most of the heterodox, as well as all Catholics, will accept this definition. But this definition includes the faithful who lived before Christ; as well as those who have lived since, and as those who lived and died before the Incarnation could not enter into heaven before the way was opened by our Lord himself, who is the first-born from the dead, and the resurrection and the life, a definition more particularly adapted

to the state of the church since the coming of Christ is needed. The church has indeed existed from the beginning; but before the Word was actually incarnated, she existed by prophecy and promise only; but Christ having come and fulfilled the promise, the church exists now in fact, in reality, for the reality foretold and promised has come. Hence St. Paul, in referring to the faithful of the Old Testament, says, "And all these being approved by the testimony of faith, received not the promise"—or the fulfilment of the promise—"God providing something better for us, that they should not be perfected without us." (Heb. xi. 39, 40.) The church, before Christ, was incomplete, and needed further fulfilment or perfecting; the church in the state in which she exists since Christ, is the church realized, completed, or perfected. According to this state, and as the kingdom of God on earth, she is, as Billuart again defines: *Societas fidelium baptizatorum ejusdem fidei professione, eorumdem sacramentorum participatione, eodem cultu inter se adunatorum sub uno capite Christo in cœlis, et sub ejus in terris vicario summo pontifice*—"the society of the baptized faithful, united in the profession of the same faith, in the participation of the same sacraments, and in the same worship, under one head, Christ in heaven, and the supreme pontiff, his vicar on earth."*

All will not accept the whole of this definition; but all will agree that the church is a society embracing all the faithful, united in the true worship of God under one head, Jesus Christ in heaven; but the heterodox deny the union under one head or one regimen on earth. But what is a congregation or society of the faithful under Christ its head? A congregation or society under one head implies both unity and multiplicity, either many made one, or one manifesting or explicating itself in many, and in either sense supposes more than the heterodox in general understand by the church. The faithful, congregated or associated under one head, Christ, are one body, for Christ is the head of the congregation or society, not merely of the individuals severally; but the heterodox generally, in our times at least, make the church consist solely of individuals aggregated to the collective body of believers, because already united as individuals by faith and love to Christ, as their

*Billuart, *De Reg. Fid.* Dissert. III. *De Eccl.* Art. I.

head; which supposes Christ to be the head of each individual of the church, but not of the church herself. According to this view, men are regenerated outside of the society or church, and join the church because supposed to be regenerated or born again, not that they may be born again. The church in this case is simply the aggregate of regenerated persons, and derives her life from Christ through them, instead of their deriving their life from Christ the head through her. The one view makes the church a general term, an abstraction, performing and capable of performing no part in the regeneration and sanctification of souls; the other makes the church a reality, a real existence, living a real life not derived from her members, and the real medium through which our Lord carries on his mediatorial work; and therefore union with her is not only profitable to spiritual life, but necessary to its birth in the soul, and therefore to individual salvation. This must be the case if we suppose Christ to be the head of the congregation or society called the church, and of individuals severally only as they are affiliated to her.

There is, we suspect, a deeper philosophy in the church than the heterodox in general are aware of. The church, it was said in *The Problems of the Age*, "is the human race in its highest sense," that is, the regenerated human race, the human race in the teleological order, not in the order of natural generation, which is simply cosmic and initial. This supposes in the church something more than individuals, as, indeed, does society itself. With nothing but individualities brought together there is no society, there is only aggregation, because there is no unity, nothing that is one and common to all the individuals brought together. In all real society there is a social principle, a social life, in which individuals participate, but which is itself not individual, nor derived from the individuals associated. Thus in every real nation, not a pseudo-nation made up of the forced juxtaposition of distinct and often hostile communities, there is a real national life. An insult to the nation each one feels is an insult to himself; and if the existence of the nation is threatened, every one in whose heart throbs the national life, rises, and all, in the fine Biblical expression, "march as one man" to the rescue, prepared to save the nation or die in its defence.

The unity of social life is still more manifest when we come to the race. We are aware of the old quarrel be-

tween the nominalists and conceptualists on the one hand, and the old realists on the other; but we disposed of that controversy in the article entitled *An Old Quarrel*,* and established, we think, the reality of genera and species, while we denied that of abstractions, or simple mental conceptions. If we deny the reality of genera and species, we must deny the fact of generation, and the Catholic dogmas of the unity of the species and of original sin. If all men have not proceeded from Adam by way of natural generation, there can be no unity of the species; and if no unity of the species, there can be no original sin, which is "the sin in which we are born," the sin of origin, the sin of the race, transmitted by natural generation from Adam to all his posterity. To deny the reality of the species is to deny this, is to deny generation, that we are born in any sense of Adam; to deny generation is to deny regeneration; and to deny regeneration is to deny the whole Christian or teleological order. We cannot then logically be nominalists or conceptualists and Christian believers at one and the same time.

We do not pretend that the species subsists without individualization any more than we do that the individual can subsist without the species. What we contend for is, that in every individual there is that which is not individual, but distinguishable from the individuality, which is common to all the individuals of the species, and which in men binds all men together from the first to the last, in the unity of their natural head or progenitor. The species is more than the individual, operates in the individual, determines his specific nature, separated from which the individual is nothing; but the species does not subsist without individualization, and could not be explicated by natural generation if not individualized. Yet the entire race was individualized in Adam.

We can now understand the assertion that the "church is the human race in its highest sense," the regenerated race in its progenitor, its unity and reality, therefore in its real head, in the supernatural order. The head of the regenerated race, or the race in the supernatural or teleological order, is Christ himself, the second Adam, the Lord from heaven. Hence the apostle says (1 Cor. xv. 22), "As in Adam all die, so in Christ all shall be

*Vol. II., p. 284.

made alive." The apostle, in this fifteenth chapter of his Epistle to the Corinthians, draws a parallel between the first Adam and the last Adam, which must hold good between the race as born of the first Adam, and the race as born anew of the last Adam; and, therefore, the race born anew must hold to Christ in the order of regeneration a relation strictly analogous to that borne by it in the natural or initial order, to the first Adam. The difference is, that in the natural order the race is explicated by natural generation, and in the supernatural or teleological order by the election of grace. But the relation between the members and the head is no less real in the one case than in the other, and we live in the order of regeneration, if born again, the life of Christ as really and truly as in the natural order we live the life of Adam. The church, then, proceeds as really through grace from Christ, the supernatural head, as the race itself proceeds from Adam, the natural head.

This view of the church is sustained by Saint Augustine, who represents Christ as both the head and the body of the church, and says Christ and his members are the whole Christ —*totus Christus.* If we view the church in her origin, her principle, her life, that is, in her head and soul, she is Christ himself; if we view her as the congregation or society of the faithful, made one in the unity of the head, the church is the body of Christ. Hence, Saint Paul teaches (Col. i. 18), that Christ "is the head of the body, the church, who is the beginning, the first-born from the dead;" "the head, from which all the body, by joints and bands being supplied with nourishment and compacted groweth unto the increase of God." (Ib. ii. 19.) "Christ is the head of the church; he is the Saviour of his body." (Eph. v. 23.) "Now you are the body of Christ, and members of member." (1 Cor. xii. 27.) "We are members of his body, of his flesh, and of his bones." (Eph. v. 30.) "And if one member suffer any thing, all the members suffer with it: or if one member glory, all the members rejoice with it." (1 Cor. xii. 26.) Nothing can more clearly or unequivocally assert Christ as the head of the church, the church as the body of Christ, or the members of the church as members of his body and members of one another, or the perfect solidarity of Christ and the church, and of the members of the church in Christ, and with one another, as implied in the definition of the church quoted from Billuart.

The men of the world do not understand this, because they

recognize no existence but that of individual things, and have no conception of unity. What transcends the individual or particular, is, for them, an empty word, or a pure abstraction, therefore nothing. They have never asked themselves how individuals or particulars can exist without the general or universal, nor how there can be men without the generic man. What has not for them a sensible existence is, indeed, no existence at all. They seem never to reflect that, if there were no supersensible reality, there could be no sensible reality. The sensible is mimetic, depends on the intelligible or noetic, which it copies or imitates. Take away the intelligible or non-sensible, and the sensible would be a mere appearance in which nothing would appear—less than a vain shadow.

We have defined the church in her origin, principle, and life, to be Christ himself; as the society of the faithful, to which all the faithful are affiliated, to be the body of Christ. But the principle on which we have asserted this union of the faithful with Christ, applies only to those who are in the order of regeneration; for in that order only is Christ our head, or are we, as individuals, affiliated to him, and included in him, as the father of regenerated humanity; and hence they who die unregenerated, suffer the penalty of original sin and of such actual sins as they may have committed. How then do we enter that order? By the new birth; by being born of Christ into it, as we enter the natural order by being born of Adam. The Pelagians, Socinians, Unitarians, and Universalists reject the distinction of the two orders, and recognize no regenerated humanity; the Calvinists, Congregationalists, Baptists, Presbyterians, Methodists, Evangelicals, &c., hold that we are translated from the order of nature into the order of grace by the direct, immediate, and irresistible operation of the Holy Ghost. But the Holy Ghost, in his immediate operations, is God acting in his divine nature, and the medium of our regeneration is God in his human nature, the Man Christ Jesus, who, on this view, would be superseded as the mediator of God and men. The order of regeneration originates in the Man Christ Jesus, the Word made flesh, or God in his human nature, not in God in his divine nature; and therefore, to be in that order, we must be born of God in his humanity. If we could be regenerated by the Holy Ghost, or God in his divine nature alone, without the intervention of God in his human nature, or the Man Christ Jesus as the medium or mediator, the incarnation would go for nothing, and we should be made by

the new birth, sons of God in his divine nature (since neither the Father nor the Holy Ghost assumed flesh) as the eternal Word is himself the son of God, and God as he is God; which, we need not say, is simply impossible and absurd. By the hypostatic union with the Word, man becomes God in his personality, but not in his nature, for the human nature remains always human nature. The two natures remain, as we are taught in the condemnation of the monophysites, for ever distinct in the unity of the one divine person. By regeneration we are elevated, indeed, to be sons of God, but sons of God by participation with the eternal Son in his human, not in his divine nature. We are made joint-heirs with Christ, and sons of God by adoption, not by nature.

There is no act conceivable without principle, medium, and end. In the creation of man and the universe, the three persons of the holy and indivisible Trinity concur, but in diverse respects—the Father as principle, the Son or Word as medium, and the Holy Ghost as end or consummator. In the regeneration, which St. Paul calls a "new creation," the whole Trinity also concur, the Father as principle, the Son as medium, and the Holy Ghost as end, consummator, or sanctifier; but here it is the Son in his human nature, not in his divine nature, that is the medium; for St. Paul says, "There is one God, and one mediator of God and men, the man Christ Jesus." The Son, in his human nature, is the medium of the whole order of regeneration, or of our redemption, new birth, and return to God as our final cause or last end. We must then be begotten of him in his humanity by the Holy Ghost, as the condition of being born into the regeneration, and becoming members of the regenerated human race. The heterodox overlook this fact, and even when asserting the incarnation, leave it no office in the regeneration and sanctification of souls, or, at best, no continuous or permanent office. According to them, the mediatorial work was completed when Christ died on the cross, at least, when he ascended into heaven; and now the salvation of souls is carried on by the Holy Ghost without any medium or any participation of God in his human nature, as if one person of the indivisible Trinity could operate alone, without the concurrence of the other two! This, if it were possible, would imply the denial of the unity of God, and the assertion of the three persons of the Godhead as three Gods, not three persons in one God. The heterodox, the supernaturalists, as

well as the naturalists, really deny the whole order of grace as proceeding from God in his human nature, its only possible medium, and hence the reason why they so universally shrink from calling Mary the Mother of God and accuse of idolatry the devotion which Catholics pay to her. Though the eternal Word took the flesh he assumed from her, yet, as that flesh is not in their view the medium of our spiritual life, they cannot see in her, more than in any other pure and holy woman, any connection with our regeneration, and our spiritual or eternal life. They cannot see that, in denying her claims, they virtually reject the whole Christian order.

The difficulty, though not the mystery, disappears the moment we recognize the sacramental principle, which it was the prime object of the reformers to eliminate from the Christian system. In the definition of the church, she is said to be "the society of the faithful baptized, united *inter se* in the profession of the same faith, and in the participation of the same *sacraments*." The sacraments are all visible signs signifying, that is, communicating grace to the recipient. Among these sacraments is one, which is the sacrament of faith, the sacrament of regeneration, that is, baptism, in which we receive the gift of faith, and are born members of Christ's body, and united to him as our head, and as the head of the regenerated race. In baptism we are regenerated, born into the supernatural order, the kingdom of heaven, and have the life of Christ infused by the Holy Ghost into us, so that henceforth we become flesh of his flesh, bone of his bone, one with him, and one with all the faithful in him, as really united to him in the spiritual order, as we are to Adam in the natural order, and derive our spiritual life from him as really as we derive from God, through Adam, our natural life. This is what we understand St. Paul to mean when he says, "It is written, the first man, Adam, was made a living soul; the last Adam a quickening spirit." The sacraments are all effective *ex opere operato*, and through them the Holy Ghost infuses the grace special to each, when the recipient opposes no obstacle to it. Infants are incapable of offering any obstacle, and are regenerated by baptism in Christ and joined to him. In the case of adults who have grown up without faith, the *prohibentia*, or obstacles to faith, must be removed, by reasons that convince the understanding and produce what theologians call *fides humana*, or human faith, such faith as we have in the truth of historical events; but this faith is wholly in the natural order, although it embraces things in

the supernatural order as its material object, and does not at all unite us to Christ as our head. It brings us, when faithful to our convictions, to the sacrament of baptism, but cannot introduce us into the order of regeneration; the faith that unites us to the body of Christ, and through it with Christ himself, or divine faith, is the gift of God, and is infused into the soul by the Holy Ghost in the sacrament of baptism itself.

Hence, in her present state, only the baptized belong to the society called the church of Christ, and only the baptized are united as one body under Christ, their head in heaven, or under his vicar on earth. The satisfaction or atonement made by our Lord to divine justice, though it was made for all, and is ample for the sins of the whole world, avails individuals, or becomes practically theirs, only as through baptism, *vel in re*, *vel in voto*, they are really united to him, and are in him as their head, as we were in Adam; and hence the dogma, *extra ecclesiam nulla salus*, judged by the world to be so harsh and illiberal, is founded in the very nature and design of the church, of the whole mediatorial work of Christ, and in the very reason of the incarnation itself. To say a man can be saved out of the church, is saying simply a man can be saved out of Christ, without being born of him,—as impossible as for one to be a man and in humanity, without being born of Adam. The justice, the sanctity, the merits, the life of Christ, can be really ours, only as we are really assimilated to his body, and are in him as our living head, our Father in the order of grace; and hence it was not idly or inconsiderately, that St. Cyprian, one of the profoundest of the fathers, said: "He cannot have God for his father, who has not the church for his mother." It lies in the very nature of the case.

The other sacraments are channels of grace from the head to the body and its members; and are all means of sustaining or restoring the life begotten in baptism, preserving, diffusing or defending the faith, bringing up children in the nurture of the Lord, augmenting the life and compacting the union of the body of Christ, and solacing individuals in their illnesses, and comforting and strengthening souls in their passage through the dark valley of death. The sacramental system is complete, and provides for all our spiritual wants. Baptism initiates us into the life of Christ; the Holy Eucharist nourishes that life in us; Penance restores it when lost by sin; Confirmation gives strength and heroic courage

to withstand and repel the assaults of Satan ; Orders provide priests for offering the unbloody sacrifice, the stewards of the mysteries of Christ, intercessors for the people, teachers, directors, and defenders, in the name of Christ, of the Christian society ; Matrimony institutes and blesses the Christian family ; and Extreme Unction heals the sick, or sustains, strengthens, and consoles the departing. Indeed, the sacraments meet all the necessities of the soul, in both the natural and the supernatural orders, from its birth to its departure, and even leave us not on the brink of the grave, but accompany us till received into the choir of the just made perfect.

The medium of all sacramental grace is the Man Christ Jesus, the Word made flesh, and the sacraments are the media through which the grace of our Lord Jesus Christ flows out from him, the fountain,—the grace that begets the new life, justifies, sanctifies, and makes pleasing to God, we mean, —is infused by the Holy Ghost into the soul, and constitutes alike the vital principle of the individual, and of the whole body, quickening and sustaining each. In rejecting sacramental grace, the heterodox separate the individual soul, and also the church herself, from all real communion or intercourse with Christ, or God in his human nature, and accept the seminal principle of rationalism, into which we see them everywhere falling. They dissolve Christ, and render the Word efficient only in his divine nature. The sacraments are the media of our union with God in his human nature, through which the hypostatic union is, in some sort, repeated in us, or made by the Holy Ghost practically effectual to the justice and sanctity of believers, and the perfecting of the church, which is the body of Christ ; and as this grace, in its principle and medium, is Christ himself, all who are born of it are born of him, and the life which they live in and by it is the one life of God in his humanity. Looking at the church, in what theologians call her soul, she is literally and truly the man Christ Jesus, and looking at her as the whole congregation of the faithful, she is the body of Christ, and related to him as the body to the soul. It is this intimate relation of the church to God in his human nature, that led Moehler to represent the church as in some sort the continuation on earth, in a visible form, of the Incarnation ; and she is certainly so closely united to his divine personality, that we may say truly, that he is her personality, as really as he is the personality of the flesh he assumed and hypostatically united to himself. Perrone says that, if we exclude

from this view all pantheistic conceptions, it is scriptural, and, moreover, sustained by the fathers, especially St. Athanasius, who says, in writing of the Incarnation, "Et cum Petrus dicat: *certissime sciat ergo omnis domus Israel, quia et Dominum eum, et Christum fecit Deus, hunc Jesum quem vos crucifixistis:* non de divinitate ejus dicit, quod Dominum ipsum et Christum fecerit, sed de humanitate ejus, quæ est UNIVERSA ECCLESIA, quæ in ipso dominatur et regnat, postquam ipse crucifixus est: et quæ ungitur ad regnum cœlorum, ut cum illa regnet, qui seipsum pro illa exinanivit et qui induta servili forma, *ipsam assumpsit.*"* Christ, in his humanity, is the universal church, which rules and reigns in him. We cannot study the great fathers of the church too assiduously, and we wish we had earlier known it. The doctrine we are trying to set forth is there.

There is nothing here that favors pantheism: 1. Because the hypostatic union is by the creative act of God, as much so as the creation of Adam. 2. Because, although God is really the church, regarded in her soul, it is God in his human, which is forever distinct from his divine nature, and therefore in his created nature. 3. Because the Word was incarnated in an individual, not in the species, as some rationalists dream, save as the species was individualized in the individual nature he assumed; and, 4. Because, though Christ is identically the soul, the informing principle, the life of the church, the individuals affiliated to the body of the church retain their individuality, their human personality, and therefore their own free-will, personal identity, activity, or their character as free moral agents. Not all individuals apparently affiliated to the body of the church are really assimilated to her, and virtually united to the body of Christ. They pertain to the society externally, but not by an inward union with Christ, the head and soul. They are, as St. Augustine says, "*in*, not *of*, the church," as the dead particles of matter in the human body which receive not, or have ceased to receive, life from it, and are constantly flying or cast off. *Gratia supponit naturam.* All the operations of grace presuppose nature, and nature has always the power to resist grace. Without grace nature cannot concur with grace; yet even they who have been born again, and have entered into the order of regeneration,

* Edit. Maur. op. tom. i. p. 2, p. 887; apud Perrone, Prælect. Tract de Locis Theolog. p. 1. c. 2; *De Anima Ecclesiæ*, Art. 1.

are always able to fall away, or back, practically, into the natural order. Not every individual in the church is assimilated to her, nor every one who is assimilated to her will continue to the end. But she herself survives her loss and remains always one and the same body of Christ.

We have dwelt at great length on this view of the church, not because we have any special partiality or aptitude for mystic theology, but because we have wished to show that the church is not something purely external and arbitrary. We hold that all the works of God are real, and have a real and solid reason of being in the order of things which he has seen proper to create. He does nothing in the supernatural order, any more than in the natural order, without a reason, and a good and valid reason. We have wished to get at the reality, and to show that Catholicity is not a sham, a make-believe, a reputing of things to be that are not; but a reality, as real in its own order as the order of nature itself, and, in fact, even more so, as nature is mimetic, and Catholicity, to borrow a term from Plato, is *methexic*, and participates of the divine reality itself. All heterodox systems are shams, unphilosophical, sophistical, and incapable of sustaining a rigid examination. Their abettors do not, and dare not, reason on them. The age supposes Catholicity is no better, is equally unsubstantial, unreal, dissolving and vanishing in thin air at the first glance of reason. We have wished to show the age its mistake, and to let it see that Catholicity can bear the most thorough investigation, and that it has nothing to fear from the most rigid dialectics. We do not pretend to divest it of mysteries, or to explain the mysteries so as to bring them within the comprehension of our feeble understanding, but to show that the church, with all her attributes and functions, has a reason in the divine mind and in the order of things of which we make a part, and is a real, inward life, as well as an outward form.

From the view of the church which we have presented, it is easy to deduce her attributes. She is in some sort, according to St. Athanasius, the human nature of Christ, or Christ in his humanity, and he is her divine personality, for his humanity is inseparable from his divine person. That she is one, follows, necessarily, from the unity of Christ's person, from the fact that, in her soul, she is Christ and, in her body, is his body. Her unity is the unity of Christ himself, and the unity of the life she lives in him.

There are individual distinctions and even varieties of race or family among men in the natural order, but all men are men only in that they are one in the unity of the species. Jesus Christ is not only the individual man Christ Jesus, but also in the order of regeneration the species, as Adam was both an individual man and the entire species in the order of genesis or generation. The church is growing out of the incarnation, and, in some sense, continuing it, and in her body composed of individuals born of him and affiliated to him, must necessarily be one, one in her faith, one in her sacraments, one in her worship, one in her love, one in the life that flows through her, animates and invigorates her, from the one Christ, who is her *forma*, or informing principle, as the soul is the informing principle of the body. Diversity in any of these respects breaks the unity of the body and interrupts communion with the head, and the communion of the body with the soul, whence is derived its life. It is therefore all Christians have always held heresy and schism to be deadly sins, and the most deadly of all. They not only sever those guilty of them from the body or external communion of the church, but from her internal communion, from Christ himself, the only source of supernatural and divine life. There is not only the grossest ingratitude and baseness in heresy and schism, but there is spiritual death in them. By them we die to Christ as, in the natural order, we should die to Adam, or lose our natural life, if we were deprived of our humanity or cut off from communion with its natural head. It is not from bigotry or intolerance that the church regards heresy and schism with horror; it is because they necessarily separate the soul from Christ, and destroy its spiritual life; because they reject Christ, and crucify him afresh. It is so in the very nature of the case, and she can no more make it not so, than the mathematician can make the three angles of a triangle *not* equal to two right angles. It is not, therefore, without reason that the church has always insisted that to keep the unity of the faith is the first of Christian duties, or that St. Paul bids St. Timothy to keep the deposit, and to hold fast the form of sound words; for without the faith it is impossible to please God. We know men may err without being heretics; we know that invincible ignorance, an ignorance not culpable in its cause, excuses from sin in that whereof one is invincibly ignorant; but there is no invincible ignorance where one may know the truth, but

will not; and invincible ignorance itself cannot regenerate the soul, and elevate it to the supernatural order, which can be done only by faith given in baptism.

The church is holy, holy in her doctrines, her worship, her life, and in her living members. This follows necessarily from the fact, that in her soul she is Christ, and her body the body of Christ. She is holy as he is holy, and because he is holy, as she is one because he is one. Doubtless all individuals in her communion are not holy; for men may, as we have seen, be *in* the church and not *of* the church. Regeneration, or the infused habits of faith, justice, and sanctity, do not destroy one's individuality, or take away one's free-will; men may, if they will, profane the sacraments, eat or drink unworthily, even fall from grace, and become gross sinners against God and criminals before the state. These are not holy, but the reverse; yet all who are born again, and are united by a living bond to the church, may derive, if they will, life from Christ through her, and all who do so are holy in her holiness, as she is holy in the holiness of Christ. His life, the life of God in his humanity, is their life.

The attempt to disprove the sanctity of the church from the bad conduct of some, if you will many, of her members, overlooks the real character of the church, supposes her to be simply an aggregation of individuals, living only the life she derives from them; and it also starts from the false assumption that grace is irresistible and inamissible. Poor Luther, in the morbid state into which he fell in his convent, could find relief only in assuming that, as he had once been in grace, he must still be in grace and sure of salvation; for grace, once had, can never be lost, however one may sin after having received it. Yet this doctrine was false, and but for his morbid, half insane state of mind, he would never have entertained it for a moment. Protestantism sprang from the diseased state of Luther's soul. A sad origin.

The church is *visible* as well as invisible. This also follows necessarily. The internal life of the church is invisible, hidden with God; but the body of the church is visible, as was the body of Christ when on earth. The church is composed, as we have seen, of body and soul, and every body living on earth in space and time, is by its own nature visible, and would not be body if it were not. The body of the church is composed of individuals united in the profes-

sion of the same faith, and in the participation of the same sacraments, under one head, and is therefore, since the individuals are visible, a visible body. The whole analogy of the case supposes her to be both invisible and visible, as are all the sacraments, which are visible signs or media of invisible grace. The church is the medium through which the soul is regenerated and comes into communion with Christ, the head, and derives life from his life; and how if not visible could we know where to find her, or be able to approach her sacraments, and through them be born again, and be united in the supernatural order to Christ, as in the natural order we are united to Adam? No: the church is as a city set on a hill, and cannot be hidden; and is set on a hill, made visible, that all may behold her, and flock within her walls.

The church is indefectible. This follows from the fact that Christ himself whose body she is, is indefectible, and dies no more, but ever liveth and reigneth. No matter whether you call the rock on which he said he would build his church, and against which the gates of hell shall not prevail, Peter, the truth that Peter confessed, or Christ himself, her indefectibility is equally asserted. He himself in every case, is the chief corner-stone, is, in the last analysis, the rock; and the church cannot fail, not because men may not fail, but because he who is her support, her life, cannot fail, since he is God, and as truly God in his human nature as in his divine. The heterodox of all shades, however they may err as to what she is, hold, as we have seen, that the church is, in some form, indefectible.

The church is authoritative. Her authority is the authority of Christ; and his authority is the authority of God in his human nature. "All power is given unto me," he said, "in heaven and in earth," and therefore is he exalted to be "King of kings and Lord of lords," so that at the name of Jesus every knee should bow. The church is Christ in his humanity, and his authority is hers. for it is in and through her that he exercises his authority. To resist her, is to resist him, and to resist him is to resist God. "He that despiseth you, despiseth me, and he that despiseth me, despiseth him that sent me." This is no arbitrary authority, or authority resting solely on an external commission or appointment. It is internal and real in the church, as the body of Christ, because he is in her, lives in her, and governs in and through her. It is, then, no light thing

to resist the authority of the church; for to do so, is not to resist the authority of fallible men, but the authority of God—is to resist the authority of the Holy Ghost himself. The age feels it, and seeks to justify itself in rejecting the church by denying the divine sovereignty, or that God has any rightful authority over the creatures he has made. It demands liberty, and M. Proudhon, a man of iron logic, maintained that to assert liberty in the sense this age asserts it, we must dethrone God, and annihilate belief in his existence. "Once admit the existence of God," he said, "and you must admit the authority claimed by the church, the papal despotism and all." We have met this denial of the divine sovereignty in the essay on *Rome and the World*,* and proved, we think conclusively, that God is sovereign Lord and Proprietor of all his works. Very few people are willing to avow themselves atheists, however atheistic may be their speculations; and most people have, after all, a lurking belief that God is sovereign, and has plenary authority over all the creatures he has made. Concede this, and the authority of the Son is conceded; and if the authority of the Son is conceded, that of the church cannot be denied or questioned.

The church is infallible. This follows necessarily, if our Lord himself is infallible, which it were impious to doubt. Our Lord is God in his human nature indeed; but God in his human nature is God no less than in his divine nature. In this is the mystery of the incarnation—that God should humble himself, assume the form of a servant, annihilate himself, as it were, become man, and be obedient unto death, even the death of the cross, and yet be God, have all the fulness of the Godhead dwell in him bodily; this is a mystery that only God himself can fathom. We know from revelation the fact, and can understand its relation to our redemption, justification, sanctification, and glorification; but it remains a fact before which we do, and always must, stand in awe and wonder. If Christ is God, God in his humanity and also in his divinity, for he includes both natures in the unity of his divine person, he has all the attributes of divinity, while he has also all the attributes of humanity, what the fathers mean when they say, "he is perfect God and perfect man." He knows all things, and can do all things, and can neither deceive nor be deceived. He

* Vol. III., p. 324.

is the divine personality of the church, who is not the individual man, but the human nature hypostatically united to himself, as we have seen from St. Athanasius. His life is her life, and she must, therefore, be infallible as he is infallible. He who is infallible, as God is infallible, lives in her, and she lives, breathes, moves, and acts by him and in him. How, then, can she be not infallible? How could she err? She could no more err as to the truth that lives and speaks in her than God himself, for she is all in him, and in her soul indistinguishable from him. She is not infallible by external appointment or commission alone, but really so in herself, in her own life and intelligence. We speak of the soul of the church, but as her soul and body are not separated or separable, she must be equally infallible in her body, or as the body of Christ, who is the life and informing principle of the body. The body of the church, by virtue of its union with Christ is, and must be, infallible. But the body of the church is a society of individuals; and is it meant that all individuals in the communion of the church are infallible? There is in the church regenerated humanity which, though it subsists not without individualization, is not individual. This regenerated humanity is united to Christ, its regenerator, and derives its life from him. In all the individuals affiliated or assimilated to the body of the church, there is both this regenerated humanity and their own individuality. As regenerated humanity, no one can err, but in their individuality all individuals do or may err more or less. Reason is in all men, and reason within its sphere is infallible; but all men are not infallible in their understanding of what is reason, or what reason teaches. Individuals who are in the communion of the church, so far as made one with her body and one with the indwelling Christ, are infallible in his infallibility; but in their individuality they are not infallible. Hence, when it is said the church is infallible, the meaning is, that she is infallible in the universal, not in the particular, or in the sense in which she is one, not in the sense in which she is many. Our faith as individual believers is infallible only in believing with the church, what she in her unity and integrity believes and teaches.

The church, we should have said before, is catholic. This follows from her unity and completeness. *Catholic* means the whole, or universal; and since the church is one, and is the body of Christ, who is "the way, the truth, and the life," she cannot but be catholic. She is catholic, in the words of

the catechism, "because she subsists in all ages, teaches all nations, and maintains all truth." She is catholic because in her soul she is Christ himself; because in her body she is the body of Christ; because she is the whole regenerated human race in their head, the second Adam. Having Christ, who, in the order of regeneration, is at once universal and individual, she has the whole, has the universal life of Christ, has all truth, for he is the truth itself and in itself, and is the only way of salvation; for there is no other name given under heaven among men whereby we can be saved—neither is there salvation in another. She subsists in all ages, prior to the incarnation, as we have seen, by prophecy and promise; since the incarnation, in fact and reality; and has authority to teach all nations, and is set to make all the kingdoms of this world the kingdom of God and his Christ. Whatever is outside of her is outside of Christ, and is necessarily non-catholic.

The church is apostolic. This means that she is endowed with authority to teach and govern, not merely that she descends in the direct line from the apostles, the chief agents in founding and building her up, though, of course, that is implied in her unity and catholicity in time no less than in space. It means that she is clothed with apostolic authority; that is, authority in doctrine and discipline. This authority is distinguishable from the sacerdotal character conferred in the sacrament of orders. Men may have valid orders, be real priests, and actually consecrate in schism, or even heresy, as is the case with the clergy of the schismatic Greek church and some of the Oriental sects. But these schismatic or heretical priests have no apostolic authority, no authority to teach or govern in the church, no authority in doctrine or discipline, and all their sacerdotal acts are irregular and illicit. This authority, which we have seen the church derives from the indwelling Christ, and possesses as his body, we call the apostolate. It is inherent in Christ himself, and is and can be exercised only in his name by his vicar, the supreme pontiff, and the pastors of the church under him and in communion with him. All the arguments that prove the visibility of the church prove equally the visibility of the apostolate, or, as Saint Cyprian calls it, the episcopate; all the arguments that prove the unity of the church prove the unity of the apostolate or episcopate; and, therefore, with those which prove the visibility of the church, prove a visible centre of authority, in which the episcopate takes its rise, or from which the whole

teaching and governing authority under Christ radiates and pervades the whole body. The visible church being one, demands a visible head; for if she had no visible head, she would lack visible unity; and would be, as to her teaching and governing authority, not visible, but invisible. Hence Saint Cyprian, after asserting the episcopate or apostolate, held by all the bishops *in solido*, says, that the unity might be made manifest, or the apostolate be seen to take its rise from one, our Lord established one cathedra and gave the primacy to Peter. Saint Cyprian evidently assumes the necessity of a visible centre of authority, so that we may as individual members of the church, or as persons outside the church seeking to ascertain and enter her communion, know what is her authority and where to find it. Hence in the definition of the church we began by saying she is defined to be "the society of the baptized faithful united *inter se* in the profession of the same faith, and in the participation of the same sacraments, and in the true worship of God, under Christ the head in heaven, and under the supreme pontiff, his vicar on earth." The papacy is the visible origin and centre of the apostolate, as Christ is himself its invisible origin and centre, and is as essential to the being of the visible church as are any of the attributes we have seen to be hers. To make war on the supreme pontiff is to make war on the church, and to make war on the church is to make war on Christ, and to make war on Christ is to make war on God and man.

It is no part of our present purpose to discuss the constitution of the hierarchy or external organization of the church, which, to a certain extent, is and must be a matter of positive law, and which, though having its reason in the very nature and design of the church as founded by the incarnation, lies too deep in that mystery of mysteries for us to be able to ascertain it by way of logical deduction. The idea of one living God includes the three persons in the Godhead; the idea of the incarnation includes the church; and the idea of the church includes unity, sanctity, catholicity, visibility, indefectibility, infallibility, apostolicity; and the idea of apostolicity includes authority in its unity and visibility; and, therefore, the papacy is the visible origin and centre of the authority of the church as the visible body of Christ. So far we can go by reasoning from the ideas, principles, or data supplied by revelation. The rest depends on authority, and is not ascertainable by theological reason.

We know from the New Testament that our Lord has set in his church some to be apostles, some to be pastors, &c.; but these are all included in the supreme pontiff, who possesses the priesthood, the episcopate, the apostolate, the pastorate, in their plenitude; and all, except what is conferred in the sacrament of orders, is derived directly or indirectly from him, as its origin and source under Christ, whose vicar he is. This is enough for our present purpose, and it is worthy of remark that always has the papacy been the chief point of attack by the enemies of the church; for they have had the sagacity to perceive that it is the keystone of the arch, and that if it can be displaced, the whole edifice will fall of itself. It is the pope that heresy and schism to-day war against, and the whole non-Catholic world seek to deprive him of the last remains of his temporal authority, because they foolishly imagine that the destruction of the prince will involve the annihilation of the pontiff. It is the pontificate, and Garibaldi avows it, not the principality, that they seek to get rid of. But they may despoil the prince; they cannot touch the pontificate. He who is King of kings and Lord of lords has pledged his omnipotence to sustain it. Our Lord has prayed for Peter that his faith fail not.

It were easy for us to cite the commission of our Lord to the teaching church, and from that to argue her authority to govern under him, and her infallibility in teaching; but we have had another purpose in view. We have wished, by setting forth the relation of the church to the incarnation, and deducing from that relation her essential attributes, to show how the church can be holy and yet individual Catholics can be unholy, and how individuals, all individuals in their individuality, can be fallible and err, and yet she be infallible. The heterodox argue against the church from the misconduct of individual Catholics. They ransack history and collect a long list of misdeeds, crimes, and sins, of which Catholics have been guilty, and then ask, How can a church who has done such things be holy or be the church of God? In the first place, we answer, none of the things alleged have been committed by the church, but, if committed at all, it has been by individuals in the church; and in the second place, even rebirth in baptism does not, as we have seen, destroy the personality of the individual, or take away his free will. He can sin after grace as well as before, and glorification is promised only to those who persevere to the end. The church is holy by her union with Christ, as his body;

individuals are so by their assimilation to her, and by living through her the life of Christ.

It is asked again how, if the church is infallible, can individuals be fallible; and if individuals are fallible, and do not unfrequently err, how can the church be infallible? How from any possible number of fallibles get an infallible? The answer is in principle the same. The church is infallible, for he who assumed human nature, and whose body she is, is her personality, for she is individualized in the individual human nature he assumed; but the individual is not in himself infallible, for he retains his own personality with all its limitations and imperfections. The infallibility is in Christ, and proceeds from him to the regenerated race, not to the individual member in his individuality. Our Lord assumed human nature without its human personality, though human nature individualized; but individuals assimilated to Christ through the church retain their proper human personality, and are infallible only in the church, only so far as they think and speak her thoughts, and believe what she believes and teaches. The pope himself is not personally infallible, but at most only when speaking *ex cathedra*, in union with the mind of the church, and declaring her faith. Hence some theologians maintain that the papal definitions themselves are reformable till expressly or tacitly accepted by the universal church, though we do not agree with them; for we regard the pope as the vicar of Christ in teaching as well as in governing, and, therefore, as expressing, when speaking officially, the infallible faith of the universal church. For us, in the language of St. Ambrose, *ubi Petrus, ibi ecclesia.* Whenever the church speaks, she speaks the words of her Lord, and is infallible and authoritative; whenever the individual speaks in his own individuality, he is fallible, and his words, as his, have no authority. The church can then be infallible and individuals fallible. Consequently, any arguments drawn from the errors and misdeeds of individuals have no weight against the church.

If non-Catholics would pay attention to this, they would write fewer books, publish fewer essays, and preach fewer sermons, against the church, for they have hitherto alleged little or nothing against her but the errors and bad conduct of churchmen. When they wish for examples of the purest and most heroic sanctity, they are obliged to seek them in her communion, and the most anti-Catholic among them feel that they may assert without proof any doctrine they hap-

pen to like, if the church has taught and teaches it. It is remarkable with what confidence and mental relish they assert particular doctrines for which they feel that they have her authority. Is it because a secret conviction of her infallibility lurks in the minds of all who are Catholic by their reminiscences? and would they not be far less enraged against what they call "the seductions of Rome," if it were not so, if they did not feel themselves constantly tempted to return to her communion? They resist her influence, in fact, only by a constant effort, by main strength.

But it is time to bring our remarks to a close. We have opened a vast subject, one to which we could do scant justice in a magazine article, even if we were otherwise able, as we are not, to treat it not altogether unworthily. No mortal can speak worthily of the church of Christ, in which the power, the wisdom, the justice, the love, and the mercy of God, of the indivisible and ever blessed Trinity, in all their infinitude are, so to speak, embodied and displayed. Even God himself cannot do more or better than he has done in the church, for he gives in her himself, and more than himself even he cannot give. How great, how glorious, how awful is the church! How great, how exceedingly great, the loving kindness of God, who permits us to call her our mother, to draw life from her breasts, and to rest on her bosom! We love the church, who is to us the sum of all things good and holy, and we grieve daily over those who know her not; we grieve when her own children seem to treat her with levity or indifference; we are pained to the heart when we hear men, who have souls to save, for whom Christ died, and whom she longs to clasp to her loving bosom, railing against her, calling her "the mystery of iniquity," and her chief pontiff "the man of sin." We seem to see our Lord crucified afresh on Calvary, and to hear her sweet voice pleading, "Father, forgive them, for they know not what they do."

AUTHORITY IN MATTERS OF FAITH.

ARTICLE I.

[From the Catholic World for November, 1871.]

THE question we propose to discuss in this article is opened in the note from the editor of the *Catholic World*, which we introduce, answering an objection to the infallibility of the church, made by a lawyer through a third person, and by an elaborate note from the lawyer in reply, and urging another and, in his judgment, a still more serious objection. The editor's note is:

"The objection of your friend against the *infallible* Bible interpreted by a *fallible* reason, as a sure rule of faith, is unanswerable. Nothing stronger could be said against the Protestant position.

"His objection against the church, *so far as it goes*, if I understand it correctly, is also unanswerable. It is quite evident that no agglomeration of fallible men can make an infallible church, either by the personal authority of the individuals or in virtue of their agglomeration. But that is by no means the question with us.

"We deny that the church is simply an agglomeration of men; and we deny that the infallibility comes by the authority of its members in any way.

"As Christ is a Theanthropical person, so also the church is a Theanthropical society, of which Christ is the head, the Holy Ghost the soul, and the regenerated men the body. The infallibility comes from the Holy Ghost, through Christ, to the body.

"*If it is so*, it is evident that the infallibility will remain as long as the union shall last. And in that supposition the learned lawyer cannot fail to see that infallibility does not, in any way, come to the body by the authority of its members, but from God, the only authoritative and absolute power in the world, which can bind the minds as well as the wills of men.

"That is the Catholic question, and the real position we maintain."

This speaks for itself, and the position it takes is not controverted. But the lawyer says it does not meet the question, that is, we presume, the question as it is in his mind, though he had not previously expressed it. He says:

"The note given me does not meet the question. It is claimed that

the church is infallible because a divine institution—that is, because established by God.

"Now, admit it to be a divine institution, if it is to be presented for our acceptance, it must be for the acceptance of our fallible reason.

"For example, when the missionary carries the church to the heathen, does he not present it for their rational acceptance? And if so, does he not ask their finite judgment to pass upon and accept the infinite and the absolute?

"Now, the point is this: if the thing or truth presented be infinite and absolute, and the person to whom it is presented be imperfect, fallible, and conditioned, how can the truth—or the church, if you please—appear otherwise to him than according to his finite and partial interpretation of it?

"The question in respect to the absolute is, not whether it be *really* true and absolute or not, but to what extent does the normal affirmation go respecting it. In short, must not the same argument obtain against the church as against the Bible?

"It comes to the question of *authority*; and, if all intelligent authority resides in *the person* (and certainly each one must, from the nature of his constitution, be his own authority), then it follows that no authority whatever can reside in the state, the church, or in any mere institution or being *outside* of the person, whether that church or institution assume divinity or not.

"The authority is not in *the so-called fact*, but in *the person* to whom the so called fact is presented, and who is called upon to pass upon it.

"The Baconian system is false, because it makes the so-called fact the authority for itself; when plainly the very existence or comprehension of the so-called fact depends wholly on the *person* to whom it is presented.

"If each man is his own authority, according to the preceding remarks in this book (and that is conceded), then an authoritative church is impossible, because it presents an authority external to me, and then asks me to accept it. I admit that, if there is to be *any* church, it must be of divine origin. Even were the Bible inspired and infallible, I, being fallible, must interpret it fallibly, and therefore it must be the same *to me* for all intents and purposes as if it were a fallible book. The same argument applies to the church as a divine, authoritative institution—what is *outside* of the man—that is, the so-called fact is not an authority for him; but *he* is the authority for it; if not an absolute authority, at any rate, the only authority possible. The trouble arises from the Baconian philosophy, which has attempted to build up a system on *facts* so-called—without rejecting the *authority* for those facts—*as if the authority were in the fact itself.*"

The objection is, apparently, the objection we ourselves bring to the Protestant rule of faith, namely, the Bible in-

terpreted by private judgment. The Bible may be the word of God and infallible, but our interpretation of it, or our private judgment in interpreting it, is fallible, and therefore we have in it and with it only a fallible rule of faith. So the church may be a divine institution, and by the assistance of the Holy Ghost infallible; but her teaching is addressed to our intelligence, and must be passed upon by our private judgment, which is finite and fallible, therefore incompetent to pass upon the infinite and absolute. Hence, the Catholic rule no more gives infallible faith than does the Protestant rule. The principle of the objection the lawyer urges is that authority is intrinsic, not extrinsic; comes not from without, but from within, from the mind, and can never be greater than the mind itself; and as that is fallible, there is and can be no infallible authority for faith or belief. The objection is simply that an infallible authority for the mind in matters of faith is impossible, because the mind is not itself infallible, and therefore incapable of an infallible act or assent. This, we believe, is the objection in all its force.

The objection rests on two principles, neither of which is tenable: first, that the mind or intellect is universally fallible; and, second, that the authority in matters of faith is in the mind itself, not out of it, and, therefore, belief in any thing on extrinsic authority is impossible.

1. The intellect is not universal or infinite, and does not and cannot know all things; but it is never false in what it knows, and in its own sphere is infallible; that is, the intellect is not false or fallible in what it knows, for every one who knows knows that he knows. The judgment is false or fallible only when and where and so far as knowledge fails. Thus, St. Augustine says,* *Omnis qui fallitur, id quo fallitur, non intelligit.* The error is not in the intellect or intelligence, but in the ignorance or non-intelligence. Doubtless, we can and do err in our judgment of matters of which we are ignorant, of which we have only an imperfect knowledge, or when we undertake from what we do know to judge of things unknown, which is all that St. Thomas means when he says, *Falsitas est in intellectu.*† To deny this is to deny all human knowledge, and to assert universal scepticism, and then the lawyer could not assert his

* Lib. quæst. lxxxiii. qu. xxx.
† *Vide Sum. Theol.* q. xviii. a. 3 in c

objection, and would be obliged to doubt even that he doubts. If the intellect is universally fallible, we may as well close the discussion at once, for nothing can be settled. If it, in its own province, where it really does know, is infallible, then the only question is, whether, in passing judgment on the facts that establish the infallibility of the church, the intellect is obliged to go out of its own province, and judge of matters in regard to which it is confessedly incompetent and fallible?—a question we shall consider in its place.

2. We join issue with the lawer on his assertion that the authority is intrinsic in the mind itself, not extrinsic, either in the object or the authority that affirms it. He says in his note that "no authority whatever can reside in the state, the church, or any mere institution or being *outside* of the person, whether that church or institution assume divinity or not. The authority is not in the so-called *fact*, but in the *person* to whom the so-called fact is addressed, and who is called upon to pass upon it. The Baconian system is false, because it makes the so-called fact the authority for itself; when plainly the very *existence* or comprehension of it depends wholly on the person to whom it is addressed." So we do not know facts because they exist, but they exist because we know them or judge them to exist! But how can so-called facts be addressed to the person before they exist? The lawyer goes further than his argument against the church requires, and consequently proves, if any thing, too much, and therefore nothing. He makes not only all knowledge, but, unintentionally, we presume, all existences, depend on their being known, and therefore makes them purely subjective, and falls into Fichteism or pure egoism.

The lawyer's rule excludes not only faith, but knowledge of every sort and degree; for all knowledge is assent, and in the simplest fact of knowledge the intellectual assent is given on authority or evidence extrinsic to the person, though intrinsic in the object. Knowledge is either intuitive or discursive. In intuitive knowledge, the evidence or motive of the intellectual assent is intrinsic in the object, but extrinsic to the assenting mind. The immediate presence of the object motives or authorizes the assent, and the mind has simply the power or faculty of apprehending the object, or judging that it is, when presented; for, without the object affirming its presence to the mind, there can be no fact of knowledge or intellectual assent. In discursive

knowledge the authority or evidence, as in intuitive knowledge, is intrinsic in the object, but it is implicit, and can be placed in immediate relation with the intellectual faculty only by discursion—a process of reasoning or demonstration. But demonstration does not motive the assent; it only removes the *prohibentia*, or renders explicit what is implicit, for nothing can be asserted in the conclusion not already implicitly asserted in the premises; yet the assent is by virtue of the evidence or authority intrinsic in the object, as in intuition. All this means that we know objects because they are and are placed in relation with our cognitive faculty, not that they are because we know them, or because the mind places them, or makes them its object. If the lawyer's rule, that authority is not in the object but in the mind or person, were true, there could be no fact of knowledge, either intuitive or discursive, because the mind cannot know where there is nothing to be known.

Faith or belief agrees with knowledge in the respect that it is intellectual assent, but differs from it in that it is mediate assent, by an authority extrinsic, as authority or evidence, both to the object and to the person. The authority or evidence mediates between the mind and the fact or object, and brings them together in a manner somewhat analogous to that in which the middle term in the syllogism brings together the two extremes and unites them in the conclusion. If the evidence or the authority is adequate, the belief is reasonable and as certain as any conclusion of logic, or as the immediate assent of the mind in the fact of science or knowledge. We are as certain that there is such a city as Rome, though we have never seen it, that there was such a man as Julius Cæsar, George Washington, or Napoleon Bonaparte, as we are that the three angles of the triangle are equal to two right angles. It is on this principle the lawyer acts and must act in every case he has in court. He summons and examines witnesses, and relies on their testimony or evidence to obtain a conviction or an acquittal, except in a question of law; and then he relies on the judge or the court. If there is no authority *outside* the person, that is, no authority not in his own mind, why does he summon and examine and cross-examine witnesses or consult the judge? Why does he not work the facts and the law out of his own "inner consciousness," as do most modern historians the facts they give us for history? As a lawyer, our friend would soon find his principle, if he carried it into court, operating as an effectual estoppel to the practice of his profession.

The lawyer asks, "When the missionary carries the church to the heathen, does he not present it for their rational acceptance? And if so, does he not ask their finite judgment to pass upon and accept the infinite and absolute?" We are sure our friend would argue better than this if he had a case in court on which any thing of importance depended. When presented by his brother lawyer opposite with the decision of the court of appeals barring his case, would he attempt to judge or pass upon the judgment of the court before accepting it, or would he not be content with simply verifying the fact that the decision has been rendered by the court of appeals or court of last resort? We feel quite sure that, if he were on the defensive, and adduced the decision of the court of last resort barring the action, he would be very far from allowing his brother opposite to question the judgment. Nor would he as a lawyer dream of rejecting the decision because his own mind had not passed upon its merits; but, when once assured that the court had rendered it, he would accept it and submit to it as law, not on his own judgment, but on the authority of the court itself. All he would allow himself to do would be to verify the powers of the court, in order to ascertain if it is a court of competent jurisdiction, and to be sure that it had rendered the decision. The decision itself he would not, as a lawyer, think of examining any further than to ascertain its meaning. He would take it as final, and submit to it as law, whether for him or against him.

The objection fails to distinguish what, in the case supposed, the heathen are required to pass upon in order to act rationally in accepting the church. They would be required to pass on the sufficiency of the evidence of her divine institution and commission to teach and govern all men and nations in all things pertaining to the kingdom of God on earth. That evidence, called by theologians "motives of credibility," found complete, all the rest follows as a logical consequence, and there is no calling upon "the finite to pass upon the infinite and absolute," any more than there is upon the counsellor to pass upon the merits of the judgment of the court of final resort after being certified that the court had actually rendered it. All that one has to believe of the infinite and absolute, after he has established by evidence appropriate in the case the divine institution and commission of the church, he believes on the authority of the church herself.

The missionary, no doubt, presents the church to their rational acceptance, and must, therefore, present to them the motives of credibility, or the facts which accredit her as divinely instituted and commissioned, and these motives, these facts, must be addressed to their understanding, and be such as their reason can pass upon and accept or reject. But the question is, Supposing reason has passed upon these facts or the motives, and found them sufficient to accredit the church, as a teacher come from God, and commissioned or authorized by him to teach his word, is not the acceptance of that word on her authority as the word of God a "rational acceptance," and all the most rigid reason does or can demand?

The lawyer says no; and because all authority is in the person, and resides nowhere *outside* of him, and therefore it is necessary that reason should pass upon the contents of the word, that is, upon the doctrines and mysteries contained in the word the church professes to teach, which is impossible; for it requires the finite to pass upon the infinite and absolute, which exceeds its powers; therefore, faith is impossible. But this simply implies that no belief is admissible that is not science, and faith must be swallowed up in knowledge, and thus cease to be faith, before the human mind can rationally accept it.

The trouble with the lawyer's objection is that it assumes that faith is irrational, unless it is science or knowledge. His statement goes even further than this. He not only denies that there can be any rational belief on extrinsic authority, but that there is or can be any such authority, or that any state, church, or *being* has or can have any authority *outside* of us, or not derived from us. This, as far as words go, asserts that God himself has not authority over us, and his word has no authority for our reason or will, not dependent on us. We do not believe he means this, for he is not divested of the reason common to all men. He means, we presume, simply that no state, no church, not even God himself, has any authority on which we can rationally believe any thing which transcends the reach of our reason, or which is not intrinsically evident to our reason by its own light. But what is evident to us by the light of our own reason, we know, and not simply believe. As belief is always on extrinsic authority simply accredited to reason, this goes so far as to deny that any belief is or can be rational, and that any authority or any amount of testimony is sufficient to warrant it, which, as we have seen, is much further than the

lawyer can go in the practice of his profession, or any man in the ordinary business of life.

We do not think our legal friend has duly considered the reach of the principle he lays down. Even in the so-called positive sciences, the greater part of the matters accepted by the scientist are accepted on extrinsic authority, not on personal knowledge. No geologist has personally observed all or even the greater part of the facts he uses in the construction of his science; no geographer, however great a traveller he may have been, has visited and personally examined all parts of the globe which he describes; the botanist describes and classifies more plants, the zoölogist more forms of life, than he has personally seen, and the historian deals almost entirely with facts of which he has no personal knowledge. Eliminate from the sciences what the scientist has not observed for himself, but taken on the reported observation of others, and from the garniture of every mind what it believes or takes on extrinsic authority, not on its personal knowledge, and there would be very little left to distinguish the most learned and highly educated man from the untutored savage. In all the affairs of life, we are obliged to rely on extrinsic authority, on evidence neither in the subject nor in the object, on the observations and testimony of others, and sometimes on the observations and accumulated testimony of ages, especially in wise and prudent statesmanship; and if we were suddenly deprived of this authority, evidence, or testimony, and reduced to our own personal knowledge, intuitive or discursive; society would come to a standstill, and would soon fall below the level of the New Hollander, for even he inherits some lessons from the past, and associates with his observations some observations of others.

We presume our friend the lawyer means nothing of all this, and his mistake arises from not sharply distinguishing between the motives of credibility and the authority, on the one hand, and the authority and what it authorizes, on the other. The existence of God is a fact of science, though discursive, not intuitive, science. That God is, as the theologians say, *prima veritas in essendo, in cognoscendo, et in dicendo*, is also a truth of science—is a truth we not simply believe, but know or may know, for it can be proved with certainty by natural reason prior to faith. God is truth; it is impossible for him to lie, since he is *prima veritas in dicendo*, the primal truth in speaking, and can nei-

ther deceive nor be deceived, for he is *prima veritas in cognoscendo*, or the principle of all truth in knowing.

This granted, the word of God must be true, infallibly true. So far we can go by science or certain knowledge. Now, suppose the lawyer to have full proof that it really is God's word that is announced to him, would he not be bound to believe it true, nay, could he in the exercise of his reason help believing it true, prior to and independent of any consideration of its contents, or what it is that God says? God can neither deceive nor be deceived, therefore his word must be true, and cannot possibly be false. God's word is the highest and most conclusive evidence conceivable of the truth of what is asserted in his word, and, if the truth, then reasonable, for nothing is more reasonable than truth or unreasonable than falsehood. It would, therefore, be as unnecessary as irreverent and impertinent to examine God's word to see if what he asserts is reasonable before yielding it our assent. We know beforehand that it is true, or else God could not affirm it, and that whatever conflicts with it is false and unreasonable; and the lawyer himself will admit, we presume, that the highest possible reason for believing is God's word, in case we have it. Let us consider so much settled.

The next step is the proof or certainty that what is alleged to be the word of God really is his word. His word is his revelation. Suppose, then, that he made his revelation, and deposited it with the apostles whom he commanded to go forth and teach it to all men and nations. The apostles would, on this supposition, be competent and credible witnesses to the fact that God made and deposited his revelation with them. Suppose, further, that the apostles transmitted it to their successors, or, rather, that the church is the identical apostolic body, continued without any interruption or break down to our time, the church would then be a competent and credible witness to the fact of revelation and to what is revealed. Being the eye-witness of the facts which proved our Lord a teacher come from God and authorized to speak in his name, and the depositary of the revelation, her testimony is conclusive. She saw with her own eyes the facts, she knows what has been deposited with her, and the commission she received, and therefore her testimony or evidence cannot be gainsaid. She is the living and contemporary witness, and every way credible, as we have shown in the article *The Church accredits Herself*.

The infallibility follows necessarily from her commission from God to teach all men and nations. This commission from God commands all men and nations in his name to believe and obey what she teaches as his word. If she could err in teaching, then all men and nations might be required by God himself to believe error or falsehood, which is impossible, since God is truth, and can neither deceive nor be deceived. The divine commission to the church or apostolic body to teach carries with it the divine pledge of infallibility.

Now, supposing the church to be what she claims to be, reason itself requires us to accept and obey as the word of God whatever she teaches as his word, since his word is true, and the highest possible evidence of truth. Nothing is or can be more reasonable than to believe the word of God, or to believe God on his word. Equally reasonable with it is it to believe that what the apostolic church declares to be his word, really is so, if she is instituted and commissioned by God to keep, guard, teach, interpret, declare, and define it. The only point, then, to be proved is the divine institution and commission, both of which, if the apostolic body, she is herself the authority for asserting, as the supreme court is the authority for asserting its own legal constitution, power, and jurisdiction. This leaves, then, only a single point to be proved, namely, the historical identity of the body calling itself the Catholic Church with the apostolic body with whom the revelation was deposited.

We need not now go into the historical proofs of the identity of the Catholic Church with the apostolic body, for that is easily done, and has been done over and over again; besides, it lies on the very face of history, and Pius IX., the Pontiff now gloriously reigning, is as easily and as certainly proved to be the successor of Peter as Ulysses S. Grant is proved to be the successor in the presidency of the United States of George Washington, the schism of Jefferson Davis to the contrary notwithstanding. Moreover, if the lawyer doubts, as we presume he does not, the identity, we hold ourselves ready to adduce the proofs whenever he calls for them. Assuming, then, the case to be as stated, we demand what, in the whole process of acceptance of the faith the missionary proposes to the heathen, is irrational, or not satisfactory, to the fullest demands of reason? In fact, the points to be proved are exceedingly few, and those not above the reach of private judgment, or difficult. The au-

thority of our Lord as a teacher come from God was proved by miracles. These miracles the church witnessed and testifies to as facts, and so far her testimony is unimpeachable. Their supernatural and miraculous character we can ourselves judge of. Whether they prove the divine authority of Jesus or not, is also a matter of which we are competent to judge. His divine authority proved, his divinity, and all the mysteries of his person can be rationally accepted on his word, and what his word was, the church who received it is competent to declare. There really, then, is nothing to be proved which the church herself does not either prove or supply the means of proving in order to render belief in what she claims to be, and in what she teaches, as rational or reasonable as belief in any well-ascertained fact in natural science. The motives of credibility which she brings with her and presents to the understanding of all men who hear her accredit her as the divinely appointed depositary and teacher of the revelation God has made to men, and all the rest follows of itself, as in the syllogism the conclusion follows from the premises.

The lawyer does not admit it, and rejects the whole, because he rejects all belief on extrinsic authority. But is not this because he mistakes the meaning of the word *authority* as used by theologians and philosophers? We have generally found that the men who object to belief on authority understand by authority an order or command addressed to the will, without including any thing to convince the reason or to motive the assent of the understanding. This is not precisely the theological sense of the term. The theologians understand by authority in matters of faith authority *for* believing as well as an order *to* believe. It is the reason which authorizes the belief, and is therefore primarily authority for the intellect, and furnishes it an ample reason to believe.

Authority addressed simply to the will ordering it to believe, and giving the intellect no reason for believing, can produce no rational belief, and induce no belief at all, and this we presume is what, and all, our legal friend means. Taking authority in his sense, we entirely agree with him, except a command from God is always a reason for the intellect as well as an order to the will, since God is *prima veritas*, and can command only what is true, reasonable, just, and right. His command is his word, and an order from him to the will is *ipso facto* a reason for the under-

standing, since no higher evidence of truth than his word is possible. With this reserve, the lawyer is right in his objection to belief on authority, as he understands it, for there is no belief where there is no intellectual conviction. But he is mistaken in supposing that theologians mean only authority in his sense, authority commanding the will, and giving no reason to the understanding: they mean primarily by authority in matters of faith or reason authority for believing, and commanding it only through conviction to believe, which it must do if convinced.

The authority, then, which we assert, is the reason for believing; it is the *medius terminus* that unites the credible object and the creditive subject, and renders the belief possible and an intellectual act, and so far assimilates it to knowledge. Belief without authority is belief without any ground or reason for believing, and is irrational, unfounded, mere credulity, as when one believes a rumor for which there is no authority. When the authority is worthy of credit, the belief is warranted, and when it is infallible, the belief is infallible. In believing what the church teaches us is the word of God, we have infallible authority for our belief, and cannot be deceived, be mistaken, or err. This is all so plain, and so fully in accord with the demands of reason, that we are forced to explain the repugnance so many people manifest to believing on authority, by supposing that they understand by authority simply an order of a master to believe, without accompanying it with any thing to convince the understanding, thus making the act of faith an act not of faith at all, but of mere blind obedience. This is all wrong. Faith as an intellectual act cannot be blind any more than is the act of knowledge, and must have a reason that convinces the understanding. Hence, the church does not censure unbelief in those who know not the authority or reason there is for belief, and, if at all, it is only for their neglect to avail themselves with due diligence of the means of arriving at belief within their reach.

The authority or command of God is indeed the highest reason the mind can have for believing any thing, and it is therefore that unbelief in those who have his command or authority becomes sinful, because it implies a contempt of God, a contempt of truth, and practically says to him who made us, from whom we hold all that we have, and who is truth itself, "We *will* not take your word; we do not care what you say; we are the masters of our own thoughts, and

will think and believe as we please." This is not only irreverent and disobedient, indicating a wholly indefensible pride and self-will, but denies the very principle asserted by unbelievers in justification of their refusal to believe at the order or command of authority, namely, that it is not in one's power to believe or disbelieve at will, nor as one wills.

These explanations suffice, we think, to show that private judgment or individual reason is not required by the Catholic to judge "the infinite and absolute," or to pass upon any matter that lies out of the province of natural reason, and exceeds its competence or finite capacity. It is required to pass only upon the motives of credibility, or the facts that prove the church is a divine institution, commissioned to teach all men and nations through all time the divine revelation which she has received, and of these we are able by our own light to judge. The authority to teach established, all the rest follows logically and necessarily, as we have just said, as in the syllogism the conclusion follows from the premises. The authority being addressed to the intellect as well as to the will, and a sufficient reason for believing as well as obeying, the lawyer's principal objection is disposed of, and the acceptance of the faith is shown to be a rational acceptance.

But, conceding the infallibility of the church, since her teaching must be received by a fallible understanding, why is belief on the authority of the church less fallible than belief on the authority of an infallible book, interpreted by the same fallible understanding? You say to Protestants: The Bible may be infallible, but your understanding of it is fallible, and therefore even with it you have no infallible rule of faith. Why may not the Protestant retort: Be it that the church is infallible, you have only your fallible private judgment by which to interpret her teachings, and, therefore, with your infallible church have only a fallible faith?

More words are usually required to answer an objection than are required to state it. We do not assert or concede the fallibility of reason, intellect, or private judgment in matters which come within its own province or competence. Revelation presupposes reason, and therefore that man is capable of receiving it; consequently of certainly knowing and correctly understanding it, within the limits of his finite reason. We do not build faith on scepticism, or the in-

capacity of reason to know any thing with certainty. Reason is the preamble to faith, and is competent to receive and understand truly, infallibly, if you will, clear and distinct propositions in their plain and obvious sense when presented to it in words spoken or in words written. If it were not so, all writing and all teaching, all books and all sermons, would be useless. So far the Protestant rule and the Catholic are the same, with this difference only, that, if we happen to mistake the sense of the church, she is ever present to correct the error and to set us right, while the Protestant rule can give no further explanation, nor add a word to correct the misapprehension. The teachings of the church need to be understood, but not ordinarily to be interpreted; and, even when they do have to be interpreted, she is present to interpret them, and declare infallibly the sense in which they are to be understood. But the Bible, from beginning to end, must be interpreted before it can be understood, and, while private judgment or reason may be competent to understand it when it is interpreted or explained, it is yet only a fallible interpreter, and incompetent to explain to the understanding its real sense.

The church interprets and explains herself; there are books, also, that carry their own explanation with them, and so need no interpretation or further explanation; but manifestly the Bible is not such a book. It is inspired; it is true; it is infallible; and is, as St. Paul says of all Scripture, divinely inspired, "profitable to teach, to reprove, to correct, to instruct in justice, that the man of God may be perfect, furnished to every good word and work" (2 Tim. iii. 16, 17); but it bears on its face the evidence that it was addressed to men who were already believers, and already instructed, partially at least, in the truths it teaches or enforces, and that it was not written to teach the faith to such as had no knowledge of it, but to correct errors, to present more fully the faith on certain points, to point out the duties it enjoins, to exhort to repentance and reform, and to hold up as motives, on the one hand, the fearful judgment of God upon those who disregard his goodness, or despise his mercy, or abuse his long-suffering, and, on the other, the exceeding riches of divine love, and the great reward prepared in heaven for those that believe, love, and obey him. No one can read it without perceiving that it neither is nor professes to be the original medium of the Christian revelation to man, but from first to last supposes a revelation pre-

viously made, the true religion to have been already taught, and instructions in it already received. This is true of the Old Testament, and more especially true of the New Testament; and we know historically, and nobody denies it, that the faith was preached and believed, and particular churches, congregations of believers, were gathered and organized, before a word of the New Testament was written.

The Protestant, reduced to the sacred text, even supposing he has the genuine and authentic text, and his private judgment, would be reduced to the condition of the lawyer who should undertake to explain the statutes of any one of our states, in total ignorance of the Common Law, or without the least reference to it or the decisions of the common-law courts. Now and then a statute, perhaps, would explain itself, but in most cases he would be wholly at a loss as to the real meaning of the legislature. Our wise law-reformers in this state, a few years since, seeing and feeling the fact, attempted to codify the laws so as to supersede the demand for any knowledge of the Common Law to understand them, and the ablest jurists in the state find them a puzzle, or nearly inexplicable, and our best lawyers are uncertain how to bring an action under the new Code of Procedure. The Protestant needs, in order to interpret the sacred text, a knowledge of revelation which can neither be obtained from the text itself without interpretation nor supplied by private judgment. Hence it is that we find Protestants unable to agree among themselves as to what is or is not the meaning of the sacred text, and varying in their views all the way down from the highest Puseyite who accepts all Catholic doctrine, "the damnatory clauses excepted," to the lowest Unitarian, who holds that our Lord was simply a man, the son of Joseph and Mary, and rejects the church, the mysteries of the Trinity and Incarnation, original sin, redemption, the expiatory sacrifice, regeneration, supernatural grace, the resurrection of the dead, the last judgment, the everlasting punishment of the incorrigible in hell, and the reward of the just in any heaven above the Elysian Fields of the Greeks and Romans or the happy hunting-grounds of the poor Indian. Protestants are able to agree among themselves only so far as they follow Catholic tradition and agree with the church. The Protestant needs to know the Christian faith in order to interpret the sacred text and ascertain it from the Bible, and this he cannot know by his own private judgment or develop from his

own "inner consciousness," since it lies in the supernatural order, and is above the reach of his natural faculties. It is clear, then, that in the Bible interpreted by private judgment he has and can have only a fallible authority.

It is not because the Holy Scriptures do not contain, explicitly or implicitly, the whole faith, that, interpreted by private judgment, they give only a fallible rule of faith, but because, to find the faith in its unity and integrity in them, we must know it *aliunde* and beforehand. This difficulty is completely obviated by the Catholic rule. The church has in Catholic tradition, which she preserves intact by time or change, the whole revelation, whether written or unwritten, and in this tradition she has the key to the real sense of the sacred Scriptures, and is able to interpret them infallibly. Tradition, authenticated by the church as the witness and depositary of it, supplies the knowledge necessary to the understanding of the sacred text. Read in the light of tradition, what is implicit in the text becomes explicit, what is merely referred to as wholly known becomes expressly and clearly stated, and we are able to understand the written word, because tradition interprets it for us, without any demand for a knowledge or judgment on our part that exceeds our natural powers. Our judgment is no longer private judgment, because we have in tradition a catholic rule by which to judge, and our judgment has not to pass on any thing above the province of reason.

The objection we make to the Protestant rule, it must be obvious now to our friend, cannot be retorted. The Protestant must interpret the sacred Scriptures by his private judgment, which he cannot do without passing upon questions which transcend its reach. The Catholic exercises, of course, his judgment in accepting the infallible teachings of the church, but he is not required to pass upon any question above the reach of his understanding, or upon which, by his natural reason, he cannot judge infallibly, or with the certainty of actual and complete knowledge. He is not required to pass upon the truth of what the church teaches, for that follows from her divine institution and commission to teach the revelation God has made previously established. He has simply to pass upon the question, What is it she teaches, or presents clearly and distinctly to his understanding to be believed? and, in passing upon that question, his judgment has not to judge of any thing beyond or above reason, and, therefore, is not fallible any more than in any other act of knowledge.

There is another advantage the Catholic rule has over the Protestant rule. In this world of perpetual change, and with the restless and ever-busy activity of the human mind, new questions are constantly coming up and in need of being answered, and so answered as to save the unity and integrity of the faith. The Bible having once spoken is henceforth silent; it can say nothing more, and make no further explanations of the faith to meet these new questions, and tell us explicitly what the word requires or forbids us to believe with regard to them. Hence, Protestants never know how to meet them. Then new or further explanations and decisions are constantly needed, and will be needed to the end of time. Even the explanations and decisions of the church, amply sufficient when made, not seldom, through the subtlety and activity of error, and its unceasing efforts to evade or obscure the truth, become insufficient, and need themselves to be further explained, and applied so as to strike in the head the new forms of old error and deprive them of their last subterfuge. These explanations and decisions so necessary, and which can be infallibly made only by a living and ever-present infallible authority, can be only fallibly made, if at all, on the Protestant rule. Even the creed of the church, though unalterable, needs from time to time not development, but new and further explanations, to meet and condemn the new forms of error that spring up, and to preserve the faith unimpaired and inviolate. How is this to be done infallibly by a book written two thousand years ago and private judgment, or without the divine and infallible authority of the church?

These remarks and explanations, we think, fully answer the objections of our legal friend to the belief on authority, and prove that no attempted retort of the Protestant on the Catholic can be sustained, or entertained even, for a moment. We have thus vindicated for him the Catholic rule, and proved that faith on that rule is possible, practicable, and rational, is reasonable obedience, and by no means a blind submission, as he probably supposes. What more can he ask of us? He cannot repeat his charge and say we have not met the question, for we have met it, at least so far as we understand it, and under more forms than he probably dreamed of in urging it. The question is one that meets the inquirer at the threshold, and he can hardly suppose that we could have accepted the church ourselves without meeting it, considering it at length, and disposing of it.

Yet there is one thing more wanting. The method of proof we have pointed out, however sure and however faithfully followed, does not suffice to make one a Catholic, or to give one true Catholic and divine faith, or faith as a theological virtue; it only removes the obstacles in the way of the intellect in believing, and yields only what theologians call human faith—*fides humana*—which really advances one not a single step towards the kingdom of God, or living union with Christ. A man may be thoroughly convinced, so far as his reason goes, of the whole Catholic faith, and yet, perhaps, never become a Catholic. To be a Catholic, one must have supernatural faith, and be elevated by the grace of God in baptism to the supernatural order of life in Christ. Reason can construct no bridge over which one can pass from the natural to the supernatural; the bridge must be constructed by grace. Faith, the beginning of the Christian life, is the gift of God. The method we have pointed out or the Catholic rule produces the conviction of the truth of the church and what she teaches, and shows it to be one's duty to seek, if he has it not, the grace that inclines the will, illumines the understanding, and regenerates the soul.

The way in which to seek and find this grace is pointed out by our Lord (Matt. vii. 7): "Ask, and you shall receive; seek, and you shall find; knock, and it shall be opened unto you." The way is the way of prayer. The grace of prayer, *gratia orationis*, is given unto all men. All men can pray. He who prays for it shall receive the grace to seek, and he who seeks shall find, and receive the grace to knock at the door of the church, which will be opened to him, and he have the grace to enter into the regeneration, and live the life of Christ. We have no hope for the conversion of any one who does not pray; and we have more confidence in the humble prayers of simple, sincere, and fervent Catholic souls for the conversion of those without than in all the reasonings in the world, however conclusive they may be. When once grace has touched the heart, all clouds vanish of themselves, all darkness is dissipated, all obstacles disappear, we know not how, and to believe is the easiest and simplest thing in the world. To believe is difficult only when one persists in relying on one's own strength and will accept no aid from above. Let those, then, who have faith pray unceasingly for those who have it not.

ARTICLE II.*

[From Brownson's Quarterly Review for October, 1874.]

This is a letter dated New York, Nov. 16, 1871, and addressed to Rev. Father Hecker containing observations on his *Aspirations of Nature*, and a formal reply to an article in answer to his note to the editor of the *Catholic World*, which appeared in that *Magazine*, for November of the same year. The matter would not specially concern the *Review* but for the fact that its editor wrote the article to which it professes to be a reply, and the *Catholic World*, by stating in a recent number that fact, washes its hands of its responsibility and turns the matter over to us.

With the portion of the Letter that relates to the *Aspirations of Nature*, we have nothing to do. We reviewed that book at length when it was first published, and stated frankly, but in no unfriendly spirit, our objections to some of its views. We believe that nature, though not totally depraved or corrupted, has suffered more by the fall, or Adam's sin, than does its very reverend author, or than does the able and learned author of the *Problems of the Age*. We are of the school of neither, and we are indisposed to say that God could have created man from the beginning such as he is now born, unless we are permitted to add, *seclusa ratione peccati et pœnæ*. Man lost by the fall, or original sin, not only the original justice in which he was constituted, but the integrity of his nature, became captive to Satan, darkened in his understanding, weakened in his will, and disordered in his appetites and passions. We do not believe that man has ever actually existed in what is called *status naturæ purœ*, for we hold that he was originally created and intended for a supernatural destiny, and is never found in a state of pure nature, but always in a state either above it, on the plane of a supernatural destiny, or in a state below it, on the plane, not of a natural beatitude, but of a subnatural or infernal destiny. In other words, he is always either on the plane of heaven, or on the declivity to hell. He has no natural destiny, but his destiny is either

* *De l'Autorité ou de la Philosophie du personalisme. Lettre adressée au* Rev. Pére I. T. Hecker, *suivie d'un appendice sur la Souverainete du Peuple.* Par Dwight H. Olmstead. Traduction approuvée par l'auteur. Genève: 1874.

above nature, or by his own fault below it. Never could man by his natural development or his natural virtues, or without the re-birth by grace and supernatural assistance, attain to the end for which God created him. The alleged natural beatitude, or beatitude in the natural order, we regard as purely imaginary.

But we leave to Father Hecker, should he recover his health, to defend his own publications against Mr. Olmstead or any other opponent, or to the community he has had the most prominent share in founding. Father Hecker sent us Mr. Olmstead's reply to his note addressed to that gentleman, with the request that we should answer it. We did so as best we could, in the *Catholic World* for November, 1871. The chief part of the Letter addressed to Father Hecker now before us is taken up with a rejoinder to our answer, but on the supposition that it was written by Father Hecker himself, as the writer only develops and reasserts the doctrine of his note.

We supposed in writing this reply we were replying to a lawyer, who would at least understand and appreciate ordinary legal reasoning; but from his letter we find him, apparently, as far from being a lawyer as he is from being a philosopher. We misapprehended the real nature of his objection, or rather, though we did not actually misapprehend it, we could not bring ourselves to believe that he meant it. He denies, in his note to Father Hecker, not only that there can be any rational belief on any intrinsic authority, but that there is or can be any such authority, or that any state, church, or *being* has or can have any authority outside of one's own personality, or not derived from it. "This," we said, "as far as words go, asserts that God himself has no authority over us, and his word has no authority for our reason or will not dependent on us. We do not believe he means this, for he is not divested of the reason common to all men." Yet, we learn from his letter that this is what, and precisely what, he does mean.

We learn that he holds that the authority is in the subject, the *Ego*, and he avowedly defends what he calls the *Philosophy of Personalism*. Authority, he maintains, resides neither in the object nor in the fact, neither in the court nor in the church, and in nothing extrinsic to the personality, and "*is the supreme sanction of the conscient and subjective Ego.*" It is entirely personal. "The Ego, being subjective and non-objective or phenomenal, fulfils the im-

portant condition of a criterion, that is to say, is not open to criticism, as it would be if phenomenal. If I have rejected the positive philosophy of Sir William Hamilton and his school, the philosophy based on the hypothesis of the reality of the objective world, on the other hand I am forced to oppose the Cartesian philosophy in its relations with the subjective man. I maintain that the *Cogito, ergo sum*, is not axiomatic, for the *being* is not a necessary conclusion of the Ego, that is to say, the *person* is superior to its being, or its conditions, among which may be counted the mental operations, and perhaps distinguished from it. If I say *I am*, *I* or the person is superior to *am*:" pp. 19, 20.

This is enough for our purpose, and proves that the writer we replied to did and does mean the absurdity we charitably supposed he did not. It would seem that there is no absurdity so great but some learned man may be found to maintain it. "The *I* or the person is superior to the *am* or being, and distinguishable from it:"—prescind am or being, and what and where is the I or personality? Is not all that is real or subsistent in the Ego, in being? What says *I*, if you add not *am* or exist? Then, again, does this transcendentalist gone to seed hold that *am*, in the assertion I am, is a mental operation, that is to say, the *Ego* creates its own being or existence, that what is not can operate?

We gather from the passage cited that the author denies the reality of the objective world, and holds that the objective is phenomenal, consequently, that the *Ego*, or personality, is the only real or substantive existence or being in the universe. The *Ego* and its phenomena, or itself, its personality and its modes, affections, and operations are all that are or exist. It is alone, and beside it there is none other! This makes the *Ego* God, and the author might say as Bronson Alcott said to us one day in a transcendental paroxysm, "I am God, I am greater than God. God is one of my ideas, I contain God. Greater is the container than the contained. Therefore I am greater than God." The author says the *Ego* is superior to being, which, since God is being, the one only being, is only saying in other words, "I am greater than God." No wonder, then, that he recognizes no authority but that of his own personality, or the subjective *Ego*; for that is the only being, existence, or reality, included in his philosophy. Well may he say authority is

not in the fact nor in the object, nor in the mind even, but in the *Ego* alone, for the *Ego*, the personality, is alone real, all else is phenomenal, mere appearance, unsubstantial: in asserting which he out-Fichtes Fichte. Great philosopher is Mr. Dwight H. Olmstead, and he does well to reject, as we find he does, the philosophy of Common-Sense.

But here is a little difficulty in the way of this author's theory. The *Ego* is neither intelligent nor intelligible in itself or himself—the gender is doubtful. How then does it come to the recognition of itself, or is it able to assert itself, since there is nothing else in existence? If the *Ego* knows any thing, it knows that it can know itself only as reflected or mirrored in the object, or that which is not itself. Perhaps there are depths in the fact of knowledge which our philosopher has not sounded, and which transcend his *Ego*, or personality. It so happens that the *Ego* is not an independent being existing and acting in and by itself alone, but is a dependent existence, and capable of living and acting only in concurrence with a life and activity which are not its own, and which are independent of it. The author's theory, which denies all reality but his own personality, denies the possibility of all intellectual activity, and makes all faith, all knowledge, all thought even, impossible. Such a theory needs no refutation, for it refutes, by contradicting, itself. This is not undeserving the author's consideration, as well as the consideration of all those philosophers who represent thought as the sole product of the subject, as do all exclusive psychologists, without the initial and concurrent activity of the object. Absurd as Mr. Olmstead's doctrine is, it is only the last word of the psychologism in which the great body of our students of philosophy are indoctrinated, in the majority of modern schools and colleges, and which the *Catholic World* in a panic would have us accept and hold as the authorized or traditional Catholic philosophy, only not so boldly stated.

The author, from the fact that the matter of knowledge is presented to the intellect, and is passed upon by our reason, concludes that the authority that sanctions is subjective, our own personality. But this is to make the *Ego* its own yardstick, by which he measures truth or the matter presented. But this is simply to deny that man has any measure or criterion of judgment; and, as what is false is not intelligible, it is only denying, in other words, that man or the *Ego* has any faculty of intelligence, or *vis cognoscendi*, either with

or without the object. The author is mistaken in saying that it is the *Ego* or personality, distinguished, as he distinguishes it, from the mind or reason that is appealed to either in the fact of faith or the fact of science. The *Ego*, distinguished from the mind or reason, is unintelligent, inconscient, capable of no conscient act. Reason or mind, again, is not purely personal. It is not ours nor yours, but is common to us both,—common to all men, above every one's personality, and therefore it is that every one is required to yield to reason. Mr. Olmstead is doing his best,—which is very little, we admit,—to make us yield to his reason or reasons; but even he would recoil from the outrage of attempting to impose upon us his *Ego* or personality, or pretending that it is authority for us.

The author knows much less of philosophy than he fancies. He has confounded in his own mind the authority which authorizes or motives the mental assent, whether the assent of faith or the assent of knowledge, with the mind that assents, the yardstick with the clerk who measures you by it a piece of tape or of cloth. In fact, he goes further, and confounds not only the measure, but the measured with the measurer, and makes all three identical and indistinguishable, as we told his friends, the transcendentalists, some thirty years ago. We saw clearly enough that he did so in his note to Father Hecker, to which we replied, but we did not choose to regard him as meaning it. Yet the letter before us leaves us no option in the case, for he not only reiterates his assertion, but undertakes to prove it. But we need not go on, for he adds nothing more.

We have nothing to say to the author's appendix on the sovereignty of the people, which is a hard nut for him to crack with his doctrine of pure individualism or personalism. The author is too narrow-minded and too superficial, indeed, too ignorant of the questions he raises, to be refuted. He is, however, a brilliant example of the deplorable effects of a vicious philosophical training. The difficulty in his case is not so much in teaching him the truth, as it is in unteaching him the errors imbibed from his vicious education. His mind is worse than a blank.

We see in the absurdities into which a man like Mr. Olmstead, possibly a very respectable lawer, falls the moment he steps out of his profession, the importance of giving our educated young men a sound and thorough philosophical education. Out of our Catholic schools and colleges,

with non-Catholics there is absolutely nothing worthy of the name of philosophy learned or taught. Even in our Catholic schools and colleges the philosophy taught needs revising, or at least needs to be more thoroughly taught. Our professors, with rare individual exceptions, fall into a routine, and do little or nothing to quicken the minds of their pupils, or to create in them a love for philosophical studies. Then, what can a boy seventeen or eighteen years of age learn of philosophy in the course of one year, and half of that year taken up with other studies? The blame is not all with the college; it is chiefly with the parents who will not leave their sons long enough in college to go through the necessary curriculum. Our young men graduate with only a slight smattering of philosophy, not enough to serve any purpose in active life, and that little, save a few technicalities, they lose in a year or two. Parents must correct their error, and leave their sons in the college long enough to complete a respectable course of study. If they are too poor for that, let them keep their sons, especially the dunces, at home. Better to have no learning, than to be only half-learned. Let our colleges also lengthen their course of studies, and give, at least, two years more to philosophy.

We say "especially the dunces." It is a great mistake on the part of parents to suppose that all children are capable of profiting by a liberal education, or to seek to bring up all their sons to learning, as it is said. Some boys, if brought up to the pursuit, may make excellent farmers, mechanics, or traders, who would only be spoiled for life, if sent to college and devoted to literature and science. Our colleges should refuse matriculation to boys of only ordinary abilities, and who give no promise of superior aptitude for learning. Give to all the education or instruction, as far as they are capable of receiving it, needed for the ordinary avocations of life; but reserve your colleges and universities for those only who give promise of superior abilities, of parts more than ordinarily bright, and, in training them, follow, and allow them to follow, their natural aptitude. Some boys have a natural genius for languages, some for mathematics, some for history, some for antiquarian research, some for polite literature, some for the physical sciences, and a few for philosophy and theology. Do not thwart their natural genius, or attempt to train them for pursuits or professions for which they have no natural aptitude, and in which it is pretty sure beforehand that they can never rise above re-

spectable mediocrity. All college-bred men are not competent to teach philosophy.

We, as Catholics, want a grand Catholic University into which the students who have taken their degree of A. B., and have distinguished themselves in our existing colleges, may enter and continue under able professors their studies of predilection for four, six, or eight years longer. Then we may have scholars, learned men, scientific men, philosophers, theologians, not unworthy of the name, to the great service of the church and benefit to American society, especially to our Catholic community. We must bear in mind that scholars are trained for the public good, not for their private advantage; and that the thorough education of the few is of vastly more importance to the community than the half education of the many, which is all the many in any nation or country do or can receive.

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